A

REMONSTRANCE

AGAINST

Lord Viſcount BOLINGBROKE's

PHILOSOPHICAL RELIGION.

ADDRESSED TO

DAVID MALLET, Eſq; the Publiſher.

By G. ANDERSON.

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To the READER.

OF all that hath been publiſhed againſt Lord Viſcount BOLINGBROKE's *philoſophical works, I have only ſeen two letters. How this hath come to paſs, you are not much concerned to know. To excuſe my ignorance, I can plead, that it was not owing to want of reſpect to thoſe who have appeared before me, but to my ſituation. By this incident, if you have not the fulleſt, you have my freeſt thoughts on the ſubject; and you ſhould have had them ſooner, had health permitted. If this my* Remonſtrance *is done to your ſatisfaction, and if it becomes a means of reclaiming one ſingle perſon from irreligion, or of confirming another in the perſuaſion that he is an accountable ſubject of GOD's moral government, I ſhall think my labour well beſtowed. Farewel.*

CONTENTS.

Sect.		Page
I.	*The Introduction* - - -	1
II.	*Of logics, metaphyſics, and abſtraction*	14
III.	*Of eternal truth and righteouſneſs*	34
IV.	*Of morality, and the moral law*	88
V.	*The antiquity and univerſality an evidence of religion* - - -	116
VI.	*The idea of GOD a demonſtration of his exiſtence* - - -	142
VII.	*Of GOD's moral attributes* -	146
VIII.	*Of our imitation of GOD's moral attributes* - - -	214
IX.	*Of GOD's preſerving providence*	237
X.	*Of GOD's governing providence*	259
XI.	*Of the immateriality of the human ſoul*	293
XII.	*Of the immortality of the human ſoul, and a future ſtate* - -	366

A

REMONSTRANCE

AGAINST

Lord Viſcount BOLINGBROKE's

PHILOSOPHICAL RELIGION.

SECTION I.

The INTRODUCTION.

To DAVID MALLET, Eſq;

SIR,

THERE is no man alive ſo much concerned in the late Lord Viſcount BOLINGBROKE's philoſophical works as you, who have publiſhed them; for what end, you yourſelf beſt know. To publiſh the works of another, gives no great honour to one who hath publiſhed his own; and adds no more to your reputation as a writer, than that of a bookſeller like-

wiſe. By your merit in the literary way, you have acquired the military honour of an Eſquire, or *Armiger*. I am pleaſed to hear that your worldly circumſtances put you above doing a mean and dirty thing for bread. By occupation you are neither bookſeller nor printer, who, as ſuch, are not ſuppoſed to know more about books than what they bring in the way of trade and buſineſs; but you can judge of their intrinſic value, and of their tendency to promote the virtue and happineſs, or the vices and miſery of mankind.

THE book, as it hath your *Imprimatur*, muſt likewiſe have your approbation. I have your word, and I have no more than your word, that it is the late Lord BOLINGBROKE's. Did I give credit to reports, I might be induced to believe, that neither he was, nor you are, the author of what you have publiſhed in his name; but a certain Reverend D. D. Such a one hath been accuſed publicly for reviſing and correcting the work at leaſt. The evidence muſt be ſtrong to make me believe, that any clergyman hath had a hand in a work ſo inconſiſtent with his profeſſion and ſacred character. Infidel and Atheiſtical authors are apt to inſinuate, that divines do not believe what they teach. Thus your author or you have dealt with Dr CLARKE's memory. To ſay one thing, and to think another, is the common practice of all thoſe who profeſs Chriſtianity, and at the ſame time diſbelieve it. I have not heard that you have renounced

nounced your baptiſm as yet; but I think you have renounced ſincerity, by publiſhing to the world, that the religion you profeſs to believe is fable and fiction.

WERE I vain enough to think it more honourable to deal with the Noble philoſopher, than with one of no greater dignity than that of an Eſquire, I ſhould have ſuppreſſed your name, and only mentioned you as a bookſeller: but as I chuſe to ſpeak to the living, rather than ſpeak of the dead, I ſhall charge you with all the blunders, all the errors, all the immorality, all the impiety, and all the Atheiſm, that I find in Lord BOLINGBROKE's philoſophical works, and for all the diſſervice they are calculated to do mankind. I ſhall therefore have occaſion to aſk you many queſtions, and to make my demands on you to reconcile many apparent contradictions, and to clear and juſtify yourſelf from the imputation of impiety and Atheiſm.

AND I aſk you, how you came to publiſh a book ſo large, and ſo confuſedly written, without an *index rerum?* Was it becauſe you was not able, or not willing to take the pains to do it? or was it rather to bewilder your readers with the diſorder of the work? I do not complain of this neglect without a reaſon: for I have found it more laborious and difficult to collect and join the ſcattered paſſages, than to refute the reaſonings contained in them. If you find it for your

purpoſe to make another edition, do, give the public an *index verborum*, if you are not capable to give an *index rerum*.

And I aſk you again, what hath provoked, or rather enraged you, to give very hard words, when ſofter might have ſerved your purpoſe? The expreſſions uſed in ſpeaking of the fundamental articles of Chriſtianity, are ſo rude and ſhocking, that I cannot but judge the publication premature. The fall of man is called profane nonſenſe; and the doctrine of redemption, founded on this *fall*, is repreſented in a worſe light. And that none of his hard words may be forgotten, he concludes his philoſophical works thus. " * If God muſt appear to be the fountain " of all good, and the ſole author of all the happi- " neſs we can hope for; can any man now preſume " to ſay, that the God of Moses, or the God of " Paul, is this amiable Being? The God of the " firſt is partial, unjuſt, and cruel; delights in blood, " commands aſſaſſinations, maſſacres, and even ex- " terminations of people. The God of the ſecond " elects ſome of his creatures to ſalvation, and pre- " deſtinates others to damnation, even in the womb " of their mothers. The precept of the Gospel, " *Thou ſhalt love the* Lord *thy* God *with all thy* " *heart*, cannot refer to ſuch a God as either of " theſe." Such language might do, were the Bible

* Vol. v. p. 217.

abolished

aboliſhed by law as an impious book: but whilſt it is reckoned the ſacred record of ſalvation, and eſteemed ſuch by Chriſtians of all denominations, it is intolerably rude and offenſive. We uſe to ſpeak with decency, of things and perſons which thoſe we addreſs put a value upon, though we ourſelves may differ from them in opinion. To do otherwiſe, is to inſult them out of conceit with their own, rather than to reaſon them into our way of thinking.

SURELY, you and he muſt have imagined, by treating the religious part of mankind with ſo much contempt, that inſtead of the GOSPEL of our LORD JESUS CHRIST, the time was at hand when the GOSPEL of ST JOHN Lord BOLINGBROKE ſhould be the eſtabliſhed religion of the nation, and 'Squire MALLET have the honour of his Evangeliſt; and without ſuch hopes, however ſo vain, ye were both idly employed at leaſt. There may be ſome who are ready to impute his Lordſhip's antichriſtian and irreligious labours, to a ſpirit of reſentment and revenge againſt his native country, for the neglect of his great abilities in the adminiſtration of national affairs. Nor is this conjecture altogether without ground; for it is perfectly agreeable to his angry and abuſive ſtyle. Solemn nonſenſe, cant, and jargon, he ſays, is part of the clergy's trade; and that artificial theology, that is, ſuch theology as the clergy teach, is blaſphemy and Atheiſm.

THE

THE character or diſtemper of *madneſs* he beſtows ſo freely and frequently on thoſe that differ from him, that I have not yet determined whether I ſhall publiſh theſe few ſheets with my name or without it. For I do not like to be called a madman by name, by any one of rank and reputation, and particularly by DAVID MALLET, Eſq; and I preſume to put him in mind, that ſuch maltreatment is actionable. I do not like to be outdone in any thing I take in hand: and though I think myſelf capable enough to return hard words, perhaps with harder; yet, becauſe I acknowledge your ſuperior talent in ſcurrility and ruſticity, I ſhall endeavour to avoid returning you the abuſe you put upon as good men, and men as learned, and as good reaſoners, as you, or your Noble Lord.

THE weakneſs of infidel and atheiſtical writings, is no reaſon for neglecting them, as unworthy of regard or anſwer; for the weakeſt of them is ſtrong enough for thoſe that are ſtrongly inclined to embrace their principles; of which there are but too many. A religious author hath ſaid above a hundred years ago, " * When I conſider thoſe ſcandals which the " looſeneſs of our times have offered, even to the re- " ligious, and the bold and horrid pride and pre-

* Seth Ward's philoſophical eſſay, ſecond edition, *anno* 1655, *init.*

" ſumption

" ſumption of Atheiſts and Epicures, which, by pro-
" fane and confident aſſerting the uncertainty of all
" things, (undervaluing the abilities of our nature,
" to raiſe an opinion of their own perſonal excel-
" lencies), have laboured to introduce into the world
" a general Atheiſm, or at leaſt a doubtful ſcepticiſm
" in matters of religion; and when we conſider the
" nature of our minds, which are upon ill ſuggeſtions
" apt ſtill to receive ill impreſſions, (thoſe things be-
" ing of like operations with calumny, which, if it
" be confidently and boldly charged, will be ſure to
" leave ſome ſcar behind it); when we obſerve this
" uſe and inclination in ourſelves, which is in things
" where we have not a belief of what is ſpoken, and
" do not give perfect credit to an accuſation, yet to
" admit of a ſuſpicion that things may be as they
" are ſpoken; and although our contrary belief do
" keep us from a full aſſenting to the thing in que-
" ſtion, yet if it happen that the thing concern our-
" ſelves, and we have uſed to croſs our opinions
" and our belief in the way of practice; ſuch is the
" perverſeneſs of our hearts, that in ſome caſes they
" will make uſe of the belief of others, (eſpecially
" if they have the reputation of knowing men), to
" oppoſe againſt their own belief, and to interpoſe
" betwixt the laſhes of their conſciences and them-
" ſelves." Few, if any, have attacked Chriſtianity more plainly and boldly, and with greater contempt and indignation, than his Lordſhip and you; and no writer

writer hath more directly endeavoured to root out of the minds of men, a belief of the capital articles of natural religion. Read these works who will, they can never be the better for their pains; and the danger of being worse is truly great. The free and frequent rejecting GOD's moral attributes, the immateriality and the natural immortality of the soul, a particular providence, and a future state of rewards and punishments, takes off the horror which such impious assertions are apt to raise in the minds of the truly religious; and weakens the influence which the principles of natural religion, and the Christian revelation, commonly have on the minds of those who believe both. And certainly it is a disagreeable task (I speak from experience) for one who fears GOD, and believes the GOSPEL, to employ his thoughts, and to let them follow you through shocking expressions into horrid and blasphemous conclusions. For this I see no remedy: for men cannot be hindered or persuaded not to read what others are allowed, commended, and, perhaps, rewarded for publishing.

IT is said by Lord BOLINGBROKE and by you, That "* religion is necessary to strengthen, and "that it contributes to the support of government, "cannot be denied without contradicting reason and "experience both." This is something in favour of

* Vol. iii. p. 45.

religion,

religion, but not ſaid with preciſion. For if it is *neceſſary*, it muſt be more than a *contribution* to the ſupport of civil government; and if it does but contribute, it cannot be ſaid to be neceſſary. But in as far as it contributes, in ſo far at leaſt ſhould civil governors ſuſtain and ſupport it. His Lordſhip, more to the purpoſe, ſays, " * To make government effectual to all " the good purpoſes of it, there *muſt* be a religion; " this religion muſt be national; and this national re- " ligion muſt be maintained in reputation and reve- " rence." Theſe, in my apprehenſion, are the firſt principles of good policy.

THEREFORE you either act the part of a bad politician, or the religion nationally eſtabliſhed in this country muſt be very abſurd, and even hurtful to ſociety; becauſe you attempt, and deliberately endeavour to expoſe it to contempt and ridicule; and notwithſtanding you ſay, in Lord BOLINGBROKE's name, " † Suppoſing Chriſtianity," the religion profeſſed and believed in Great Britain, " to have been purely an " human invention, it had been the moſt amiable and " the moſt uſeful invention that was ever impoſed " on mankind for their good." As a Theiſt, a philoſopher, and a politician, you have no reaſon to find fault with it, if it is really your opinion, that " ‖ Chriſtianity is founded on the univerſal law of

* Vol. iii. p. 330.
† Vol. iii. p. 24.
‖ Vol. ii. p. 287.

" nature. I will not ſay, that Chriſtianity is a repu-
" blication of it; but I will ſay, that the GOSPEL
" teaches the great and fundamental principles of this
" law, (univerſal benevolence), recommends the pre-
" cepts of it, and commands the obſervation of them
" in particular inſtances occaſionally, always ſuppoſes
" them, always inforces them, and makes the law
" of right reaſon a law, in every poſſible definition
" of the word, beyond all cavil." And you further add, " * The ſyſtem of religion which CHRIST pu-
" bliſhed, and his evangeliſts recorded, is a complete
" ſyſtem to all the purpoſes of true religion, natural
" and revealed. It contains all the duties of the
" former, it inforces them by aſſerting the divine
" miſſion of the publiſher, who proved his aſſertion
" at the ſame time by his miracles." And again, " † Chriſtianity, as the Saviour publiſhed it," (Chriſtians uſually ſay *our* Saviour), " was full and ſuf-
" ficient for all the purpoſes of it. Simplicity and
" plainneſs ſhewed that it was deſigned to be the re-
" ligion of mankind, and manifeſted likewiſe the di-
" vinity of its original." Another good thing which you ſay of the national religion eſtabliſhed in our native country is, That " ‖ the Chriſtian law is no-
" thing elſe than the law of nature inforced by a new
" revelation, every friend to Chriſtianity admits, and

* Vol. ii. p. 329.
† Vol. iii. p. 96.
‖ Vol. iv. p. 26.

" the

" the worſt of its enemies dares not deny, though he " denies the reality of the revelation."

I ſhould thank you for all theſe fine ſayings, if I thought they were fairly and honeſtly ſaid; though in the laſt you blunder. For no man that denies the reality of the Chriſtian revelation, will ſay that Chriſtianity is inforced with a new revelation; unleſs you can make a *new* revelation to be *no* revelation. However, you are honeſt enough, as far as deſigned contradictions are conſiſtent with honeſty, to decline calling CHRIST your SAVIOUR. Of the New Teſtament, you only admit the GOSPELS to be genuine; and at the ſame time you pay but little regard to theſe records, or to the author of them. Without ſtopping here, and entering into an examination of particulars, I only inſtance, as want of reſpect to the founder of the Chriſtian faith, theſe three things. 1. Your accuſation of our SAVIOUR's judgment, given in the caſe of divorce. 2. Your denying a particular and univerſal providence, which our Lord extends to ſparrows. And, 3. Your denying a life of future rewards and puniſhments, though CHRIST teaches it plainly, fully, and expreſsly. Abſtracting from the divine authority of the teacher, it can be made appear, that the firſt is a deciſion according to the rules of morality, and that the two laſt are articles of natural religion. And as my deſign is to correct your many miſtakes in morality and natural religion, I

ſhall find a place to juſtify Chriſtianity in theſe three inſtances.

WITHOUT going further, I think it proper to inform the reader, that my deſign is to give a diſtinct defence of natural religion, without meddling with, or mixing your objections againſt revelation, with thoſe which you bring againſt natural religion. You ſay, in name of your Noble philoſopher, or rather he ſays without your aſſiſtance, " * That the Theiſt is " a much more formidable enemy to the Atheiſt than " the divine. The former takes all the real advan- " tages againſt a common adverſary, which the latter " has it in his power to take; but he gives none a- " gainſt himſelf, as the latter is forced to do. When " the divine writes or diſputes on any ſubject relative " to his profeſſion, he is always imbarraſſed by his " theological ſyſtem. Whether his mind be ſo or not, " his tongue and his pen cannot be otherwiſe. A " Theiſt is under no reſtraint of this kind." True; provided he does not pretend to be a Chriſtian, a Jew, or Mahometan, or to believe any revealed religion. " He may ſpeak the truth, ſuch as it appears to him; " when the divine, though it appears the ſame, muſt " be ſilent. The Theiſt may be ſilent, by regards " of prudence; when the divine is obliged to ſpeak, " by the obligation of his profeſſion, and to main- " tain what he cannot defend, as well as what he

* Vol. v. p. 315.

" can."

" can." He knew his advantage, and ſo he takes it, by a medley of objections againſt natural and revealed religion, in ſuch an immethodical way, that it becomes very difficult to follow him foot by foot; and this, perhaps, as I ſaid before, on purpoſe to bewilder his readers with the diſorder of the work, and without doubt to cramp and ſtraiten, or to ſtop the divine in his examination of it. Did he not dread the divine as an adverſary, he would have afforded him a plainer and fairer field for debate. To ſay that divines are obliged, right or wrong, to maintain the doctrine they are by their profeſſion obliged to teach, and to ſpeak and write againſt their own real ſentiments, is invidious, and injurious to men of as much probity and piety as you or your deceaſed Lord. However, in reaſoning on philoſophy, and morality, and natural religion, they do not expect to be believed on the credit of their character, but on the ſtrength of their arguments. And though I have made many remarks on what you ſay againſt the Chriſtian revelation, I will trouble you with none of them, until I have finiſhed what I have to ſay upon the ſubject of natural religion. For my own part, I can aſſure my readers, that, without breach of any profeſſional obligation, I might have been ſilent, if I had pleaſed; and that no temporal advantage, either in poſſeſſion or expectation, hath induced me to make my thoughts public. It is my concern in the ſubject that hath made me imbark in the debate.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Of logics, metaphyſics, and abſtraction.

YOUR Noble philoſopher and you, in order to accompliſh your undertaking of a new ſyſtem of philoſophical irreligion, bar two of the ſciences from your philoſophical works, *logics* and *metaphyſics*. Like gallant diſputants, ye give the challenge, and chuſe the weapons. A neceſſary precaution it is, for one that pretends to know nothing of God, and the duty he owes him, than by *ſenſe and experience*. To go no further, if he is not ſure of victory, he is ſure of ſafety. For it is impoſſible to diſprove what he aſſerts of his own ſenſations and experience; but it muſt give ſurpriſe to every man beſides, that one pretending to be a philoſopher ſhould reject ſuch uſeful and neceſſary parts of it. Logic is the organ of ſcience. It is the art of thinking, and the rule of reaſoning. It is the ſquare and plumb-line by which our thoughts are adjuſted, and by which rational ſyſtems are erected with order and ſymmetry. There is a natural logic with which every rational creature is adorned; ſome in a higher, and others in a lower degree. Artificial logic is the improvement and cultivation of it; and to reject the one, is to reject the other. You may as well ſay, that arithmetic, or the art of meaſuring numerical quantity, is an uſeleſs or a hurtful

ful part of mathematics. There never was an able mathematician that deſpiſed, or did not underſtand the rules of arithmetic; nor was there ever a good architect who rejected the uſe of the line and ſquare. But Lord BOLINGBROKE is the firſt who ſeriouſly rejected the rule of reaſoning, as a hindrance to reaſoning. Had he taken pains to have ſquared his looſe thoughts and precarious concluſions according to the rules of logic, his volumes of philoſophy would have wanted fewer of my corrections; and inſtead of five, leſs than one would have contained the whole that deſerves reading, either for the good or the ill to be found in them; and he had ſaved himſelf the trouble of writing, and the public of reading, a great deal of ſmall talk. Your Lord approves of the ſuccinct and preciſe reaſonings of the ſcholaſtics, though he doth not approve, nor do I, of the many curious and needleſs queſtions which they decide. And this preciſion in their writings is as much owing to their obſervation of logical rules, as to their greatneſs of genius. An author univerſally learned, and much acuter than Lord BOLINGBROKE, is very far from judging logic to be an impertinent part of philoſophy *.

* Patet ex omnibus logicæ nominibus et definitionibus, eam eſſe diſciplinam qua ingenium humanum efficitur idoneum ad probandum bonis rationibus quod probandum incumbit; ad detegendam falſitatem rationum quibus aliquid probatur; ad reſpondendum difficultatibus in veritatem propoſitis; uno verbo, ad ſuperanda impedimenta quæ veritatem nobis obtegunt. *Oeuvres diverſes de M. Bayle, vol.* iv. *p.* 206.

THERE

THERE hath lately happened a deplorable inſtance of ignorance of logic. An Honourable author * undertook to prove, that motion is eſſential to matter, by this argument: A ſtone moves downwards, and I do not know why it doth not move upwards; therefore it moves itſelf. For this is concluding againſt the premiſſes, and extracting knowledge from his own ignorance. I wiſh he had publiſhed his eſſay apart, and not diſgraced an uſeful work with his blundering ſpeculation. He gravely regrets the misfortune of mathematicians for their want of logic. But to learn that part of philoſophy, they muſt have a better maſter than Lord KAIMS. Did he make good his point, it would be a ſupplemental improvement of the Epicurean and Lucretian Atheiſm. But he knows beſt whether he intended it as ſuch or not.

IF it lies out of the way of a philoſopher to reject logic, it is ſtill more out of his way to deſpiſe metaphyſics. It treats of *being* in general, of eſſentials and accidentals; and were it properly taught, it would become a ſyſtem of axioms, definitions, and diſtinctions. It treats of the very firſt principles of knowledge and ratiocination, and the *criteria* of the truth or falſity of all propoſitions, in ethics, phyſics, mathematics, and natural religion. For inſtance, to prove that two contradictory propoſitions cannot be both true,

* The Honourable Henry Home, Eſq; a Senator of the college of juſtice.

it

it is ſufficient to ſubſume, that it is impoſſible a thing can be and not be at the ſame time. And this axiom is the foundation of all truth. And notwithſtanding DESCARTES's *Cogito, ergo ſum,* it ſtands, as it did long before, the *principium abſolute primum,* and is the laſt reſort in reaſoning. And to ſhew, that this principle was not precariouſly eſtabliſhed as the very firſt, that of DESCARTES is no more than a repetition of the ſame thing. For *I think,* is to be reſolved into *I am thinking*; and then his *ergo* is juſt, *I am,* therefore *I am.* I am able to convict you and your Noble author, of uſing metaphyſical arguments; and that metaphyſics, which ye deſpiſe, are your *ne plus ultra.* He ſays, and you publiſh, "* I cannot ſoar ſo high as PLATO "and CUDWORTH; I will not ſink ſo low as PRO-"TAGORAS and other ancients, as HOBBES and "other moderns. The former amuſe, inſtead of in-"ſtructing me; and if I underſtand the latter, I on-"ly underſtand them to know, that they impoſe on "themſelves, and would impoſe on me the groſſeſt "abſurdities. Strange extremes! When CUDWORTH "holds up the metaphyſical glaſs to my eye, I ſee "ſomething, I know not what; ſomething that glit-"ters at an unmeaſurable diſtance from me. When "HOBBES holds it up, he changes the poſition, and "I ſee ſomething monſtrous at the very end of the "glaſs." The glaſs which CUDWORTH uſes, is finiſhed and ſufficient: it ſhews truth at a very great,

* Vol. iii. p. 349.

but not at an unmeaſurable diſtance; it ſhews it in ſplendor; not in glittering and corruſcation, but in a ſure and ſettled light. For ſuch truths are fixed and immutable, as eternity itſelf. If ſuch truths appear to the author in a dazzling view, it muſt be owing to a defect in his intellectual eye; or to a voluntary, and therefore a greater imperfection: *None ſo blind as thoſe that will not ſee.* That ſome men are capable of ſome ſciences, who are incapable of others, is but common. His Lordſhip might have made wonderful progreſs in hiſtory and politics, in law and languages, and even in the uſeful ſcience of medicine, and the noble ſcience of mathematics; while at the ſame time he had no turn of mind for metaphyſics. On the other hand, a good metaphyſician may make but a ſorry mathematician. This was M. BAYLE's caſe, who complained, that fractions, or broken numbers, would break his head. Another reaſon may be given for calling metaphyſics a delirium of the underſtanding. In many inſtances metaphyſics are againſt his Lordſhip. And when reaſon is againſt a man obſtinate and *opiniatre*, he will be againſt reaſon. Metaphyſics are by Lord VERULAM ſaid to be the trunk of all ſciences, on which all others depend as branches. In this the firſt and univerſal principles of reaſon are to be found; and it is to theſe principles that the laſt appeal is made in all matters of ratiocination. When authors not much inclined to favour religion, find, that abſtract reaſoning doth not favour them, they deſpiſe

ſpiſe the ſcience from which ſuch reaſoning proceeds. DAVID HUME, Eſq; a gentleman of ſuch largeneſs of thought, that it takes in all religion as a very little thing, to ſhew his contempt of that as eſtabliſhed in England, calls the thirty-nine articles the metaphyſics of the church of England *. As I gave you M. BAYLE's judgment of logic, I here preſent you, on the margin, with his opinion of metaphyſics †. And I take the liberty to aſſume, that no man deſpiſes metaphyſics, but he who doth not, or pretends not to underſtand them; and he who does not underſtand them, can never write on any ſubject, and eſpecially natural religion and morality, correctly, and with preciſion.

AFTER talking abſtractly about abſtraction, his Lordſhip ſays ‖, "This abſtraction becomes as great "a myſtery as any myſtery that religion holds out to

* Hiſtory, p. 389.

† Quamvis metaphyſica verſetur circa res ab omni connexione materiali ſegregatas, ideoque poſtulet ſummam mentis attentionem, ingratam tamen pleriſque mortalibus, qui rebus tantum delectantur; nulla tamen eſt diſciplina dignior, in qua perdiſcenda ardentiſſimo ſtudio laboretur. Hæc enim eſt quæ generales differentias perſcrutatur; quæ attributa eſſentialia a ceteris adjunctis rerum diſcernere docet; quæ ideas, ſeu principia æternæ veritatis ſuppeditat, quibus omnes veritates aliarum ſcientiarum probentur; et ad quæ, tanquam ad regulam, expandentur omnia diſciplinarum principia peculiaria. Igitur neceſſaria in primis eſt illis, qui non leviter imbui philoſophia, ſed ad intimos uſque receſſus illius pervenire cupiunt. *Oeuvres diverſes, vol.* iv. *p.* 464.

‖ Vol. iii. p. 368.

" us." To have writ with preciſion, he ſhould have ſaid *revealed* religion. For he cannot mean myſteries in natural religion; for he rejects all the articles of it which he doth not comprehend. Natural religion is the reſult of reaſon; and no man will reaſon out to himſelf what he doth not underſtand. I do acknowledge, that the doctrine of *abſtraction* and *univerſals* hath been the ſubject of much debate from PLATO down to this day. *Ens rationis*, or mental entity, and *univerſale a parte rei*, or real univerſals exiſting independently of thought, have exerciſed his Lordſhip's underſtanding, and his readers patience, until he is forced to confeſs, that he underſtands nothing of the matter. His underſtanding, ſuch as it was, and yours, ſuch as it is, might ſerve him, and may ſerve you; but it cannot therefore be impoſed on others for the ſtandard of reaſon.

PLATO is accuſed of holding ideas really exiſtent out of the divine and human mind; but he is accuſed unjuſtly. There is no ſuch thing to be found in his writings, nor once mentioned by his moſt famous diſciples and followers. On the other hand, paſſages are brought to prove that he was of the contrary opinion, and with which I do not think it proper to ſtop myſelf and the reader from matters much more material. This miſtake of PLATO's doctrine gave riſe to a ſect called the *Nominales*; who maintained, that there were no *univerſals* but in the mind which framed

framed them. Between them and the *Peripatetics* aroſe another debate. Theſe maintained, that there were univerſals *in rerum natura*, of which theſe mental univerſals were but ideas and repreſentations. From the *Nominales*, with whom the Stoics joined, the debate deſcended to the ſcholaſtics. The diſciples and followers of SCOTUS, or John of Dunce, your countryman, were of opinion, that the nature of a circle, or of a man, was not made, or in itſelf univerſal, but only diſcovered to be ſuch by the mind. On the other hand, the followers of AQUINAS held, that all nature was contracted and ſingular; and that without the operation of the mind theſe natures muſt remain ſingular and contracted, to the excluſion of all *univerſals*. Hence aroſe a diſtinction between metaphyſical and logical univerſals *. The *univerſale metaphyſicum* was ſaid by them to be that by which we contemplate the eſſential parts of a ſubject, ſeparately, diſtinctly, and by degrees. For as the eye cannot ſee at once the four ſides of a ſquare pillar, no more can the mind take in at one view every property of the thing to be conſidered and examined. Let a circle be the ſubject of thought. The firſt thing which offers itſelf to conſideration, is its extenſion, next the figure, and then what ſort of figure it is; ſuch as, it

* Of which they gave this definition, *Unum aptum ineſſe, vel prædicari de multis univoce et diviſim.* The word *ineſſe* makes *univerſale metaphyſicum*, and the word *prædicari* makes *univerſale logicum.*

hath

hath a centre, from which all lines drawn to the circumference are equal. And ſuch *univerſals* are the eſſential ingredients of all ſciences. *Univerſale logicum* is that whereby the mind, cutting off all differences, takes into one idea the ſimilitude, ſpecifical or generical, as the unity of many; *v. g.* the humanity of SOCRATES and PLATO, and the triangularity of all triangles of whatever particular ſort.

THESE are the things which become a myſtery to your Noble and voluminous philoſopher; and not only a myſtery, but a moſt important myſtery; and a more important myſtery to all writers in matters of ſpeculation than he imagines. Without theſe things nothing can be ſaid with exactneſs and preciſion. "* For my own part," ſaith he, "I know that I am "not able to make ſuch abſtractions. I am utterly "unable to elevate my mind from particulars to ge-"nerals." But he is able to contradict himſelf, and ſay †, "Out of a variety of ideas, the mind ſelects "ſuch as have a more remote, and ſuch as have a "more immediate reſemblance, and claſſes them ac-"cordingly. From this operation of the mind ariſes "the ſchool-diſtinction of *genus* and *ſpecies*, and we "ſpeak according to it intelligibly on this occaſion." And why not on all occaſions? The terms are explained, and you underſtand them, though you call them the gibberiſh of the ſchools. So far as you un-

* Vol. iii. p. 365. † Vol. iii. p. 354. 355.

derſtand

derſtand what is meant by *genus*, and what is meant by *ſpecies*, you and the ſcholaſtics are agreed. But whoever agrees with you in what follows, I can never agree with you; becauſe I do not like words that have no meaning You ſay, "As the mind is unable "by abſtraction to comprehend any one *ſpecies*, and "much more any one *genus*, under one general idea, "it comprehends one under one general name; and "we ſay, for inſtance, *man* and *animal*." Thus, when he ſays, or you ſay, *man* or *animal*, you underſtand yourſelf, and I underſtand you; but you mean nothing, becauſe you have not an idea that correſponds with the word. The deſign of language is to make one's ſelf to be underſtood; and when you and I underſtand the word *animal*, it is not a mere word to either of us, or a word without ſignification, as *blicktri*. Abſtraction cuts off differences, and conſiders the animal nature, without the difference that is between a *man* and a *horſe*; and by not allowing this difference to enter into the idea or conception, the conception always leaves a remainder; and this remainder is intelligibly called *animality*, and ſo underſtood by ſuch as never learned either logics or metaphyſics. But his Lordſhip's ſubtraction is ſo ſublimated, that it leaves nothing. *Abſtraction* or *ſubtraction*, is to take away one part, and to leave another; it is therefore a diviſion; and a diviſion which takes away the whole, is a mathematical as well as a metaphyſical abſurdity. And Lord BOLINGBROKE, when he

ſays

ſays *man* or *animal*, means nothing; and only uſes ſound inſtead of ſenſe. But for this he offers a ſort of reaſon: "Some make themſelves and others be-"lieve, that, from a multitude of particular ideas, "one general nature and eſſence is abſtracted, which "is all of them, and none of them." I anſwer, When many individuals agree in ſome attributes and properties, as SOCRATES and PLATO agree in the attribute of rational; and as it is ſaid, *univoce et diviſim*, that SOCRATES is reaſonable, and PLATO is reaſonable in the ſame way, without equivocation; this agreement of rationality, or of their being reaſonable, is the abſtracted idea, and that by which all thoſe animals who are adorned with this faculty of reaſon, are claſſed in the ſame ſpecies. Whatever Mr MALLET may think of me, I am not aſhamed to acknowledge, that I profeſs to underſtand logics and metaphyſics, abſtraction and univerſals, and think the knowledge of them a neceſſary qualification of a philoſophical writer; and I know both formally and fundamentally, and what *univerſale* is *a parte mentis*, and what it is *a parte rei*: and I know that all ſpecifical and generical ideas are not the ideas of all men, nor of all animals, nor the ideas of any particular man or animal; but the ideas of thoſe powers, faculties, and attributes, which are common to men, and to all animals as ſuch.

THEREFORE it is not by making one individual man

man repreſent all mankind that we generalize: for one man cannot repreſent all men, but in that very thing which is common to all. If from the *ſpecies* we aſcend to the *genus*, it will appear evidently, that a horſe cannot repreſent a man, nor a man repreſent a horſe, but in thoſe things in which they agree, *viz.* in life, ſenſe, and locomotive power. That my reader may the better underſtand my meaning, I ſhall give it in the words of Dr KING's annotator *. "We are at firſt only acquainted with particular ſub- "ſtances; but obſerving, that as theſe particular ſub- "ſtances differ in ſome reſpects, ſo they agree in o- "thers, (*i. e.* though this particular excites in the "mind ſome ſimple idea or ideas which another does "not, yet there are ſome ideas excited equally from "both); we take no notice of thoſe ideas in which "two or more particular ſubſtances differ, but ſelect "thoſe only in which they agree, and connect them "into one complex idea, by giving them one name: "which complex idea becomes general; that is, it "may *be affirmed of, or belong to, or is found in more "than one particular ſubſtance* †: and the ſeveral "ſubſtances of which it is affirmed, &c. are ſaid to "be contained under that general idea. General "ideas of ſubſtances therefore are not made, by add- "ing all or any of the particular ideas found in each

* The ingenious Edmond Law, *Origin of evil, p.* 5. 6.

† This is *unum aptum inesse, vel prædicari de multis.*

" ſubſtance;—— but only by leaving out all thoſe " ideas in which two or more ſubſtances differ, and " retaining thoſe in which they agree. And from ge- " neral ideas thus made, we proceed to more general " ones in the ſame way, *viz.* by always dropping the " particulars in which they differ. Thus, by obſer- " ving a certain agreement among individuals, and o- " mitting the reſt, we form an idea of the ſeveral " *ſpecies.* In like manner, leaving out the diſtin- " guiſhing marks of each *ſpecies*, we get an idea of " the *genus* *. The method of making or forming " general ideas, by making the idea of an individual " ſtand for the whole ſpecies, muſt be wrong on this " very account, *viz.* according to the forementioned " ſcheme, univerſals, ſuch as *animal* or *matter*, would " have a real exiſtence in the ſame preciſe manner in " which we conſider them; whereas, under ſuch pre- " ciſions, they are confeſſedly the creatures of our " own minds, and exiſt no where elſe. We have no- " thing at all to do therefore with *analogy* in forming " abſtract ideas: we can never come at them, by ſub- " ſtituting one particular for the reſt; but, on the " contrary, we muſt conceive them, by removing all " particularities of exiſtence, and leaving only what " remains in common."

The idea we have of *man* or *animal*, as *ſpecifical* or *generical*, are not the ideas of all men, and all ani-

* Origin of evil, p. 8.

mals,

mals, (for as it is only in the mind, it hath no objective *ideatum)*; but the ideas of the agreement of powers, faculties, and attributes, common to the *ſpecies* of mankind, and to the *genus* of animals: and this idea is called *general*, becauſe it is to be found in, or may be ſaid of many; and is ſignified, and very well underſtood by the abſtract words, *animality* and *humanity*.

Lord Bolingbroke with a good deal of aſſurance ſays, we cannot abſtract *whiteneſs* from all things white. This is not a matter of ſpeculation, but of experience. And if he cannot, it doth not follow that no man can. And if you 'Squire Mallet cannot abſtract whiteneſs from all white things, it muſt be owing to your ignorance of *implicit* and *negative*, and *explicit* and *affirmative* abſtraction. By the one we join the *abſtract* and *concrete* together, as *white*; which then ceaſes to be a mere abſtraction: and in this ſenſe neither you nor I can abſtract *whiteneſs* from all white things. By the other we exclude out of the idea or conception all white things, or every particular thing that is white. This I can, and you may eaſily do, and you do it daily. A colour of any kind may be conſidered without its being inherent either in cloth, or in ſtone, or timber; for as an accident, it is ſeparable from the ſubject.

I am afraid I have wearied the reader with the au-

thor's affected ignorance of the nature of abſtraction. I ſay *affected*; for every man is conſcious of a power of abſtracting. Though he ſays he is not able to elevate his mind from particulars to generals, yet he affirms, and that with reaſon, that, without generalizing, there can be no ratiocination.

Ex particulari non licet ſyllogizare.

His Lordſhip makes uſe of abſtract terms as freely and frequently as any modern writer does; ſuch as, *poſſibility*, *actuality*, *activity*, and *paſſivity*. After all his pains to introduce *ſenſe and experience* as the only ſtandard of knowledge, he hath theſe words: "* After ſaying ſo much about theſe abſtract ideas, "I muſt freely confeſs, that I ſcarce comprehend "what they are intended to be. Abſtraction is a "myſtery in philoſophy." He therefore hath no right to admit or to reject it, nor to uſe them, and far leſs to abuſe others for doing the ſame. I do pretend to underſtand abſtraction; and have therefore a better right to declare this operation of the mind, or the capacity of the human underſtanding to form general ideas, to be real, than he hath to call it metaphyſical jargon.

EVERY reader will not eaſily apprehend the Noble author's deſign of expunging abſtraction out of philoſophy. It is common to all that think, ſpeak, or

* Vol. iii. p. 368.

write;

write; for there is no reaſoning without it. How this comes to paſs, and for what purpoſe, is not eaſily imagined. But I have learned from Dr CUDWORTH, that Atheiſts have the ſame quarrel with innocent and harmleſs abſtraction. He ſays *, "Becauſe it is ge-"nerally conceived, that an error cannot be ſuffi-"ciently confuted without diſcovering the cauſe of the "miſtake; therefore Atheiſts will undertake to ſhew "the original of the doctrine of incorporeal ſub-"ſtances, and from what miſapprehenſion it ſprung; "as alſo to take occaſion from thence further to deny "a Deity. They ſay, that the original of this doc-"trine of incorporeal ſubſtances proceeded chiefly "from the abuſe of abſtract names, both of ſub-"ſtances, and alſo of accidents, when they are con-"ſidered alone without their ſubjects and ſubſtances. "——As there is ſome uſe of thoſe abſtract names, "ſo the abuſe of them hath alſo been very great. "Though the eſſence of this and that man is not any "thing without the man, nor an accident any thing "without its ſubſtance; yet men have been led into "a groſs miſtake by them, to imagine them realities "exiſting by themſelves." For which the ſcholaſtics are chiefly blamed. He quotes an author, then modern †, who ſays, "It is a great abuſe which ſome "metaphyſicians make of abſtract names, becauſe co-"gitation can be conſidered alone without the conſi-

* Intellectual ſyſtem, p. 67. edit. fol.

† Hobbes.

"deration

" deration of body, therefore to conclude, that it is " not the action and accident of that body which " thinks, but a ſubſtance by itſelf; and that it is " upon this account, when a man is dead and buried, " they ſay his ſoul (that is, his life) can walk ſepara- " ted from the body, and is ſeen by night amongſt " the graves." That abſtraction ſhould be blamed for ſuperſtition, is an accuſation too finely ſpun. And who would think, that the vulgar ever learned from the ſcholaſtics all their tales of fairies, apparitions, and hobgoblins, and particularly by peruſing their *quiddities*, *entities*, *eſſences*, *hæcceities?* But to this the Reverend and very learned author himſelf hath returned a ſatisfactory anſwer *: " The belief of " ghoſts and ſpirits incorporeal, and conſequently of " an incorporeal Deity, ſprung neither from any ridi- " culous miſtake of the abſtract names and natures " of mere accidents for ſubſtances, nor from the " ſcholaſtic eſſences ſaid to be eternal. As for the " latter, none of thoſe ſcholaſtics ever dreamed, that " there was any univerſal man, or univerſal horſe, ex- " iſting alone by itſelf, and ſeparate from all ſingulars; " nor that the abſtract metaphyſical eſſences of men, " after they were dead, ſubſiſted by themſelves, and " did walk up and down amongſt graves." The reader may peruſe the reſt of the anſwer. One can ſcarce forbear laughing, to hear men of common ſenſe blame metaphyſics and abſtraction for the ſuperſtition of the

* Intellectual ſyſtem, p. 835. 836. edit. fol.

vulgar.

vulgar. Thoſe men who have impudence enough to pretend to cenſure mankind for their folly and madneſs in believing religion, and to account for the antiquity and univerſality of the miſtake, ſhould not look upon their fellow-animals to be ſtupid enough to believe, that thoſe who never heard of PLATO or the ſcholaſtics, were induced by them to believe a God, and a life of rewards and puniſhments when this life is ended.

I cannot ſay that it is for this purpoſe, directly and immediately at leaſt, that Lord BOLINGBROKE hath attacked the doctrine of abſtraction; but he hath done it for a purpoſe bad enough. " * Who can help " ſmiling," ſaith he, " when he is told, that, by the " help of ſuch ideas, and of certain ſelf-evident " maxims, knowledge is a comprehenſion of things *a* " *priori?*——Strange effects of myſterious abſtrac- " tion! ſtrange foundations of eternal and immutable " morality! They might be rejected with contempt, " if they were abſurd only; but they are carried ſo " far, that they become profane, a ſort of metaphy- " ſical blaſphemy, and deſerve indignation." His Lordſhip ſays, " † We can take the properties of " things both phyſical and moral, into diſtinct conſi- " deration. This philoſophers have done, with ho- " nour to themſelves, and advantage to others. But

* Vol. iii. p. 368.

† Vol. v. p. 58.

" when

" when they have been long accuſtomed to ſuch " abſtract conſiderations, and have eſtabliſhed certain " mathematical and moral truths upon them, ſome " of theſe philoſophers aſſume, that theſe general " notions are natures, independent on God." Theſe notions can never become *natures*; nor can any philoſopher give being and exiſtence to notions, and turn his ideas into *ideata*. For this he blames logicians, metaphyſicians, and divines; and I have as good a right, and I hope to make it appear that I have a better right, to blame him for talking nonſenſe, on purpoſe to darken the firſt principles of knowledge, and to caſt a thick veil over the moral attributes of the ALMIGHTY, and to ſap the foundation of morality and the moral law. When his Lordſhip looked through Dr CUDWORTH's metaphyſical glaſs, he ſaw nothing ſo horrid as blaſphemy; he ſaw ſomething that glittered, though he knew not what; and, ſure, he did not ſee glittering blaſphemy. Metaphyſics are the ſame thing now that they were then; and why ſhould he charge them not only with abſurdity, but likewiſe with blaſphemy? The ſcience treats of being in general, and not of theology. If it is carried too far, it is by departing from the fundamental truths which it teaches. For this neither the ſcience, nor theſe truths are to be blamed. Be aſſured, 'Squire MALLET, that there is no more blaſphemy in metaphyſics than in mathematics. All things which this philoſopher doth not like, or that ſtand in the way of his ſyſtem, muſt be ſwept away with ſtrong and abuſive

uſive expreſſions; logics, metaphyſics, divinity, and even diſputation, becauſe it is fraudulent; fraudulent, not ſure, as managed by him; but by all that oppoſe him or differ from him: and all this to lay a new foundation of morality, not only in oppoſition, but in injurious contempt of all writers on the ſubject, except Mr POIRET, ſo far as I know. To charge the greateſt philoſophers and moraliſts with abſurdity, diſcovers more vanity than wiſdom, and more ruſticity than becomes a gentleman. But to treat them as profane blaſphemers, deſerves ſuch a return as cannot decently be given to the dead; and I have no mind to enter the liſts with his Eſquire the publiſher, on the art of debating in ill language.

HIS Lordſhip's doctrine is, That the will of GOD is to be learned from his works, and that there is no other way of knowing it. Any one who is diſpoſed to take repetition for reaſon, would find this theſis or poſition confirmed with forty arguments. And that he had nothing to ſay on the ſubject, but *ſo it is*, is to me evident, by his not beſtowing one ſingle page to ſhew the connection between the works and the will of GOD, as the rule of our behaviour, and a law which we are bound to obey. Now, what I have to ſay on this, and other following aſſertions contained in this Nobleman's philoſophical works, are, in my opinion, the greateſt and moſt important things that can come under human conſideration. QUOD FELIX FAUSTUMQUE SIT.

SECT. III.

Of eternal truth and righteouſneſs.

I BEGIN with the author's theſis or poſition, That *the will of* GOD, *as the rule of our behaviour, and a law which we are bound to obey, is to be learned only from his works.* And it deſerves the firſt place according to the rules of good order. For Atheiſts and Theiſts agree, that there is a natural and eſſential difference between *right* and *wrong*, *juſt* and *unjuſt*, moral *good* and moral *evil*. And how an Atheiſt can have ſuch a notion, I cannot underſtand: nor can Mr MALLET, if it is only by the works of GOD that morality is to be learned; for an Atheiſt neither believes a GOD, nor that the world is his work.

THIS new foundation of morality hath two faults at leaſt. *1ſt*, The works are not the only way of knowing the will of GOD; and, *2dly*, It is not the proper and immediate way. And I ſay, firſt, It is not the only way of finding out, and of laying a foundation for morality. For it is of his own ſhewing, "* That a moral obligation may ſubſiſt without a law, and a law may be ſuch as to create no moral obligation. When we ſpeak of moral obli-

* Vol. iii. p. 402. *ad marg.*

"gations,

" gations, either we mean nothing; or we mean that " we are tied, bound, and under an internal, that " is, a moral neceſſity, of conforming ourſelves to " thoſe rules which are expreſſed in the conſtitution " of our nature, and on the obſervation of which " the happineſs of our kind depends. Reaſon is in " this caſe the obliger. A rational creature is the " obliged, and he is ſo obliged as no law made by " mere will can of itſelf oblige." Here he muſt mean human laws, becauſe ſuch laws may enact immoral things. —— " This order is inverted in the " divine law of nature. The moral neceſſity of act- " ing agreeably to it, in order to ſecure the happi- " neſs which we are determined irreſiſtibly to de- " ſire, is a firſt conſideration, and is alone ſufficient " to create obligation. In diſcovering this law, we " are led to diſcover the legiſlator; and will is add- " ed to inveſt obligation with all the forms of law; " the will of that Being who conſtituted the obliga- " tion, when he made the human ſyſtem, and who, " by conſtituting the obligation, made and promul- " gated the law."

His Lordſhip talks here beyond metaphyſics, and beyond human underſtanding. A moral obligation without a law, is a law known independently of the works and the will of God. In this caſe then it is not by the works that we know the will of God. To make a law without a lawgiver, is what neither

you nor I can do. And therefore, poſterior to this known lawleſs law, *will* is added to inveſt the *obligation* with all the forms of law. I aſk, If before this inveſtment the obligation had the force of a law, or not? If it had the force of a law, it did not want any additional forms; and if it had not the force of a law, it was not a law; for a law without the force of a law is an abſurdity. In diſcovering this law, we are led to diſcover the legiſlator. The law, and the knowledge of it, are antecedent to the diſcovery of the will of GOD known by his works. There can be no law without a lawgiver; and yet the law is known before it diſcovers the lawgiver. The moral neceſſity of acting agreeably to the moral law, and the ſecurity of our own happineſs, is a firſt conſideration, and is alone ſufficient to create obligation. Therefore this obligation wants no more force or form. If happineſs is the firſt conſideration, and foundation of the moral law, which lays us under a moral neceſſity to obſerve it; what is a moral law to one, may not be a moral law to another; becauſe men may, and often do differ in their opinions of happineſs. Reaſon, he ſays, is the obliger, and the rational creature the obliged. Well and wonderfully diſtinguiſhed between a reaſonable creature and his reaſon! This diſtinction is ſo fine that I cannot ſee the difference. This reaſonable creature is both the obliger and the obliged. He obliges himſelf to himſelf; and ſo leaves himſelf abſolute maſter, without law and without obligation. And how, in this caſe, we can be

tied,

tied, bound, and under an internal moral neceſſity of conforming ourſelves to the rules expreſſed in the conſtitution of our nature, cannot be underſtood. A law is given to thoſe, and to thoſe only, who may, and can break or obey it; and can therefore be under no neceſſity of acting according to any rules preſcribed by it. Theſe rules are expreſſed in the conſtitution of our nature; and are made obligatory by the will of that Being who made the human ſyſtem. This is, in ſhort, that GOD made man a reaſonable creature, and the dictates of his reaſon a rule of action. And this is all the ſenſe that can be extracted out of a heap of incoherent ſtuff.

MORALITY is one thing, and the moral law is another. We muſt know what actions are moral, and what are immoral, before we can judge of what is commanded, and what is forbidden. The queſtion ariſing from this is, How do we know morality? Lord BOLINGBROKE ſays, by the will of God manifeſted in his works. But this is againſt himſelf, and againſt univerſal experience. For, as I ſaid, men, whether Theiſts or Atheiſts, have a notion of *right* and *wrong*, *juſt* and *unjuſt*. The firſt men, ſaith he, could not diſcover the being of GOD, until their underſtandings were ripened into maturity. And he ſays *, (though moſt falſely), that "this was done ſo ſlowly, that polytheiſm was prior to monotheiſm." By

* Vol. i. p. 204.

this

this time men had formed themſelves into ſocieties. And can one think, that, during ſo large a ſpace of time, they did not know a diſtinction between juſt and unjuſt, equity and iniquity, morality and immorality? A mere ſavage, a child, knows the difference between an injury and a good office, without ever thinking of GOD, or of his works. And GROTIUS ſaid, and ſaid well, that though it ſhould be granted there is no GOD, yet the diſtinction betwixt *juſt* and *unjuſt* would take place; *aliquem locum haberet.* His Lordſhip diſtinguiſhes between the moral law, and the poſitive law, that depends entirely on the will of GOD; which diſtinction cannot hold, unleſs there is ſomething in morality conſidered in itſelf, which makes it independent of, or anterior, in our conception, both to the will and the works of GOD.

ALLOWING the moral ſenſe to be nonſenſe, and, if you will have it, let it be ethical enthuſiaſm, and let innate ideas or proleptical knowledge be diſcarded from philoſophy; there remains no other way of knowing *juſt* from *unjuſt*, *morality* from *immorality*, but by the uſe of underſtanding and reaſon. We diſtinguiſh virtue from vice the ſame way that we diſtinguiſh *true* from *falſe*. And we may as well ſay, that it is only by the works of GOD that we diſcover every mathematical truth and metaphyſical axiom, as that it is only from theſe works that we can deduce and conclude the eſſential difference between morality and

and immorality. Obſerve, I do not ſay *ſin* and *duty*. Is it not by reaſon (his Lordſhip ſays, by long and ſtrong reaſoning) that we diſcover the being of GOD, his unity, and other attributes? And had we no previous conception of power and wiſdom, of goodneſs, juſtice, and truth, it is abſolutely impoſſible that we could conclude the unity, wiſdom, and power, the juſtice, goodneſs, and veracity, and even the being of GOD. To affirm, that it is only from the works of GOD that we diſcover his will; and that it is owing to his will, that two and two are equal to four, that the cauſe is prior to the effect, and that juſt cannot be unjuſt; that power cannot be weakneſs, nor wiſdom folly, is really to reaſon in the round. Theſe truths, whether mathematical, metaphyſical, or moral, do not depend on the arbitrary will and appointment of GOD. We do depend on him in every thing; for he hath made us, and not we ourſelves. And he hath made us capable to know truth from falſity, *right* from *wrong*, as he himſelf knows, and as they really are; that is, antecedently and independently on his will, as eternal, immutable, and independent on his power and wiſdom, or any other of his attributes, his intelligence only excepted. As his own neceſſary exiſtence and nature doth not depend on his will, no more do neceſſary truths depend on his pleaſure.

IT would coſt more pains than the work would be worth, to collect all the paſſages the author hath ſcattered

tered in his voluminous philoſophy againſt eternal and independent truth. In place of which, I ſhall tranſcribe part of a paragraph *. "We ſay, that the law "of nature is the law of reaſon; and ſo it is in this "(CICERO's) ſenſe, and thus far. A right uſe of "this faculty which GOD hath given us, collects this "law from the nature of things, as they ſtand in the "ſyſtem which he hath conſtituted. Reaſon can look "no higher, nor will right reaſon attempt it. For "ſurely no diſquiſition can be more vain and need-"leſs, than that which examines whether actions are "lawful or unlawful, *debiti aut illiciti*, becauſe they "are commanded or forbid by GOD; or whether they "are ſuch *per ſe* independently of GOD, and there-"fore neceſſarily, *neceſſario*, commanded or forbidden "by him. GROTIUS adopts the laſt of theſe no-"tions, and the general current of metaphyſical re-"finement runs that way. It aſſumes in man a com-"munity of reaſon with GOD; and then it ſeems "conſequential to aſſume, that men, ſuch at leaſt as "theſe reaſoners imagine themſelves to be, are able "to diſcern natures, and to judge of things antece-"dently to actual exiſtence, and abſtractly from it: "whereas, perhaps, to think rightly, we muſt think, "that theſe natures and things, conſidered abſtractly "from the manner and the relations in which they "exiſt, are nothing better than imaginary entities, ob-"jects of ill-choſen ſpeculation, not of knowledge.

* Vol. iv. p. 12. 13. 14. 15.

"He

" He who thinks thus, will be apt to aſk, What " would become of juſtice, if we ſuppoſe a ſyſtem " wherein there was no property? or what of tempe- " rance, if we ſuppoſed one wherein there is no ex- " ceſs? Such queſtions, and many other objections, " would not be eaſily anſwered. And the ſole effect " of this hypotheſis muſt be, as I think it hath been, " to render our notions of natural laws diſputable and " undeterminable in many caſes. The diſquiſition is " not only vain, but hurtful. It is needleſs too, ab- " ſolutely needleſs. For will any man deny, that " however indifferent natures may be *per ſe*, and ſim- " ply conſidered, they ceaſe to be ſo when they are " connected with a ſyſtem, and cannot be ſeparated, " even in imagination, from the relations they bear to " other parts of the ſyſtem, nor from the effects on " the whole? The ſyſtem to which we belong, like " every other ſyſtem, was made by the will of GOD; " and therefore all the creatures contained in it, both " phyſical and moral, are ordained by the ſame will. " It hath been ſaid, with ſhocking impiety, by ſchool- " men, and others, That if things were made as they " are by the mere will of GOD, and not according " to the eſſential differences, and the eternal inde- " pendent nature of things, GOD might have made " our obligations to the law of nature to be contrary " to what they are: He might have made it our du- " ty to blaſpheme, not adore him; to exerciſe inju- " ſtice, not juſtice, in our dealings with other men.

" But this is an inſtance, and not the leaſt, of that ha-
" bitual preſumption which men contract in the ſchools
" of metaphyſics and theology; where they are ac-
" cuſtomed to reaſon about what infinite wiſdom and
" power might or ſhould have done, inſtead of con-
" tenting themſelves to know what they have done,
" and pronouncing for that reaſon fitteſt to be done.
" In creating man, GOD deſigned to create, not only
" a rational, but a ſocial creature, and a moral agent;
" and has framed his nature accordingly. If he had
" deſigned this world to be the habitation of devils,
" he might have made us by nature what we ſay they
" made themſelves by rebellion. But as we ought
" not to preſume to cenſure the divine perfections,
" nor the proceedings of infinite wiſdom, by our fan-
" cy and precarious ideas; ſo it is worſe than pre-
" ſumption, to aſcribe, even hypothetically, to the
" all-perfect Being, any thing that is evidently re-
" pugnant to our ideas of perfection. Once more,
" therefore, let us be content to know things as GOD
" hath been pleaſed to ſhew them to us, and to look
" no further than our own nature for the law of it.
" In that we ſhall find this law co-eval with our ſy-
" ſtem, if not with the author; and as immutable
" as the ſyſtem, if not as immutable as GOD."

To me it appears a wilful miſrepreſentation of abſtract eſſences, to call them *natures*, and yet more expreſsly

expreſsly *ſpiritual ſubſtances.* " * The eſſences of " things, the *æternæ veritates*, are incorporeal ſub- " ſtances." For he muſt know, that in truth they are no more, and at preſent are held for no more, than relations, which are unchangeable. For inſtance, the conformity or the agreement of the *ſubject* with the *predicate.* It is certain, that every truth is ſuch an agreement; but every truth is not immutably ſuch. It is now true, that PETER was learned; but PETER was not always learned, and PETER may forget all his learning: but the equality of two and two to four, (which is but a relation), always was, and always will be true, without arbitrary appointment, and even though there was no mind to compare them. For by comparing they are not made equal; but being equal, they are found ſuch when compared. So is this truth, The cauſe is prior to the effect; and this other truth, Morality is the product of right reaſon, or, Juſtice is a conformity of our actions to the dictates of it. It is no wonder your Noble author falls into many blunders, when it is obvious to every reader the leaſt acquainted with ſuch matters, that he either doth not underſtand, or perpetually miſapplies the common terms. For it is certain, that the relation of the *ſubjectum* to the *prædicatum* is neither nature nor ſubſtance. Subſtances are made to exiſt, and may be unmade: but though omnipotence may deſtroy, it cannot alter the eſſences of things. This

* Vol. iii. p. 346.

he acknowledges. Though all triangles were turned out of the univerſe, and though no ſuch figure exiſted in matter, ſtill it would remain a truth, that a triangle is a figure comprehended with three lines. And were it not for ſuch truths, we could prove nothing.

I have ſaid *, "That there are eternal and unchangeable truths, is as certain as that there is any truth at all. Eſſentials are invariable; and what is eſſentially predicated of a ſubject, is invariably true. For inſtance, to the idea of man belong the ideas of *animal* and *reaſonable*; and therefore that man is a reaſonable animal, is an eternal and immutable truth. It was a truth before man was made, and will be a truth if man ſhould be no more.—— And though GOD is infinitely free, and can do or not do whatever doth not imply a contradiction; yet there muſt always be a difference in the things conſidered in themſelves, not in the divine pleaſure, to conſtitute ſome *poſſible* and others *impoſſible*; otherwiſe GOD might make *impoſſible* to become *poſſible*." Poſſibility conſiſts in the conſiſtency of attributes, *conſiſtentia attributorum*; and impoſſibility in their repugnance. And to make a thing conſiſtent and inconſiſtent at once, is the height of abſurdity, and againſt the firſt and fundamental principle of ratiocination. The root of poſſibility, in part known

* Eſtimate of religion, p. 82.

to

to us, and perfectly known to GOD, is the immutable rule of his creation. And ſo his knowledge of *right* and *wrong*, *juſt* and *unjuſt*, is an invariable rule of his government of the world. As the divine knowledge of things poſſible doth not make them poſſible, (for it is the will that is operative); ſo no more doth the divine knowledge of *juſt* and *unjuſt* make actions either the one or the other. To the divine mind, the knowledge of *true* and *falſe*, *right* and *wrong*, is as eſſential as is his omniſcience. It admits therefore of no change, no variation; and what is thus fixed and immutable, never had, and never can have any dependence on the will. It therefore can be no objection, That " * God makes things dependent on him " to exiſt conformably to natures independent on " him:" for, before exiſtence, things have no dependence on GOD; and after exiſtence, the nature of theſe things remains the ſame, as in a ſtate of poſſibility they were in the divine mind. Their exiſtence is owing to his will; and as exiſtent, they depend upon him. But the eternal omniſcience of GOD, by which not only things actual, but poſſible likewiſe, are known, doth not depend on his will, becauſe it is an eſſential attribute of his being. Nothing depends on the ſupreme Being, but what he wills to be; and he doth not will himſelf to be omniſcient, for he is ſuch eſſentially. You, or your Noble author, ſay †, That " GOD may have conſcious knowledge of all

* Vol. iii. p. 351. † Vol. iii. p. 378.

" things

" things poſſible, as we have conſcious knowledge of " our own exiſtence." Whatever GOD knows, he knows intuitively: but I would not ſay that this is conſcious knowledge, and ſuch as we have of our own exiſtence; becauſe it ſounds as if poſſibilities were inherent and eſſential to the divine eſſence, and knowledge and things known are not juſt the ſame. GOD knows the equality of two and two to four, not conſciouſly, but intuitively. But his knowledge doth not make the equality. For, upon ſuppoſition that this equality never was, and never will be known, it is ſtill the ſame in itſelf, independently of all intelligence.

I will not deny that it hath been ſaid by ſchoolmen and others, That if all actions were indifferent antecedently to divine appointment, and if their equity and iniquity depended on his will and arbitrary pleaſure; then might he have commanded what he forbids, and forbidden what he commanded. And if this is ſhocking, it doth not follow from that which he oppoſes, but from that which he vainly and weakly endeavours to ſupport. He who makes all things true, juſt, and good, to depend on the arbitrary will of GOD, may be charged with this ſhocking impiety; but it is not to be placed to the account of thoſe ſchoolmen and others who hold, that morality and immorality, virtue and vice, are eſſentially, eternally, and unchangeably different. I give you and your

Lord

Lord back your abſurdity, with the addition of an advice, Never to meddle with things too high for your low underſtanding, and who profeſs to know nothing but by *ſenſation* and *experience.*

He imagines it a very puzzling queſtion, and not eaſily anſwered, "What would become of juſtice, if "we ſuppoſed a ſyſtem wherein there was no pro-"perty?" A wonderful ſyſtem it muſt be, which doth not admit of intelligent beings. Exclude them, and there remains no place for the knowledge and the exerciſe of juſtice. Admit intelligent beings, and private right and property muſt go along with them. For every intelligent being hath a right and property to what it is; to his life and to his limbs; which, without a crime, he cannot forfeit; nor other intelligent beings deprive him of, without a violation of juſtice. But upon ſuppoſition of no ſyſtem at all, (and before the creation there was none), juſtice would be juſtice, right would be right, and truth would be truth, becauſe unmade and eternal.

It is further ſaid, "Will any man deny, however "indifferent actions may be *per ſe*, and ſimply con-"ſidered, they ceaſe to be ſo when connected with "a ſyſtem, and cannot be ſeparated, not even in i-"magination, from the relation they bear to other "parts, nor from their effects upon the whole?" That is to ſay, That there were no truths, either mathematical,

mathematical, metaphyſical, or moral, before this or ſome other ſyſtems were made. Before, it was not true, that a triangle was a figure comprehended with three lines; nor was it true, that the cauſe is prior to the effect, and that there was nothing bad or good; but that all theſe things began to be when the ſyſtem was made. He forgets that GOD knew from eternity all poſſibilities; and therefore all agreements and diſagreements of things, and ſo all truths, were open to his omniſcient intelligence. Theſe truths he did not make, as I have proved, for he knew them from eternity; and nothing eternal can be made. And if he did not make them from eternity, he did not make them in time. If before the commencement of the world no propoſitions were true, no actions juſt; then no propoſitions were falſe, no actions unjuſt; true and falſe, juſt and unjuſt, and I may add *poſſible* and *impoſſible*, were unknown to the omniſcient, the ſupreme Being, the Author of our ſyſtem, and all other ſyſtems: than which nothing is more abſurd, nothing more blaſphemous.

There are truths neceſſary, and truths contingent; there are ſome actions in themſelves neceſſarily good and juſt, and others indifferent, or contingently ſuch. For the Noble philoſopher admits the diſtinction between the moral and poſitive law. This is variable according to circumſtances and occaſions; but that is fixed and immutable. It is a matter of indifference

to

to eat thrice or twice a-day. And our lawful ſuperiors and ſovereigns may determine which is to be done; and their commands become lawful and binding. And GOD may bring us under many obligations to act in things, which he knows, and we know not, that tend to our happineſs. And the difference between human and divine law, as contingent and poſitive, is, that human legiſlators may be miſtaken, but the divine legiſlator never errs. But to break or to perform a promiſe, is not a matter of indifference; but is determined to be moral or immoral, by the dictates of right reaſon, previouſly and independently of all appointment, and all authority, human or divine. Had he ſaid, that ALL actions are indifferent until the conſtitution of the ſyſtem makes them otherwiſe, he had ſpoken intelligibly, though erroneouſly; but to ſay that *ſome* actions are indifferent until the ſyſtem makes an alteration, looks like the fraud of diſputation. For, becauſe ſome actions indifferent become lawful or unlawful, by the mere and arbitrary appointment of a ſuperior and lawful power, therefore all actions are ſuch, is ſuch a concluſion that logic doth not admit. And for many ſuch arguments to be found in his philoſophical works, it is no wonder he hath declared it impertinent to his purpoſe.

THE men who maintain, that many actions are *juſt* and *unjuſt* in themſelves, antecedently to divine ap-

pointment, do not in every caſe determine what infinite power and wiſdom ſhould do. Many things ſtill depend upon GOD's arbitrary will and pleaſure. He may create more worlds, (for extenſion is not actually infinite), and he may preſerve or reduce thoſe worlds which he hath made. But it is no diſcredit to the ſchools of metaphyſics and theology, that in them they have learned, that GOD always acts according to the rectitude of his eſſence; and that therefore he cannot change neceſſary and eternal truths into error, nor neceſſary and eternal righteouſneſs into injuſtice. Inſtead of being guilty of preſumption, it would be a neglect of duty in them, not to inquire into the equity and iniquity of actions, that thereby they may know and obey the will of their Creator: and the ſooner the better. I cannot therefore take your or your author's advice, and ſuſpend giving judgment of the morality and immorality of actions, until I have learned by their conſequences, what good or what evil theſe actions do. Place Mr MALLET in any poſt or ſtation in this our ſyſtem, in which he hath neither been nor acted; if he will act a reaſonable and a moral part, he muſt immediately and firſt of all have recourſe to the dictates of his reaſon. And as this life is the only ſcene of acting and ſuffering, according to your opinion, you may live forty years before you can ſtate the balance of the advantages and diſadvantages of morality; and conſequently before you can ſettle to yourſelf a rule

of

of life. This metaphyſics and theology teach; and this every reaſonable and moral man ought to practiſe. He knows that it is his duty to act reaſonably; but he cannot know the conſequences with certainty, until they happen. His certain knowledge is to be his rule of action, and not thoſe contingent conſequences, of which he hath no fixed and determined knowledge. This is a rule of morality which good Theiſts do, and ought to obſerve, To do what is right, and to refer the conſequences to GOD, who ſees, and can provide for them. And becauſe "it is "worſe than preſumption, to aſcribe to the all-per-"fect Being any thing that is repugnant to our "ideas of perfection," I do aſſert, that there are truths and actions eternally and eſſentially ſuch, independently on the divine appointment; and that GOD cannot change the equality of two and two to four, nor command impiety and immorality. And that GOD may command what he forbids, and forbid what he commands, is not metaphyſical or theological blaſphemy, but a concluſion which follows from his Lordſhip's principles; that is, That the truth of all propoſitions, and the equity of all actions, depend upon the arbitrary appointment of the ſupreme Being. I am content, as his Lordſhip adviſes, "to know things "as GOD hath been pleaſed to ſhew them." But if GOD hath been pleaſed to make me underſtand things above your capacity of underſtanding, and particularly, that ſome truths and ſome actions are neceſſary

and eternal, theſe morally good, and thoſe unchangeably true; I am not obliged to ſtop when he ſays Halt. I am as ill pleaſed with the other part of his advice, "To look no further than our nature, for "the law of it."

My reaſon for this is, that I find it laid down as a principle by another writer, That "* actions com-"mon to the nature of every ſpecies, are conſidered "by us as regular and good.——The laws of na-"ture are to be derived from the common nature of "man, of which every perſon partakes who is not "a monſter.——And this is the ground-work of all "morality. We are not left to gather our duty by "abſtract reaſoning, nor indeed by any reaſoning. "It is ingraved upon the table of our hearts. We "adapt our actions to the courſe of nature by mere "inſtinct, without reaſoning or experience." This I have already examined †. It is true, his Lordſhip of Bolingbroke ſays, that "the law of na-"ture is the law of reaſon;" but he admits it with this reſtriction: "A right uſe of this faculty which "God hath given us, collects this law from the na-"ture of things, as they ſtand in the ſyſtem which "he hath conſtituted." Reaſon then can only make the diſcovery, by obſerving the courſe of nature in the material, animal, and moral world, ſo far as

* Lord Kaims's Eſſays, p. 37. 40. 316.

† Eſtimate, § iv.

we

we know it. In the lower part, or mere material, we obſerve order and regularity. But this is no foundation for regulating our actions according to the dictates of reaſon; becauſe this material regularity doth not teach us what is morally right, or immorally wrong. Tho' his Lordſhip believed that he was made after the image of ſome beaſt or other, I am perſuaded he did not think it his duty to live and act as brutally as they do. He had too little reaſon to live like a moral man, and too much to live by mere inſtinct. There is no other way left then to learn his duty, but from the courſe of human life, as it ſtands in our ſyſtem. And to follow his human leaders, and in his turn to lead the way in the practice of virtue and vice, without regard to the law of reaſon, inforced by divine authority, is a very bad ſchool to learn in, what is *good* and *evil*, *right* and *wrong*, *juſt* and *unjuſt*, unleſs by the conſequences of his actions, founded on long experience. And I am of opinion, that his Lordſhip's life was an inſtance of the vanity and uncertainty of ſuch a moral ſcience. Better he had made uſe of his faculty of reaſon in the metaphyſical and theological way, to have learned his duty to GOD and man. Before I have done, I do believe that I ſhall make it appear, that his philoſophy amounts to this, That this world, and all other worlds that are, together with their inhabitants, are neceſſarily what they are, and

and cannot poſſibly be otherwiſe, either better or worſe.

BEFORE I leave what I have tranſcribed, the concluſion, which ought to be the moſt important part, muſt be conſidered. His words are: "In our nature "we ſhall find the law of nature co-eval with our "ſyſtem, if not with the author; and as immutable "as the ſyſtem, if not as immutable as GOD." Sure, no man writes with leſs preciſion; and no wonder, for he conſiders metaphyſics as the delirium of human underſtanding. Is the human nature the whole of our ſyſtem? Has man no relation, no connection with other beings? We are but a ſmall part of what we know, and a much ſmaller of the numberleſs and unmeaſurable imaginary worlds, and the author's imaginary ſcale of beings. If the law of nature is only found in our nature, ſuch as it is, and ſuch as we find it, it is idle to talk of a larger ſyſtem. This law, you ſay, is as immutable as the ſyſtem. What ſyſtem? that of human nature, or that of the univerſe? In the human, which I take to be the ſuperior part of our terreſtrial globe, nothing is fixed, becauſe there is nothing more various than man. Some agree to-day, and differ to-morrow from one another; and ſome are not the ſame in principle and practice for a day. To ſay, that the law of our nature is as immutable as our ſyſtem, is no great encomium. It is rather *conſtant in inconſtancy*. Such a phraſe I have heard

heard in ſpeaking of the human nature. But if the law of nature is not more permanent, it is ſo far from being a law, that it is an archetype or pattern of irregularity. I allow, that this irregularity is almoſt or very near co-eval with mankind. I likewiſe not only admit, but affirm, that the law of right reaſon, that teaches the eternal difference betwixt virtue and vice, morality and immorality, is co-eternal with the author of the univerſe, becauſe independent of all arbitrary appointment, and therefore as immutable as the ſupreme Being. This his Lordſhip neither denies nor affirms. And what hath he learned by ſearching our ſyſtem for the foundation of morality? Is not all that he hath ſaid on the ſubject no better than ſmall talk, ſeeing from it he can conclude nothing certain? But I have learned from him, that he knows nothing of the matter.

On another occaſion, notwithſtanding, he talks dogmatically on the ſame ſubject. "* We muſt go "through a proceſs of reaſoning, that connects cer- "tain evident truths intuitively together, and ſo ar- "rive at demonſtration. Though the Atheiſt doth "not connect them into a demonſtration of God's ex- "iſtence, yet he knows them all to be truths, as well "as the Theiſt. He knows they reſult from the na- "ture of things, he pronounces them therefore im- "mutable and eternal: but he takes no ſide of the

* Vol. iii. p. 343. *ad marg.*

"queſtion,

" queſtion, whether they are dependent or independ-
" ent on GOD, ſince he acknowledges no GOD."
In theſe few words, there are two errors of inadvertency, *alias* blunders; ſuch as, a proceſs of reaſoning, which connects evident truths *intuitively* together. Intuitive knowledge depends on no proceſs or ſeries of argumentation. The other blunder is, that the Atheiſt doth not determine, whether theſe eternal and immutable truths depend on GOD, or not, becauſe he acknowledges no GOD. And becauſe he acknowledges no GOD, he certainly determines in the negative. It is not for theſe remarks that I take notice of the paſſage, but to ſhew, that he is poſitive and peremptory in aſſerting the eternity and immutability of eſſences and eſſential truths, in which Theiſts and Atheiſts are agreed. He further acknowledges, that ſome truths are not only eternal, but alſo independent on GOD. " * Truths relating to GOD, always
" have been, and always will be the ſame. They
" are abſolutely from all eternity to all eternity in-
" dependent on his will: for he is what he is, by the
" neceſſity of his nature; and ſelf-exiſtence is a part
" of his eſſence." *A part of his eſſence.* I do not like the expreſſion. GOD's neceſſary exiſtence is a truth, and ſuch a truth from which it neceſſarily follows, that he is not the cauſe of his own exiſtence; and from this truth follows another more general truth, That nothing can make itſelf to be; and this

* Vol. iii. p. 343. *ad marg.*

great

great truth, That this neceſſarily-exiſtent and uncauſed Being is the cauſe of all things contingent. Whatever truths neceſſarily follow from ſuch as relate to the ſupreme Being, are of the ſame nature with thoſe they follow from, and are therefore independent of the divine will and appointment. This is metaphyſics, which his Lordſhip treats with contempt; though without ſuch principles, and ſuch reaſoning from them, he cannot connect his ideas and notions into a demonſtration of the exiſtence of GOD. He often ſpeaks of this truth as demonſtrated *a poſteriori*; and ſo makes the exiſtence of other beings the means of knowing, not only the being, but likewiſe the power and wiſdom of GOD. He muſt have known, that Atheiſts of all denominations ſtrive to deſtroy the connection between our exiſtence and the exiſtence of the ſupreme Being; yet in all his voluminous works he takes no notice of their exceptions; which had he done, he would have found it abſolutely neceſſary to take into his reaſoning many metaphyſical maxims.

WITH the help of a truth which he acknowledges, all this affair of dependence and independence of eſſences and eſſential truths is eaſily determined. He admits, and ſo do I, that "* GOD knew, from all "eternity, every ſyſtem, corporeal and intellectual, "which he created in time. He knew, by conſe-"quence, for he ordered the various manners in which

* Vol. iii. p. 339.

" all the parts of theſe ſyſtems, and the ſyſtems them-
" ſelves, ſhould operate on one another; the relations
" they ſhould have; the proportions they ſhould bear;
" the ideas they ſhould communicate to creatures fit-
" ted to receive them. All this he foreknew; but all
" this did not therefore exiſt. Such an exiſtence was
" at moſt eventual; and depended on the will, not on
" the knowledge of GOD, if we may diſtinguiſh them,
" to be a little more intelligible." Without this diſ-
tinction, what he ſays muſt have been perfect nonſenſe.
And it is much better founded than his diſtinction be-
twixt a reaſonable creature and his reaſon, and better
than his diſtinction between GOD's neceſſary exiſtence
and his eſſence. If GOD knew all things from eter-
nity, he cannot deny that ſome truths are eternal in
the divine mind. His Lordſhip extends this know-
ledge to contingent truths, and cannot therefore put
neceſſary truths beyond the reach of omniſcience. If
GOD foreknew, that you and I ſhould exiſt, and be
perſuaded that two and two are equal to four, that a
triangle is a figure comprehended with three lines,
and that man is a reaſonable animal; and that we
know that an injury is not a good office, and that theſe
things cannot poſſibly be otherwiſe: all theſe truths
muſt have been known to GOD from eternity, ſuch as
they are; the firſt as contingent, and the others as
neceſſary and immutable. But that which I chiefly
fix upon, is BOLINGBROKE's diſtinction between the
divine underſtanding and the divine will. And it is
allowed

allowed by him, that it is not the knowledge, but the will of GOD, that makes being and reality. Therefore whatever receives nothing from GOD, is independent of him. The eſſences and natures of ſyſtems made, or poſſible to be made, were eternally in the divine mind; and as ſuch, they were and are the objects of his knowledge, but not of his power or will. Exiſtence and eſſence therefore are not the ſame. The divine knowledge is more extenſive than the divine will; for GOD knows what is poſſible, as well as what is actual. All eſſences and eſſential truths never were, and never can be dependent on GOD: not on his will; for he muſt firſt know them, before he wills them to be; and knowledge makes no alteration in the things known. Poſſibilities known to GOD, remain poſſibilities until produced into actuality: and when produced, they retain the ſame eſſences which they had in the divine knowledge previouſly to their exiſtence. In a ſtate of mere poſſibility, all things only poſſible were independent; and ſuch things as do exiſt, depend only on GOD for their being and exiſtence. This, I believe, his Lordſhip was aware of; and therefore aſſerts, that GOD makes things poſſible. Of this more hereafter. That there are eternal truths, metaphyſical, mathematical, and moral, independent of divine appointment, is no limitation of the divine power, becauſe it doth not extend to impoſſibilities. And impoſſibility is a *purum nihil*, a mere nothing

objectively and relatively. And what is limited by nothing, is unlimited.

DESCARTES held all neceſſary and eſſential truths to be immutable, but dependent on GOD. About which, after your Lord had exhauſted his ſtock of metaphyſics, he acknowledges that he hath done it to no purpoſe. For he ſays, "It is now time to conclude a note too long perhaps already; though I have hurried through it, and treated the matter more lightly than I could have done. I do not pretend to decide the queſtion between him and his adverſaries. All I would inculcate from this is, that ſince his opinion may receive a reaſonable interpretation, it ſhould not be condemned as abſolutely and as dogmatically as it hath been; and that it becomes a Theiſt to incline always to the ſide which aſcribes the greateſt poſſible power to GOD; ſince that which even hath the appearance of limiting it, by maintaining an independency, when a dependency on him implies no contradiction." This able philoſopher, after pleading to no purpoſe for the dependency of eternal truth and righteouſneſs on the arbitrary appointment of GOD, humbly begs the favour of ſuch Theiſts as himſelf to incline, without a reaſon, (for he gives none), to take part with DESCARTES in the debate. I cannot grant the favour; becauſe I have proved, that his Lordſhip's reaſonings are not only weak, but abſurd. If independency hath

hath an appearance of limiting the power of GOD, it is only to thoſe that extend it to impoſſibilities.

PERHAPS he did not know, nor do you Mr MALLET, that ſchoolmen diſtinguiſh poſſibility into *objective* and *relative*, or *ad intra* and *ad extra*. When we conceive a conſiſtency of attributes and predicates with one another, and with the ſubject, we judge the thing poſſible, provided there is a power ſufficient to produce it. Some things are poſſible to human power, and all things conceivable are poſſible to omnipotence. To find out what is poſſible, we firſt conſider this conſiſtency and agreement of the attributes with the ſubject, and by this we pronounce it a poſſibility; if inſtead of an agreement we diſcern a repugnancy, it becomes, *in our idea*, an impoſſibility; and comparing the agreement of the ſubject with its predicates, and both with omnipotence, we declare it poſſible both objectively and relatively, intrinſically and extrinſically. And I learn from AQUINAS, that if abſolute poſſibility was to be ſought only in GOD's omnipotence, this omnipotence could not be explained but in the circular way. For if we ſay, that GOD is omnipotent, becauſe he can do all things to which omnipotence extends, (and it can extend no further); this is juſt to ſay, that GOD is omnipotent, becauſe he can do all things that he can do.

THOUGH perhaps I am as weary of the ſubject as his

his Lordſhip was, I cannot think of leaving it as he did; that is, juſt as he found it. He contends, in contradiction to what he elſewhere aſſerts, that eſſence and exiſtence is the ſame; and I abſolutely refuſe it, for the following reaſon and diſtinction. The word *to be*, ESSE, hath in philoſophy three ſignifications. *1ſt*, It is taken for *exiſtence*; IT IS, or it exiſts. *2dly*, It is taken for the eſſence and nature of a thing. For this ARISTOTLE's authority is appealed to; who ſays, that a definition explains the τὸ τί ἐστι; the being, nature, and eſſence of a thing; which ſome call the *quiddity*. And, *3dly*, It is taken for the connection of the predicates with the ſubject; as when we ſay a circle is round, and two and two are equal to four. In the firſt ſenſe it is plain, that only GOD is eternal. Univerſals do not exiſt really, but in ſingulars; and no ſingulars, GOD excepted, do exiſt from eternity. In the ſecond ſenſe, it is obvious, that eſſences and eternal truths are not really exiſtent natures. They are ſomething real and poſitive in the divine intellect, but not out of it. But out of it theſe eſſences are but negatively eternal, in ſo far as they are not limited or circumſcribed with time. When we conſider human nature in itſelf, we abſtract from all time, and mentally ſeparate it from duration: for time doth not in any manner belong to the human eſſence. *3dly*, It is certain, that thoſe propoſitions in which the ſubject and eſſential attributes are connected muſt be eternally true; ſuch as, A triangle is a figure comprehended

prehended with three lines; Man is a reaſonable animal. Theſe propoſitions are definitions which are convertible with the things defined: for if we ſay, *Man*, or, *A reaſonable animal*, we only ſay the ſame thing in other words: and *idem non eſt aliud.* This always was, and always will be a truth; and no time can alter or change it, no not when men ſhall be no more. The definition of *man* may be divided into two propoſitions: *Man is an animal*; and, *Man is reaſonable:* and as the whole definition is an immutable truth, ſo are the parts of it. This doth not hold in propoſitions contingently true, becauſe they depend on time. For inſtance, DAVID MALLET, Eſq; is a philoſopher; and certain it is, that once he was neither Eſquire nor philoſopher.

NECESSARY, eſſential, immutable, and eternal truths, conſiſt in the inſeparable connection between the ſubject and the predicate, and the identity of the definition with the thing defined. And it is by a conſiſtency of attributes, and their conformity to the ſubject, that we judge of the truth of things actual, and the poſſibility of others. This connection and conformity we cannot aſcribe to the will of GOD; becauſe, in our conception of eſſential truth and poſſibility, the conſiſtency is anterior to the divine appointment, as I have proved from AQUINAS. And it is by ſuppoſing this conſiſtency to be independent and immutable, that, by a ſeries of argumentation, we arrive

arrive at a demonſtration of the being of GOD. It would be a ridiculous circle, firſt to prove that GOD made truths, and from theſe truths to prove that there is a GOD. The concluſion goes firſt before the premiſes, and then follows them.

ALL truths of ſpeculation are, or ought to be the orderly ground-work of action. " * *Truth* and *right* are " ſo nearly related, that they are often put for one " another. CICERO ſays, *What is right, is alſo true.* " And the LORD JESUS CHRIST ſaith, *He that* " *doth the truth, cometh to the light.* And the apoſtle " PAUL ſpeaks of thoſe *who obey not the truth, but* " *obey unrighteouſneſs.*" Let it be obſerved, that I do not tranſcribe ſcriptural phraſes and expreſſions, as of divine authority, (for I write for thoſe who do not believe the BIBLE), but as ſayings of ſenſe and antiquity. " A wicked action is an oppoſition to " truth, as well as a violence done to juſtice. It is " an error or a lie in action; from which it follow- " eth, that the *prima regula morum*, and the *radix* " *poſſibilitatis*, that is, the firſt rule of morality, and " the root of poſſibility, are the ſame." As propoſitions are ſome neceſſarily, and others contingently true; ſo there are actions, ſome neceſſarily, and others contingently moral. And upon this is founded the diſtinction of the *moral* and *poſitive* law. As the agreement of the ſubject with the attributes is truth,

* Eſtimate, p. 83.

and

and their diſagreement falſity; ſo the rectitude and obliquity of actions is ſaid to be, and really is, the equity and iniquity of actions. Reaſon is the faculty by which we compare our ſpeculative ideas, and judge of their identity or diverſity; and reaſon is the faculty by which we judge of the equality or inequality of our doings. The meaſure of this equality or inequality, can be nothing elſe but right reaſon. And this is more obvious to the underſtanding, than moſt truths of pure ſpeculation. It is conſcious knowledge, and ſuch as we often perceive intuitively, and without argumentation. And I ſuppoſe it is from this that the word *conſcience* denotes our approbation or diſapprobation of what we call good and what we call bad actions. And it is an obſervation of Lord BOLINGBROKE, that "we ſearch out and diſcover "mathematical truths; but moral truths force themſelves upon the underſtanding." And no man capable to know that a whole is more than any of its parts, but knows that a good office, and the murder of a benefactor, eſſentially differ; that the one is diſgraceful, and the other laudable; that the one is wrong, and that the other is right. And ſince the Atheiſt, who denies the divine being, and ſince they who have no rational conviction of it, know the difference; it is certain, they neither do, nor can conſider morality as dependent on the will of GOD. All who allow the * diſtinction between the natural or

* Vol. v. p. 193.

moral law, and the voluntary and positive law, must admit, that the one depends, and that the other is independent of *will* and authority, whether human or divine.

It is the consistency of the subject with the attributes which makes truth, whether we conceive the subject to be actual, or only possible; and it is the conformity of the action to the dictates of right reason, that makes it morally good and just. All these relations are discovered by reason, and many of them are even forced upon the understanding; and not by the will, nor by a third unknown faculty of the soul, nor by an unintelligible moral feeling. All things are known to God, from everlasting to everlasting; but as knowledge makes no alteration in the things known, neither truth, possibility, nor morality, depend upon the arbitrary appointment of his will.

Willingly would his Lordship restrict our faculty of reason, and confine all human knowledge to sensation and experience. "* It is," saith he, "absurd to reason about substances that are not actual, "though they may be possible." And this absurdity must be the same which Lucretius states against the being of God.

* Vol. i. p. 86

Quove

Quove modo eſt unquam vis cognita principiorum,
Quidnam inter ſeſe permutato ordine poſſent,
Si non ipſa dedit ſpecimen natura creandi?

That is, "How could the Creator underſtand the "force and poſſibility of the principles, what they "would produce when variouſly combined together, "before nature and things themſelves, by creating, "had given a ſpecimen?" The Noble philoſopher was not ſurpriſed into this aſſertion; for in many places he aſſerts, that there can be no knowledge but of things actual; and frequently diſtinguiſhes between real and fantaſtic knowledge. To this I may borrow an anſwer from himſelf; for he ſays, "* I "am far from ſaying, that we ſhould not reaſon about "things poſſible, as well as actual." And where then is the abſurdity before mentioned? He that pretends to prove *a poſteriori* the being of GOD, and to know his will by his works, cannot but maintain moſt abſurdly, that things muſt be prior to knowledge, and that he did not know them until they exiſted. I am obliged to ſchoolmen for their diſtinction between *actuals* and *poſſibles*, and for giving to poſſibilities an *eſſe cognitum*, though not an *eſſe actuale*. In the conception poſſibilities have an entity, or being, but not without the conception. "† It is a ridiculous conceit of a modern Atheiſtic

* Vol. i. p. 81.

† Dr Cudworth's intellectual ſyſtem, p. 731.

" writer, that univerſals are nothing elſe but names " attributed to many ſingular bodies; becauſe what- " ſoever *is*, is ſingular. For though whatſoever ex- " iſts without the mind be ſingular, yet it is plain " there are conceptions in our minds *objectively* uni- " verſal. Which univerſal objects of our mind, " though they exiſt not as ſuch any where without it, " yet are they not therefore nothing, but have an " intelligible entity, becauſe they are conceivable: " for ſince non-entity is not conceivable, whatſoever " is conceivable, and an object of the mind, is there- " fore ſomething." So far is knowledge from depending upon the exiſtence of ſingulars, that, properly ſpeaking, knowledge does not ariſe from them, nor depend upon them at all. Nothing more true than that of BOETHIUS, *Omne quod ſcitur, non ex ſua, ſed ex comprehendentium natura, vi, et facultate cognoſcitur.* " Whatever is known, is known not " by its own force and power, but by the force and " power, the vigour and activity of that thing itſelf " which knows and comprehends it." It is ſaid by ARISTOTLE, that " there is no knowledge, even of " the univerſal theorems of geometry, by ſenſe. For " if we could perceive by ſenſe, that the three " angles of a triangle are equal to two right; yet " ſhould we not reſt ſatisfied in this, as having a " ſufficient knowledge thereof, but we would ſeek " further after a demonſtration of it; ſenſe reach- " ing only to ſingulars, but knowledge to univer- " ſals."

" ſals." When from the univerſal or abſtracted idea of a triangle, which is neither here nor there, nor any where without our mind, but yet hath an *eſſe cognitum*, or intelligible entity, we ſee a plain neceſſity, that its three angles muſt be equal to two right angles; then, and not till then, do we know the truth of this univerſal theorem: and ſo we underſtand that every ſingular triangle hath this property in it. From which it follows, that the knowledge of this and the like truths is not derived from ſingulars; nor do we arrive at them by way of aſcent or induction; but, on the contrary, having firſt found them in generals and univerſals, we afterwards deſcending, apply them to particulars and ſingulars. Thus our knowledge is not derivatively from ſingulars, but in the order of nature before them. It is not only poſſible, but very probable, that there are not in actual exiſtence, any ſtraight lines, perfect circles, ſquares, or cubes, as anſwer to the exactneſs of our conceptions, nor ever will be; yet they are not therefore abſolute *non-entities*, becauſe we can demonſtrate things concerning them; and though but poſſibilities, yet are they the foundation of many mathematical and uſeful truths. It is ſo far therefore from being abſurd to reaſon about things poſſible, that the very firſt principles of mathematics are no more than ſuppoſitions and poſſibilities.

THOUGH his Lordſhip admits, that the human mind

mind can compound and decompound ideas; yet he maintains, that it cannot form any one ſimple idea; and therefore all our knowledge muſt be originally owing to outward objects. The mind, admitting it to be a fermentation of ſome material parts, (and his Lordſhip thinks it is), hath much more activity than the ſenſible objects which it perceives, and therefore is fitter to form ideas than they. I have an idea of my pen and of my paper; and this idea muſt either be formed by them, or by my mind. If made by them, my mind muſt be a paſſive recipient, and my pen and paper muſt have activity, power, and faculty of making thoſe ideas, not in themſelves, but in my mind. If it is otherwiſe with your or your Lord's underſtanding, all I have to ſay is, that our underſtandings differ eſſentially.

I do believe, that the Noble philoſopher is the firſt who hath advanced, that GOD makes poſſibilities. "* GOD," ſaith he, "made things actual, becauſe "he knew them; and why ſhould not I ſay, be- "cauſe he made them poſſible?" After ſaying this, you may ſay as much nonſenſe as you pleaſe. *Poſſible* and *impoſſible*, or *not poſſible*, are contradictions. And if *impoſſible* can become *poſſible*, then two contradictory propoſitions can both be true; and a thing may be and not be at the ſame time. When GOD makes things poſſible, it is by an act of the will; for

* Vol. i. p. 81.

underſtanding

underſtanding makes nothing, and theſe new-made poſſibilities remain only poſſibilities. And therefore, upon the ſuppoſition that GOD makes poſſibilities, he wills, and by his will produces nothing. The Noble author, without ſcruple, admits, that GOD, by one ſingle act of his almighty will, created, preſerves, and governs the univerſe. Before actual creation the whole ſyſtem was poſſible. It muſt have been abſolutely and independently poſſible, or it muſt have been made poſſible. The firſt is what I contend for. But if the ſecond takes place, that is, if the world was firſt made poſſible, then its exiſtence was not the effect of one ſingle volition, but of two. He had no occaſion to make poſſibility depend upon the will of GOD: for it is the object of his knowledge; and he ſays expreſsly, *It is the range of infinite knowledge.* A made poſſibility was not always a poſſibility; before, it was impoſſible, or not poſſible; and an impoſſibility or non-poſſibility is not an object even of divine omniſcience; and therefore it could not be made poſſible; for GOD did not make what he did not know. He muſt therefore have waited until

——*Ipſa dedit ſpecimen natura creandi.*

This is either his meaning, or he doth not underſtand what he ſays in another place, *viz.* "* We do not, "like reaſoners *a priori*, imagine what may have "been according to our abſtract reaſonings, and ſo

* Vol. v. p. 287.

"conclude

" conclude from poſſibility to actuality; we proceed " much more reaſonably from actuality to poſſibility, " in a method ſo often, and ſo abſurdly reverſed by " philoſophers." Philoſophers can anſwer for themſelves, by affirming, that it is abſolutely certain, that in any caſe, except one, they never do conclude, *Such a thing is poſſible, therefore it is actual.* The caſe excepted, is the poſſibility of one ſupreme Being, ſelf-exiſtent, and ſelf-ſufficient; and if ſuch a Being is poſſible, it muſt be actual, becauſe it cannot be made to be ſuch. And I leave the author to anſwer for his allowing nothing to be poſſible but what is actual, and for numberleſs contradictions; many of which are induſtrious and deſigned.

PHILOSOPHERS, after eſtabliſhing certain mathematical and moral truths upon abſtract conſiderations, " * aſſume," ſays he, " that theſe general notions " are natures independent on GOD, and in themſelves " of eternal neceſſity. GOD hath made triangles and " men; but triangularity, they ſay, and they might " juſt ſay as well humanity," (and why not?), " are " independent natures, antecedent to his will, and that " do not owe their original to arbitrary poſitive appoint- " ment. That there are neceſſary truths, mathemati- " cal and moral, and ſuch muſt be as long as there " are men, and as the preſent ſyſtem of things con- " tinues, is certain: but theſe would not perhaps be

* Vol. v. p. 58.

" called

" called eternal truths, nor would theſe notions be " repreſented like eternal independent natures, if it " was more conſidered, that the ſelf-exiſtent Being is " the fountain of all exiſtence; and that ſince every " thing ſubſiſts by his will, it muſt exiſt according to " his will. For which reaſon it ſeems as abſurd to " ſay, that when he made man, he could give him " no other nature than the human, which was before " neceſſarily, not abſtractly, given; as it would be to " ſay, that when he made a man, he did not make a " tree. A man with the properties of a tree, would " not be a man; a tree with the properties of a man, " would not be a tree. The ſame will which made " each, made the properties of each. It is one and " the ſame act; and to ſay, that the nature of any " thing, or the truths reſulting from it, are independ- " ent in any ſenſe on the will that made them, ſeems " to me therefore to imply a contradiction."

It hath been ſaid, and proved, that *eſſence* and *exiſtence* are not preciſely the ſame; and if any thing his Lordſhip ſays can give ſtrength to an opinion, (for he ſays and unſays at pleaſure), we have his word, that they are not preciſely the ſame; becauſe he ſays, that " God may deſtroy the thing, but he cannot " alter the *eſſence* of it." And if he cannot alter it, it cannot proceed from his arbitrary appointment, and muſt have been from eternity and to eternity the ſame in the divine mind. Dr Clarke ſays, that " the

" exiſtence of things depends upon the arbitrary will " of GOD; but when they are created, and as long " as they do exiſt, their proportions, reſpects, and " relations, are abſtractly of eternal neceſſity, accor- " ding to the different natures of things." And Lord BOLINGBROKE ſays, that " * GOD inſtituted mo- " ral obligations, when he made moral agents; that " the law of their nature, is the law of his will; and " that how indifferent ſoever we may preſume every " thing is to him before his will has determined it to " be, it becomes, after this determination, a neceſſa- " ry, though a created nature. Such juſtice is in " man, though in GOD it may be nothing more than " one mode of his infinite wiſdom. As long as there " are men, this nature muſt exiſt. Where it will be, " and what it will be, when they, and this moral ſyſtem " is at an end, let thoſe able perſons who know ſo " well where and what it was before they both be- " gan to exiſt, determine. The Platoniſts aſſume an " eternal morality, antecedent, not only to any ſignifi- " cation, but to any actual determination of the will " of GOD.——By this GOD publiſhed a moral law " when he made moral agents, but he was not proper- " ly the legiſlator. The law exiſted before them, " and it binds both him and them."

OF all this I do admit ſomething to be right, but much more I aſſert to be wrong. And I obſerve, *firſt*,

* Vol. v. p. 64.

That

That philoſophers, by abſtracting one property of a thing from another, take them all by turns into diſtinct conſideration; and by accuſtoming themſelves to ſuch abſtract conſiderations, they eſtabliſh certain mathematical and moral truths upon them.—That there are neceſſary truths, both mathematical and moral, and ſuch there muſt be as long as there are men, and the preſent circumſtances of things continue, is certain. Agreed. And I might ſuppoſe by this, that he hath loſt his averſion to *abſtraction* and to eternal truth. I obſerve, 2*dly*, That it is not true that any of theſe philoſophers aſſume, that theſe general *notions* are general *natures*. "Since philoſophers ab-"ſtract ſo well, that they do honour to themſelves, "and ſervice to mankind; and from their abſtracted "notions draw many neceſſary truths, both mathema-"tical and moral;" it is to repay good with evil, to refuſe them the uſe of the diſtinction between *abſtractum* and *concretum*. In the firſt caſe they ſay, and ſay juſtly, that thoſe notions which they call *eſſences*, (not natures), are neceſſary, eternal, and independent; but *in concreto*, or a ſtate of actuality, they are contingent and dependent. Theſe men called *philoſophers* (and great men they were) diſtinguiſhed likewiſe between *hypothetical* and *abſolute* neceſſity. In the firſt ſenſe they held *eſſences* to be neceſſary, and in the other contingent. Hypothetically, man while he exiſts, is *in concreto*, and neceſſarily too, a *reaſonable animal*; but *in abſtracto* he is abſolutely and neceſſa-

rily a reaſonable animal. I ſaid, that word EST, *it is*, in a third ſenſe, is put for the connection between the *ſubjectum* and the *prædicatum*, the ſubject and the attribute; and this, when done without reſpect to time, is *negatively* eternal; as, Man is a reaſonable animal: for man always was, and is, and always will be ſuch. But the connection between Mr MALLET and his philoſophy is but temporary, and therefore neither neceſſary nor eternal. Your Lord admits, that there are, and muſt be moral truths, as long as there are men. And Dr CLARKE ſays, that the exiſtence of things depends upon the arbitrary will of GOD; but when they are created, and as long as they exiſt, their proportions, reſpects, and relations, are abſtractly of eternal neceſſity, according to the different natures of things. The ſchoolmen aſked no more than this hypothetical neceſſity, and leſs cannot be allowed them.

HIS Lordſhip inſiſts, That as every thing exiſts by the will of GOD, it muſt exiſt in the way and manner in which he wills it to be. Certainly. For inſtance, if GOD makes a man, he makes a rational animal. This is the τὸ *εἶδος τοῦ*, the eſſence of the thing made and created. In a ſtate of actual exiſtence, this eſſence is ſomething poſitive, and therefore dependent on the will of the Creator; but not ſo in a ſtate of abſtraction. The connection, or rather the identity of a *reaſonable animal* with *man*, is neceſſary, independent,

ent, and eternal. By comparing PLATO with HOBBES, he rejects both their doctrines. He rejects that of HOBBES juſtly, in ſo far as he repreſents it; that is, that "there was no diſtinction made between "*juſt* and *unjuſt*, *moral good* and *moral evil*, till the "will of man made this diſtinction by civil conſtitu- "tions, and poſitive laws." But it will be found, though HOBBES acknowledged no law, no obligation, until human conſtitutions made law and obligation by authority and force, that he did admit the diſtinction between *juſt* and *unjuſt*, not as an obligation, but as a *rule*. And this Atheiſts do, and do conſiſtently with their principles. The fault he finds with PLATO, is, that though GOD publiſhed a moral law when he made moral agents, "yet he was not "properly the legiſlator. The law exiſted before "them, and it binds both him and them." The diſtinction between *juſt* and *unjuſt*, *right* and *wrong*, was as neceſſary, eternal, and independent of all appointment, as the equality of two and two to four. And though this was known to GOD, yet when he made moral agents, he made their knowledge of it a law to them; and by ſo doing he became very properly a legiſlator. If by this law binding him as well as them, he means, that GOD always acts according to the rectitude of his own nature, and cannot act otherwiſe, the meaning is good, though the expreſſion is indecent. And it derogates nothing from the majeſty and ſovereignty of the Almighty, that holineſs is one of his

his eſſential attributes. A monarch who knows the equity and iniquity of actions, and who makes laws for the practice of virtue, and for the avoiding vice and wickedneſs, is ſtill a legiſlator: and if he is a wiſe and a good prince, the ſame that ſerves his ſubjects as a law, ſerves himſelf as the rule of his behaviour. Thus ALMIGHTY GOD and righteous LORD, who knows and loves righteouſneſs, brings his intelligent creatures under a moral law, as ſoon as they become actually rational. His Lordſhip would have allowed, and I hope you will allow, that GOD is eſſentially holy, (and ſuch he is whether you allow it or not); and whenever he exerts his power, it is always in conſiſtency with this moſt glorious attribute. From the ſanctity of the Deity flows his approbation of morality, and our obligation to the practice of every good and reaſonable action. And GOD, in effect, ſays to all his reaſonable creatures, *Be ye holy, for I am holy.* Our holineſs is imperfect and contingent; but the holineſs of GOD is perfect, and as neceſſary as his being. His is the pattern, the archetype, the paradigma; and it becomes our duty to copy, tranſcribe, and imitate it as near as we can in all our actions. Becauſe we know that GOD is holy, a GOD of truth, and without iniquity, and that juſt and right is he; and that he therefore approves of all our moral doings, and even of our moral endeavours; it may be ſaid, that GOD's holineſs is to us a moral law, at leaſt the ſource of it: and ſince GOD wills, and acts ſuitably

to

to his holineſs, or moral attributes, and cannot act otherwiſe, the ſame rules by which he governs the moral world become a law to us. And therefore, ſince morality flows neceſſarily from the ſanctity of GOD, it is as neceſſary, eternal, and independent of his arbitrary appointment, as is his own being and eſſence. This I take to have been PLATO's opinion; and it is my opinion that his Lordſhip maintains a worſe.

FOR he imagines he hath found out a medium between PLATO's and HOBBES's doctrine. His words are, "* GOD inſtituted moral obligations when he "made moral agents; that the law of their nature "is the law of his will; and that how indifferent ſo-"ever we may preſume every thing is to him, be-"fore his will has determined it to be, it becomes, "after the determination, a neceſſary, though crea-"ted nature:" That is, upon ſuppoſition that GOD makes moral agents, it is neceſſary to bring them under moral obligations; but before theſe agents were made, morality and immorality were indifferent to the Deity. And how can any thing in itſelf and eternally indifferent, become neceſſary upon any new emergency whatever? And did not GOD, who made this reaſonable and moral agent, know that it was fit and reaſonable he ſhould be under a moral law? If he did not, then he acted at random. And if he did know it, then morality and immorality were not in-

* Vol. v. p. 62.

different

different to the Deity, before the exiſtence of theſe rational agents. If it is fit, if it is neceſſary, that every rational and intelligent creature ſhould act rationally and morally, and for that purpoſe come under a law; this is what GOD previouſly approved of. And if he approves of this rectitude in his intelligent creatures, it is becauſe he himſelf is eſſentially holy, and holy in all his works. From the works of GOD his Lordſhip learns the exiſtence and the will of the ſupreme Being, his infinite wiſdom and power. And if his argument *a poſteriori* is good, then our knowledge and approbation of what is good and juſt proves, that GOD knows and approves all goodneſs and juſtice. He knows and approves what is ſuch in all caſes, actual and poſſible, and we only in a few. But ſtill we know, even againſt our inclinations, that there is an unchangeable difference between right and wrong in general, and in many particular inſtances. His Lordſhip thinks it ſhocking impiety to aſſert, that GOD can command whatever he forbids, and forbid whatever he commands; and ſo do I; and yet I cannot ſee how this conſequence can be avoided, if it is true, that, before the creation of rational agents, equity and iniquity were in themſelves, and to the Deity, indifferent. A man who is ready to renounce his GOD, rather than believe that he ſtrengthens the hand of a parricide, when he plunges a dagger into the heart of a father, cannot imagine that the action, previouſly to the exiſtence of the

the murderer, was indifferent to the Deity. For my part, I am as confident, as I am certain of the being of GOD, that from eternity he diſapproved all ſuch horrid crimes.

THIS ſaying, "The law of our nature is the law of "GOD's will," appears to me to be an equivocation. I ſuppoſe that by the law of nature is by all underſtood, the law which our reaſon and underſtandings dictate to mankind for the rule of their righteous and moral behaviour; which, whether they obſerve or neglect, ſtill remains a law to them. The law of nature is the law which we diſcover by the light of nature; but the law of *our* nature may ſignify, and I believe he intends it ſhould ſignify, the ordinary courſe of human actions. It is his opinion, that GOD hath made man ſuch as he is, without obliging him to be another kind of creature, or to obſerve another conduct above his preſent make and conſtitution. It was the will of GOD he ſhould be ſuch; and as he is, ſo he acts. And thus the law of his nature becomes the law of GOD's will. An adventitious diſqualification to obſerve the law of GOD and nature, his Lordſhip ridicules. He was, during all the days of his life, ſuch as he was made; and if he was not a better and a more moral man, he could not be blamed. But I leave it to DAVID MALLET, Eſq; to reconcile this to the many faults which his conſcience accuſed him of. For it witneſſeth againſt you

and me, and all mankind, for falling ſhort of our duty.

He that challenges an equivocation, is obliged, by the rules of debate, to correct it with a diſtinction. And as I have ſaid, there is an equivocation in theſe words, *The law of our nature is the law of* God's *will*; I offer, in my defence, a double acceptation of the will of God. It is commonly ſaid, that God wills things to be, when he makes things which were not before. And in this ſenſe his Lordſhip uſes it frequently. For inſtance, "God only knows how "many ſorts of beings his omnipotent will hath "made." Another ſenſe of the will of God is that whereby he commands ſuch of his creatures as are intelligent and rational, capable to underſtand and to obey, to obſerve ſuch a conduct and behaviour as they diſcover to be preſcribed and appointed by divine authority. This my author likewiſe admits. This I call the legiſlative and *imperative* will of God; and the other I call his *operative* will. When my author ſays, that the law of our nature is the law of God's will, he underſtands his *operative* will, and can underſtand no other. The law of nature, and the law of *our* nature, are different things. The one is the courſe and tenor of the human life, and the other the dictates of right reaſon. This is ſo perfect and complete, that the obſervation of it would render our ſtate truly paradiſaical. This the author admits

mits it would effect in ſpeculation, but in practice it would place man in a higher rank than he is fitted or deſigned for. But as for the law of *our* nature, which he abuſively calls the law of GOD's will, being only the effect of his operative will, it is not tranſgreſſible. As the nature of the vegetative part of the univerſe, and of the animal ſyſtem, continues the ſame; ſo, according to my author's plan, doth the human and rational continue the ſame which they were originally, beyond the power of thoſe beings to make any alteration. His Lordſhip objects againſt the law delivered by MOSES, That it hath proved more ineffectual than any other law that can be quoted. And if this be aſcribed to the hardneſs of the heart, and obſtinacy of the people, to ſave the honour of the law; this honour will be little ſaved, and its divinity ill maintained. " * The excuſe " might be admitted in the caſe of any human law; " but we ſpeak here of a law ſuppoſed to be dictated " by divine wiſdom, which ought and would have " been able, if it had been ſuch, to keep in a ſtate " of ſubmiſſion to it, even a people rebellious and " obſtinate enough to break through any other." If this is true, then the law which men break cannot be the law of GOD. Therefore, according to this philoſopher, whether the will of GOD be *operative* or *imperative*, it muſt be irreſiſtible. How happy and ſafe are you, DAVID MALLET, Eſq; in this opinion?

* Vol. v. p. 362.

If you tranſgreſs any law, if you make void all that other men account obligation, your very tranſgreſſion proves, that it is not, nor can be the law of GOD, though it may be one of the dictates of right reaſon. All your buſineſs is to follow your nature, lead whither it will. But mean time pleaſe to know, that you then ceaſe to be a rational, a free, and a moral agent. And believe this if you are able. You make no account of the *imperative* will of GOD; and that your great principle, That the will of GOD is only to be learned from his works, amounts only to his operative will. Thus, from firſt to laſt, your reaſoning from the works to the will of GOD, is but a *paralogiſm*, or rather a moſt fraudulent *ſophiſm*.

"As long as there are men, this nature" (that is, the nature upon which truth and righteouſneſs is founded) "muſt exiſt. Where it will be, and what "it will be, when this moral ſyſtem is at an end, "let thoſe able perſons who know ſo well where "and what it was before they both began to exiſt, "determine." If there were no intelligent, rational creatures, no moral agents, the exerciſe of all moral virtues muſt ceaſe. But it is an immutable truth, that ſuch creatures owe obedience to GOD's will, upon ſuppoſition of their exiſtence. That virtue and vice, equity and iniquity, are contradiſtinguiſhed, and that what is wrong cannot become right, is certain. As the equality of two and two to four, is not

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a made truth by comparing, but upon comparing is found to be ſuch; ſo juſtice is not a made virtue by judging, but by judging is found ſuch. And neither juſtice, nor the equality of two and two to four, are made ſuch by arbitrary appointment. And therefore there is eternal truth, and eternal righteouſneſs. This his Lordſhip inadvertently admits, when he maintains that GOD cannot make a rational creature, without bringing him under a moral law. "As long as "there are men, the law of nature muſt exiſt." Becauſe it is commonly ſaid, that truth and righteouſneſs were eternally in the divine mind; to cut off this reſource of the eternity and independency of them, he ſays, "Juſtice in man may be a mode of divine "wiſdom." But as he ſays much to the ſame purpoſe, or the ſame thing very often, I ſhall defer an examination of this extraordinary doctrine, until I come to the conſideration of GOD's moral attributes. Againſt all I have ſaid, this Noble philoſopher hath a capital anſwer in reſerve, That it amounts to no more than to the delirium and blaſphemy of metaphyſics. To which I return no other anſwer, than, had he underſtood *ontology*, which is properly metaphyſics, he had not committed ſo many faults in his natural religion.

IT is a pity his Lordſhip had been ſo idle as to write ſo much to no purpoſe. As he declined deciding a preceding queſtion between DESCARTES and

and his oppofers, he here again concludes to the very fame purpofe. " * If I infift much on this point, " I do not pretend to clear it of all the difficulties " that lie in the way, neither by what is faid here, " nor by what hath been faid elfewhere, nor by " what I may fay hereafter. There are many on " either fide that have perplexed, and may continue " to perplex better heads than mine. But, in the " firft place, I feel an infuperable repugnancy to " own that any thing is independent on GOD; and, " in the next place, I am fhocked at the confequen- " ces that are drawn from this doctrine." His feelings are for himfelf, and he ought to allow others the fame privilege. GOD's being and attributes, phyfical and moral, do not depend on his arbitrary will; and whatever neceffarily flows from them, is independent likewife. But morality, as hath been proved, flows neceffarily from the holinefs of the fupreme Being, and is therefore independent on his arbitrary will and appointment. We, with all our faculties, and all our knowledge, depend upon GOD, and particularly our knowledge of *right* and *wrong*, *juft* and *unjuft*. But right and wrong do not depend upon GOD's will and appointment. GOD eflentially and neceffarily approves whatever is good and true, and difapproves whatever is falfe and evil morally. It is therefore plain, that his Lordfhip doth not fpeak with precifion, when he fays, he feels an infuperable repugnancy to own that any thing is independent

* Vol. v. p. 62.

on

on GOD. For all the creation, all his doings *ad extra*, depend entirely on his good will and pleaſure; but *true* and *falſe*, *right* and *wrong*, are founded in the divine ſanctity, and therefore are as independent on his will as his own being. He is the *ſuprema ratio*. From this all right reaſon is derived. His only is the knowledge and the authority, to lay his intelligent creatures under an obligation to be holy, as he is holy. Morality is one thing, and our obligation to practiſe it is another. The firſt we know as a capital and fundamental truth; a truth, I may ſay, indelibly imprinted on the human mind. Morality in itſelf, that is, juſtice, goodneſs, and truth, is independent on GOD's will. But our obligation to be moral and holy, is founded in divine dominion and authority, and imperative will and command promulgated by our own reaſon and underſtanding. Whatever your Lord ſaw, or you ſee, I ſee no inſuperable difficulty in this deciſion. But as he ſees many on both ſides of the queſtion, he ought to have treated thoſe who differed from him with more reſpect than he hath done; and particularly Dr CLARKE, who, in my opinion, had a better head than his own. The conſequences that follow from the ſuppoſition, That the equity and iniquity of actions were indifferent in the divine mind, before the conſtitution of any moral ſyſtem, is, by his own confeſſion, ſhocking impiety; and nothing follows from the other ſide of the queſtion that can give offence to the moſt pious underſtanding.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

Of morality, and the moral law.

I HAVE obſerved, that Lord BOLINGBROKE lays down as a principle, That the will of GOD is to be learned from his works, and that there is no other way of knowing it; and from this concludes no more than his wiſdom and power. I did ſay, that this principle of his hath two faults. *1ſt*, That it is not the only way to know the will of GOD; and, *2dly*, That it is not the direct and immediate way. I have done with the firſt; and I hope to diſcuſs the ſecond in fewer words. His Lordſhip ſhould have diſtinguiſhed between *ſkill* and *wiſdom*. Formerly ſuch philoſophers as you admitted no more than *knowledge* and *power* to be learned from the works of GOD; but, in place of knowledge, you have ſhuffled in the word *wiſdom*, but inconſiſtently with your ſcheme or ſyſtem of natural religion, *alias* Atheiſm. It will be eaſily admitted, that the make of the world, as far as we know, doth diſplay the wonderful and amazing ſkill of the artificer, and a power in proportion. But wiſdom conſiſts not in the work, but in the uſe and end for which it is made. An architect builds a houſe which ſpectators take for an hoſpital. The edifice is exquiſitely finiſhed. This ſhews that he hath ſkill; but it is the end and uſe of the erection that ſhews his wiſdom.

wiſdom. The material parts of the creation, however ſo well fitted and adapted to one another, cannot paſs for their ultimate end and uſe. The deſign of the grand artificer muſt go beyond the order and ſymmetry of the fabric. The hoſpital mentioned was not made for ſhew, but ſuppoſed to be for the benefit and accommodation of the poor and indigent. The work in that caſe would be morally good. Were the building, by its beauty, ſo contrived, as to inſnare inhabitants, in order to cruſh them under its ſudden ruin; the end would be bad, and the action morally evil. To do good, is wiſdom; and to do evil, is weakneſs and folly. Therefore, before you can prove the wiſdom of GOD from his works, you muſt prove, that they are finally intended for holy and good purpoſes; good for himſelf, or good for others. He is eternally and eſſentially happy, and can receive no addition to his happineſs from all the works that he hath made; it muſt therefore be good for others; for ſuch beings as know what is good, and what is evil; that is, for intelligent and reaſonable creatures. And can any man, for the Noble author, ſearch out the ALMIGHTY and his works unto perfection? This earth, and its rational inhabitants, is the part of the creation we are beſt acquainted with. All the moral and rational inhabitants he puts upon the ſame level. The beſt and the worſt of men he places within the reach of the wheels and ſprings of the mechanical fabric, that keep their fated courſe, ſometimes for the preſervation, and ſometimes

for the deſtruction of the inhabitants. Famine and peſtilence, inundations and earthquakes, ſweep away into nothing millions of reaſonable animals, without difference and diſtinction. The author, who refuſes theſe multitudes any future life, and places individuals below the care of divine providence, cannot poſſibly from the works conclude the wiſdom of GOD. But if this ſurpaſſes his ſkill in philoſophy, he hath found out a very ſhort conceit, to prove, that all the world is wiſely made, by ſubſuming, that GOD is infinitely wiſe. This is a ſhameful, and even a ſtupid begging the queſtion. He undertakes to prove the wiſdom of GOD from his works; and becauſe he cannot do it, he puts the intended conſequence in place of the antecedent, and proves from that, that the world is wiſely made.

IT is in GOD's dealings with the rational part of the creation that he can be ſaid to do either good or evil. And if the Noble philoſopher will take in his brethren the beaſts, and make them ſuſceptible of moral government, and ſenſible of the obligations incumbent on them to do their duty to GOD and to their fellow-animals, he cannot make the divine wiſdom any thing more apparent. They all go the ſame way into a ſtate of eternal inſenſibility. If the beaſts have leſs reaſon and underſtanding than men, they have leſs concern for their loſs, and leſs anxiety for the preſervation of life. The lamb licks the hand that holds the knife lifted

lifted up for its deſtruction: but I have ſeen inſtances of dread and horror raiſed in breaſts thought brave, by the apprehenſion of approaching diſſolution; and I have heard, that a Noble philoſopher, for fear of death, died mad and diſtracted. Not ſo died MAHOMET EFFENDI, condemned for Atheiſm at Conſtantinople, who ſcorned to tell a lie to ſave his life. I am very ſure that his Lordſhip, in his philoſophical works, hath told ſeveral for a meaner purpoſe, if induſtrious and deſigned contradictions can be reckoned lies. The difference between EFFENDI's caſe and his Lordſhip's was, that EFFENDI was condemned by the civil magiſtrate, and his Lordſhip by his own conſcience. *The ſpirit of a man will ſuſtain his infirmity; but a wounded ſpirit who can bear?*

THE author, who reduces all the divine attributes into wiſdom and power, and who, inſtead of proving wiſdom from the works of GOD, only proves his ſkill and knowledge, can never diſcover from them the will of GOD as a law which we are bound to obey. And when he attempts any thing of this kind, (and I think he doth it twice), he preſently paſſes from the works to the neceſſary exiſtence and infinite perfection of the ſupreme Being. I have ſaid, and proved *, that morality hath no relation to the works of nature or art, let them be ever ſo exquiſite. The author whom I have examined had ſaid †, "A ſtate

* Eſtimate, p. 97. † Lord Kaims's Eſſays, p. 136.

" of nature is repreſented by all writers as a ſtate of " war, nothing going on but rapine and bloodſhed. " From this picture of the firſt men, one would be " apt to conclude, that man by nature is a wild and " rapacious animal, little better than a beaſt of prey, " but for his inclination to ſociety, which moulds " him gradually into a rational creature. And from " this original ſtate of mankind, it would ſeem, that " moral virtues are not natural, but acquired by " means of education in a well-regulated ſociety; " in a word, that the whole moral part of our ſyſtem " is artificial." This he ſtates as an objection againſt what he ſaid concerning the moral ſenſe. To which he returns for anſwer what ſtrengthens the objection: " Savages, being conſcious of nothing but diſorder " and ſenſual impulſe within, cannot be conſcious of " any thing better without them. Society teaches " mankind ſelf-denial and improves the moral ſenſe. " Diſciplined in ſociety, the taſte for order and regu- " larity unfolds itſelf.——And thus to ſociety we " owe all the bleſſings of life, and particularly the " knowledge of GOD." The Honourable author remits mankind to learn morality from one another. And certain it is, if they have not previous knowledge of right and wrong, all muſt be founded on cuſtom and practice. What I have further remarked, I forbear to tranſcribe.

HIS Lordſhip of BOLINGBROKE pretends to learn the

the will of GOD from his works. Were all the material world as open to his underſtanding as the ſurface of my paper is to my eye, no concluſion could thence be drawn for the government of rational creatures. I do not think, that he takes the mere material and animal parts of the creation for his teachers. Intelligences ſuperior to himſelf he is not acquainted with. Men alone muſt be his maſters. Theſe he knows not ſo well as he doth himſelf. Leſs therefore ſhould he truſt to their practice, than to his own underſtanding. I recommend it to you, DAVID MALLET, Eſq; to conſult your own reaſon and underſtanding, as the ſureſt and only way (for you refuſe revelation) to know the will of GOD, as the law which you are bound to obey. His Lordſhip talks of learning the will of GOD by experience. And what experience can he have of morality or the will of GOD, but by the conſequences of actions? Were every good and moral action attended with good and happy temporal conſequences, and every evil and immoral doing attended with bad and hurtful conſequences in this life, (for he doth not admit another), he might learn morality by his own practice. But all the world knows that this is abſolutely falſe.

BESIDES, to meaſure the morality of actions by the advantage and profit ariſing from them, Lord SHAFTESBURY holds not only to be mean and ſordid, but alſo reaſon ſufficient to deſtroy the worth and value

value of them. Certain it is, that morality is good and reasonable, let the consequences be what they will; and that GOD is to be obeyed without reserve. In close contradiction to this, his Lordship says, "* The morality of actions does not, I think, consist in this, that they are prescribed by will, even "the will of GOD; but in this, that they are the "means, however imposed the practice of them may "be, of acquiring happiness agreeable to our nature." And he says, "† When we have reasoned *a posteriori*, "from the works to the will of GOD, and from the "constitution of the system wherein we are placed "by him to our interest and duty in it, we shall have "laid the foundation of morality on a rock. Let us "trust to pure intellect less than we are advised, and "to our senses more." I can allow, that morality, that is, goodness, justice, and truth, are such antecedently to the will of GOD; such in themselves, because they flow from his essential holiness: and though his Lordship doth not conceive how the practice of these virtues may be imposed, I do conceive that it is the will of GOD that brings us under the obligation, and not that which we may esteem our happiness in this life. If every man is left judge of what will make him happy, and if his happiness is the first and only rule of morality, I am convinced that nothing can have a more precarious foundation than virtue. And for that rocky foundation which

* Vol. ii. p. 290. † Vol. iii. p. 384.

his

his Lordſhip lays for morality, our intereſt and duty as we find them in the ſyſtem wherein we are placed, it is but a foundation for every wicked and profitable work. Intereſt is the leading principle; and if there is any ſubſequent duty, it is only to purſue it. And can any man have worſe principles, than to make, or juſtify his making, his temporal intereſt and advantage take place of every conſideration? Mr MALLET, do, renounce ſuch villanous philoſophy, for the ſake of your honour and reputation. GOD hath made us reaſonable creatures, and ſuch he made Lord BOLINGBROKE; but it was not GOD, but he himſelf, who made him a vitious and immoral man. As we are reaſonable creatures, we are the work of GOD; from which we may conclude, that it is his will that we act and live reaſonably. It is our reaſon then that diſcovers to us morality, and the moral law. But we muſt not miſtake our own works for the works of GOD, and reaſon from them, that it is his will that we ſhould principally and only conſult our temporal advantage in the ſyſtem in which we are placed. Had GOD made us ſuch as the beaſts, only with animal inſtincts, it had been vain in us to have attempted a higher life. It is the will of GOD that beaſts ſhould live as beaſts, for he hath made them beaſts: but if men make themſelves beaſts, and worſe than beaſts, it is their own will, and not his, that they live as ſuch.

IT is ſomething extraordinary, that a ſtir ſhould be held

held about the nature and origin of morality, and the means of knowing it. One may as well pretend not to ſee, when his eyes are open and well diſpoſed, the object at a due diſtance, and the medium duly enlightened; as to pretend, that the knowledge of *right* and *wrong*, *juſt* and *unjuſt*, depends on a courſe of natural philoſophy, or on a long obſervation of the practice of mankind. This piece of knowledge is eſſential to all rational beings. In men it begins with reaſon, if not before it, and continues while almoſt every other thing is forgot. It is poſſible a man may work himſelf up into a diſbelief of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, and even into Atheiſm; but it is not in his power to raſe out of his mind the diſtinction between the equity and iniquity of actions: nor can he hinder himſelf to judge thoſe actions that are right and equal, to be praiſe-worthy and rewardable; and ſuch actions as are bad and unjuſt, to be contemptible, hateful, and puniſhable. Without offence to Mr MALLET's, and to all other antichriſtian ears, on this head I may quote the Apoſtle PAUL: * *The Gentiles not having the law, were a law unto themſelves; which ſhew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conſcience alſo bearing witneſs, and their thoughts the mean while accuſing, or elſe excuſing one another.* To make amends for any offence this quotation may give, I add the δικαιον εμψυχον of ARISTOTLE. Conſcience, that is, conſcious know-

* Rom. ii. 14. 15.

ledge,

ledge, we have in ourſelves, without ſeeking it abroad; and we therefore know *right* from *wrong*, as we know our own underſtanding.

THOUGH the knowledge of *right* and *wrong* is eſſential to all rational beings, I do acknowledge, that this doth not become a law, nor acquire the force of obligation, until we conſider ourſelves, our underſtanding, and other faculties, and particularly this our knowledge of morality and immorality, as owing to GOD. We then learn, that it is his will and command, that we live ſoberly, righteouſly, and godly; and that we practiſe every virtue, and decline every vice; and that in all caſes, all times, and all circumſtances, without regard to our temporal advantage or diſadvantage, we ſhould act according to the dictates of right reaſon, and lead our lives in all godlineſs and honeſty. Thus, what is improperly called the law of nature, becomes the law of GOD. To be a creature, and to be dependent on GOD the Creator, is the ſame. Every creature depends according to its nature. Man muſt depend on GOD, not only as an animal, but as a rational animal; and as ſuch he cannot depend without being ſubjected to a law. Therefore to be rational, and to be a ſubject of GOD's moral government, is the ſame thing.

I did ſay, that the morality of an action is one thing, and our obligation to practiſe it is another;

and now I diſtinguiſh between *morality* and the *moral law.* Morality is acknowledged by Atheiſts and Deiſts; but a moral law cannot be acknowledged by any one who does not believe himſelf a ſubject of the ſupreme Being. The dictates of right reaſon are common to all reaſonable creatures, and in ſo far they have a common influence on the conduct and behaviour of all men. And this makes place for another diſtinction, too little obſerved by philoſophers, between a *rule* and a *law.* This I have already ſet in a clear and diſtinct light *; to which I now add two authorities; one from the rules of the civil law, *viz. Regula juris non eſt jus*; "A rule of law is not law:" and the other is that of HOBBES, as quoted by the Noble author †; "who, though he acknowledged "right reaſon to be the rule, would not allow it to "be the law of human actions." Whether HOBBES was an Atheiſt or not, his Lordſhip did not know: but I know very well, that the law of nature can be no more to an Atheiſt than a rule. And this my author, and many better philoſophers than he, do miſtake. "‖ An Atheiſt," ſaith his Lordſhip, "may "think and call the law of nature, a law impoſed "on him by the operation of a ſuperior, though un-"intelligent power; the courſe of which he cannot "alter, and therefore muſt conform himſelf to it,

* Eſtimate, § iv. & x.
† Vol. iii. p. 419.
‖ Vol. ii. p. 291.

"in

" in order to be happy. And ſomething of this kind " even GROTIUS himſelf was forced to allow, a " little unwillingly, when he ſaid, *Et hæc quidem " locum aliquem haberent, etiamſi daremus non eſſe " Deum.*" The author underſtands Atheiſm as little as he does religion, when he makes the knowledge of *right* and *wrong* in an Atheiſt, the effect of the operations of a ſuperior unintelligent power: for chance and fatality exclude the operations of ſuperior cauſes, whether intelligent or unintelligent. The Atheiſt's unintelligent power and cauſe that impoſes on him a natural law, nonſenſe as it is, anſwers the purpoſe of morality juſt as well as his Lordſhip's belief of a ſupreme Being of knowledge and power, but wanting every moral perfection. The Atheiſt cannot alter the courſe of things; and therefore conforms himſelf to it, that he may be happy. The author's GOD hath eſtabliſhed general laws with regard to individuals; theſe laws his Lordſhip cannot alter, and therefore he conforms himſelf to them, that he may be happy: and his happineſs and the Atheiſt's is of the ſame kind and duration. If there is any difference betwixt the author's philoſophy and that of an Atheiſt, it conſiſts in ſpeculation, and ſuch a ſpeculation as occaſions no difference in their conduct and behaviour.

HAD his Lordſhip peruſed the paſſage quoted from GROTIUS with attention, he muſt have obſerved, that

he very willingly admitted, that the knowledge of *good* and *evil*, *right* and *wrong*, takes ſome place with an Atheiſt, and brings him under a reaſon, or (if you will have it) a rational obligation to act morally. The author, *great* by name, but much greater by abilities, draws it as a corollary from what he had ſaid, and what he might have omitted, had he not thought it an uſeful truth. However, I can eaſily excuſe the voluminous philoſopher for not obſerving, that GROTIUS doth not ſay a word of *obligation*, until he had firſt eſtabliſhed GOD's authority and dominion over us: for it hath eſcaped acuter writers, and ſome who have wrote as his commentators. Lord BOLINGBROKE yields this point to GROTIUS, by aſſerting, that "the morality of actions does not conſiſt in this, that they are preſcribed by will, even "the will of GOD;" without obſerving, that this overturns his whole ſyſtem of morality from the foundation. The capital point which he labours moſt to prove, is, That truth and righteouſneſs do depend on the arbitrary will of the ſupreme Being. But, ſays he, the morality of actions conſiſts in this, That they are the means, however impoſed the practice of them may be, (whether theſe actions take their riſe from an intelligent or unintelligent power), of acquiring happineſs agreeably to our nature. At this rate, the morality of an Atheiſt and the morality of his Lordſhip is juſt the ſame, and equally inforced, not by any authority, but a deſire of happineſs.

AFTER

After all the pains his Lordſhip hath taken to ſettle his principles of morality, he is not able to ſpeak ſenſe on the ſubject. The Atheiſt may have regard to natural differences, and to acting or not acting according to them. I allow he may. But I deſire to be excuſed in not joining with the author in what immediately follows. "The Atheiſt may ſee, "that human actions, conſidered abſtractly from all "relations, circumſtances, and conſequences, might "be deemed abſolutely indifferent; yet no human "action can be ſo conſidered." The Atheiſt may therefore perform an impoſſibility, and conſider things in a way in which they cannot be conſidered. If this is ill worded, his *therefore* ſubjoined is as ill placed. "The Atheiſt *therefore* may think himſelf under an "obligation of intereſt, though he acknowledges no "divine legiſlator." He means, or he ought to mean, an obligation to live morally: and this is as it happens. For he may occaſionally think it his intereſt, even to break a promiſe, and betray his truſt. In which caſe, all his philoſophy of right and wrong, and all his rational morality, muſt yield to his temporal intereſt and advantage. If the principles and practice of Atheiſts were not too well known, his Lordſhip would deſerve thanks for informing the world, "that the advantages and diſadvantages an-"nexed, by natural conſequence, to the obſervation "or breach of the law of nature, without believing "a law in the ſtrict ſenſe of the word, but believing

"an

" an obligation in the ſtricteſt, do determine him. And " it is manifeſt, that no other conſideration can, " nor, on his principles, ought to determine him." The law of nature, then, lays the Atheiſt under no obligation. For, *1ſt*, It is ſtrictly and properly no law to him. And, *2dly*, His own intereſt, of which he himſelf is the only judge, lays him under the ſtricteſt obligation. As he that hath not the beſt right, hath no right at all; ſo the ſtricteſt obligation diſſolves and unties all others. And, *3dly*, His Lordſhip acknowledges in ſo many words, that it is manifeſt, that no other conſideration (but ſelf-intereſt) can, nor, on his principles, ought to determine him. And to what purpoſe then doth his knowledge of the law of nature, of right and wrong, of morality and immorality, of the equity and iniquity of actions, ſerve? The grand and nobleſt faculty of the mind, by which we diſcover the difference between *right* and *wrong*, or rather perceive implanted in our underſtanding, becomes entirely uſeleſs, and ſuperfluous, and troubleſome to every one who diſregards the impreſſion. For if this knowledge hath any place in the human underſtanding, I mean of an Atheiſt, it is only in ſubſerviency and ſubordination to what he eſteems his temporal intereſt.

THE Noble author, averſe to differ from the Atheiſt, freely acknowledges that the Theiſt, that is, he himſelf, " is determined by the ſame advantages " and

" and diſadvantages, ſtill more ſtrongly." If it happens, that no temporal advantages attend the practice of morality, then it takes no place with him. But if what he eſteems an advantage or happineſs, attends immorality, then the Atheiſt and he act upon the ſame principles. The difference mentioned is really none. *His advantages determine him more ſtrongly*, " becauſe he looks upon them as annexed, not only " by natural conſequence, but by poſitive and di- " vine appointment." Is not an annexation by natural conſequence, and an annexation by poſitive and divine appointment, the ſame, if GOD is the author of the eſtabliſhed courſe of nature? But however annexed the conſequences of action are to the action, it is certain, that they come alike to the Atheiſt and to the Theiſt, in this life; and neither his Lordſhip, nor you, nor the Atheiſt, expect another. If there are no worldly advantages at all attending moral actions, or if the advantages of immorality exceed thoſe of morality, you find yourſelf diſcharged from the practice of the firſt, and indulged, or rather injoined, the practice of the ſecond. And thus you make GOD authoriſe your obedience or diſobedience to the moral law, as it ſerves your purpoſe. For if your advantage is the fundamental and formal reaſon or motive of your actions, then GOD cannot command one and forbid another action, but in ſo far as they are ſubſervient to what you imagine your happineſs. GOD doth not ſay, *Be ye holy*, that ye may be happy; but,

Be

Be ye happy, that ye may *be holy*. His Lordſhip ſpeaks of morality in an Atheiſt as a duty; but it is only a duty owing to himſelf, and not to GOD. And this the Atheiſt does as well as he. All Theiſts who believe themſelves the ſubjects of GOD's moral government, look upon the dictates of right reaſon, or the rule of right, of juſtice, goodneſs, and truth, that is, the law of nature, as the law of GOD, unchangeable, (and ſuch the Noble author admits it to be); which they are bound to obey without reſerve, let the conſequences in this life be what they will. It is their perſuaſion, that inſtead of temporal advantages binding cloſer and ſtricter than this law, they look upon them as of no force, and no diſcharge of their obedience. Like the good ſubjects of a temporal ſovereign, they refer the conſequences of their obedience to divine providence; and truſt themſelves to the diſpoſal of their ſovereign Lord and Lawgiver, who can and will provide a better for them than they can do for themſelves. Whereas Atheiſts and his Lordſhip treat the law of nature worſe than it becomes ſubjects to treat the laws of an earthly ſovereign. He requires obedience without ſubmitting to them the perſonal and public advantages that may attend it. For were they left judges of the expediency or inexpediency of the law, it would be no more a law, and he neither ſovereign nor lawgiver. But whatever you or the Atheiſt may imagine, GOD hath not, nay, cannot, ſurrender his moral government

ment into your hands, nor allow you to change or abrogate his immutable law.

It is not eaſy to underſtand the Noble author's meaning in theſe words. "Whatever actions are naturally good or evil, muſt appear to the Theiſt to "be ſo morally. They derive their particular nature from the conſtitution of our ſyſtem. They "might not have been what they are, if this ſyſtem "had not been what it is. And this ſyſtem had not "been what it is, if God, who made it, had not "willed that it ſhould be ſo." The doctrine of a ſyſtem runs through all his philoſophical works, as if it were a ſettled point not to be miſtaken; and yet what he means by it, I have not been able to underſtand, with any kind of preciſion. Sometimes it is the whole univerſe, conſiſting of parts connected with, and depending on one another. Of which, notwithſtanding the aſſiſtance of modern aſtronomers, he knows as little of the morality or immorality of the inhabitants of the viſible and inviſible heavens, as I do. At other times this ſyſtem is reſtricted to our terreſtrial planet. And what leſſon of morality did he learn from verdant fields and azure ſkies, from ſpreading oaks and large rivers, from ſtupendous mountains and impending precipices? or did the beaſts of the field, the fowls of the air, or the fiſh of the water, teach him his duty to God, and to his own ſpecies? Therefore his ſyſtem, with which our

moral doings are connected, is reſtricted to rational beings, and particularly to what he calls the *human ſyſtem*. He travelled far to ſearch out what is only found at home. Taking his Lordſhip's ſyſtem to ſignify *human nature*, (and to take it in any other ſenſe, is impertinent), he ſays, actions morally good had not been ſuch, if our ſyſtem, that is, human nature, had not been what it is. I allow him, if God had not made man a rational creature, he had not been a moral agent, nor under a moral law. But on ſuppoſition that he is what he is, (and no more is contended for by metaphyſicians, than a hypothetical neceſſity), he is immutably and eternally bound to conform his actions to the dictates of right reaſon. This is far from the author's meaning. He ſuppoſes that God can make a ſyſtem of creatures, in which what with us is accounted *moral*, ſhall with them be eſteemed *immoral*, and immorality ſhall paſs for morality, and virtue for vice, and vice for virtue, and both with equal good reaſon. Reaſoners *a priori*, with whom he finds fault for teaching what God may or may not, can or cannot do, never were guilty of ſuch horrid blaſphemy as this, That our holy God, our God of truth and without iniquity, who is eſſentially juſt and right, can, if he pleaſes, eſtabliſh iniquity by a law. The abſurdity of this doctrine is equal to the blaſphemy of it. For it may be as well ſuppoſed, that God can make a ſyſtem wherein creatures, ſuch as we, or creatures far ſu-

perior

perior to us in intelligence, ſhall neceſſarily and truly judge, that two and two are unequal to four. This the author may as eaſily digeſt, as he does GOD's power to make what is abſolutely impoſſible to become poſſible. His memory is no better than his judgment. From the make of the mundane ſyſtem, he concludes GOD's infinite wiſdom and power; and from infinite wiſdom and power, he concludes the world could not have been better nor worſe made; and from this he muſt allow me to conclude, that, according to his principles, the preſent ſyſtem cannot be altered, nor a new ſyſtem made another way. He hath ſaid, that morality doth not conſiſt in this, that it is preſcribed by will, even the will of GOD. Let his Lordſhip make as many ſyſtems as he can imagine, they muſt be the effect of will: and as morality doeſ not conſiſt in being preſcribed by will, it cannot with them be changed or altered. He further adds, "that upon ſuppoſition "of eternal differences and independent natures," that is, as I would word it, upon ſuppoſition of eternal truth and righteouſneſs, "it would ſtill be true, "that the will of GOD conſtitutes the obligation of "duty." I do admit, and I have proved, that it is the will of GOD that conſtitutes our obligation to act morally. But it is his eſſential holineſs from which morality flows, not by an act of his arbitrary will, but by a neceſſary conſequence. And therefore it is the will, and muſt be the will of GOD, that all rational

beings conform their actions to the rule of juſtice and equity. GOD, by making the human ſyſtem, did not then, and not until then, make a difference between *juſt* and *unjuſt*; nor did he conſider all actions previouſly to the creation of the human race, to be in themſelves indifferent. From eternity he approved of what is good and juſt; and could not diſapprove or diſregard it, without becoming himſelf an unholy and an unjuſt being. If he hath pleaſure in the works of his hands, (and no doubt he hath pleaſure in whatever he does), no ſyſtem of rational creatures, whether actual or poſſible, but muſt be ſubject to his moral government.

WHOEVER overlooks the duty he owes to GOD, will be found to build morality without a foundation. His Lordſhip ſays, "GOD appears in his works, and "from eaſy deductions of our knowledge of them, "to be the firſt, ſelf-exiſtent, intelligent cauſe, a "being of infinite wiſdom and power; and there-"fore an object to all rational creatures, not of cu-"rioſity, but of awe, reverence, of adoration, of "gratitude, of obedience, and reſignation." In no ſyſtem therefore whatever can rational creatures be freed from their duty to GOD, nor from the obſervation of the law of nature. I know that ſome diſtinguiſh between morality and piety. By this they underſtand the duties immediately owing to GOD, and by that the duties which men owe to one another. In

place

place of *piety* I ſhould chuſe the word *godlineſs*, as of more reſtricted and preciſe ſignification. With this the author is not much concerned. He rather ſeems to mock than recommend devotion, when he ridicules prayer, and inſinuates, that to give audience to all at all times, is a trouble that GOD cannot take upon him. As GOD's eſſential holineſs is the ſource of all morality, of all ſolitary and ſocial, of all public and private virtues, they muſt be conſidered as ſo many acts of obedience to the divine will; and as an acknowledgment of his dominion over us, and of our ſubjection to his moral government. If we are godly, if we are ſober, if we are ſocial, we ſhould always have in our thoughts, that it is the will of GOD we ſhould be ſuch. This ſhould be our perpetual and principal motive, in order to be really religious. Take any other conſideration or motive as the ground of our moral and rational doings, and they will in many caſes be found inſufficient to inforce the practice of them. For inſtance, his Lordſhip makes the ſocial duties, and the bleſſings of ſociety, man's principal duty and happineſs. I have already made appear, that, without godlineſs and religion, he cannot perform the duty, nor deſerve the reward. I hope the reader will not find my words a digreſſion. Some plead againſt the neceſſity of religion to this purpoſe: "* For their "common ſafety and comfort, men entered into ſo-"ciety, and became mutually bound to one another

* Eſtimate, p. 325.

"for

" for mutual aſſiſtance; and as their ſafety ſtill de-
" pends upon the peace and power of the community,
" it is ſtill the intereſt of every member to maintain
" it, by performing every ſocial duty. Their own
" happineſs (and there cannot be a greater) is mo-
" tive ſufficient to make them good citizens. And as
" this is the Atheiſt's" [Lord BOLINGBROKE's, and Mr MALLET's] " only life, he is more obliged to
" take care of the ſociety, without which he cannot
" take care of himſelf, than the religioniſt, who ex-
" pects a better life when this is done.

" I do allow, that it is better for ſociety in general
" to obſerve than to violate the mutual obligations
" which it brings men under: but as this doth not
" hinder ſome particulars from catching an advantage,
" by betraying their truſt; it cannot oblige a perſon
" who only conſiders himſelf, and this life, as his
" ALL, to ſuffer much for the eaſe of others, or to
" be a loſer himſelf for another's profit. It is a
" truth, not of pure ſpeculation only, but alſo of
" experience, that it is poſſible in a community, for
" a man to conſult his own advantage to the detri-
" ment of the ſociety of which he is a member: but
" this religion doth not allow, and Atheiſm doth.
" An Atheiſt hath no intereſt but his own; and as his
" intereſt in this world is his only intereſt, he is un-
" der the ſtrongeſt obligations, as he muſt think, and
" under unſurmountable temptations, as religioniſts
" ſpeak,

" ſpeak, to conſult and promote it at any rate; and " even to ſell the ſociety into the hands of the ene- " my for his ſuperior and only intereſt. And this " certainly they do mean, who plead, as the baſis of " their ſocial virtues, that their own intereſt obliges " them to conſult the good of the ſociety, becauſe " their own depends upon it. For this very BE- " CAUSE or reaſon will induce a man to ruin the ſo- " ciety when it is his own intereſt to do it. For if " *intereſt* is a good reaſon for entering into ſociety, " it muſt remain a good reaſon for renouncing every " ſocial duty, when, by ſo doing, the Atheiſt can " ſerve himſelf to better purpoſe. And his only in- " tereſt conſiſts in this life, and the appendent plea- " ſures of it.

" BUT the religious man hath an intereſt to ſerve " of infinitely more value than all that he can gain " or enjoy in this life. And it is part of his religion, " and a condition without which he cannot obtain his " glorious end, faithfully to perform all contracts, " formal or implicit, even at the expence of what the " Atheiſt eſteems his chief happineſs. Therefore he " is juſt as much obliged to conſult the advantage of " the ſociety of which he is a member, and that to " his own temporal loſs, as the Atheiſt thinks himſelf " obliged to prefer his own advantage in this world, " to the advantage of ſociety, when in competition, " notwithſtanding all the obligations he hath come

" under

" under to ſacrifice all for the ſake of it. This life " is his chief happineſs, his ALL, to which every " other conſideration, however ſo juſt and generous, " muſt give place.

" I am ſure that no ſociety upon earth would ad- " mit a member on ſuch a declaration as this. *I do* " *expect your aſſiſtance in every thing, and that all of* " *you will promote the happineſs of the community at* " *the hazard, and even at the expence of your lives;* " *and I will likewiſe contribute thereto as far as is* " *conſiſtent with my perſonal intereſt: but ſeeing it is* " *for that that I now become a member of your ſociety;* " *when that muſt be loſt, I plead to be excuſed; yea,* " *rather than loſe myſelf, ye may expect that I will* " *ruin you all.*

" ANY man who would ſpeak ſo, would not be " allowed the bleſſings and advantages of ſociety; " and he that thinks ſo, would not deſerve them. " But ſo thinks the Atheiſt, and ſo in effect he ſpeaks, " when he makes his own temporal and worldly in- " tereſt the only tie of ſociety, and the only reaſon " for performing the mutual obligations of it. A " community made up of ſuch members (if it could " be made up at all) would not laſt for a day; the " very foundation being a ſettled and fundamental " reaſon for the diſſolution of it."

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As I promiſed to call on DAVID MALLET, Eſq; to reconcile what appears to me to be contradictions, *contra bonos mores*, or the good of mankind; I now, in the moſt ſerious and ſolemn manner, call upon you to ſhew the difference between your principles and thoſe of Atheiſts, which lay a foundation for the preceding reflections. You acknowledge no future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments. You conſider yourſelf as below the care of divine providence in this life; and what more doth Atheiſm practically amount to? You ſay, that the advantages and diſadvantages annexed, by natural conſequence, to the obſervation or breach of the law of nature, do certainly determine the Atheiſt, as believing it an obligation in the ſtricteſt ſenſe; and that no other conſideration ought to determine him. The Theiſt, ſuch as you, is determined by the ſame advantages and diſadvantages; and therefore hath no more occaſion for the law of nature, or the law of GOD, to influence his choice. Well, but the author and editor are determined more ſtrongly. For what? to puſh for their temporal intereſt. Be it ſo. The reaſon is not theological. It is not becauſe it is the will of GOD, made known to them by the dictates of their reaſon; but becauſe theſe advantageous conſequences are not only annexed to moral actions naturally, but likewiſe by poſitive and divine appointment. To him that pleads an univerſal dependence of all nature and all natural conſequences on the arbitrary will of the ſupreme Being, the diſtinction of

natural and divine annexations muſt appear impertinent. The Atheiſt is moral for his temporal advantage, and for that only: and ſuch a Theiſt as you, or your Noble author, are preciſely moral for the very ſame, and no other reaſon. If you have a greater regard for thoſe temporal inducements than the Atheiſt hath, becauſe you conſider them as of divine appointment, you only make GOD approve and patronize your conduct in acting for your own advantage; the ſame with that which the Atheiſt hath in view, and that at any rate. His *ſuprema regula morum*, and his *ſummum bonum*, are reſtricted to this life, to which actions, juſt or unjuſt, muſt be ſubſervient; and ſo are yours. And thus you treat GOD rather worſe than the Atheiſt doth, who denies his being. When you and your ALL is to be totally and eternally loſt for performing the obligations you owe to ſociety, it is your opinion, that GOD doth not only diſpenſe with your fidelity, but approves, and even commands your perfidy. His Lordſhip ſays, that the reaſon why men fail in performing ſocial duties is, becauſe they conſider themſelves as individuals. For this there is no remedy, nor is there any occaſion for it. Individuals men are; and as they are, ſo they may and ought to be conſidered. He further ſays, that the law of nature lays the whole ſociety under an obligation to live morally: and this all acknowledge; but every one endeavours to become an exception when his caſe requires it. This is to acknowledge, that ſuch is the

condition

condition of every one who looks on this as his only life, that in ſome circumſtances it is his duty to act reaſonably, againſt his reaſon. The debate about *utile* and *honeſtum*, *honeſt* and *uſeful*, which hath laſted from beyond the days of SOCRATES until now, cannot be determined without a ſuppoſition of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments. And if philoſophers ſhould diſpute on the head while the world laſts, they muſt talk nonſenſe and contradictions. But of this more afterwards.

SECT. V.

The antiquity and univerſality an evidence of religion.

IF the Noble author's morality is not good, it is becauſe his theology is very bad. For he who hath no right notions of the Sovereign and Governor of rational creatures, can have no juſt perception of his laws. It is unaccountable, (if the whole performance was not ſuch), that, writing ſo voluminouſly on natural religion, he ſhould ſay ſo very little on the being and attributes of GOD, upon which all piety and morality, our duty to GOD and man, is founded, and by which it is inforced. One might have reaſonably expected a ſyſtem of natural religion ſet forth at leaſt in a new light and order. But ſuch was his averſion to revealed religion, and ſuch his indignation to the teachers of it, that he was even willing, that in order to diſcredit Chriſtianity, natural religion ſhould ſhare the contempt. He ſometimes mentions topics uſed in proving the divine exiſtence, but he follows out none of them to a well-connected concluſion. Some of them he refuſes, particularly DESCARTES's, from his idea of GOD; and the univerſal conſent of mankind; and he modeſtly, but with authority, ſays, Dr CLARKE's demonſtration of the being and attributes of GOD hath obtained more reputation than it deſerves.

deſerves. I ſhall paſs all his faults of omiſſion, though to him they are material; but I have ſeveral faults of commiſſion to lay to his charge; ſuch as, 1. Denying any reaſons, whether probable or demonſtrative, that eſtabliſh the belief of a ſupreme Being. 2. He denies GOD's moral attributes. 3. He forbids all imitation of his moral perfections. 4. He holds a particular providence as a taſk too arduous for infinite wiſdom and power, or below the majeſty of the ALMIGHTY. 5. He admits the co-eternity of the materials with the maker of the world. 6. He denies the immateriality of the ſoul. And, 7. He denies the immortality of the ſoul, and a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments.

THE univerſal conſent of mankind in believing a Deity, if not ſtrictly demonſtrative, is one of the greateſt probabilities that can be pleaded in any caſe. This appears from the oppoſition it hath met with from all the learning that hiſtory, modern travels, and logics, can afford. M. BAYLE in particular hath wrote as much againſt it as would make a volume as large as one of Lord BOLINGBROKE's five. There muſt be a good deal of ſtrength in it, or he muſt have been idly employed. And whoever will examine the exceptions he makes, will find, that they rather confirm than weaken the argument. Thoſe who uſe the argument, do not aſſert, that every individual perſon believes the exiſtence of GOD, or that

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in every nation it is believed nationally. And I am content with the univerſality, as it is allowed, and muſt be allowed by Atheiſts. His Lordſhip admits, " * That this conſent is general enough to ſhew the " proportion which this truth bears to the univerſal " reaſon of mankind." I likewiſe allow, that ſome errors have been as univerſally believed as the exiſtence of GOD; ſuch as, the impoſſibility of *antipodes*, and the reſt of the earth, and the motion of the heavens. But then, no man can diſpute the almoſt unſurmountable prejudice of ſenſe and imagination, as the ſource of theſe two errors. This doth not weaken, but rather ſtrengthen the argument, becauſe no ſuch thing can be pleaded for mens erring univerſally in believing a Deity. And I have his Lordſhip's authority, " † that prejudice was againſt religion." M. BAYLE objects further, That polytheiſm was more univerſally believed than monotheiſm. But all the world knows, that polytheiſm is a miſimprovement of monotheiſm; and ſo natural, ſo common and inſinuating, that a great many learned and judicious Chriſtians cannot be hindered, by their belief of the GOSPEL, from making ſubordinate gods and goddeſſes, who hear their prayers, and uſe their credit with the ALMIGHTY to befriend them. The argument is not to be ſtated thus, *What all mankind believes, is true; but all mankind believes the being of* GOD: *therefore*, &c.: but thus, *What all mankind believes without the in-*

* Vol. ii. p. 250. *ad marg.* † Vol. v. p. 307.

fluence

fluence of prejudice, is true. The argument is good, unleſs Atheiſts, and thoſe who deny it, can ſhew any prevailing prejudice, ſuch as the impoſſibility of antipodes, that firſt gave riſe, and continues to ſupport the belief of a GOD. After his Lordſhip had publiſhed in his own time, that "* CUDWORTH has endeavoured "to prove, many have thought, and I incline to think, "that the unity of a firſt intelligent cauſe was the "original belief of mankind;" he retracts. And I am as ſure that this was their original belief, as I am that numbers are made up of units. But if there is but a poſſibility of wandering from the road of reaſon, his Lordſhip is ſure to go aſtray. And notwithſtanding his inclination to believe what Dr CUDWORTH hath proved, or what, as I think, is too plain to need proof, he poſitively affirms, that polytheiſm was the firſt religion, and idolatry the firſt worſhip †. It is his opinion, though a truth, it is ſo far out of the reach of ordinary underſtanding, that it muſt have taken ſome generations of men of mature and improved judgment, before it could have been diſcovered; that is, before they could have learned to count one before two. Such a blank in the progreſs of religion, or ſuch a neutrality between Atheiſm and religion, at the commencement of the human race, would effectually defeat the argument drawn from the univerſal conſent, to prove the divine exiſtence. From this way of repreſenting the primitive inhabitants of the earth,

* Vol. v. p. 309. † Vol. i. p. 299.

Adam,

Adam, and his new cotemporaries, (if he had any), were no more than overgrown children. But this doth not go down with his Lordſhip; who ſays, " * If we are perſuaded that this world, and the in- " habitants of it, had a beginning in time, we muſt " of neceſſity aſſume, that the firſt men and firſt wo- " men, and that one man and one woman at leaſt, " were produced in full ſtrength and vigour of body " and mind." And I am perſuaded, that Adam, before he was forty years old, was a better philoſopher than Lord BOLINGBROKE.

NOTWITHSTANDING his Lordſhip ſays, *IF this world, and the inhabitants of it, had a beginning*, he hath wrote more than was juſt neceſſary to prove ſuch a beginning; and that this being a matter of univerſal tradition, muſt be true. From which it follows, that from the beginning of the human race, to this day, it was, and continues to be the belief of mankind, that they were made by the ſupreme Being, the firſt intelligent cauſe of their own and all other beings. And this is a conſequence he cannot refuſe, becauſe he reaſons thus. " † STRABO repreſents " the Ethiopians rather barbarous than civilized; and " yet this people believed a ſupreme immortal Being, " the firſt cauſe of all things. This people there- " fore believed that the world had a beginning." If from the being of GOD, the Ethiopians believed the

* Vol. iv. p. 43. † Vol. v. p. 260.

world

world had a beginning, it was as eaſy for all that believed the world had a beginning, to conclude that it proceeded from a prior cauſe; juſt as eaſy and obvious as it is to me, who believe that a houſe is not eternal, to conclude that it was made by a builder. According to my author's opinion, the commencement of the world is a ſtronger proof of the exiſtence of a Deity, than the exiſtence of a ſupreme Being is of the beginning of the world. For he ſays, "* I "am far from reſting the proof of GOD's exiſtence "on the authority of this tradition, That the world "began. I know we are able to demonſtrate this "fundamental truth of all religion, whether it began "or no." I am very ſure he is miſtaken, as ſhall afterwards be made appear. The matter of fact, and the reaſon of it, are eſſentially connected; and whatever proves the one, proves the other; and therefore what diſproves the one, diſproves the other likewiſe. So ſays his Lordſhip, "† There is one "fact conveyed to us by tradition, *viz.* That the "world we inhabit had a beginning in time; the "truth of which we muſt admit, becauſe it is abſurd "to aſſume the contrary."

DID he believe that the firſt men ſprung out of the earth like muſhrooms, and from ſuch obſervations as they were able to make on their own and other beings, they were obliged to provide for the ſupport

* Vol. v. p. 311. † Vol. v. p. 236.

and preſervation of their lives, he might indeed hold it as an abſurdity, (as he doth), that they became philoſophers as ſoon as their feet were free from the earthen womb. But to conſider man as the workmanſhip of God, and he muſt allow him to be ſuch, ſeeing he admits the world and its inhabitants to have had a beginning; at his firſt appearance, he was in full ſtrength and vigour of body and mind, perfectly fitted for every duty of humanity, whether religious or civil, ſolitary or ſocial. No article of belief and perſuaſion was more obvious to him, than that he was made; and that as he owed his being to his Creator, ſo he owed him obedience. All that could be learned by a freſh and vigorous underſtanding, muſt immediately, or very ſoon, be known to him. And that God ſhould have had extraordinary intercourſe with ſuch a noble creature, the chief inhabitant of this planet, in order to his ſpeedy qualification for acting a religious and reaſonable part, is a ſuppoſition entirely unworthy of the ridicule with which his Lordſhip treats it. A ſuppoſition, had I no regard for the Bible, I ſhould embrace with pleaſure. For he that makes intelligent beings, hath many ways, ſuch as inſpiration, revelation, and more ways than we can imagine, to lead them to the knowledge of truth, and to prevent their falling into error. It is what we do in ſome meaſure to one another; and ſurely God can do it to all his intelligent creatures. I can, and do believe, that the firſt animals

mals were completely fine and finiſhed; and that, for inſtance, the firſt horſe excelled *Bucephalus*; and that ADAM, as ſoon as he became a living ſoul, was ſuperior to all his race in bodily and intellectual parts. He owed his being to immediate creation; and Almighty GOD is no bungling artificer. The firſt complete man could not want paternal affection to his poſterity. For all that came into being by generation and birth, muſt have periſhed as ſoon as procreated, without the care of thoſe that came into being by immediate creation. And as man is reaſonable, as well as animal, he could not have failed to have inſtructed his children in the duties they owed to GOD and man. And why ſhould it be thought incredible, that the belief of a ſupreme Being hath been traditionally handed down from the firſt man to all his poſterity? And he who proves the commencement of the world by tradition, ought in conſequence to admit, that the knowledge and belief of GOD may be tranſmitted the ſame way: for the one ſuppoſition cannot ſtand without the other. It is his Lordſhip's opinion, that "* no people were wholly "ignorant of the principles of religion: and no go-"vernment could ſubſiſt without them." This univerſal ſpread, the remoteſt antiquity, and long duration of religion, I impute partly to tradition, and partly to this, "That the being of GOD is a truth "that bears proportion to the general reaſon of man-"kind."

* Vol. iv. p. 201.

THE Noble author, as afraid that his traditional proof of the commencement of the world ſhould turn out a traditional proof of the exiſtence of a ſupreme Being, takes care to inform his unwary reader, that the conſequence will not hold, becauſe of the diſparity between a matter of fact, and a matter of ratiocination. His words are, "As much as I am convinced of the exiſtence of a ſupreme all-perfect Being, as ſeriouſly as I adore his Majeſty, bleſs his goodneſs, and reſign myſelf entirely to his providence; I ſhould be ſorry to reſt my conviction on the authority of any man, or of all mankind; ſince authority cannot be, and demonſtration is the ſole proof in this caſe." And to what religious purpoſe hath he been at pains to prove by tradition, that this world had a beginning? If tradition proves one, it proves both. Separate the commencement of the world and the being of GOD, and all he hath ſaid on the ſubject muſt go for nothing. He muſt therefore prove, that the eternity of the world is an abſurdity, or give up all arguments *a poſteriori* for the being of GOD. He pretends to be able to demonſtrate this fundamental truth of all religion, whether the world began or no. Though I am loath to weaken any ſupport of religion that men may fancy ſufficient, yet I cannot but declare, that I am perſuaded we are not able to demonſtrate the being of GOD, if the world is eternal. He with great freedom accuſes divines of betraying the cauſe of GOD;

GOD; but I can ſay with better reaſon, though not ſo triumphantly, that in this he betrays the cauſe of GOD, and miſleads his readers into Atheiſm. How ſtrongly he is convinced of a ſupreme all-perfect Being, how ſeriouſly he adores his Majeſty, bleſſes his goodneſs, and how chearfully he reſigns himſelf to his providence, I cannot determine from any thing that he hath publiſhed on the ſubject of religion. Goodneſs is one of GOD's moral attributes, which he is very unwilling to admit; and a perſonal providence he denies. I am perſuaded he had too much humility, or too little vain aſſurance, to have conſidered himſelf in the ſight of GOD as more worthy of his care and regard than the reſt of mankind.

HE may be as ſorry as he pleaſes, to reſt his conviction of a ſupreme Being on the authority of any man, or of all mankind, provided he is ſure of better proof. But I muſt differ from him in the reaſon he aſſigns, that "authority cannot be, and demonſtration is the ſole proof in this caſe." This is the utmoſt demand an Atheiſt can make, and in him a moſt unreaſonable demand it is. He holds the negative part of the queſtion, for which he is not obliged to bring any proof; nor is he able to bring any, except the impoſſibility of a ſupreme Being. And rather than admit this as an impoſſibility, he ſubſtitutes the world, or the univerſal ſyſtem of beings, which ſome call an *aggregate*, and others one ſingle

ſingle being, in place of GOD. And all of them aſcribe to this grand being, or this one collection, all poſſible perfection. This nonſenſe only ſerves as an evaſion from the force of the arguments that prove a Deity, or as an excuſe for not believing it. They that can give no reaſon for their diſbelief, but their own ignorance, obſtinacy, and ſtupidity, have no right to inſiſt upon the higheſt reaſon from thoſe who are willing to teach and to inſtruct them. Upon ſuppoſition that the truth is on the ſide of Theiſts, it is no excuſe for an Atheiſt, that the Theiſt is not able to demonſtrate that truth to his conviction. For if it is a diſcoverable truth, the Atheiſt is as much obliged to find it out and believe it as the Theiſt is. If the Theiſt can bring any reaſon, and the Atheiſt can bring none for his opinion, not only the ſtrongeſt, but even the weakeſt reaſon ſhould carry the cauſe. And though I ſhould allow, that the univerſal agreement of mankind in the belief of GOD, is not a cloſe demonſtration, it is certainly the higheſt probability that ever was pleaded in any caſe. His Lordſhip finds fault with metaphyſicians for firſt eſtabliſhing poſſibility, and thence concluding actuality; whilſt he, with more precaution, firſt eſtabliſhes actuality, and thence concludes poſſibility. I conclude, that the being of GOD is credible, becauſe it is univerſally believed. What is credible is conceivable, and what is conceivable is poſſible. And admitting the poſſibility of the being of GOD, there can be no objection

jection againſt it. So far from that, the very ſuppoſition that ſuch a being is poſſible, affords a demonſtration of his actual exiſtence. For this poſſible being is either neceſſary or contingent. If contingent, it muſt be cauſed, it muſt be made, it muſt begin to be; and ſuch a being cannot be neceſſary, ſelf-exiſtent, and ſelf-ſufficient. Therefore ſince the divine Being is poſſible, it muſt actually be.

But admitting theſe inferences could not be drawn from the univerſal conſent of mankind, that conſent conſidered in itſelf would be ſufficient to determine my approbation of Theiſm, and my diſapprobation of Atheiſm. Atheiſts prove nothing, believe nothing. They remain on the defenſive, intrenched to the teeth, in an obſtinate negative. And whatever objections they may raiſe againſt God's government of the moral world, they have nothing to ſay againſt his exiſtence. Were the queſtion put to me, (and I ſuppoſe myſelf a reaſonable man), Whether, upon the higheſt probability, I would chuſe to believe and live like a Theiſt; or to believe nothing of the matter, and to live independently of a Creator and Governor of the world? I do think I ſhould not, I would not heſitate a moment. The Noble philoſopher did not conſider, that Theiſm and Atheiſm are contradictory doctrines; and that both therefore ſhould be adopted or rejected upon equal terms. And yet nothing below demonſtration can ſatisfy him that God is, when for

no

no reaſon at all he holds the negative, and diſbelieves religion. Were this a matter of pure ſpeculation, he might divert himſelf with reaſonings *for* and *againſt*. But when, upon the belief and perſuaſion of the being or not being of GOD, the conduct of life depends, the debate ſhould be determined as ſoon as poſſible. He who refuſes the principles of religion, does, by his refuſal, chuſe Atheiſm; and thus, becauſe he hath not the ſtrongeſt of all reaſons to be a religioniſt, he becomes an Atheiſt for no reaſon at all. For between *yes* and *no*, *it is* and *it is not*, there is no medium; and between Theiſm and Atheiſm there is no neutrality.

EACH of theſe opinions is attended with conſequences both oppoſite and important. The belief of GOD conſtitutes duty and obligation, regulates human conduct, and bears home upon the mind impreſſions of divine ſovereignty, and our ſubjection. The Atheiſt conſiders himſelf as an independent being; and though he knows right from wrong, and morality from immorality, he is under no obligation to act any otherwiſe than he himſelf thinks adviſable *pro hac nunc*. If the Theiſt judges right, and in ſo far as he lives accordingly, he hath the approbation of his Lord and Lawgiver. The other denies his ſubjection, refuſes his obedience, and ſets up for independency, and thereby incurs the divine diſpleaſure, for no reaſon but his own ignorance and obſtinacy. I ſee no dangerous,

gerous, nay no diſadvantageous conſequence attending the belief of a Deity, upon ſuppoſition of believing without grounds. But if the Atheiſt is miſtaken, the conſequence of his diſbelief is the diſpleaſure of GOD; and what the effects of that may be, is dreadful to imagine.

I know, that ſome Atheiſts plead their honeſty and ſincerity as their juſtification in diſbelieving the being of GOD; and perſuade themſelves, that, ſuppoſing they are miſtaken, they are as ſafe from divine reſentment, as the firmeſt believer of his being and attributes. But they do not conſider, that if there is any duty owing to GOD from his intelligent creatures, the firſt of all is to know it. Ignorance therefore, notwithſtanding its apparent innocence, may be criminal. Their fellows and equals in underſtanding, and thouſands of them to one, did believe, adore, and obey a ſupreme Being. If they ſucceeded in their inquiry into this fundamental truth, and if the Atheiſt miſcarries and errs, the difference cannot be in their capacities and opportunities to know the truth, (theſe are ſuppoſed equal); but muſt proceed from ſomething blameable in their conduct, and in the management of their reaſon and underſtanding. Did the Atheiſt imagine himſelf ſtanding at the bar of an omniſcient and juſt judge, pleading that his ignorance was honeſt and ſincere, what could he reply, if it were anſwered, And ſo were many thouſands honeſt

and ſincere in their inquiries, who had no advantage of you in reaſon and underſtanding, and all opportunities of knowing their dependence on GOD for their being; they believed, and you did not; they admitted the evidence which you rejected; they have ſucceeded, and you have miſcarried? It may be ſaid, and I know it hath been ſaid by ſome Atheiſts, that they are as willing to believe the being of GOD, and their obligations to obey him, as the moſt ſincere and zealous religioniſt; but it is not in their power to believe without evidence, and are really ſorry that they cannot ſee any. And ſomething like this is ſaid by Lord BOLINGBROKE. " * There is nothing, philo- " ſophically ſpeaking, at leaſt I could never find, to " my ſorrow, that there is any thing that obliges us " neceſſarily to conclude, that we are a compound of " material and immaterial ſubſtance. According to " all appearances, we are plainly one ſingle ſubſtance; " all the parts of which are ſo intimately connected, " and dependent on one another, that the whole pro- " ceeds and ends together." Of his doctrine of the immateriality and immortality of the ſoul, due notice ſhall be taken hereafter. That which I fix upon here is his ſorrow. If it gave him trouble and ſorrow of heart to find, that the ſyſtem of his being began, proceeds, and would end all together, it is ſurpriſing, that he ſhould accuſe thoſe who are of another opinion, with pneumatical madneſs. I have proved at ſome length,

* Vol. i. p. 20.

that

that both perſonal and public advantages are on the ſide of religion, particularly the perſuaſion of the immortality of the ſoul, and a ſtate of future rewards and puniſhments *. And his Lordſhip, as hath already been made appear, admits the ſubſerviency, and even the neceſſity of religion, and particularly the belief of future rewards and puniſhments. But had he been really ſorry that this doctrine was not better eſtabliſhed, at leaſt to his conviction, I cannot ſee any reaſon why he ſhould triumph over, and even abuſe thoſe who differ from him. If he was troubled in his own mind that this uſeful doctrine was not better grounded, it was cruel in him to take ſo much pains, and to uſe ſo many inſulting expreſſions, only to raiſe diſquiet in the minds of others, and to do mankind the greateſt diſſervice. And you have not acted the part of a good and benevolent man, in proclaiming and publiſhing ſuch a doctrine to the world. Was it any loſs to him, is it any loſs to you, that all mankind, you only excepted, ſhould believe themſelves obliged, under the moſt awful ſanctions that can attend a law, to live morally and virtuouſly, not only inoffenſively, but uſefully? On the contrary, it is your advantage: for ſuch, inſtead of hurting you, will be, and are bound to be your friends, your aſſiſtants and protectors. His Lordſhip, who dealt the character or diſtemper of madneſs ſo freely, did himſelf deſerve it as much as any man, except yourſelf. He was pru-

* Eſtimate, § ix. x.

dent enough to ſuppreſs his philoſophical works during his life; but you have had the imprudence, to ſay no worſe, to publiſh them after his death.

WHATEVER force is in the univerſal conſent of mankind in believing a GOD, to infer that he really is, it hath the ſame to inforce the belief of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments: for the one is as ancient and univerſal as the other. His Lordſhip admits, that, as far as hiſtory or tradition go, the notion of another life is to be found an eſtabliſhed article of religion. It is true, he ſays it is a human invention. But, to make good his aſſertion, he ought to ſhew when, where, and for what it was invented. When it was firſt invented, he cannot tell, becauſe it is beyond all tradition. For the place where this notion took its firſt riſe, he would willingly pitch upon Egypt. And VANINI, who alone, ſo far as I know, is poſitive, that it proceeds from a cuſtom of preſerving there the bodies of the dead *. He might have added, from DIODORUS SICULUS, the cuſtom of judging, whether theſe corpſes were to be honoured with funerals or not. Notwithſtanding all the pretended antiquity of that nation, the cuſtom is not ſo old as the belief of a

* Poſt mortem puniendi et remunerandi mali et boni homines, initium duxit ab Ægyptiorum ſuperſtitione in aſſervandis mortuorum corporibus. *Amphitheat. æternæ providentiæ*, p. 83.

future

future ſtate *. Nor can it be imagined, that, from that ſpot of earth, it could have overſpread all mankind, as was found of old, and is now found to do. Navigation and commerce is now improved beyond the imagination of the ancients. And if it is the belief of nations who never heard of the Egyptians or their cuſtoms, at this day, we may as well ſuppoſe, that diſtant nations of old were as little, and leſs acquainted with them, their ſuperſtition and notions. If America was not ſoon inhabited, it is certain the more eaſtern parts of Aſia were; and they believed a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments. And the inhabitants of the iſlands in the *Archipelago di Lazaro* retain this perſuaſion, when it is forgotten, as is pretended, that GOD made and governs the world. I think myſelf obliged to do a very ingenious modern writer † the juſtice to give in his own words the account of time, as pretended by three ſeveral nations, and ſettled by more candid and impartial chronologiſts. The nations are, the Aſſyrians, the Egyptians, and the Chineſe. "That the pretenſions of the Aſſyrians "were vain, may be concluded from hence, that "CALISTHENES going with ALEXANDER the Great "to the conqueſt of Perſia, and being deſired by "ARISTOTLE to ſearch into the antiquities of Ba"bylon, preſerved by the Chaldeans, (who were at

* The cuſtom was poſterior to ſuperſtition, and ſuperſtition was poſterior to religion.

† Colliber, Eſſay on creation, p. 137.

"that

" that time a ſet of Babyloniſh philoſophers), writ " back, that, after the moſt diligent inquiry, he " could find no account above one thouſand nine " hundred and three years. As for the account of " the Egyptians, we are aſſured, that it did not ex- " ceed the Chaldean account above ſixty-ſeven years. " The difference between the Moſaic and the Chineſe " account of time hath been ſufficiently adjuſted, " and is found to extend no further than four thou- " ſand odd hundred years;" that is, ſome hundreds above that of the Egyptians. MANETHO's hiſtory of Egypt, and BEROSUS's hiſtory of the Chaldeans, did not appear until the *Old Teſtament* was tranſlated into Greek; for which Mr COLLIBER charges them with fable and forgery. Of all the nations mentioned in hiſtory, Egypt, in my opinion, hath the worſt claim to the greateſt antiquity. For it is not to be imagined, that a people or family would leave fertile and high grounds, free from anniverſary inundations, to take up their dwelling, to be ſecured with great labour, as is done at this day. The firſt inhabitants of that great glen muſt have been driven into it by a more powerful people; or if they went thither voluntarily, it muſt have been when the neighbouring and higher countries were overflocked. And as the Aſſyrians and Chineſe were more ancient and powerful than they, and believed a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, there is ſcarce a poſſibility of their having

ving received the *invention* (as his Lordſhip calls it) from the Egyptians.

But it was not the Aſſyrians, the Chineſe, the Egyptians, the Ethiopians, but all the known world, that believed a future life. Where-ever a people were found, they were found with this belief and perſuaſion. This his Lordſhip acknowledges, and, to his aſtoniſhment, makes the children of Iſrael the only exception. I did promiſe not to mix his objections againſt the Chriſtian revelation, with his miſrepreſentations of natural religion. But it cannot be reckoned a departing from my reſolution, to ſhew that he miſtakes the caſe of Moses and the Iſraelites, in an hiſtorical way. It was, and is the opinion of ſome, and particularly of Dr King, that man was created mortal; and though he does not, I know that others found this opinion, on ſuppoſition that this earth muſt have been in a very little time too narrow an habitation for the inhabitants. Immortals begetting immortals, long before now this earth would not have furniſhed a foot ſquare for each perſon. But upon ſuppoſition that man was created immortal, (I need ſay nothing ſtronger), God could have diſpoſed of them otherwiſe. And to ſhew that they were to be removed into other habitations, both ſoul and body, it is ſaid, Enoch *walked with* God; *and he was not, for* God *took him.* Enoch's father lived nine hundred and ſixty-five years; Enoch's ſon lived nine hundred

and

and ſixty-nine years; and ENOCH himſelf lived only three hundred and ſixty-five years; and MOSES, as an hiſtorian, gives this reaſon why GOD took him away ſo ſoon, That he walked with GOD; that is, that he was pious. A happy immortality was the reward of his piety. And what GOD did to ENOCH, he would have done to all the race of ADAM, had they not diſqualified themſelves for it. And had not MOSES believed, and had it not been the belief of the Iſraelites, that there was a life after this, this tranſlation of ENOCH had not been recorded and received, as a peculiar reward of his piety. This inſtance ſerved likewiſe to prove another part of their hiſtory, *viz.* That death was the conſequence of diſobedience. This happened in the antediluvian world. ELIJAH was tranſlated in the Moſaical diſpenſation; and the Lord JESUS CHRIST, after death, aroſe to life, and bodily aſcended into the higher regions.——The two laſt inſtances I do not inſiſt upon in this place.

THE Egyptians, though not inventers of a future life, even in the days of MOSES, believed it nationally; and both MOSES and the Iſraelites took it for a truth univerſally eſtabliſhed. At leaſt no proof can be brought that they did not believe as the Egyptians, and all other nations did, unleſs it can be made appear that MOSES denied it. So far this belief of a ſtate of rewards and puniſhments after this life muſt

ſtand

ſtand confirmed by hiſtory, that of MOSES not excepted. From a cuſtom of preſerving the bodies of the dead in Egypt, even the belief of a future life among the Egyptians could not proceed. For it rather ſuppoſes a previous perſuaſion of a future life, than that it is the foundation of it. To give the belief of a future judgment the greater influence on their virtuous and moral behaviour, they thought it expedient to repreſent, or act this judgment on the bodies of the dead. BOLINGBROKE ſays, it was a cuſtom in Spain, to act ſome of the myſteries of the Chriſtian religion. And I have hiſtorical evidence, that CHARLES V. Emperor of Germany, and King of Spain, witneſſed the acting of his own obſequies in the abbey of ST JUST. No nation outdid the Egyptians in the miſimprovement of natural religion; and no people added to it more of their own conceits. And this of judging, whether the corpſes of the deceaſed were to be laid up in repoſitories or not, was one, and ſuch as did not want its uſe; and muſt have had as great an influence as poſſible upon their honeſt and moral behaviour, had they believed that GOD would judge of the ſoul as they did of the body. If other nations had learned the immortality of the ſoul from the Egyptian cuſtom of judging the bodies of the dead, they muſt, together with that opinion, have adopted the cuſtom, which none of them did.

I ſuppoſe Mr MALLET may demand of me to ac-

count for the antiquity and univerſality of a belief of a future ſtate, in order to ſhew that it is not a human invention, eſtabliſhed without proof or divine authority. And, with your leave, I will tell you my tale. Though there are many reaſons to induce mankind to believe a future exiſtence after death, yet I do not think, that it was only for theſe reaſons that this belief and perſuaſion was ſo early and ſo univerſal. The thing in itſelf is not ſo level to the human underſtanding as the being of GOD. It is my opinion, that it owed its origin to divine authority. The firſt man by diſobedience became mortal. The puniſhment was not remitted. Die he muſt, and die he did. But for his comfort, and for the encouragement of his good behaviour, until the execution of the ſentence, another and a better life was made known to him; and this he taught his deſcendents. And ſuch a promiſe and ſuch aſſurance was ſo reaſonable, that without it there had been as little encouragement for piety and morality, during the firſt tranſgreſſor's reprieve, as Lord BOLINGBROKE hath left as a legacy to the world. And if GOD thought fit to continue the human race ſubjects of his moral government, it was fit they ſhould know, that, according to their good or ill behaviour in this life, they were to be treated in another. For without ſuch knowledge man cannot be governed as a moral agent.

FROM

FROM the firſt man this doctrine of a future life hath been handed down to this preſent generation, notwithſtanding, as ſaith his Lordſhip, the appearances are againſt it. The credit of a divine tradition prevailed againſt them all, until there aroſe ſome BOLINGBROKES and MALLETS, who refuſed to accept of the teſtimony of all mankind, and even the teſtimony of one riſen from the dead, for the truth of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments. With theſe Greece was peſtered and plagued. Other nations retained the opinion upon credit of the tradition. It is true, that thoſe who denied a future ſtate, denied a providence; and it is alſo true, that thoſe who denied a providence, denied conſequentially a firſt intelligent cauſe, a ſupreme all-perfect Being. In a word, whoever believed a GOD, believed a future ſtate. Both theſe truths, though grounded in the ſtrength of reaſon, were originally and divinely taught. BOLINGBROKE, ſpeaking of the commencement of the world as a traditional truth, ſays, "* It "is relative no more to the particular character of "one people than of another. It favours no more "one general principle of religion or policy than "another. In a word, force your imagination as "much as you pleaſe, you will find unſurmountable "difficulties in your way, if you ſuppoſe the fact "invented. But theſe difficulties vaniſh when you "ſuppoſe it true. *The univerſal conſent of mankind*

* Vol. v. p. 279.

" *follows naturally and neceſſarily the truth of the* " *fact.*" If all mankind conſented in the belief of God, and a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, it muſt have ſuited the natural and common diſpoſition, conveniency, and advantage of every people and nation; and if there had been any material and political difference between the inclinations of one people and another, then, upon ſuppoſition that theſe two great truths had been a mere human invention, they might have been received by ſome, but muſt have been rejected by others. " Force your imagi- " nation as much as you pleaſe, and you will find " unſurmountable difficulties in your way," if you ſuppoſe that the doctrine of the being of God, and a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, is an invention and an impoſition. " The univerſal conſent " of mankind follows naturally and neceſſarily the " truth" of this fact, that God made mankind, and taught them religion. Though this is not a cloſe and a ſuccinct demonſtration, yet it is a convincing proof, that the being of God, and a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, is neither fable nor fiction; and as ſtrong and convincing as many metaphyſical and mathematical evidences. You cannot properly and ſtrictly demonſtrate to me that there is ſuch an iſland as Jamaica; but you and I are as firmly perſuaded of it, as we are that all the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. Upon ſuch evidence we venture our lives; but without any riſk you may conduct

duct yourſelf in this life, upon the evidence ariſing from the univerſal conſent of mankind, that there is another. Perhaps I had not ſaid ſo much on this topic, had not his Lordſhip denied the validity of the argument in the ſtrongeſt terms. And as I write rather for religion than againſt him, I preſume it will not be taken for a digreſſion.

SECT.

SECT. VI.

The idea of GOD *a demonſtration of his exiſtence.*

AS I did not give up the univerſal conſent of mankind as a proof of the divine exiſtence, no more will I yield the famous argument of DESCARTES drawn from his idea of GOD. The only fault I find in it, is too much ſubtilty and refinement for antimetaphyſical underſtandings. The argument hath undergone the narroweſt examination; and ſuch objections and exceptions have been raiſed againſt it, as have made Lord BOLINGBROKE conclude, that it is a paralogiſm. I muſt therefore give my reaſons why I differ from him.

THE argument, as I conceive it, runs thus. "Whatever I underſtand clearly and diſtinctly to belong to "the nature and eſſence of any thing, I can with certainty and truth affirm concerning it, as rotundity "to a circle; but when I apply my thoughts in the "moſt attentive and cloſeſt manner on the nature of "GOD, I find, that exiſtence is one of his eſſential "attributes: I therefore conclude, that it is as certain that he actually exiſts, as that a circle is round." To this GASSENDI objected, That from an ideal to a real ſtate the conſequence doth not hold. DESCARTES ſaid, that this is not his meaning. Nor indeed

deed doth he reſt his proof on ſuch a general propoſition, as GASSENDI certainly miſtakes groſsly, *Whatever we conceive, muſt exiſt*; but upon a reaſon peculiar to the divine Being, to which exiſtence is as eſſential, as rotundity is to a circle. From the idea of an all-perfect Being to his actual exiſtence, the conſequence is good, becauſe exiſtence is a perfection. The queſtion then is, Whether we have ſuch an idea or not?

IF we can conceive any perfection, (and a great many we find in ourſelves), we can eaſily remove from it all reſtriction and limitation. Power in us is a perfection; remove from it all bounds and limitation, and we have an idea of omnipotence; as, by removing from ſpace and time all limitation, we have an idea of infinity and eternity, or everlaſting duration. BOLINGBROKE allows infinite power and wiſdom to GOD; and he that admits any one infinite perfection, muſt admit all. Now, ſuch a being, who hath all perfection, never was, and never could be in a ſtate of mere poſſibility. This is what the ſchoolmen mean, when they ſay, that GOD is *actus purus*. This bare ſo hard upon GASSENDI, that he was obliged to deny that exiſtence is a perfection; though it is not only a perfection in itſelf, but the ground of all other perfections.

INSTEAD of the word *exiſtence* take *independency*, and

and then the argument will run thus. "An all-perfect being must be an independent being; but an "independent being must be actually existent." The subsumption is evident; because if from a state of mere possibility it could become actual, it must owe its actual being or existence to some other being, and so could not be independent, nor all-perfect. It therefore follows, that actual existence is as essential to an all-perfect being, as rotundity is to a circle.

OTHERS allowing GASSENDI's objection, That from an ideal to a real state the consequence doth not hold; yet maintain, that from an ideal to a possible state the consequence is good. And they reason rightly: for whatever we can clearly and distinctly conceive, is possible. And then from the possibility of such a being as GOD, that is, an all-perfect Being, they argue his actual existence; because if such a being is made, or caused to be, it could not be all-perfect; it could not be a necessary, self-existent, and self-sufficient being, but dependent on some other being who made it. But turn the argument into what form you please, still it is true, that necessary existence is essential to the divine Being; and the very conception of such a being is a proof of his actual existence. It is only the closeness and the shortness of the argument that makes it to be considered as a *paralogism*. And DESCARTES did not think himself obliged, or perhaps

perhaps thought it below him, to uſe many words, when fewer were ſufficient for his purpoſe.

To evade this argument, I can imagine no way, except denying the poſſibility of an all-perfect Being. And this no man can do who knows what perfection and imperfection is. We conceive *limited* and *unlimited*, *finite* and *infinite*; and therefore that all poſſible perfections, in the moſt perfect manner, perfections *ſimpliciter ſimplices*, belong to one ſingle being. The argument, as ſtated by DESCARTES, turns upon neceſſary exiſtence as an eſſential attribute of the ſupreme Being, and is much to the ſame purpoſe with one uſed by AQUINAS. "All things," ſaith he, "are "neceſſary or contingent. If all were contingent, "nothing could have been. Something therefore "muſt be neceſſary, one at leaſt. And as there is no "neceſſity to imagine more neceſſary beings than one, "there muſt be one, and but one, neceſſary, ſelf-"exiſtent, and ſelf-ſufficient, the free and voluntary "cauſe of all contingent beings." This argument is plain, ſuccinct, and invincible. Let this ſuffice, becauſe more words cannot make it plainer, and poſſibly might make it more intricate and obſcure.

SECT. VII.

Of GOD's *moral attributes.*

I HAVE ſaid, that the reaſon why Lord BOLINGBROKE's morality is not good, is, becauſe his theology is very bad. I do not charge him with irreligion only becauſe he denies the ſufficiency of the two arguments for the being of GOD, which I have ſupported. This is ſo common, that every topic uſed for that purpoſe hath been rejected by one or other. This was a trick of VANINI, who refuſed all the arguments for the divine exiſtence, under a pretence of giving better. But though my author had admitted all the arguments commonly brought to prove the divine exiſtence; yet what he maintains concerning GOD, muſt defeat all that he admits for the glory of GOD, and the good of mankind. "A neceſſary con-"nection between the phyſical and moral attributes "of GOD, no man who believes in GOD will deny." Theſe are his own words *. But they are words of courſe, and complaiſance to his Chriſtian reader. And becauſe it is not eaſy to perſuade a candid and honeſt reader, that he, notwithſtanding, denies the moral attributes of the ſupreme Being, I think it incumbent on me to give his own words. And he ſays, "† The "knowledge of the Creator is on many accounts ne-

* Vol. iv. p. 224. † Vol. iv. p. 25.

"ceſſary

" ceſſary to ſuch a creature as man; and therefore " we are made able to arrive, by a proper exerciſe of " our mental faculties, from a knowledge of GOD's " works, to a knowledge of his exiſtence, and of that " infinite power and wiſdom which are demonſtrated " to us in them. *Our knowledge concerning* GOD *goes* " *no further.*——How little reaſon have we to expect " any knowledge of the nature and eſſence of the in- " viſible GOD, or of his phyſical and moral attributes, " beyond what his works, and the effects of his na- " ture and attributes, communicate to us? This de- " gree, this ſufficient degree of knowledge concern- " ing GOD, is a fixed point; on one ſide of which lies " Atheiſm, and metaphyſical and theological blaſphe- " my too often on the other." To this add another paſſage. " * Heathen philoſophers diſcovered in his " works a firſt intelligent cauſe of all things, a being " of infinite power and wiſdom, whoſe providence is " over all his creatures, and whoſe will relatively to " man is manifeſted in the whole human ſyſtem. " Here was abundant matter of real knowledge. " Thus far the ſupreme Being lets himſelf down, if " I may uſe ſuch an expreſſion, within the verge of " human comprehenſion; and of human alone, as " far as we can judge of the animal world about us. " Beyond this fixed point we can have no real ideas, " and therefore no real knowledge. All that we ima- " gine we have, is, and muſt be fantaſtical. We are

* Vol. ii. p. 366.

" no more able to acquire knowledge beyond, than " other animals up to this point: and the divine na- " ture, the manner of being, *the moral attributes of* " GOD, the general ſyſtem of his providence, are as " inſcrutable as to them." That is to ſay in ſhort, that we know no more of GOD's moral attributes than the beaſts. And to make his meaning ſtill more plain, he teaches plainly, that the moral attributes of GOD are not real, but ſuppoſed. " * We cannot riſe from " our moral obligations to the *ſuppoſed* moral attributes " of GOD. I call them *ſuppoſed*, becauſe, after all " that hath been ſaid to prove a neceſſary connection " between his phyſical and moral attributes, the latter " may be all abſorbed in his wiſdom." And further, " † It is evident, that the firſt and ſtrongeſt impreſ- " ſions that we receive of benevolence, juſtice, and " other moral virtues, come from reflection on our- " ſelves, and from our dealings with one another; " from what we feel in ourſelves, and from what we " obſerve in other men. Theſe we acknowledge to " be limited and imperfect, the excellencies of our " own nature; and therefore conceiving them with- " out any limitations or imperfections, we aſcribe " them to the divine." And this all judicious and orthodox Theiſts do; and they do well. But he is of a contrary opinion, that is, they *do ill*; for he adds, " they do worſe." And rather than not carry his point againſt the divine moral attributes, he affirms,

* Vol. iv. p. 18. † Vol. iv. p. 19.

that

that " * the knowledge of the divine attributes is " impoſſible and unneceſſary for us to have, even on " the ſuppoſition there is a GOD."

I deſire it may be obſerved, that I have given his aſſertions againſt the moral attributes or holineſs of GOD, not in detached expreſſions, which very often are miſrepreſentations of an author's meaning, but as they ſtand connected with a pretty large context. And as he is not the firſt that acknowledged in the ſupreme Being only power and knowledge, I need ſay no more to prove, that he abſolutely denies the moral attributes of the ALMIGHTY. Here I have omitted nothing material, except a practical inference, afterwards to be conſidered at large, *viz.* That we are under no obligation to imitate GOD in his moral attributes, and that it is even impiety to attempt it. And, in conſequence, he rejects the diſtinction between the moral and phyſical attributes of the ſupreme Being. " † Divines have diſtinguiſhed, in their bold " analyſis, between GOD's phyſical and moral attri- " butes; for which diſtinction, though I ſee ſeveral " theological, I do not ſee one religious purpoſe it is " neceſſary to anſwer."

IN profound ſubmiſſion to, and in adoration of the ſupreme Being, he reſolves to know as little as poſſible of him; and, with an air of piety, he dares not

* Vol. v. p. 224. † Vol. iii. p. 410.

raiſe

raiſe his thoughts to that ineffable, and unſpeakable, and inconceivable Being, nor conform his conduct to the wiſe government of his GOD in the adminiſtration of his providence. In this pious ignorance his Lordſhip follows the example of VANINI *, and the example of thoſe who ſaid *unto GOD, Depart from us, for we deſire not the knowledge of thy ways.* I have already obſerved, that his Lordſhip acknowledges GOD to be "the firſt, ſelf-exiſtent, intelligent cauſe, "a being of infinite wiſdom and power; and there- "fore an object to all rational creatures, not of curio- "ſity, but of awe, reverence, of adoration, of gra- "titude, of obedience, and reſignation." And for his own part, "he ſeriouſly adores his Majeſty, bleſ- "ſes his goodneſs, and reſigns himſelf entirely to his "providence." This is language becoming a Theiſt, but ſuch as he leaves no foundation for. For, upon ſuppoſition there is no moral perfection to be found in the Deity, he may be an object of awe and terror, but not of love and adoration. And how can he bleſs the divine goodneſs, or reſign himſelf to his providence, who denies both? It is not an eaſy matter to talk of GOD, and to reject his goodneſs, and other moral attributes, and to blind the eyes of readers from diſcovering the inconſiſtency. Did he really believe that GOD is good and juſt, to what purpoſe doth he *abſorb* his moral attributes in his wiſdom?

* Quæris a me, quid ſit Deus? ſi ſcirem, Deus eſſem.

ARSORB

Absorb is not a philoſophical word. When a ſmall quantity is mixed with a quantity ſo great that the ſmall quite diſappears, it is then ſaid to be *abſorbed.* And can this be applied to the divine attributes, which are all equal, all infinite? And when he hath ſwallowed up the goodneſs, juſtice, and truth of God into his wiſdom, they thereby become imperceptible. I deſire your Eſquireſhip to tell me, whether his wiſdom is a phyſical or moral attribute. Your author makes wiſdom a phyſical attribute of the ſupreme Being; and yet he makes it comprehend all the moral attributes, or rather he makes it extinguiſh them all. "We cannot riſe from our moral obligations to the "ſuppoſed moral attributes of God. I call them "*ſuppoſed.*" And why? becauſe there is no neceſſary connection between them and his phyſical attributes. And why? becauſe they all diſappear, by being abſorbed in the divine wiſdom. Take notice how he and you blunder away the wiſdom of the ſupreme Being. That wiſdom which ſwallows up goodneſs, muſt be of the ſame kind and nature with the goodneſs which it devours. But this goodneſs is not real, but ſuppoſititious, and therefore ſuch is the wiſdom. And were not goodneſs and wiſdom of the ſame kind, they could not be diluted into one another. And ſeeing you acknowledge, that you know no more of God's moral attributes than the beaſts, I am very ſure that you know as little of his wiſdom.

I hope your Eſquireſhip will allow, that if there are no moral perfections in the Deity, neither are there any immoral imperfections; and therefore your GOD can neither do good nor evil, and cannot therefore be an object of your love or of your dread: nor can you have any greater regard to your Deity, than an Atheiſt hath to his unintelligent cauſe. With ſuch a cauſe your doctrine doth agree, but not with an intelligent firſt cauſe of infinite knowledge. You know, and can diſtinguiſh between the equity and iniquity of actions; and if GOD doth not know that, you know more than he. You approve of what is juſt and right, and you diſapprove of what is wrong and unjuſt: but a GOD of ſuppoſititious wiſdom and goodneſs, who is himſelf neither morally good nor immorally evil, is neither pleaſed nor diſpleaſed whether you be virtuous or vitious. But if you will allow that GOD knows as much as you, and that he is as good and juſt as you are in theory and ſpeculation, you muſt acknowledge his moral attributes, or you muſt deny that you are a moral man in theory; though, for the ſake of decency and conveniency, you may acknowledge you are ſuch in practice.

THOUGH I have already ſaid, and proved, that GOD is eſſentially holy, and that his holineſs is the foundation of morality; yet, becauſe this is a matter of the higheſt importance in natural religion, I preſume to inſiſt ſtill more largely on the ſubject. To know

know the will of GOD as the law of our life and actions, recourſe muſt be had to his moral perfections. Admitting the phyſical perfections of the Deity, his eternity, omniſcience, omnipotence, immenſity, ſelf-exiſtence, and ſelf-ſufficiency, no concluſion can be drawn from them to lay us under an obligation to be moral and virtuous, good and juſt, unleſs we eſtabliſh it as a firſt foundation of the will and law of GOD, that he himſelf is holy, juſt, good, and true. And on this ſuppoſition and perſuaſion that GOD is a holy being, we conclude demonſtratively, that it is his will, his law, his command, that we be moral, juſt, and good. If it is GOD who hath made us capable to know and to diſtinguiſh the equity and iniquity of actions, and to approve the former and diſapprove the latter, and hath put it out of your power to do otherwiſe; you muſt conclude, that as * he who formed the eye, muſt himſelf ſee; ſo he who commands you to be holy, muſt himſelf be holy. Lord BOLINGBROKE's zeal for infidelity, and his averſion to MOSES and the Apoſtle PAUL, have obliged him to aſſert, in the ſtrongeſt manner, the juſtice, goodneſs, mercy, and truth of the ſupreme Being. He accuſes them for aſcribing to the Deity, ſuch partiality, barbarity, and cruelty, as the moſt arbitrary tyrant would ſcarcely be guilty of; and ſays, "† I would ſooner "be reputed, nay I would ſooner be a Pagan than a "Chriſtian, an Atheiſt than a Theiſt, if to be one or

* Pſal. xciv. 9. † Vol. i. p. 315.

" the other it was neceſſary to believe ſuch abſurdi-
" ties" as theſe two have taught. That is to ſay, he would ſooner disbelieve the being of GOD, than believe that GOD commanded what MOSES commanded, or what ST PAUL taught in his name and authority. And why all this, if GOD is not eſſentially good and juſt? If MOSES and PAUL found it expedient for their temporal happineſs to act ſuch a part, they have done no more than he juſtifies in his own, and in the conduct of others. For take away GOD's moral attributes, you can be under no obligation to live morally; for he cannot ſubject you to a moral law: and, as his Lordſhip ſays, you may as well, and more conſiſtently with yourſelf, be an Atheiſt than a Theiſt. Had I only to do with you and your author, I might leave the doctrine of GOD's moral attributes as ſufficiently proved and acknowledged. But I write for the glory of GOD, and only againſt you, as ye ſtand in the way to oppoſe it.

To make a world, at leaſt the mere material part of it, power and ſkill were ſufficient; but to make out of mere matter, or to make without matter, rational creatures, and to rule and govern them when made, requires wiſdom, juſtice, truth, goodneſs, and mercy. And as far as the moral exceeds the mere material part of the creation, in ſo far, in my apprehenſion, do the moral exceed the phyſical attributes of GOD. The heavens declare the glory of GOD, by

diſplaying

diſplaying his ſkill and power: this they did not from eternity, for they had a beginning. But GOD is eſſentially glorious in holineſs, from everlaſting to everlaſting. Before there was any place for the exerciſe of his goodneſs, truth, and juſtice; before he was the Creator and Governor of the world, he was juſt, and true, and good. All that is in GOD is GOD. His being doth not admit of *magis* and *minus*, or of any degree of perfection. Our nature doth; all human attainments of body and mind, are but mere trifles in compariſon of virtue, probity, and morality. An honeſt man, ſaid his Lordſhip's correſpondent, is the nobleſt work of GOD. One had better be a man of real virtue and piety, than be poſſeſſed of all the learning and knowledge that ever adorned a human mind, and all the power of the greateſt monarch on earth, without piety and morality. Learning and knowledge have been abuſed, and power hath been perverted to very bad purpoſes. But virtue and piety is the ſalt of the ſoul, incorruptible in itſelf, and the preſervative of all attainments. Is it not aſtoniſhing, that you, or any man pretending to be virtuous and honeſt, ſhould refuſe to aſcribe to GOD all goodneſs, juſtice, and truth? O HOLY, HOLY, HOLY, LORD GOD ALMIGHTY! If morality is the brighteſt ornament of the human nature, holineſs muſt be a moſt ſplendid and glorious attribute of the ſupreme Being. We have no way of knowing the divine perfections, (and Lord BOLINGBROKE admits

they are infinite), but by conſidering the perfections which we ourſelves are poſſeſſed of. We could not know that the Deity is wiſe and powerful, if in ourſelves we experienced nothing of wiſdom and power. And we muſt firſt know by ourſelves, what is wiſdom, and what is power, before we can aſcribe theſe attributes to the Deity. This you, moſt inconſiſtently with yourſelf, deny. "* Let us not aſcribe our "perfections to him, even according to the higheſt "conceptions we are able to frame of them; though "we reject every imperfection conceivable, when "imputed to him." By removing all imperfections from our perfections, we form the higheſt conceptions of them. From finite and limited, we raiſe them up to infinite and unlimited. And by this method, and by no other, BOLINGBROKE hath found out that GOD is infinite in wiſdom and power. And what danger can there be, or wherein doth the abſurdity and blaſphemy lie, to ſay that he is infinitely holy? But I cannot imagine what can be ſaid of the ſupreme Being, though we remove from him all imperfection, and aſcribe to him no perfection at all. Then he is no being; for all beings are perfect or imperfect. We muſt therefore ſay nothing, and we muſt think nothing at all of GOD. And doth not this amount to Atheiſm? There are Mahometan philoſophers, who have refined their thoughts of GOD into nothing. They will not ſay that GOD is

* Vol. i. p. 270.

ONE,

ONE, though it is the firſt and fundamental article of their religion. One of theſe puritans called the crier a liar, when from the moſque he ſummoned the people to the worſhip of the ONE GOD; and gave for a reaſon, that GOD is GOD, and no more ſhould be ſaid. I am far from ſuſpecting you or your Noble author capable of ſuch ſuper-refined piety. On the contrary, I have reaſon to think, and I ſhall afterwards make appear, that he is willing to overlook the juſtice of GOD, and, together with that, his goodneſs, in ſo far as he himſelf is concerned. " * Let us not " humanize GOD; let us not meaſure his perfections " by ours; much leſs let us aſcribe to him, as every " ſyſtem of theology does, under the notion of good- " neſs, what would be partiality; nor, under the no- " tion of juſtice, what would be cruelty in man. " We have nothing to fear in one world more than " in another."

THOUGH I am not obliged to know every ſyſtem of theology, as his Lordſhip pretends to do, yet, ſo far as I am acquainted with theſe ſyſtems, I do not find that they aſcribed to GOD partiality inſtead of goodneſs, nor cruelty inſtead of juſtice. Not ſurely the Jewiſh ſyſtem; which affirms, that their GOD is a GOD of truth, and without iniquity, and that juſt and right is he. It was ABRAHAM's opinion, that GOD was the righteous judge of all the earth. It

* Vol. i. p. 269.

was

was ſung to his praiſe in their aſſemblies, that he was good, and did good. The Chriſtian ſyſtem of theology, inſtead of repreſenting GOD as a cruel maſter, repreſents him as good and amiable. He will have all men to be ſaved, and come to the knowledge of the truth. For this purpoſe he ſpared not, but gave his only begotten Son, that whoever believed in him, might not periſh, but have everlaſting life. As conquerors aſſume to themſelves new names, expreſſive of their brave and gallant exploits; ſo the LORD GOD, when he had finiſhed the grand plan of man's ſalvation, aſſumed a new name inſtead of JEHOVAH, even that of LOVE: For, ſaith the Apoſtle JOHN, GOD IS LOVE *. If there are any ſub-ſyſtems made of the Chriſtian revelation, which aſcribe to GOD either partiality or cruelty, I renounce them. I do not at preſent undertake a defence of the Chriſtian faith; but only taking it as I find it upon record, it is certain that Lord BOLINGBROKE miſrepreſents it. And I do think he miſtakes the effects of GOD's abſolute ſovereignty for partiality. As the potter of the ſame clay makes one veſſel for honour, and another for lower and meaner uſe; ſo, without partiality, GOD beſtowed more underſtanding on him, than upon his dog or his parrot.

THE author's plain man, who will not reaſon beyond his ſenſe and experience, and thinks that his

* 1 Epiſtle, iv. 16.

own

own knowledge, whether owing to his ſtupidity, negligence, or to his inclinations, or whether it is according to truth, or according to error, is juſt ſuch, and as much as GOD requires or allows him to have, concludes that GOD will deal with him hereafter, (if there is an hereafter), as he deals with him here. " * In whatever ſtate he is, he knows that GOD go- " verns, and hath nothing to fear in one more than " in another. GOD is an all-perfect being." By this Lord BOLINGBROKE, in the character of a plain man, means, if he means any thing at all, that GOD's adminiſtration is as perfect here as it can be hereafter; ſo that if there is another life, he cannot be worſe off than he was in the life he lived here. That is, a bungling miniſter of ſtate, a betrayer, or a cobler of the conſtitution of his country, who, for fear his blood ſhould be made a cement for a new aſſociation, fled to France; and there learned French enough to ſpoil his Engliſh †. That his political talents might not ruſt, he entered into the ſervice of a new maſter, whoſe ſecrets he ſold for a ſafe return to his native country: and in order to reinſtate himſelf in his former employment, quarrelled in vain with his friend and protector, and ſpent the remain-

* Vol. i. p. 269.

† To *hold language*. *I come from reading*. Had he tranſlated Iriſh, he would have ſaid, *I am after reading*. *It revolts me*, from the word *rebuter*, very ill tranſlated; and *to infirm* an argument.

ing

ing part of his time in diſcontent; and, *pour tuer le temps*, he became writer againſt the adminiſtration, againſt religion, and againſt GOD and goodneſs. *He had all the charms of friendſhip, but was not a friend*, was publicly ſaid of him in his lifetime. Such was his life, and all the while he neglected no animal pleaſure that he was capable of. If he did not expect a better life, and more happineſs hereafter, it was not worth his contending for. His proſpect at beſt was but poor and mean, and ſuch as no wiſe man would deſire. But upon ſuppoſition of an *hereafter*, the infinite perfections of the ſupreme Being cannot aſſure the plain man, that it will not be worſe than the preſent. For all perfection includes juſtice, or juſtice muſt be an imperfection. That his Lordſhip was a ſinner, is notoriouſly, and by his own confeſſion, true; and therefore liable to be a ſufferer, whenever GOD thought fit to call him into judgment. But plain man BOLINGBROKE will tell his ſovereign and judge, Since you did not puniſh me when you knew me guilty, you have no right to puniſh me now. And this is all the ground of Lord BOLINGBROKE's and your future happineſs or ſafety, that ye cannot be worſe or more miſerable in another world, than he was, or you are, or may be in this. How dangerous is your caſe, and how deſperate was his!

THERE are many awful queſtions concerning the juſtice

juſtice of GOD, the diſcuſſion of which would be too tedious, and unneceſſary, in my animadverſions on Lord BOLINGBROKE's philoſophy. I have proved, that truth and righteouſneſs are eternal, and independent on GOD's arbitrary will and appointment. From which it follows, that he is neceſſarily and eſſentially true and juſt; and therefore he as neceſſarily approves of what is juſt and right, and diſapproves of what is unjuſt and wrong. Our knowledge therefore of what GOD is pleaſed or diſpleaſed with, becomes to us the divine law, which we are bound to obey. It is his *imperative*, not his *operative* will, which is inconſiſtent with human reaſon and freedom. So far is the imperative will of GOD from being inconſiſtent with our liberty, that it is by our freedom of will that we become ſubjected to a law, and become obliged to obey. The effects of GOD's pleaſure and diſpleaſure, whatever they are or may be, are a double ſanction. And though the light of nature cannot determine preciſely what theſe effects are or may be, yet reaſon can aſſure us that they are certain. A law without a ſanction is vain, or rather a contradiction in terms; and a ſanction not to be put in execution, is none at all. The righteous Lord, who loveth righteouſneſs, and conſequently, who is angry with the wicked, (I ſpeak analogically to the manners of men), and who is true, as well as juſt, will reward and puniſh his rational creatures, according to their good or bad beha-

viour. That a vicarious puniſhment, at leaſt, is neceſſary to vindicate the divine juſtice, was the opinion of all thoſe who offered ſacrifice. And it is for the ſake of ſuch a puniſhment, that Chriſtians believe, that, on certain ſecondary conditions, ſins are pardonable. And ſinners of ſuch a perſuaſion comfort themſelves in the mercy of GOD, and in the merits of their SAVIOUR; and conſidering themſelves under the additional obligation of redeeming love, they are delightfully led into repentance, and amendment of life. Great muſt their guilt be, and ſtrong their diſbelief of the juſtice, truth, goodneſs, and mercy of GOD, who treat the GOSPEL as a fable and fiction; dreadful muſt their apprehenſions be, on every ſurmiſe of GOD's vindictive juſtice. And who can aſſure himſelf, that all penal ſanctions annexed to the moral law, are but empty threatenings, which never will be executed? If there is a GOD, this GOD is a holy being; and if he is a holy being, then there is a moral law; and then there is a ſanction annexed to it, and the ſanction muſt be executed; and therefore the laſt is as ſure and certain as the firſt. His Lordſhip found no ſafety, no reſting-place for his ſinful ſoul, but in his impious and blaſphemous perſuaſion, that GOD is not a holy being, but an intelligent being, without every moral perfection.

HE pretends to be perfectly well acquainted with Dr

Dr CUDWORTH's intellectual ſyſtem, and for his learning he ſhews reſpect and deference. And had he acted candidly, he ought to have conſidered what the DOCTOR had ſaid on the moral attributes of the ALMIGHTY. The paſſage is too long for a quotation, but too ſtrong to be altogether omitted. " * *Knowledge* " *and power alone will not make a GOD.* For GOD " is generally conceived by all to be a moſt amiable " and deſirable being: whereas an omniſcient and " omnipotent arbitrary Deity hath nothing either of " benignity or morality in its nature to regulate and " meaſure its will; as it could not be truly auguſt " and venerable, according to that maxim, *Sine boni-* " *tate nulla majeſtas.* Neither could it be deſirable, " it being that which only could be feared and dread- " ed, but not have any firm faith and confidence " placed in it."——From PLUTARCH he ſays, " We " fear and ſtand in awe of the Deity, for its power; " but we worſhip it, that is, we love and honour it, " for its juſtice."——And he ſays, " The whole " Manichean hypotheſis taken together, is to be pre- " ferred before this of an omnipotent arbitrary Deity " (devoid of goodneſs and morality) ruling all things; " becauſe there the evil principle is yoked with an- " other principle eſſentially good, checking and con- " trouling it. And it alſo ſeems leſs diſhonourable to " GOD, to impute defect of power, than of goodneſs " and juſtice, to him.

* Folio edition, p. 202.

" NEITHER can power and knowledge alone make " a being completely happy. We have all of us by " nature a certain divination, preſage, and parturient " vaticination (as both PLATO and ARISTOTLE call " it) in our minds of ſome higher good and perfec- " tion than either power or knowledge.——It may " be proved from the nature of GOD, who is happy, " not from things external, but becauſe he is eſſen- " tially moral and virtuous, that every man hath as " much happineſs as he hath of virtue and wiſdom. " ——In what both PLATO and ARISTOTLE ſay, " there ſeems to be little more than what may be ex- " perimentally found in ourſelves; namely, that there " is a certain life, or vital or moral diſpoſition, which " is much more inwardly and ſolidly ſatisfactory, not " only than ſenſual pleaſure, but alſo than all know- " ledge and ſpeculation whatever. Now, whatever " this chief good be, which is a perfection ſuperior " to knowledge and underſtanding, PLATO ſays, that " it muſt be firſt and principally in GOD: and there- " fore virtue is defined to be an aſſimulation to the " Deity. Juſtice and honeſty are not fictitious things, " made by the will and command of the more power- " ful to the weaker; but they are nature and perfec- " tion, and deſcend downward to us from the Deity."

DR CUDWORTH, though maſter of all the learn- ing of Greece, does not think it below him to look into the BIBLE. " The holy ſcriptures, without any " metaphyſical

" metaphyſical pomp or obſcurity, tell us plainly " what is that higheſt perfection of intellectual be- " ings, which is better than reaſon and knowledge, " and which alſo is the ſource, life, and ſoul of all " morality; namely, love and charity." And, after paraphraſing the Apoſtle's words *, he ſays, " What- " ever dark thoughts men entertain concerning God, " it can never be conceived, that the moſt ſelf-ſuffi- " cient and moſt happy Being ſhould have any ma- " lignant deſpiteful thoughts towards his creatures. " Nevertheleſs, becauſe ſo many are apt to abuſe " the notion of divine love and goodneſs, and to frame " ſuch conceptions of it, as deſtroy that awful and " reverential fear that ought to be had of the Deity, " and make men preſumptuous, and regardleſs of their " lives; therefore we think it fit here to ſuperadd al- " ſo, that God is no fond, ſoft, and partial love; " but juſtice is an eſſential branch of the divine good- " neſs, an impartial law, and the meaſure of all " things and actions.

" It is evident, that Atheiſts themſelves, in the " times of Paganiſm, took it for granted, that good- " neſs was an eſſential attribute of the Deity, whoſe " exiſtence they oppoſed, (ſo that it was generally " acknowledged ſuch by Pagan Theiſts); that is, " they did think and maintain, that if there was a " God, he muſt be holy. And to diſprove the ex-

* 1 Cor. xiii.

" iſtence

" iſtence of the Deity, they argued from the topic " of evils, the pretended ill frame of things, and " want of providence over human affairs; which, if " they were true, would not at all diſprove ſuch an " arbitrary Deity, *(as is now fancied by ſome)*," and ſtrenuouſly contended for by you and your Noble author, " made up of nothing but will and power, with- " out any eſſential goodneſs and juſtice. But theſe " arguments of the Atheiſts are directly levelled " againſt the Deity, according to the true notion and " idea of it; and could they be made good, would " do execution upon the ſame."

I ſuppoſe the learned author quotes the Apoſtle PAUL, not as a writer divinely inſpired, (for he knew for whom he wrote), but as a philoſopher, (and a philoſopher is as ſuſceptible of divine inſpiration as another man), when he makes love the higheſt accompliſhment of a reaſonable creature. And I preſume to quote the Apoſtle PETER as a philoſopher, who exhorts Chriſtians in theſe words, * *As he who hath called you is holy, ſo be ye holy in all manner of converſation; becauſe it is written, Be ye holy, for I am holy.* And indeed moſt philoſophically, and even metaphyſically, he makes the holineſs of GOD the reaſon, ground, and obligation of our holineſs and morality. For this he gives MOSES as the author, who three times delivers the command of GOD in theſe words,

* 1 Epiſt. i. 15. 16.

Be

* *Be ye holy, for I am holy, saith the* LORD. The credit of MOSES as an hiſtorian and divine apart for this time, he certainly ſpeaks and gives his orders as a good moral philoſopher. We can be under no obligation to live morally, unleſs we are perſuaded, that it is the will and law of GOD that we ſhould; and we cannot be perſuaded that it is his will, unleſs we believe that he himſelf is holy. Is it not with you a matter of the higheſt aſſurance to affirm, that "the "knowledge of the Creator is on many accounts ne- "ceſſary for ſuch a creature as man †?" For the amount of your philoſophy is, that your Creator hath nothing to do with you, nor you with him. You pretend to believe that GOD is a being of infinite knowledge and power; and beyond this ſufficient, this fixed point, you are reſolved to know no more: for this reaſon you think, that they who will know that GOD is a holy being, run into metaphyſical and theological blaſphemy.

WERE this true, it is ſufficient to terrify a man of piety from going beyond the fixed point of GOD's power and knowledge. But how can he hinder himſelf from inquiring, and endeavouring to know, whether this omniſcient and omnipotent Being is a moral being or not; whether he is good or evil, or neither? If he hath made, and if he governs the world, and

* Lev. xi. 44. xix. 2. xx. 7.

† Vol. ii. p. 25.

governs

governs us as we are moral agents, we are more concerned to know his moral, than his phyſical attributes; his truth, his juſtice, his goodneſs, and mercy, than his knowledge and power. It is our intereſt, it is our duty to inquire. It is to follow the dictates, and to comply with the make of our mind and underſtanding. Whether our inquiry ends in truth or in error, proceed we ought, and muſt. I know, that the ſchoolmen are accuſed by his Lordſhip of metaphyſical blaſphemy in their doctrine concerning the Deity. But neither he, nor you for him, can ſhew in their writings any thing unworthy of GOD, or unbecoming the ſupreme all-perfect Being. On the contrary, they have reaſoned on his attributes with the greateſt reverence, caution, and accuracy. It were to be wiſhed, that neither you nor he had come nearer to Atheiſm, than they came to blaſphemy. One would be apt to think that his Lordſhip was in jeſt, in denying and affirming GOD's moral attributes, (if ſuch a ſerious and awful ſubject could bear a jeſt). He bleſſes GOD for his *goodneſs*; though his goodneſs, and other moral attributes, are as unknown to him as to the beaſts. All the moral attributes he calls *ſuppoſititious*, with a reduplication: and yet, on repeated occaſions, he mentions and aſſerts the goodneſs, juſtice, and truth of the ſupreme Being; and rather than exclude the moral attributes, he abſorbs them all in the divine wiſdom. In his vindication, he owns he admits them; but pleads that it is not in the ſame ſenſe in which

which others do, who make the human and divine goodneſs the ſame either in kind or degree. That the divine and human goodneſs is the ſame in degree, no theologiſt, no metaphyſician, ever ſaid. That intelligent creatures may be completely moral, or without ſin againſt GOD, is poſſible: and ſuch I ſuppoſe thoſe in the higheſt rank of his Lordſhip's hypothetical ſcale of beings, are. Notwithſtanding, there is ſtill a difference between the ſanctity of GOD and the ſanctity of thoſe created and ſinleſs beings. For all ſuch beings are contingent; and ſo are all their perfections, whether natural or moral. But GOD is a neceſſary, ſelf-exiſtent, and ſelf-ſufficient being; all that he is, he is eſſentially. Human or created goodneſs, as it is contingent, may be loſt by tranſgreſſion of the law of GOD; but his goodneſs endureth from eternity to eternity. The divine goodneſs is perfect; but the goodneſs of the nobleſt created being is imperfect, becauſe it is not eſſential to the nature of a creature. But this doth not hinder even human goodneſs to be goodneſs, and real goodneſs. But whether the divine and human goodneſs are ſpecifically and generically the ſame, is a debate that may admit of more ſubtilty than your Lord was, or you are capable to underſtand. It gives no offence, ſo far as I know, to the moſt pious, to ſay, that GOD is *ens* or *being*, *ſubſtance*, *intelligent ſpirit*; and that ſuch likewiſe is man or angel. And, except his Lordſhip and you, no good man ever took it amiſs to hear GOD and man

ſpoken of with this difference, and no other, that the one is a finite, and the other an infinite being.

I appeal to DAVID MALLET, Eſq; and to any man capable of reflecting on his own mind, if he muſt not previouſly have ideas of knowledge and power, before he can aſcribe them to GOD in an unlimited and infinite ſenſe. And when he hath aſcribed infinite wiſdom and power to the ſupreme Being, doth he at the ſame time omit his primitive and original notions of power and knowledge, and raſe them entirely out of his mind? If thoſe ideas are done away, all that he aſcribes to GOD is ſomething infinite, or mere infinity, and nothing elſe: and he ſhould drop the words *knowledge* and *power*, as he does their ideas. To ſpeak intelligibly, theſe original and previous ideas of knowledge and power muſt remain in the mind, when applied to the Deity in an unlimited and infinite ſenſe. But, to do juſtice to his Lordſhip, it is proper to take into due conſideration what he hath ſaid on this ſubject. And in hopes the reader will be pleaſed to ſee things in the ſtrongeſt and cleareſt light as ſtated by him, I preſume to give him the following extract.

" * GOD is, in the notion of Deiſts," who believe another life, " nothing more than an infinite " man. He knows as we know, is wiſe as we are " wiſe, and moral as we are moral: but his know-

* Vol. iv. p. 296.

" ledge,

" ledge, his wiſdom, and morality, are in their na-
" ture infinite, though they are not exerciſed alike,
" nor with a conſtant harmony, nor conſiſtency, in the
" production of all the phenomena. No man hath
" been more dogmatical on this head than Clarke.
" He is much ſcandalized at thoſe Theiſts, among
" others, who, being ſo abſurd as to imagine, that
" goodneſs and juſtice are not the ſame in God which
" they are in our ideas, but ſomething tranſcendent,
" think it is impoſſible we ſhould argue with any cer-
" tainty about them. This opinion, he ſays, doth
" not ſtand on any conſiſtent principles, and muſt fi-
" nally recur to abſolute Atheiſm. Now, I own
" very freely, that the opinion is mine, and that it
" is one of thoſe I think it impious to alter.——Far
" from apprehending that I ſhall be reduced to A-
" theiſm by holding it, the Doctor ſeems to me in
" ſome danger of being reduced to manifeſt ab-
" ſurdity by holding the contrary opinion."

If juſtice and goodneſs be not the ſame in God as in our ideas, then we mean nothing, when we ſay, that God is neceſſarily juſt and good. And for the ſame reaſon it may as well be ſaid, that we know not what we mean, when we affirm, that he is an intelligent and wiſe being. " Theſe are the Doctor's own
" words: and ſurely they ſhew, that great men, in
" common eſtimation, are ſometimes great triflers.
" When they who are of his opinion affirm, that

" GOD is neceſſarily juſt and good, according to their " preciſe notion of juſtice and goodneſs, they know " indeed what they mean, and they mean very pre- " ſumptuouſly. When they who are not of his opi- " nion ſay, that GOD is juſt and good, they too have " a meaning, which is not leſs reaſonable for being " more modeſt. They aſcribe all conceivable per- " fections to GOD, moral and phyſical, which can " belong to a divine nature, and to a ſupreme being: " but they do not preſume to limit them to their con- " ceptions; which is their crime with Dr CLARKE. " Every thing ſhews the wiſdom and power of GOD, " conformably to our ideas of wiſdom and power in " the phyſical world, and in the moral: but every " thing does not ſhew in like manner the juſtice and " goodneſs of GOD, conformably to our ideas of theſe " attributes in either. The phyſical attributes are in " their own nature more glaring, and leſs equivocal. " The divine and the Atheiſt *therefore* deny that to " be juſt and good, which is not one or the other, " according to their ideas. The Theiſt acknowledges " whatever GOD hath done to be juſt and good in it- " ſelf, though it doth not appear to be ſuch in every " inſtance, conformably to his ideas of juſtice and " goodneſs. He imputes the difference to the defect " of his ideas, and not to any defect of the divine at- " tributes. Where he ſees them, he owns them ex- " plicitly; where he does not ſee them, he pronoun- " ces nothing about them. He is as far from deny-

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" ing them, as he is from denying the wiſdom and " power of GOD. In every caſe he knows what he " means; and his meaning is in every caſe rational, " pious, and modeſt.

" WILL the divine ſay, that he does not deny the " juſtice and goodneſs of GOD, becauſe he proves " them in general *a priori*; and that when he denies " them in particular, he only denies the complete ex- " erciſe of them in this world, becauſe that is reſer- " ved for another? When he proves then the juſtice " and goodneſs of GOD, he proves them as he could " not prove even his own intelligence, that is, *a prio-* " *ri*; and when he denies them, his denial is abſo- " lute, unleſs an hypotheſis,—which may be denied " on much better grounds, be true. But what is this " proof *a priori?* Does it prove, that juſtice and " goodneſs, though they are ſo connected with the " phyſical attributes, that when we aſcribe one, we " are obliged, by neceſſary conſequence, to aſcribe " the other to the ſupreme Being, are yet ſo diſtinct, " that they may be ſeparated in the exerciſe of them, " and that either of them may act as independently on " his wiſdom, as of one another? If this be ſaid, " they who ſay it may aſſume, in conſequence, that " the ſupreme Being is ſometimes partial, inſtead of " being always juſt; and ſometimes evil, inſtead of " being always good.——And this ſets the reaſoning " of ſuch a divine as CLARKE on principles as little " conſiſtent

" conſiſtent as thoſe of an Atheiſt. Does the argu-
" ment *a priori* prove, that the juſtice, and goodneſs,
" and wiſdom, and power of GOD, are ſo intimate-
" ly connected, and are ſo much the ſame by na-
" ture, that they cannot be ſeparated in the exerciſe
" of them? In this caſe his natural attributes abſorb
" the moral. The will of GOD is not ſometimes
" determined by one moral attribute, and ſometimes
" by another, like that of man; but by a concur-
" rence of them all with his wiſdom in every act of
" it. GOD is then infinitely wiſe: he does always
" that which is fitteſt to be done; that which is fitteſt
" to be done, is always juſt and good; and the diſ-
" pute is over."

THESE words are his Lordſhip's ſtrong reaſons for diveſting the divine Majeſty of all moral perfections, and excluding the moral and excellent perfections of GOD from his firſt philoſophy. It hath been a point, and a ſettled point, that the way of coming to the knowledge of GOD, is by *negation* and *eminence:* that is, by removing from what we know of our own or other minds all defect and imperfection, and by raiſing our conceptions of our own abilities and faculties above all reſtriction, bounds, or limitation. We know, for inſtance, what our own knowledge is; and we know, as I have juſt now ſaid, what it is previouſly to our application of knowledge to GOD. Our knowlege is imperfect; but knowledge in any degree

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is so far a perfection, as it exceeds ignorance. And when all limitation is removed from it, we ascribe it to GOD, and pronounce that he is omniscient. And when we have done the same by every thing that we know is good and commendable in ourselves, we form as just and perfect an idea of GOD as possibly can be formed by human understanding, and perhaps by the completest created intelligence. We say, and say without blasphemy, that GOD is omniscient, omnipotent, infinitely wise, holy, just, good, and true: and, consequently, we deny that GOD ever was, or can be ignorant of any thing; that he is weak; that he mistakes the just means of creating, preserving, and governing all his creatures, and all their actions. We deny that he is either malevolent or unjust; and that he can either be deceived himself, or deceive others. A GOD with all these natural and moral attributes is worthy of our adoration and obedience; and much more worthy than BOLINGBROKE's God, who wants many of them. From which no man in the exercise of a sound judgment will conclude, that this is to make GOD nothing more than an infinite man. Had he any other way to come to the knowledge of GOD's omniscience and omnipotence, but by his previous ideas of knowledge and power, he might with the better grace maintain, that Christian philosophers make GOD too much like to themselves. But with the same reason I do maintain, that he makes GOD nothing more than an omniscient and omnipotent man.

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All man's imperfections are left to himſelf; his errors, ignorance, weakneſs, folly, malice, injuſtice, and deceit. Some virtues too remain his portion; ſuch as, temperance, fortitude, prudence; becauſe they can take no place in an omniſcient, holy, and infinitely happy being.

ALL this I own is according to our ideas; and do think, that Dr CLARKE is juſtly ſcandalized at thoſe Theiſts, who are abſurd enough to imagine, that goodneſs and juſtice are not the ſame in GOD that they are in our ideas, but ſomething tranſcendent. For it is by our own ideas that we reaſon and judge, and by no other beſides, whether ſuperior or inferior to them. And if it were poſſible to have any thing in our minds tranſcending our ideas, we muſt have an idea of that tranſcendency. And if it is by this tranſcendency that we know, judge, and reaſon, and at the ſame time we have no idea of it, it is impoſſible that we can judge or reaſon about it. When he ſays, that GOD is infinitely good and juſt, but not according to his ideas of infinite goodneſs and juſtice, but in a way tranſcendent to them, of which tranſcendency he hath no notion, (nor can he, for nothing tranſcends infinite); his meaning is, that he underſtands nothing of divine goodneſs and juſtice. He hath been at ſome pains to prove, that there are uſeful words which ſignify nothing, ſuch as *force* and *chance*.

chance. And ſuch to him, and to you, are all the moral attributes of GOD.

WITH this abſurdity Dr CLARKE charges ſuch Theiſts as his Lordſhip; and he honeſtly gives ſome of the DOCTOR's words, but not all of them that make for the DOCTOR's purpoſe. He introduces his anſwer with an indecent reflection on the DOCTOR's abilities, if the character of a *great trifler* ſignifies any contempt. He owns, the DOCTOR, and thoſe of his opinion, do know what they mean, when they ſay, that GOD is neceſſarily juſt and good; but they mean preſumptuouſly: and he, and ſuch as he, who uſe the ſame words, mean ſomething as rationally, but more modeſtly. I cannot think, nor will I believe on his authority, (and I have nothing elſe for it), that he who judges and ſpeaks according to his own ideas and conceptions, does either preſumptuouſly or raſhly. And if his Lordſhip ſpake and thought, and if you ſpeak and think below or above your ideas, you do wrong; I mean when you ſpeak, for think you cannot. He who ſpeaks in words tranſcending his ideas, when he ſays, that GOD is good and juſt, certainly ſpeaks without a meaning. He makes it a crime in the DOCTOR, to limit the perfections of GOD to his ideas and conceptions: but he who ſays and thinks, that the divine perfections are unlimited and infinite, can never be guilty of ſetting bounds and limits to them. He conceives them unlimited, and therefore

includes in his conception the very thing which his Lordſhip charges him with excluding. I deſire you would learn to diſtinguiſh between *apprehenſive* and *comprehenſive* knowledge. There are but few objects of thought, if any at all, of which we have comprehenſive knowledge; but every thing that we do know, we know apprehenſively. I do apprehend, that GOD is an infinitely-perfect being; but my knowledge of him is not therefore comprehenſive and adequate. I know that I live and think; and though I knew this intuitively and conſciouſly, yet I do not fully comprehend what is my life, and what is my mind. I have an apprehenſive knowledge of GOD's infinite perfections, phyſical and moral; but not a comprehenſive knowledge, and that becauſe they are infinite. When authors write philoſophical volumes, they ſhould learn philoſophical language.

HIS Lordſhip ſays, that he, and ſuch as he, aſcribe all conceivable perfections to GOD, *which can belong to a ſupreme being*; but he doth not ſay, that holineſs, juſtice, goodneſs, and truth, do belong to this ſupreme being. This is playing the *legerdemain*, and ſtealing himſelf away from an abſurdity. The queſtion is not, Whether the ſupreme Being hath all the perfections that belong to ſuch a being? for that hath every thing; but, more particularly, Whether juſtice, goodneſs, and truth, are attributes and perfections of the Deity? and ſure he hath given his

his judgment for the negative oftener than once. He knows no more of GOD's moral attributes than the beasts; no more than his omniscience and omnipotence: nay, with him they are all suppositious; they are absorbed in his wisdom; there they all vanish, and the wisdom of his GOD along with them.

THIS I have proved. And I am not surprised that he says, "I am as far from denying the moral attri-"butes of GOD, as I am from denying his power "and wisdom." And as little do I accept as a testimony of his Deism, these solemn words: "* A ne-"cessary connection between the natural and moral "attributes of GOD, no man *who believes in him*, "will deny. All the perfections of an all-perfect "being must be consistent and connected; to be o-"therwise, would be imperfection." For if no man who believes in GOD, will deny the necessary connection between his natural and moral attributes; and if you and Lord BOLINGBROKE deny this connection, then he was, and you are ————. Dr CLARKE's meaning I understand, when he says, that justice and goodness are the same in GOD, that they are in his ideas and apprehension: but for his Lordship's meaning, he keeps it to himself; and therefore I cannot allow, that "his meaning is in every case "rational, pious, modest;" I rather think it is irrational and absurd, impious and blasphemous, pre-

* Vol. iv. p. 224.

ſumptuous and atheiſtical. I am far from thinking it "a fooliſh and wicked rhodomontade in Dr "CLARKE, that the man who denies the moral at- "tributes, ſuch as he and every Theiſt apprehends "(I do not ſay comprehends) them to be, may be "reduced to a neceſſity of denying the natural like- "wiſe, and conſequently into abſolute Atheiſm." To ſave himſelf, his Lordſhip pretends, that he admits moral attributes *in general.* But a general that excludes particulars, is what neither he nor any man can underſtand. And for all the moral attributes of GOD, muſt we accept of his Lordſhip's *ens rationis?*

BUT there is nothing more obviouſly falſe, than the difference he makes in the facility and difficulty of conceiving the natural and the moral attributes of GOD. "Every thing ſhews the wiſdom and power "of GOD, according to our ideas of wiſdom and "power, in the phyſical and moral world; but every "thing doth not ſhew in like manner, the juſtice "and goodneſs of GOD, conformably to our ideas "of theſe attributes in either." This ſaying is both ſhort and ſenſeleſs. Every thing doth not ſhew the juſtice and goodneſs of GOD in the phyſical world. Nothing more certain; but nothing to his purpoſe. A tree ſhews neither the juſtice nor goodneſs of GOD, becauſe it is not a moral agent; and therefore hath no connection with his moral attributes. But it doth not therefore follow, that we cannot form an idea of goodneſs,

goodneſs, or underſtand what it is, as eaſily as we underſtand knowledge and power. I have juſt now ſaid, (and I have reaſon to repeat), that we muſt know what goodneſs and juſtice is, before we can affirm them of the Deity; and ſo muſt we know what power and wiſdom is, before we can aſcribe either to GOD. And the difference between good and evil, juſt and unjuſt, is ſooner and more eaſily known than power and wiſdom. Children know when they are ill and well uſed; and can reaſon on their right and property, upon a good office and an injury, better than on power and knowledge. This rational inſtinct (if I may uſe the expreſſion) is confirmed and ſtrengthened by experience, and habit of deciding eaſily, in numberleſs inſtances, where the equity and iniquity of actions lies, till at laſt it is indelibly ingrained in the human nature. If we call him a good man, who is faithful, true, and juſt, who is benevolent and beneficent to his power; ſurely we may call GOD a good being, who is good to all, conformably to our exacteſt idea of goodneſs. It is therefore falſe, that the phyſical attributes are more glaring, and leſs equivocal, than the moral. But admitting this to be as true as it is falſe, how can he conclude, that the Atheiſt muſt deny that to be juſt and good, which is not one or other, according to their ideas? There is no connection between theſe two propoſitions. "The "phyſical attributes of GOD are more glaring than "the moral; therefore the Atheiſt and the divine "muſt

" muſt deny that to be juſt and good, which is not " ſo according to their ideas of either." The conſequence is true, but it doth not follow from the antecedent. This is an inſtance of his impertinent logic. And no leſs impertinently does he in the preſent caſe join the Atheiſt and the divine together. The Atheiſt denies the exiſtence, wiſdom, power, juſtice, and goodneſs of GOD, becauſe inconſiſtent with his ideas. The divine aſſerts the being, and all the phyſical attributes of the Deity. The divine, beſides, aſcribes all moral perfections to GOD, according to his idea of morality. But his Lordſhip ſays, that the divine cannot have an idea of divine goodneſs. Here he and the Atheiſt join, as they do in many other things. It is his own caſe not to have, or to pretend not to have, ſuch a clear and certain idea of the divine goodneſs and juſtice, as he hath of the omniſcience and omnipotence of the ſupreme Being; but not the caſe of the divine. For the moral attributes of GOD are more ſtrongly imprinted on the human mind than the phyſical attributes. Mathematical and phyſical truths we diſcover by application of thought, but moral and ethical truths force themſelves upon our underſtanding.——So ſays his Lordſhip.

BOLINGBROKE's Theiſt acknowledges whatever GOD hath done to be juſt and good in itſelf, though it doth not appear ſuch in every inſtance: and ſo does Dr CLARKE; he conſiſtently with his principles, but

but his Lordſhip inconſiſtently with the whole of his ſyſtem of divine attributes. And never man was ſo vain as to pronounce every particular adminiſtration of government to be juſt and good, by reaſons *a poſteriori*, without knowing the caſe, and all the circumſtances of it. We can reaſon from the infinite goodneſs and juſtice of the ſupreme Being; and reaſon *a priori*, that GOD's government of the moral world is good and juſt. But nothing below omniſcience can determine the equity of every thing which happens to intelligent and rational creatures. And therefore his Lordſhip unjuſtly and injuriouſly imputes to Dr CLARKE, that he denies the divine goodneſs and juſtice in particular inſtances. And, for what I know, no Chriſtian philoſopher ever did. Becauſe GOD is a being of all perfections, religious philoſophers conclude that he is therefore good and juſt. This is proof *a priori*. But his Lordſhip, who knows nothing but by ſenſe and experience, muſt call GOD to the bar of his ſhallow underſtanding, to juſtify every act of his adminiſtration. "When he "ſees things which GOD hath done to be good and "juſt, he explicitly owns them; and when he doth "not ſee them to be ſuch, he pronounces nothing about "them." Wonderful modeſty in dealing with an all-perfect being! Though he doth not ſee nor believe, that this and the other act of divine providence is either juſt or good, he declines pronouncing any thing about them. He imagines that he can ſave every abſurdity,

dity, by aſſerting that GOD is infinitely wiſe; and therefore doth always that which is fitteſt to be done; and that which is fitteſt to be done, is always juſt and good. To let his argument ſtand as he ſtates it, it is to reaſon *a priori*. And why may not Dr CLARKE and others do the ſame? The argument, however, is not diſtinctly ſtated; for the works of GOD in creation and providence, are of different kinds and ſorts. There is a mere material, and a moral or rational world. With reſpect to the material, ſkill and power is ſufficient for its production; but the caſe is quite different with reſpect to rational beings. In the firſt inſtance, neither the goodneſs nor juſtice of GOD take place; for material and unintelligent things are not ſubjects for the exerciſe of theſe moral attributes; and though they are well and wonderfully made, they cannot be ſaid to be made according to goodneſs and juſtice. In the ſecond caſe, the creation of rational beings, capable to know the equity and iniquity of actions, divine goodneſs and juſtice do take place, as they do in the government of them when made. GOD made them all capable of being holy and happy, and of making themſelves ſuch. And as he put this in their power, he conſequently left it in their power to make themſelves worſe. But the doctrine of divine wiſdom, which abſorbs all the moral attributes, whether real or ſuppoſititious, that makes them vaniſh and diſappear, can bear no concluſion from them, to prove that rational

creatures

creatures are either well or ill made, or governed according to goodneſs and juſtice. And that this is no miſtake of his real meaning, ſhall be made appear when I come to conſider his doctrine of providence.

I cannot paſs over the argument drawn from the infinite wiſdom and power of GOD, to prove that all which GOD hath done is juſt and good, without another remark, "GOD is infinitely wiſe; he does always that which is fitteſt to be done; and what is fitteſt to be done, is always juſt and good." A being infinitely wiſe and powerful does always what is fit to be done, but not that which is fitteſt; and that becauſe he is infinitely wiſe and powerful. This world is well and wonderfully made; but in making it, he hath not acted adequately to infinite wiſdom and power. Theſe attributes are inexhauſtible. GOD can make many more worlds, both material and moral, than now exiſt; and with more knowledge in the one, and more ſplendour and beauty in the other, than I can imagine. It is likewiſe to be obſerved, that there is a fitneſs of deſign, and a fitneſs of means; this is intermediate, and that is final. This world is going on to perfection, and to a concluſion worthy of infinite wiſdom. If the parts bear an analogy to the whole, it muſt be ſo. GOD doth not make trees to ſtart up at once out of the ground. An oak is folded up in an acorn, and requires to be

nouriſhed in the earth for many years before it comes to maturity. And from conception to birth, and from birth up to maturity, do animals gradually ariſe. Many things are fit and proper as means, that are not finally ſo. Therefore there is nothing more precarious than what Lord BOLINGBROKE frequently inculcates, that the material and moral world is ſuch as it is, and could not, nor cannot poſſibly be otherwiſe; in ſo far that he makes the errors and immorality of mankind to be a neceſſary and eſſential part of their conſtitution. "Did man," ſaith he, "obſerve the law of nature, this our habitation muſt "have been a paradiſe; but then we had not been "what we are, and what GOD deſigned we ſhould "be; and a gap had been left in the ſcale of beings." Not only MOSES, but Heathen philoſophers held, that the materials of the viſible world were firſt a chaos; from this aroſe all the order and beauty which is now obſerved. And until the conſummation or concluſion of the grand plan, things will be carried on from lower to higher degrees of perfection. Chriſtians need not be ſurpriſed to ſee ſuch doctrine publiſhed as makes ſinners ſafe in their own conceit; being forewarned by the Apoſtle PETER *, *That there ſhall come in the laſt days ſcoffers, walking after their own luſts, and ſaying, Where is the promiſe of his coming? for ſince the fathers fell aſleep*, or, except

* 2 Epiſtle, iii. 3. 4.

that

that the fathers have fallen aſleep, *all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation.*

But to return: That there are ſome actions neceſſarily and eſſentially good and juſt, and others evil and unjuſt, I have already proved, and that in the ſight of God and man. From which it follows, that Dr Clarke hath well ſaid, that there is a rule of action common to both; and that this rule of action conſiſts in the eternal and neceſſary relation of things to one another; that is, in the eſſential difference between good and evil, juſt and unjuſt. And I think his Lordſhip hath no where directly denied this difference. So far from it, that he makes this difference the principle on which he reaſons againſt Hobbes. And therefore, without contradicting himſelf, (which is common enough), he cannot find fault with the Doctor for demonſtrating that there is ſuch a difference. And if the Doctor affirms that men may but that God cannot miſtake one thing for another, it doth not follow, that he judges of God as he doth of man: but it follows, that his Lordſhip is to the higheſt degree injurious, in aſſerting that the Doctor is to the higheſt degree impertinent. To this injury he adds another, That he, and thoſe of his profeſſion, "ſeek "for nothing more than the honour of the gown, by "having the laſt word in every diſpute." In this I have no perſonal concern: for I am as little influenced by temporal obligations or expectations to defend religion, as his Lordſhip had, or you have to oppoſe

it. But the third injury is the greateſt of all, and highly unbecoming men of any honour or honeſty. For he affirms, though not upon his own perſonal knowledge, that Dr CLARKE did not believe what he wrote. It is ſaid, that ſome men lie for the ſake of the truth. But, for what he knew, his Lordſhip hath lied moſt ſcandalouſly for the ſake of a ſyſtem of impiety and iniquity. Had he had a due value for his own memory, he would not have aſperſed the memory of another.

I take it now for granted, and for proved, that there is an eſſential difference between *right* and *wrong*, *equity* and *iniquity*; and that GOD is eſſentially and neceſſarily whatever he is, and man only contingently ſuch; that the rule of right is fixed and unchangeable. This rule GOD obſerves by the rectitude of his being, and that as unalterably as his being is unchangeable. But man, whoſe nature is liable to change and variation, is not eſſentially good and juſt in all his actions, becauſe he is not a neceſſary and unchangeable being. And though he doth not obſerve this rule of righteouſneſs always, it doth not follow that GOD doth not. The rule is ſtill the ſame, and men ought to obſerve it, becauſe GOD doth. Add to this, that it is GOD who hath made man capable to diſtinguiſh between right and wrong: and in vain muſt he have beſtowed this power on him, had it not been his will and pleaſure that man ſhould be juſt and good. From what

what we know of ourſelves, we learn God's moral attributes; and from theſe we learn our duty to God and man. But we do not form an idea of God on the plan of human perfections. Theſe perfections are only openings for a higher view of the Deity. And from this view we know whoſe we are, and what we ought to be and to do. So far is Dr Clarke, and ſo far are all religious philoſophers, from making God an infinite man, that they rather make man, were he ſuch as he ought to be, a diminutive god. In profound piety, his Lordſhip did, and you do, decline, or rather, in the vanity of heart, deſpiſe the dignity, as much more for your honour to be independent, than a dependent being on the almighty Creator of the world.

All that the Noble author hath ſaid againſt Dr Clarke's ideas of God's moral attributes, he revokes in theſe words. " * We are forced to help our " conceptions of the divine nature by images taken " from the human nature; and the imperfections of " this nature are our excuſe. But then we muſt " take care not to make humanity the meaſure of di- " vinity, and much more not to make the laſt the " leaſt of the two. When we have raiſed the idea " of any human excellency as high as we are able, it " remains a very limited idea. When we apply it to " God, we muſt add to it our negative idea, or our

* Vol. ii. p. 59.

" notion

" notion of infinity; that is, we muſt not confine it " by the ſame, nor ſuppoſe it confined by any limi- " tations whatever." To add a negative idea, is a very ſmall addition. I do not think that infinity is properly negative; for bounds, and limitations, and reſtrictions, which hinder extenſion, are in themſelves ſomething negative. They ſtop our thoughts from riſing higher than their limited and imperfect objects permit. And nothing is more poſitive and real than the divine perfections; and the neareſt and exacteſt conceptions that we have of them are ſuch as exclude all wants and defects. And this excluſion of imperfection we call *infinity*. By this we diſtinguiſh the ſupreme Being from all other beings, and the almighty Creator from his works. Perfection is poſitive, and imperfection is therefore negative. When from our idea of the Deity we remove all imperfections, we conceive GOD to be the moſt poſitive, the moſt real, the fulleſt, completeſt, and moſt perfect being. This Noble author ſhews as much diſhoneſty as ſkill in writing on both ſides of the queſtion.

OF which take this other inſtance. Though no man ever treated PLATO with greater contempt, he nevertheleſs gives his theology the preference to all of his own and ſome ſucceeding ages. " * There " are," ſaith he, " many notions ſcattered in the wri- " tings of PLATO, which the moſt orthodox Theiſt

* Vol. ii. p. 379.

" may

" may adopt. He acknowledges one ſupreme being,
" ineffable, incomprehenſible, all-perfect, the ſelf-
" exiſtent fountain of all exiſtence, divine and hu-
" man, himſelf above all eſſence. GOD is truth, but
" above all truth; intelligent as well as intelligible,
" but above all intelligence; good, but above all
" goodneſs. He is none of theſe, but the principle
" of them all; as the ſun is the principle of light,
" and as he makes all things to be ſeen, without be-
" ing light or ſight himſelf. In a word, PLATO ac-
" knowledged the omniſcience, the omnipotence, the
" omnipreſence, the infinite power and wiſdom of
" GOD. Theſe are very elevated ſentiments, which
" may be collected from his writings. They are
" ſtrained as high as the utmoſt pitch to which we can
" carry our ideas, and they ſtill point higher. And
" ſo they ſhould: for after all the efforts that the
" mind of man is capable of making, our conceptions
" will fall infinitely ſhort of their object, when this
" object is the majeſty of the all-perfect Being. Nei-
" ther PLATO, nor they who received his philoſophy
" four or five hundred years after his time, and who
" were even more extravagant, and leſs intelligible
" than he, could puſh their general or abſtract notions
" of this ſort too far. The intellectual proſpect is
" immenſe; and the intellectual ſight muſt be ſtrained
" from objects clearly and diſtinctly perceived, to
" ſuch as are leſs ſo; and from theſe ſtill farther, till
" it can be ſtrained no more, and the mind is loſt in

" the

" the ſublimity of its own conceptions." To which he adds, " If theſe ſpeculations cannot diſcover " by infinite degrees the whole truth, they cannot " lead us into any error; and may ſerve to maintain " in our minds that awful ſenſe of the ſupreme Being, " of the true GOD in the unity of his nature, which " are due to him from every intelligent creature. " Thus far, therefore, and in this manner, PLATO " was an excellent maſter of natural theology."

THESE things, and ſayings, and ſentiments, ſaith he, the moſt orthodox Theiſt may adopt. Some of them I do not, and ſome he himſelf doth not adopt. I cannot allow, that GOD is above all eſſence, above all truth, above all intelligence, above all goodneſs; unleſs it be admitted, that this eſſence, this truth, this intelligence, is only ſuch as is found in creatures. For as theſe perfections are in GOD, he is not, nor can he be above them, without being above himſelf. The reverſe of which ſeems to me to be a doctrine of the ſame ſort with VANINI's, who denies that GOD is *ens*, but admits that he is *ſjentia*; ſomething *in abſtracto*, but nothing *in concreto*. And to me it appears plainly, that BOLINGBROKE makes the ſame uſe of GOD's being above all eſſence. For he ſays, " * Though the Heathen philoſophers ſpake ſome- " times of the monade, or firſt unity, alone, as God; " yet they aſcribed often ſo much to the ſecond God,

* Vol. iii. p. 116.

" that

" that the firſt became in ſome ſort a non-entity, an " abſtract or notional being, a being without eſſence " or nature, *becauſe above them*, and rather an intel- " ligible than an intelligent principle. Thus they " left no place to the true GOD in their conceptions, " whilſt they endeavoured to raiſe him above all con- " ception." And if a being above eſſence is a non-entity, his Lordſhip, orthodox Theiſt as he is, muſt not adopt all that he imputes to PLATO; nor can he, without running into Atheiſm, and making GOD a non-entity. And though he admits, that PLATO was extravagant, and thoſe that received his philoſophy afterwards were more extravagant than he, in puſhing their general and abſtract notions of the Deity; yet none of them could puſh them too far. Is not this a contradiction? Whatever is extravagant, exceeds; and notwithſtanding this exceſs, Platonic philoſophers ſtill fell ſhort. This is nonſenſe in terms. And then, like one that doth not know nor care what he ſays, he finds fault with ſuch intellectual attempts to know GOD. " * The divine nature cannot be ex- " plained by human words; for it cannot be concei- " ved by human ideas: and therefore none but de- " lirious metaphyſicians, who impoſe by their ſound, " and have no determined ideas affixed to them," (ſo far is neither ſenſe nor grammar), " will ever at- " tempt ſuch explication. All that the wit of man " can do, is to ſpeak cautiouſly and reverently of it,

* Vol. iii. p. 113.

" according to thoſe general notions of wiſdom, and " power, and majeſty, and all other perfections " which we are able to collect *a poſteriori*; that is, " from the works of GOD; and which ſerve ſtill " more to ſhew our ignorance than our knowledge *." And it muſt not be omitted, that, in order to carry his point againſt our knowledge of GOD, he affirms, that " the knowledge of the divine attributes" (not only the moral, but the phyſical) " is impoſſible, and " unneceſſary for us to have, even on the ſuppoſition " there is a GOD." With what induſtry doth he inculcate our ignorance of GOD? For if upon ſuppoſition there is a GOD, and on ſuppoſition that it is impoſſible and unneceſſary to know whether this GOD hath any natural or moral perfections or attributes; then ſuch knowledge of the exiſtence of a Deity is the very ſame to us as Atheiſm.

FROM the works of GOD we learn no more *a poſteriori* than his knowledge and his power. But, as Dr CUDWORTH hath demonſtrated, knowledge and power will not make a GOD. The reſt therefore muſt be learned *a priori*; ſuch as, the unity, the eternity, the immenſity, the independency, and the neceſſary exiſtence of the ſupreme and all-perfect Being. And for all the delirium and blaſphemy of metaphyſics, it muſt require ſome ſkill, either natural or artificial, in that ſcience, if we intend to acquire any

* Vol. v. p. 224.

more

more knowledge of GOD *than what we can learn by ſenſe and experience* *. What a noble philoſopher muſt he be who takes no other method to learn and to teach? He hath no uſe for reaſon. But can he demonſtrate by his ſenſe and experience, that all the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles? that the earth moves every day round its axis, and every year in an orbit, that touches the tropics of Cancer and Capricorn? He ſeems to be very certain, without ſenſation and experience, that there is no future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments. Neither doth he know by ſenſe and experience, that GOD is omniſcient and omnipotent, the firſt intelligent cauſe, and an all-perfect being. For ſuch philoſophy, as the greateſt ſavage knows as well as his Lordſhip, one ſingle page, inſtead of five volumes, was more than enough. Rather than know or admit the phyſical and moral attributes of the Deity, he reſolves not to know, or not to acknowledge that he knows any more than the greateſt ſavage, and ſome beaſts.

MR MALLET, you and I know that every ſtream hath a ſource, and that every ſource is ſufficient for the ſtream that flows from it. Many ſtreams we have ſeen, but the ſources of few. If you and I ſhould follow a ſtream up to the unknown fountain, I would deſire you, when we reached it, to ſtay a little, and examine what this ſource and fountain is. You im-

* Vol. iii. p. 412.

mediately return, and you know no more than you did before, that this, as well as all other ſtreams, hath a ſource. I ſtay, and, by examination, I find, that this fountain receives no ſupplies; and that it never increaſes nor decreaſes, notwithſtanding the ſtream that flows from it; that in it was found every thing that can ſatisfy the largeſt deſires of a reaſonable ſoul. I purſue the ſimilitude no further. All that you know is, that the world is a production, and that the producer is ſufficient to have produced it; that he muſt have ſkill and power enough for the purpoſe. But I know beyond what you do, or rather will underſtand, that this Being who made the world is the firſt cauſe, and therefore himſelf uncauſed; therefore eternal, neceſſarily exiſtent, and independent: and that therefore no perfection, either phyſical or moral, is to be found in his works, but what was and is in this firſt cauſe, this ſupreme Being, in an eminent way; that is, without reſtriction and limitation. GOD cannot limit himſelf, and nothing elſe can. It is no leſs abſurd than aſtoniſhing, that one who acknowledges the omniſcience and omnipotence of a Deity, ſhould deny his holineſs, goodneſs, juſtice, and truth. Theſe things we reckon perfections in ourſelves; and yet you refuſe them to GOD, and that becauſe in us they are no more than human. With the ſame reaſon you may argue, becauſe we are, GOD is not.

THE diſtinction between the phyſical and moral attributes

attributes of GOD, BOLINGBROKE frequently mentions and admits. But in greater ſincerity of heart, he ſays, that "* divines have diſtinguiſhed, in their "bold analyſis, between GOD's phyſical and moral "attributes; for which diſtinction, though I ſee ſe-"veral theological, I do not ſee one religious pur-"poſe that it is neceſſary to anſwer." And without a perſuaſion of the moral attributes of almighty GOD, I do not ſee that there can be any place, any purpoſe, for religion, and morality founded in religion. For if I am not perſuaded that GOD is holy, (or moral), I can never know that it is his will that I ſhould be ſuch, or that I can procure his approbation by regulating my conduct according to goodneſs, equity, truth, and juſtice. Wonderful was his Lordſhip's averſion to every thing that might bring him under an obligation to obey the will of GOD; and no leſs wonderful is his inadvertency, or inſincerity; for I dare not ſay his ſtupidity. There is not a ſavage, even the moſt thoughtleſs, nor an Atheiſt, even the moſt obſtinate, but knows the difference between a good office, and the murder of a benefactor. And doth not GOD, who hath made the ſavage and the Atheiſt, the Noble philoſopher and DAVID MALLET, Eſq; know as much as they? And if he knows what is right and what is wrong, what is juſt and what is unjuſt; which of the two we obſerve and practiſe, cannot be to him a matter of indifference. It is not ſuch to us.

* Vol. iii. p. 410.

We

We approve of and commend morality in ourſelves and in others, we diſcommend and diſapprove of all immoral and wicked doings; and that becauſe we know the difference. And if GOD doth not know the difference, he is not omniſcient; nay, we know more than he. And if he doth not commend all good and condemn all evil actions, Lord BOLINGBROKE was, and DAVID MALLET is, a better being than the GOD who made them moral and rational agents. This is horrid blaſphemy; but they are to be blamed for it. * *If our heart condemn us, GOD is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things*; and particularly that we are juſtly condemned. *If our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence towards GOD*, that neither will he condemn us.

NUMBERLESS are the contradictions to be found in Lord BOLINGBROKE's philoſophical works. For notwithſtanding all that he hath ſaid againſt GOD's moral attributes, or againſt any attempt to know them, we are gravely told, that "† the principles "and duties of natural religion ariſe from the na- "ture of things, and are diſcovered by the reaſon "of man," (therefore not only by ſenſe and experience), "according to that order which the author "of all nature, and the giver of all reaſon, hath "eſtabliſhed in the human ſyſtem." And how is it poſſible that GOD, who hath given reaſon to man,

* 1 John iii. 21. † Vol. iii. p. 46.

by

by which he knows the principles and duties of natural religion, can himſelf be deſtitute of all holineſs and morality? If GOD hath beſtowed reaſon on man, he is the author and original cauſe of all the good and noble diſcoveries that men make, either in the phyſical or moral world, and particularly of the difference between the equity and iniquity of actions, and our commendation of the firſt and our condemnation of the ſecond. Our morality is the effect of GOD's holy good will and pleaſure; and whatever is in the effect, muſt be prior in the cauſe; and in this particular caſe, muſt be eminently and infinitely ſo. But all this is nothing to the author. He follows his point through abſurdities and contradictions to the laſt. And becauſe I intend to follow him as far as he goes, (for the ſubject is of the greateſt importance), I beg the reader's leave to tranſcribe two paragraphs.

" * LET us draw a line of ſeparation between na-
" tural and artificial theology. By that we are
" taught to acknowledge and adore the infinite wiſ-
" dom and power of GOD, which he hath manifeſt-
" ed to us in ſome degree or other, in every part,
" even the moſt minute, of his creation. By that too
" we are taught to aſcribe goodneſs and juſtice to
" him, where-ever he intended we ſhould ſo aſcribe
" them; that is, where-ever either his works, or
" the diſpenſation of his providence, do as neceſſari-

* Vol. v. p. 168.

" ly

" ly communicate theſe notions to our minds, as " thoſe of wiſdom and power are communicated to " us in the whole extent of both. Where-ever they " are not ſo communicated, we may aſſume very " reaſonably, that it is on motives ſtrictly conform- " able to all the divine attributes, and therefore to " goodneſs and juſtice, though unknown to us, from " whom ſo many circumſtances, with relation to " which divine providence acts, muſt be often con- " cealed. Or we may reſolve all ſuch caſes into " the wiſdom of GOD, and reſigning ourſelves to " that, not preſume to account for them morally. " Thus we follow GOD, and pretend to have know- " ledge of his moral character no further than he " gives it; no further than theſe abſtract or general " notions, which we collect from the proceedings of " his providence, are confirmed by the ſame.

" BUT we are taught a very different leſſon in the " ſchools of artificial theology. In them all the no- " tions of thoſe obligations under which men lie to " one another, by the conſtitution of their nature, " are transferred to GOD; and an imaginary con- " nection between his phyſical and moral attributes " is framed by very precarious reaſonings *a priori*; " all of which is founded on that impertinent ſup- " poſition, that moral fitneſſes and unfitneſſes are " known, by the eternal reaſon of things, to all ra- " tional beings, as well as to GOD. They go fur-

" ther.

" ther. As GOD is perfect, and man very imper-
" fect, they talk of his infinite goodness and justice,
" as of his infinite wisdom and power; though the
" latter may preserve their nature without any con-
" ceivable bounds; and the former must cease to be
" what they are, unless we conceive them bounded.
" Their nature implies necessarily a limitation in the
" exercise of them. Thus, then, the moral attri-
" butes, according to this theology, require infi-
" nitely more of GOD to man, than men are able,
" or would be obliged, if they were able, to exer-
" cise to one another; greater profusion in bestow-
" ing benefits and rewards, greater rigour in punish-
" ing offences. This whole system of GOD's moral
" obligations, or of divine ethics, being raised *a pri-*
" *ori*, and not *a posteriori*, is a system of the duty
" of GOD to man. Let the blasphemy of this ex-
" pression be charged to the account of those who
" make it proper and necessary to be used, in order
" to expose their doctrine. It is a system of what he
" ought, or is obliged by his attributes to do, and
" not a scheme of what he hath done. It prescribes
" to GOD: and the dispensations of his providence
" are acquitted or censured, as they are conformable
" or not conformable to it."

THIS passage is such sublime nonsense, that it surpasseth all understanding. By natural theology we acknowledge the infinite wisdom and power of GOD.

Agreed. By this we are taught to aſcribe goodneſs and juſtice to him. And we are taught the ſame by artificial theology; that is, ſuch theology as Chriſtian philoſophers teach. But this goodneſs and juſtice he aſcribes to GOD only, when GOD intends we ſhould aſcribe them. From which it follows, that in ſome caſes it is not the intention of GOD, that we ſhould aſcribe goodneſs and juſtice to him. And how doth he learn the intention of GOD to be ſometimes worthy, and ſometimes unworthy of the appellation of good and juſt? or where doth he learn, that GOD is ſometimes good, and ſometimes evil, ſometimes juſt, and ſometimes unjuſt, or ſometimes neither? This doctrine of yours ſuits better an atheiſtical unintelligent cauſe, than a being of infinite wiſdom and power. For if GOD is juſt and good, he is neceſſarily and eſſentially ſuch; and therefore juſtice and goodneſs is aſcribable to him at all times, and in all caſes. But, ſay you, GOD's intention is to be known, and our duty of aſcribing goodneſs and juſtice to him, by the works and diſpenſations of his providence, communicating to our minds as neceſſarily thoſe notions of juſtice and goodneſs, as thoſe of wiſdom and power are communicated to us in the whole extent of both. Which is to ſay, when we perceive as clearly the juſtice of every adminiſtration of his providence, as we do his knowledge and power in his works of creation, then it is GOD's intention that we ſhould aſcribe to him goodneſs and juſtice: but

but if we do not perceive the juſtice of divine providence, then are we forbidden to call him juſt. His Lordſhip can never pardon Dr Clarke for quoting to a Chriſtian audience an appeal ſaid to be made by God to man, for the juſtice and goodneſs of his government: and, notwithſtanding, he takes upon himſelf to determine, whether this or the other event is good or evil, juſt or unjuſt; and aſſumes, that it is God's intention and command that he ſhould do ſo. Before he can juſtify his God, and acquit him of wrong and injuſtice, he muſt have as good evidence of the juſtice and goodneſs of every particular diſpenſation of his providence, and adminiſtration of his government, as he hath of his wiſdom and power. Nor is this enough to abſolve him for aſcribing goodneſs and juſtice to him. He muſt further be inſtructed in the full extent of God's goodneſs, as the notions of divine wiſdom and power are communicated to him in the full extent of both. No man but this vain and conceited writer ever pretended to know the utmoſt extent of all that God knows and can do. And if he will not ſay that God is good and juſt, until he knows the utmoſt extent of divine knowledge, that is, until he himſelf becomes omniſcient, he never will, he never can. I have ſaid that our knowledge of right and wrong, juſt and unjuſt, is intuitive, and even conſcious; and I have the teſtimony of all mankind for it: and this our knowledge exceeds in general that of ſkill and power. And

though I cannot account for the juſtice of every particular event, I may, and muſt ſay, that GOD is juſt and good. As we cannot account for every phenomena of the material world, yet knowing that they are the doings of omniſcience and omnipotence, we conclude, and ſo doth BOLINGBROKE and MALLET, *a priori*, that theſe things are neither idly nor ill placed, but rather to anſwer ſome good end, of which we are ignorant. And ſo this oppoſer of GOD's moral attributes is obliged to acknowledge, in contradiction to himſelf, that where-ever the goodneſs and juſtice of particular diſpenſations of divine providence do not appear to us, we may aſſume very reaſonably, that it is on motives ſtrictly conformable to all the divine attributes. In every caſe then, and not occaſionally, we conclude, that GOD is juſt in all his works, and righteous in all his ways.

BUT is this "to follow GOD, and to pretend to "have knowledge of his moral character no further "than he gives it; no further than theſe abſtract and "general notions, which we collect from the proceed-"ings of his providence, are confirmed by the ſame?" And you follow GOD! and for what purpoſe? You firſt allow, that he is eſſentially juſt and good, and on that account you aſſume reaſonably, that whatever GOD does, it is on motives ſtrictly conformable to all the divine attributes, though the juſtice and goodneſs of every particular diſpenſation of his providence does

not

not appear ſuch to you; and then you pretend to have knowledge of God's moral character no further than he gives it. And what more knowledge would you have of God's eſſential holineſs, than that it is eſſential; or what leſs can you have? And becauſe your words *no further than he gives it* are not eaſily underſtood, you explain yourſelf in a way ſtill more unintelligible: "No further than theſe abſtract "and general notions, which we collect from the "proceedings of his providence, are confirmed by "the ſame." You collect, in the analytical method, abſtract notions of the juſtice and goodneſs of God, from the proceedings of his providence. The particular events, the juſtice of which you cannot account for, are to you the proper means of knowing the goodneſs and juſtice of God; and that is to ſay, that your collection of ſuch events is the reaſon why you cannot aſcribe to the Deity any one moral attribute. And if in this you are miſtaken, it is not you that are to be blamed: for you pretend to have no more knowledge of God's moral character than he gives. And theſe abſtract and general notions of the goodneſs and juſtice of God in particular, (nonſenſe enough), you admit no further than they are confirmed by the ſame, the *ſame collection.* This is to begin at particulars, and there to end with your inquiry and your knowledge. To deny divine providence, and to appeal to that for the goodneſs and juſtice of God, is to treat the reader with intolerable contempt. This is

not

not all. BOLINGBROKE and you admit no other ſanction of the moral law, than the natural conſequences of our good and bad actions. Theſe are not all immediate. Some of them follow our doings at the diſtance of many years. And how then can you by induction make a full enumeration of particulars, to juſtify or to impeach the juſtice and goodneſs of GOD? It is an obſervation of conſiderable antiquity, *That the righteous and the wiſe, and their works, are in the hand of GOD. No man knoweth either love or hatred by all that is before them. All things come alike to all: there is one event to the righteous and to the wicked; to the good and to the clean, and to the unclean; to him that ſacrificeth, and to him that ſacrificeth not: as is the good, ſo is the ſinner; and he that ſweareth, as he that feareth an oath.* And if ſentence againſt an evil work was immediately to be executed, there would be no place left for repentance and amendment. Of this more hereafter. He had, more agreeably to his ſyſtem of natural religion, ſaid, that GOD neither does good nor evil, but that every thing comes to paſs according to the neceſſary conſtitution of nature, or according to fatality.

INSTEAD of troubling himſelf with GOD's moral attributes, he and you think it a better way to reſolve or diſſolve all the collections made from the proceedings of providence, "into the wiſdom of GOD; and "reſigning ourſelves to that, not preſume to account

"for

" for them morally." His attempt to abſorb all GOD's moral attributes into his wiſdom, I have already proved to be nonſenſe. But it may be aſked, whether this wiſdom is a moral or a phyſical attribute of the Deity? If it is a moral attribute, he only ſhifts the word, and retains the thing. If it is a phyſical attribute, implying ſkill and knowledge, morality hath no relation to it. If he makes wiſdom ſtand for both a phyſical and moral attribute, he is guilty of a contradiction becoming the greateſt blunderer, by aſſerting, that " an imaginary connection is framed between " GOD's phyſical and moral attributes, by very pre- " carious reaſonings *a priori*." For how can goodneſs and juſtice be abſorbed in the divine wiſdom, if there is no connection between them?

THE Noble author is pleaſed to call Dr CLARKE's invincible demonſtration an impertinent ſuppoſition. The Doctor had made it plain, that morality is not founded on poſitive and arbitrary appointment, (and his Lordſhip ſays the ſame againſt HOBBES), more than the equality of two and two to four, ſeeing actions in themſelves are ſome fit and others unfit to be done. And this is known, by the eternal reaſon of things, both to GOD and man. The righteous LORD loveth righteouſneſs; and GOD is good, and doth good, and that according to the eſſential rectitude of his nature. And this juſtice and goodneſs he eſſentially proportions and adapts in a way the moſt fit and

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ſuitable to the ſubjects of his moral government. It is therefore no objection againſt GOD's moral attributes, that they are limited in the exerciſe of them. "Infinite wiſdom and power may preſerve their na- "ture, without any conceivable bounds; but divine "goodneſs and juſtice muſt ceaſe to be what they are, "unleſs we conceive them bounded." A little more attention would have made his Lordſhip ſee, that the moral and natural attributes of GOD, and particularly his power, are in the very ſame caſe as to the exerciſe of them. I ſhall ſuppoſe, that GOD made the man BOLINGBROKE by an act of his infinite power; but this man was not an infinite man, but a perſon limited and bounded in power and underſtanding; and therefore the divine power in making him was limited in the exerciſe of it. For as boundleſs as GOD's power and knowledge are, yet are they both limited in the exerciſe of them, unleſs GOD can make an infinite creature; than which nothing is more abſurd. To give his reaſoning the appearance of an argument, it muſt run thus. "If GOD is good and juſt, he muſt "always beſtow the greateſt bleſſings and benefits, "and exerciſe the moſt complete and exact juſtice; "but he doth neither: therefore he is neither good "nor juſt." In anſwer, I deny the condition of the firſt propoſition, or what logicians call the *ſequela majoris*; for the reaſon immediately above; and for another reaſon already mentioned, that we have no grounds of perſuaſion that GOD muſt immediately reward

ward and puniſh, poorly doth his Lordſhip conclude, that, "according to Dr CLARKE's theology, GOD's "moral attributes require infinitely more of GOD to "man, than men are able, or could be obliged, if "they were able, to exerciſe to one another; greater "profuſion in beſtowing benefits and rewards, and "greater ſeverity in puniſhing offences." That GOD exerciſes goodneſs and juſtice in a more complete and better proportioned way than men exerciſe their goodneſs and juſtice to one another, all who believe in GOD will admit. But his ſuppoſition of man's being as able as GOD, is both idle and impious; and not only impious, but it defeats the purpoſe for which he makes it. The term *require* might admit an orthodox meaning, if he did not reſolve it, in the next ſentence, into *duty* and *obligation*. "The whole ſyſtem of GOD's "moral obligations, and divine ethics, being raiſed *a* "*priori*, and not *a poſteriori*, is a ſyſtem of the duty "of GOD to man.——It is a ſyſtem of what he "ought and is obliged by his attributes to do, and "not a ſcheme of what he hath done. It preſcribes "to GOD: and the diſpenſations of his providence "are acquitted or cenſured, as they are conformable "or not conformable to it."

THAT all reaſonings *a priori* are not precarious, the author does allow. For, from the infinite wiſdom and power of GOD, he concludes the world is well (not infinitely well) made. And from this it follow-

eth, that GOD is a free and voluntary agent, becauſe he might not have made it at all, or made it otherwiſe than it is. No man ever carried this ſuppoſition ſo far as his Lordſhip, who maintains ſtrenuouſly, that GOD can make a ſyſtem, wherein what is now juſt ſhall be unjuſt, and wherein what is true ſhall be falſe, and two and two ſhall be unequal to four. GOD can do all his pleaſure; but he is pleaſed with nothing but what is good and juſt. And though he hath made every thing perfect *ſuo ordine et genere*, yet there is a difference in degree of perfection in one creature from that in another. His Lordſhip's ſcale of being from an oyſter up to a man, and from a man higher and higher than he can tell, all of which being, in his opinion, mere matter, endued ſome with more, and ſome with leſs elaſticity; it depended on GOD's free will to have made of the ſame materials a he-goat or the man BOLINGBROKE. But this man being once made a rational creature, capable of knowing his duty to GOD and man, and thereby the relation of a ſovereign and a moral ſubject being eſtabliſhed, he became obliged to obey the will of his maker and maſter. GOD acts as the ſupreme Being, the ſovereign Lord, and Ruler, and Governor of the world, according to the eſſential holineſs, morality, and rectitude of his nature. And the eternal truth and righteouſneſs, and the moral fitneſs of things, is indeed the rule of GOD's conduct with regard to man, and all other rational creatures. It is likewiſe a rule

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of conduct to all such creatures; and no more than a rule to an Atheist; but to a religionist it becomes a law and obligation. It is therefore an unfair representation of the sanctity of the supreme Being, and of Dr CLARKE's demonstration of the certainty and obligation of natural religion, to say, That "the whole "system of GOD's moral obligations, or divine ethics, "is a system of the duty of GOD to man." Though there may be a rule, there can be no obligation without a law; and there can be no law without a superior; and the supreme Being admits of none. In consequence of GOD's having made reasonable creatures, he becomes their Lord and Lawgiver, their Ruler and their Judge; and he rules and judges them according to the sanctity and rectitude of his own nature, without coming under any obligation, but that of his unerring wisdom, and holy will and good pleasure, which is essentially good and just. Dr CLARKE did not pretend to give a scheme of what GOD hath actually done, because that was not for his purpose; but to shew the grounds and evidences of natural religion, and the unchangeable obligations of it. And this he hath done to the satisfaction of every reader of unbiassed reason. His intention was, to shew what men are to believe and to expect from a good and just GOD, and what they ought to do in order to procure his approbation and protection. But this Nobleman writer, (I beg pardon for having said a Noble writer), with an impious affectation of wit, misapplies the term

obliged, intimating ſome reſtraint on the ALMIGHTY by acting always according to his own attributes. "It "is a ſyſtem of what GOD ought or is obliged by "his attributes to do." GOD, for the glory of his being, always acts conſiſtently with his attributes; but cannot properly be ſaid to come under an obligation. But man, who is obliged by the law of GOD to act reaſonably and morally, doth not always act as he is obliged to do. The author therefore poorly inſinuates, that in this very thing man has the advantage of his maker. "The ſame rule of conduct is "common to GOD and man, with this difference, "that man may, but GOD never muſt depart from "it." A poor advantage, for a reaſonable creature to act unreaſonably: and ſuch a privilege it is, as it would be for a wiſe man to become mad at his pleaſure. His Lordſhip muſt have imagined himſelf happier than GOD, becauſe he could depart from the rule of reaſon at his diſcretion. How happier is he who knows, that a reaſonable and moral life is an acceptable ſervice done to a GOD of holineſs, juſtice, goodneſs, and truth; a GOD who knows all his good doings and endeavours, and who can, and will protect, and plentifully reward him; a GOD whom none ſeek, whom none ſerve in vain?

LORD BOLINGBROKE, being reſolved not to be bullied by orthodox divines, hath exerted all his ſtrength in his laſt and dying words, and fled from life

life to take refuge in an everlaſting inſenſibility. How vain, and how weak muſt he have been! proud of his philoſophical labours, but without fortitude to publiſh them during his life. The brave part he hath left you to act, and to maintain his philoſophical infidelity and Atheiſm. And I have a right to ſay ſo, for ſome more than this reaſon, That a God of no moral perfections cannot be the Sovereign and Governor of moral agents; and therefore, as ſuch, you have nothing to do with him, nor he with you.

SECT.

SECT. VIII.

Of our imitation of GOD's *moral attributes.*

ONE would think, that he who denies GOD's moral attributes, employs himſelf idly in the debate concerning the imitation of them. But the author knew his buſineſs better. For, upon ſuppoſition that he might not prevail in perſuading mankind that GOD is neither good nor juſt, he was reſolved that their *opiniatreté* ſhould profit them as little as poſſible. It is only on ſuppoſition that GOD is holy, that he contends we ought not to preſume to imitate him in holineſs. To prevent miſrepreſentation, take his opinion in his own words. " * I muſt give ſome " anſwer to a queſtion, which our good friend the " B. of C. makes, Whether there is any abſurdity in " ſuppoſing, that man ſhould imitate the author of " nature as far as he is able? This is ſaid to be, not " only agreeable to the Chriſtian plan, but alſo to " that of the Stoics.——In anſwer to this query, I " confeſs, and think myſelf obliged in conſcience to " confeſs, that I hold it to be abſurd, and worſe than " abſurd, to aſſert, that man can imitate GOD, ex- " cept in a ſenſe ſo very remote and ſo improper, " that the expreſſion ſhould never be uſed, and much " leſs ſuch a duty recommended." After obſerving

* Vol. iii. p. 410.

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the distinction made by divines, of GOD's physical and moral attributes, (which distinction must be admitted), he says, "They admit, that though we cannot imi- "tate GOD in the exercise of the former, they insist, "that we can, and ought to imitate him in the exer- "cise of the latter. And to complete this proof, "which consists in affirmation rather than argument, "they maintain, at least CLARKE does so, very per- "emptorily, that the divine moral attributes, that "is, holiness, goodness, justice, righteousness, and "truth, are the very same in GOD that they are in "our ideas.——And that GOD desires to be imitated "by men in those perfections, which are the founda- "tion of his own unchangeable happiness."

I willingly admit, and admit for the honour of the Christian plan, that there is no absurdity in supposing that man should imitate the author of nature as far as he is able, and in so far as the author of nature is imitable. I likewise admit, that Dr CLARKE doth maintain, that the divine moral attributes are the same in GOD that they are in our ideas; but I do not find, that he makes use of this affirmation as an argument for our imitation of these moral attributes. And I further allow, that GOD desires, or rather commands us to be holy, because he himself is holy. But this Nobleman writer thinks himself obliged in conscience to confess in the face of the world, that he holds this to be absurd, and worse than absurd.

IN

In order to proceed to the examination of this heavy charge brought againſt Chriſtians, and the beſt of Heathens, I deſire you will be pleaſed to let me know, what ſort of conſcience is here to be underſtood, whether a private or a public conſcience. As a good citizen, he thinks it beſt to diſclaim private conſcience. For on every occaſion, and ſometimes without an occaſion, he tells us, that private conſcience is dangerous to the public peace and tranquillity. If we are to underſtand a public conſcience, a pretence to it in a Chriſtian nation, againſt the national profeſſion, if not the national principles of religion, is a direct violation of that conſcientious duty which you owe to the ſociety whereof you are a member. As this, I think, is the only appeal made to conſcience, (for I do not remember another inſtance in all your voluminous works), it is fit that this conſcience of yours ſhould be narrowly looked into. A man is bound in conſcience, when his reaſon dictates to him what he ought to do, and what he ought to forbear. Whatever a man *ought* to do, he is *obliged* to do. This preſuppoſes the knowledge of a duty, a duty preſuppoſes an obligation, and an obligation preſuppoſes a law, and a law, as ſuch, is indiſpenſable at the diſcretion of the obligee. Whoever therefore ſtands accountable to his own conſcience, ſtands accountable to a ſuperior legiſlator, and to a legiſlator who knows the thoughts of his heart, his deſigns and his endeavours, as well as his actions. Conſcience

therefore

therefore belongs to no man but to him who believes himſelf one of GOD's moral ſubjects, ſenſible of his ſovereignty, and of his own ſubjection. Leave the man and his conſcience ſubject only to the authority of his own underſtanding, he will find himſelf under no obligation of conſcience, but what is diſpenſable at his pleaſure; and ſuch an obligation is none at all. So far as civil authority reaches, a ſubject may find himſelf bound by that authority to conform his conduct to the laws of the ſociety, but no further than the judge knows his obedience or tranſgreſſion: whereas a ſubject of GOD's moral government hath a religious conſcience; and this conſcience binds and obliges at all times, in all caſes, without reſerve or exception. And how could he, or how can you plead a religious conſcience as dictatrix of what is morally good and evil, when you deny GOD's moral attributes? He was not baſhful, and you are not blate, to diſcharge your conſciences againſt thoſe who think themſelves obliged to be holy in all manner of converſation, becauſe GOD is holy, for the abſurdity, and worſe than abſurdity, in taking ſuch an obligation on them. And whatever in this caſe is worſe than abſurdity, muſt be impiety and blaſphemy. *Abſurd* is a word his Lordſhip uſes freely and frequently; but had he known that nothing is abſurd but what is demonſtrably falſe, he had uſed it more ſparingly. Notwithſtanding he allows, that the Chriſtian doctrine may bear an orthodox ſenſe; but a

ſenſe ſo remote and ſo improper, that the expreſſion ſhould never be uſed, and much leſs ſuch a duty recommended. Whatever he might ſay as a nobleman, it became him as a philoſopher to have pointed out this remote and improper ſenſe, that his reader might judge whether the expreſſion was to be uſed, and the duty recommended, or not. I cannot take his aſſertions, even his appeal to his conſcience, for a deciſive argument.

THERE are many generical attributes which may be predicated of GOD and his creatures. To GOD we and he aſcribe being, exiſtence, intelligence, wiſdom, and power; and Mr MALLET is a being adorned with intelligence and power, and wiſdom too; for he is not an idiot: and theſe things are ſaid of him, and ſaid of GOD, *univoce et diviſim*. And therefore, without impiety or abſurdity, in ſo far man may be ſaid to be like to GOD. The difference indeed is extremely great, and therefore plain. But difference doth not take away the generical agreement. Let *reaſonable animal* be the definition of man, in which *reaſonable* ſtands for the moſt proper difference between *man* and other animals; it doth not take away *animality*, in which *man* and *beaſt* agree generically. Man is ſtill a real animal; and ſuch is a horſe. No more do the exiſtence, knowledge, power, the goodneſs, and juſtice of GOD, take away the reality of juſtice, goodneſs, power, intelligence,

gence, and exiſtence from man. To aſcend with his Lordſhip in his hypothetical ſcale of beings, to the higheſt of them in the higheſt rank, who never departed from the rule of equity, who never tranſgreſſed the law of nature, and who never diſobeyed the will of his GOD, and whoſe goodneſs and beneficence extended as far as his power; ſuch a being muſt reſemble a GOD of holineſs, more than Lord BOLINGBROKE ever did. I do admit, and his Lordſhip admits it too, that between finite and infinite there is no proportion: yet it doth not follow, that the creature muſt in every thing be unlike to the Creator. For then it would follow, that if GOD is an intelligent being, we muſt be unintelligent; and if he exiſts, we cannot *be*. And therefore, though GOD is infinitely holy, we may be finitely ſuch. And ſure I am, it is not our duty to GOD, to differ from him in every thing, and to be wicked becauſe he is good and juſt. You would do well to conſider, that ſuch profound piety and reverential awe of GOD as hinders you from imitating in your conduct the divine moral attributes, tends to make men immoral. On ſuppoſition that we are the ſubjects of GOD's moral government, it is our duty to conform our conduct to his known will, and to improve in piety and morality; and all our endeavours to that purpoſe may be conſtrued aſpiring to a ſimilitude with our ſovereign Lord and Maſter. It is making his will the rule and foundation of our will, and of our

works. And when we will and do the ſame things which GOD wills and commands us to will and to do, in ſo far we agree with him: and in this agreement we reſemble him more than the devil and damned ſpirits, who are ſaid to act a contrary part. This is what I underſtand, and what all Chriſtians underſtand, and what the beſt of Heathens did underſtand, by the imitation of GOD's moral attributes.

FOR this purpoſe, among others, all religious people and nations have inſtituted a worſhip and adoration of the Deity. When in the moſt ſolemn and ſerious manner we employ our thoughts in contemplation of the ſupreme Being, and with our voice praiſe him for his glorious perfections, and *bleſs him for his goodneſs*, we are led to love him; and whom we love, we wiſh to reſemble as far as we are able. This is natural: and to deſire to be like the being whom we adore, is natural likewiſe; ſo natural, that wicked Heathens made their deities like themſelves. The Siamites admire and adore their god SOMMONOCODDAM, who neither doth good nor evil, that by this adoration they may become the liker to him in his perfections. And he who copies the completeſt pattern, will ſooner learn the buſineſs, though he doth not come up to the original, than he who works without any. But let us hear what his Lordſhip ſays againſt the opinion of ſo great and ſo good a part of mankind. And he ſays,

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" * THEY would do well to conſider, that if the " moral attributes of GOD were demonſtrated by ar- " guments *a priori,* and they are not ſo even by " them, to be the ſame in GOD that they are in our " ideas; yet this general aſſurance would be far from " making them objects of human imitation. To be " ſuch, they muſt be known *a poſteriori,* like his " phyſical attributes: for we can have no knowledge " of either, *except that which ſenſe and experience* " *gives us.* They muſt be diſcerned in the works of " GOD, and in the conduct of his providence. And " it is evident, that they cannot be ſo diſcerned in " them, as to be proper objects of our imitation. The " divine attributes are exerciſed in ſuch innumerable " relations unknown to us; though we are ſure the " exerciſe of them, in the immenſity of the univerſe, " is always directed by the all-perfect Being to that " which is fitteſt to be done on the whole; yet the " notions of created beings, who ſee them in one re- " lation alone, like us, cannot be applied to them " with any propriety, nor with any certainty, ſuffi- " cient to make them objects of their imitation. This " is ſo true, that in many caſes we ſhould act in direct " contradiction to the law of our nature, if we made " the conduct of divine providence the rule of ours. " GOD makes the ſun to riſe upon the evil and the " good, and he ſends rain on the juſt and unjuſt. " He involves the innocent with the guilty in great

* Vol. iii. p. 412.

" calamities;

" calamities; and there is no theme on which divines " enlarge more pathetically than on the unjuſt diſtri- " bution of good and evil.——Are theſe appearances, " however conſtant ſome, and however frequent o- " thers, to ſtand as objects which we are to imitate in " our moral conduct? I think no man will ſuppoſe " that they are, except thoſe who have ſo little re- " gard to conſiſtency, that they propoſe the firſt to " our imitation, whilſt they aggravate the two laſt to " ſuch a degree, that they aſſume the juſtice and " goodneſs of GOD's diſpenſations in this ſyſtem to " be capable of no other vindication, than that which " ſuppoſes another. Theſe writers and preachers, " therefore, muſt mean, when they exhort us to imi- " tate GOD, not the GOD whom we ſee in his works, " and in all that his providence orders or permits; but " a GOD who appears in their repreſentations of him, " and who is often ſuch a GOD as no pious Theiſt " can acknowledge."

IN conformity to this ſcheme of judging of things and actions only as they are circumſtanced, or *in concreto*, he denies that we can form any idea of juſtice * *in abſtracto*. And he gives for reaſon, That he knows the real eſſence of juſtice, and can define it ſeveral ways; yet theſe definitions or their contraries, a conformity to one or the other of which conſtitutes every action juſt or unjuſt, cannot form in any mind

* Vol. iii. p. 366.

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one abſtract idea of juſtice. "We can contemplate "each of theſe apart, and compare any particular "action with it; but we cannot abſtract one general "nature, with which we may compare every action "that falls under ſome one of theſe definitions." Before he can pronounce an action to be juſt, he muſt compare it with the definition of juſtice. And what is this definition of juſtice? It is not the definition of a particular juſt action; for action is not compared with itſelf, but with the idea of juſtice. One muſt be hard put to it, to eſtabliſh and ſupport a ſyſtem of religious or irreligious philoſophy, to be obliged to ſpeak nonſenſe with ſo much aſſurance, and ſo directly contrary to the firſt principles of ratiocination. But I have already fully anſwered all his objections againſt the doctrine of abſtraction. This however is the foundation of robbing GOD of all his moral attributes, and condemning every attempt to imitate his holineſs in our conduct. It may ſerve the purpoſe of one who pretends to know no more of GOD's phyſical or moral attributes than what ſenſe and experience teach him; and that is juſt nothing at all. He hath no uſe for reaſon; and without it I know not what he can learn; for I do not remember that I ever was an irrational creature. How doth he prove *a poſteriori*, that GOD is omniſcient and omnipotent, without reaſoning from the effect to the cauſe, and from the nature of the effect to the nature of the cauſe? He can have no experience, that this world, material and moral, is the work

work of GOD. He did not ſee it made, nor was he witneſs of repeated acts of creation. But this great doctor of ignorance, and antirational philoſopher, can reaſon both *a poſteriori* and *a priori*, when he is in one of his rational fits. "Though the divine attri-" butes are exerciſed in innumerable relations abſo-" lutely unknown to us, we are ſure, that the exer-" ciſe of them, in the immenſity of the univerſe, is al-" ways directed by the all-perfect Being to that which " is fitteſt to be done." And upon what grounds can he be ſure of this, but by reaſoning *a priori*, after this manner: There is an eſſential difference between right and wrong, independently of all arbitrary appointment, human or divine; from which ariſes a fitneſs of ſome actions, and unfitneſs in others: and this eternal independent fitneſs is a rule for GOD, as well as for man: A being of all perfection, both phyſical and moral, can never do any thing that is unfit to be done; and when we do that which is juſt and good, we obſerve the ſame rule of conduct; we then co-operate with GOD, which, his Lordſhip ſays, is honour enough for the creature? And may it not then be ſaid, without impiety and blaſphemy, that in this we imitate GOD's moral attributes?

BUT he objects, "If we are to imitate GOD, we " muſt imitate the works of his providence; and in " that caſe we ſhould act in direct contradiction to the " law of nature; becauſe GOD makes the ſun to " riſe

" riſe upon the juſt and the unjuſt, and ſends rain " upon the evil and the good; and he involves the " innocent with the guilty in great calamities." He vindicates the divine goodneſs and juſtice in his government of the univerſe, becauſe whatever he does, is fitteſt to be done; and in particular he impeaches his GOD of maleadminiſtration. He makes the ſun to riſe and the rain to fall upon the worſt and the beſt of men, without diſcrimination; and he involves the innocent with the guilty into great calamities. And if we ſhould do ſo, we ſhould act unjuſtly. He knows, that it is an article of the Chriſtian religion, that all mankind are ſinners; and every one who believes natural religion, acknowledges, that in many things he offends, and falls ſhort of his duty. Thoſe innocents, therefore, who are involved in great calamities with the wicked, are not *abſolutely*, but *comparatively* innocent. GOD is omniſcient, and knows the caſe of every individual; but we are often ignorant of the merit and demerit of men and nations. And if a hypocritical knave is ſignally puniſhed by providence, it can lay us under no obligation to hurt a man in whom we perceive no fault. Our duty can never extend beyond what we can poſſibly know. And, to be ſure not to err, we have nothing to do, but to act according to the rules of morality. And if his Lordſhip, or you for him, pleaſe to ſtop, (as you frequently adviſe others to do), without going beyond thoſe duties which we owe to GOD and man, you may aſſure

yourſelf of the approbation of the ſupreme Being. There is no occaſion for giving yourſelf any trouble with GOD's government of the world: for you will find yourſelf under no obligation to make the ſun to riſe and the rain to fall upon the juſt and the unjuſt; but you will find yourſelf obliged to extend your benevolence and beneficence to the virtuous and to the wicked. I ſay to the wicked, as far as it tends to their reformation, and is conſiſtent with the peace and ſafety of the ſociety: for to do good to thoſe who deſerve evil, is often to do evil to thoſe who deſerve better. Earthly ſovereigns take into their own hands the adminiſtration of government, and the diſtribution of rewards and puniſhments; and they make it a crime in ſubjects to invade this their prerogative. And it is more criminal in men to invade the divine prerogative, and willingly involve the innocent with the guilty in any diſtreſs, becauſe GOD appears to us, by all obſervable circumſtances of the caſe, to do ſo. The moſt innocent of mankind are infants; and yet I ſuppoſe his Lordſhip would not have thought it an error in GOD's providence, to have permitted MOSES to have periſhed in his ark of bulruſhes; ſeeing thereby, according to the courſe of cauſes, his Lordſhip's clients the Canaanites had not ſuffered extermination. And had BOLINGBROKE died in his cradle, neither his country nor mankind would have loſt much; nothing, I am ſure, but what might have been made up many other ways. For one who pretends to believe

that

that GOD is the omniſcient and omnipotent Creator and Governor of the world, to examine and determine that this particular diſpenſation of his providence is juſt or unjuſt, is an impious invaſion on the prerogative of the ſupreme Being, and a ſcandalous contradiction to his belief and perſuaſion. At any rate, Dr CLARKE, and ſuch divines as he, can ſupport the juſtice and goodneſs of GOD's government of the world, by the argument *a priori*, drawn from the divine wiſdom and power, in the preſent ſyſtem, as well as his Lordſhip does, and that without finding fault with particular events and caſes; and in ſo far better by ſuppoſing another ſyſtem, than his Lordſhip did, or you can do without it.

I have ſaid before, that by no manner of reaſoning can it be proved, that all, either the good or bad, conſequences of human actions muſt be immediate. Lord BOLINGBROKE knew more of the world, than to have imagined, that every great deſign muſt be carried on by means with a direct tendency, a tendency obvious to every one, to promote it. If, in the affairs of this life, we muſt wait for the ultimate and grand event of many various actions, in order to ſee their influence on the effect firſt in view; how can we be able to pronounce, that this and the other diſpenſation of divine providence is well or ill adapted for the good of the creation, and the glory of the Creator, before the whole ſcheme is finiſhed? Let a man be witneſs of

the greateſt crime committed by a perſon of reputed probity, who eſcapes puniſhment during years; the witneſs could not conclude, that the criminal therefore muſt eſcape for ever. Hidden things of darkneſs, after long delay, are wonderfully brought to light in the preſent ſyſtem of things. GOD permitted (and BOLINGBROKE ſays, that GOD in his providence orders or permits) JOSEPH to be ſold to the Iſhmaelites, and permitted them to ſell him in Egypt. The ſale was cruel and immoral, and yet it was the means of preſerving his father and his family. This I hope, will not be taken for a fable, becauſe it is the foundation of much real hiſtory. It is really ſurpriſing, that any man who makes pretenſions to morality, ſhould maintain, that we cannot know a good from a bad action, either human or divine, but by the immediate conſequences of it. Poor is this *prima regula morum*, That whatever action procures the greateſt and moſt immediate good, is to be choſen as reaſonable and moral; and of this temporal and immediate advantage every one muſt judge for himſelf. This is to renounce all ſubjection to the great Sovereign of the univerſe. I do think, that Dr CLARKE, whom you deſpiſe and abuſe, ſpeaks much better ſenſe. " * The " eternal and neceſſary differences of things make it " fit and reaſonable for *reaſonable* creatures to act " *reaſonably*," (I will not ſay, *that this cauſes it to be a duty, or lays an obligation upon them ſo to do*),

* Evidence, propoſ. 1.

" even

" even ſeparate from the conſideration of theſe rules " being the poſitive will or command of GOD; and " alſo antecedent to any reſpect or regard, expecta- " tion or apprehenſion, of any particular, private, " or perſonal advantage or diſadvantage, reward or " puniſhment, either preſent or future, annexed, " either by natural conſequence, or by poſitive ap- " pointment, to the practiſing or neglecting theſe " rules." A great dealer in contradictions is his Lordſhip, to maintain, that the morality of actions is only to be known by their good and bad conſequences; and to aſſert, (as before obſerved), that morality is not made by will, either human or divine, but that things are right or wrong abſolutely and in themſelves. I may now conclude, that it is falſe and abſurd to aſſert, as his Lordſhip hath done, that we know nothing of GOD's phyſical or moral attributes, but by ſenſe and experience; and that we know nothing of the morality and immorality of actions, but by their immediate good or bad conſequences; and that there is no way to know the holineſs of almighty GOD, but by the immediate conſequences of every diſpenſation of his providence.

WITH equal diſreſpect to his intelligent and attentive reader, and diſcredit to himſelf, BOLINGBROKE aſſerts, that the moral attributes of GOD " muſt be " diſcovered in his works, and in the conduct of his " providence;" when at the ſame time he denies divine

vine providence, at leaſt as to individuals. From a general providence that comes no further down than to nations and communities, one may learn politics, but nothing for his own perſonal conduct. This philoſopher muſt have imagined himſelf made only for the management and adminiſtration of public buſineſs; and that his perſonal conduct was below his own elevated wiſdom, and below the care of divine providence. Grant all this, and he was in the right to refuſe an imitation of GOD's moral attributes. The phyſical and moral attributes of GOD are only diſcernible in the conduct of his providence; and this providence is not extended to individuals, and therefore can have no influence on any man's perſonal behaviour. And as little could he have been influenced in a public ſtation by a national providence. For he finds fault with GOD's making the ſun to riſe and the rain to fall on the juſt and unjuſt, and for involving the innocent with the guilty in great calamities, and that finally, according to his theology. From this he muſt have learned, that an imitation of GOD's government of the world was unjuſt. Both in a public and private capacity, he had no occaſion for divine providence as a rule and example for his behaviour. All that he knew, and all that you know of GOD, is, that he abandons every particular man to the conduct of his own underſtanding, with liberty to act independently on him; and if he governs nations, it is in a way that is not equal. His religion, and his know-

ledge

ledge of the ſupreme Being, had as little influence or tendency to make him or you wiſer or better men, either in a perſonal or public capacity, than he might have been, or you may be, as an Atheiſt.

To hear his Lordſhip conclude the debate about the imitation of GOD's moral attributes, one would be apt to think that he had learned nothing by his philoſophical inquiry into the nature of the ſupreme Being, but to contradict himſelf. "Men ſhould "content themſelves to know GOD, as he hath "thought fit to be known by them. And why are "not divines, eſpecially, ſo content? He appears "in his works, and by eaſy deductions of our know-"ledge of them, to be the firſt, ſelf-exiſtent, intelli-"gent cauſe of all things, a being of infinite wiſ-"dom and power, and therefore an object to all ra-"tional creatures, not of curioſity, but of awe, of "reverence, of adoration, of gratitude, of obedi-"ence, and reſignation." This is in ſo far true, (and I have already acknowledged it); but it doth not follow from his principles. "To what purpoſe "then do divines contend to make him an object of "human imitation, by deductions from his nature "and attributes, independently of his works, by "which alone they can have the little, inadequate, "general, but ſufficient knowledge of his nature and "attributes, that hath been mentioned? Do they "hope to carry Theiſm any further by nice meta-

"phyſical

" phyſical ſpeculations, hard to be underſtood, and " inconcluſive when they are underſtood, than by " thoſe obvious proofs which GOD hath proportioned " to the comprehenſion of every man? I conclude " therefore my anſwer to this query, by aſking, in " my turn, our excellent friend, whether the doc- " trine of imitating GOD, even ſo far as we are able, " does not tend to draw men off unneceſſarily, and, " if I may ſay ſo, wantonly, from real knowledge, " into thoſe abſtractions that have led ſo many to " confound the divine and human nature; to imagine " an uninterrupted ſcale of intelligence from man up " to GOD; to flatter themſelves with notions not " only of imitating him, but of being united to him; " and to invent and adapt, in the licentiouſneſs of " imagination, all that metaphyſical and myſtical " blaſphemy which hath paſſed for the moſt ſublime " theology?"

I have ſaid, that I am content to know GOD as he hath thought fit to be known. But I am very ſure, that it is his will and pleaſure, that I ſhould know as much of his phyſical and moral perfections, as I am capable to diſcover: and therefore I am not content to limit my knowledge of him, to his knowledge and his power. Beyond this his Lordſhip doth maintain we ſhould not go; and that further we cannot go; becauſe between GOD's phyſical and moral attributes there is only an imaginary connection. But, conſiſtently

conſiſtently with his method of learning, he cannot arrive at the knowledge of the divine knowledge and power. For neither ſenſe nor experience can teach him, that GOD made and governs the world. To know more than, or to know any thing of GOD, he muſt reaſon from what he ſees and obſerves; and this he will not do, becauſe ſuch reaſoning muſt lead him into metaphyſical abſtraction. More than this, if he ſhould miſtake error for truth, he ought to be content with being deceived, becauſe it is GOD himſelf who deceives him. Never was philoſopher more idly employed. For if the knowledge or ignorance of GOD, if our conceptions of his being and perfections are according to truth, or according to error, it is the ſame thing to him, and conſequently to every rational creature. What occaſion then had he to trouble himſelf and others with his ſpeculations? ſince knowledge, error, and ignorance, in our conceptions of the ſupreme Being, are equally fit and proper, the proper means appointed by GOD himſelf, for attaining as much knowledge of our obligations to adore and obey him, as is neceſſary for us. Such a writer is in the right to reject logics and metaphyſics, and together with theſe, to reject all reaſoning; and ſo he does on the ſubject of natural religion. I know, and I know it by abſtract reaſoning, that GOD is holy, juſt, and good, and true. And if his Lordſhip knows no more than he learns from ſenſe and experience, he hath no uſe for any deductions, whe-

ther eaſy or difficult, to learn that GOD is the firſt, ſelf-exiſtent, and intelligent cauſe of all things. And theſe deductions, eaſy as they are, he hath never once attempted, becauſe it cannot be done without ſomething of metaphyſics, artificial or natural. For inſtance, if an infinite ſucceſſion of cauſes and effects is not impoſſible, it cannot be demonſtrated from the works of nature, or from all that we ſee and obſerve in the material and moral world, that GOD is the firſt cauſe of all. It is owing to metaphyſics, and abſtract reaſoning, that we know the world is made, and well made, becauſe it bears all the marks of an intelligent and powerful architect; and becauſe nothing can make itſelf, ſince in that caſe it muſt be both the cauſe and the effect, prior and poſterior to itſelf. From which it follows, that this world, and the maker of it, muſt be two diſtinct beings. The maker of the world muſt be an unmade and uncauſed being, and therefore muſt be a ſelf-exiſtent, ſelf-ſufficient, and all-perfect being; a being who is himſelf independent, and on whom all things made to be, are dependent. This is no metaphyſical blaſphemy. It is the foundation of natural religion, and the moſt ſublime theology. This is ſo far from leading men to confound the divine and human nature, or confounding GOD and nature, as Atheiſts do, that it is the true way to diſtinguiſh them.

BY our imitation of GOD's moral attributes and perfections, all that I underſtand, or others underſtand,

ſtand, as far as I know, is our obligation to be holy, becauſe the GOD whom we adore, is himſelf holy. And can we overact our part in morality? Is it diſpleaſing to the ſupreme Being, that we ſhould make his holineſs an obligation on us to be holy, *as far as we are able?* Is it becauſe men of piety and morality are liker to GOD than the devil and damned ſpirits are, that his Lordſhip forbids all imitation of his moral attributes? I am ſure, that they who believe the moral perfections of the Almighty, and, in conſequence of their belief, make it their ſtudy and endeavour to lead a pious and a moral life, act a more reaſonable part, and do their Creator more honour, than either his Lordſhip did, or you do, by denying his moral perfections, and ſetting men free from all divine obligations to live righteouſly and godly. Is not the world wicked enough? It ſeems not, for your purpoſe. A very poor purpoſe it muſt be, to make mankind worſe than they make themſelves, and to teach them to cut your throat for their own advantage, whenever they find an opportunity of doing it ſafely. I fear no man who fears GOD; but I ſhall never willingly truſt myſelf, or what belongs to me, to any man who denies GOD's moral perfections, his providence, and a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments; becauſe it is his opinion, that he may do every thing ſafely, that he can ſecretly. Are not you afraid leſt a brother in unbelief ſhould take the firſt opportunity to diſpatch you, for fear you ſhould diſpatch him? Prevention, between you and him, is

the only means of ſafety. Would it not be for your advantage, that all mankind were honeſt and moral? And for this purpoſe divines and preachers exhort their readers and hearers to imitate, as far as they are able, GOD's moral perfections. This, you ſay, will lead men unneceſſarily and wantonly from *real knowledge* into metaphyſical blaſphemy. But the reduction of all your means of knowledge into ſenſe and experience, is to lead men into a total ignorance of GOD; and if not into a perſuaſive and reaſoned, at leaſt into a ſtubborn Atheiſm; that is, if not into a diſbelief, at leaſt into an unbelief of the being and attributes of GOD. In place of natural religion, it tends to eſtabliſh an affected, ſtudied, a learned and laborious, and conſequently a wicked ignorance of GOD, and of all the duties we owe to him, and to one another for his ſake *. In fine, I hope the religious reader will excuſe me for ſaying, that I look upon ſo much of Lord BOLINGBROKE's philoſophy as I have examined, as diſguiſed Atheiſm: and what I have further to ſay, I believe will confirm me and my reader more and more in this opinion.

* No man who hath any right apprehenſion of the holineſs of GOD, and of the morality of human actions, can forbid our imitation of the divine moral attributes. His Lordſhip's doctrine ſerves no religious purpoſe, but may be a *caveat* againſt carrying the principles of Atheiſm too far. For on ſuppoſition that "ignorance and knowledge, truth and falſity, fidelity "and perfidy, virtue and vice, are equally emanations from "the firſt being," it were a diſſervice done to mankind to teach them to imitate ſuch a being.

SECT.

SECT. IX.

Of GOD's *preſerving providence.*

I HAVE ſaid, that Lord BOLINGBROKE's philoſophy leads to a total ignorance of GOD, and to an unbelief of his being and attributes, ſo far as I have examined it. And what I have to ſay, confirms me ſtill more in this opinion; and particularly his doctrine of divine providence. For the ſatisfaction of readers not well acquainted with the ſubject, I ſhall firſt ſtate my notion of it; and if I do not obviate, I ſhall afterwards anſwer my author's objections againſt it.

BY the term *providence*, I underſtand in general, the care which GOD takes of his creatures, conſidered as actually created. This, though true, is not ſufficient to give us a diſtinct notion of all that concerns the ſubject; and therefore it muſt be conſidered more fully and particularly. Scarce any ever denied the whole of providence, except thoſe who likewiſe denied GOD's creation of the world. So cloſe is the connection between theſe two, that by common conſent it hath paſſed for an axiom, *If GOD is, the world is governed by providence.* It is true, the ancient Epicureans did, and modern Epicureans do, in words, acknowledge a Deity; but ſtrongly oppoſed, and

and ſtill oppoſe a providence; and no wonder, for they both deny a creation. The ancient Epicureans were therefore juſtly eſteemed Atheiſts by men of learning and ſolid ſenſe. The Stoics taught other and better things; and if what they ſay of fate, had not hindered, they deſerved applauſe for their doctrine: and it is poſſible that their meaning, even in that, is not rightly underſtood.

UPON ſuppoſition that GOD is the *creator*, I am to maintain that he is therefore the *curator* of this world. Nor is there any difficulty to demonſtrate this, by comparing the excellence of the ſupreme Being with the manifold imperfections of the creature. SENECA ſaid, and ſaid well, *Non ſine cuſtode ſtare tantum opus.* But more particularly, we are to conſider divine providence as it is exerciſed with reſpect to thoſe things that depend on it. In every being produced by creation, there are two things to be conſidered, the permanency or duration in exiſtence, and its activity in operation. From this ariſe two diſtinct acts of divine providence, (I mean relatively to the effects), commonly and properly called *conſervation* and *government* *. To prevent miſtakes, I do not mean, that, in our conceptions of divine providence, by *preſervation* is to be underſtood a bare negative *non-deſtruction* of the things which GOD

* Conſervation, preſervation, and ſuſtentation, are uſed promiſcuouſly.

might

might or may destroy or annihilate, if he pleased. They who seemingly admit divine preservation, and contend that there is no more necessary to preserve created beings in existence but divine permission or indulgence, do but divert themselves with a negative and positive meaning of the word. They imagine, that a thing once created stands in need of no further assistance, but only to be left to itself in order to continue in existence. But I undertake to prove, that *preservation* is an efficacious act of providence, whereby things created are made to continue in being; just as the sun preserves and continues the day as long as it is day: for it doth not only not destroy the meridian light, but by a very positive virtue and influence, no less efficacious than that by which it produced the morning, it operates for the preservation of the day.

That preservation is something *positive*, the manifest imperfection of all created beings doth plainly demonstrate. Every thing created is dependent, contingent, and successive in duration. This no man who admits creation can deny. And no less certain it is, that the permanency of a created thing *in suo esse*, in its own being, is not a mere nothing; otherwise a thing created would begin to be nothing as soon as it began to be; than which nothing can be more absurd. Duration, then, is something true and real. Not only so, but this duration is something distinct from the first

firſt moment of exiſtence. It is likewiſe certain, that nothing of independency can belong to a created being. Therefore permanency in exiſtence, which is ſomething and poſitive, hath no place in ſuch dependent and created beings; but is entirely to be aſcribed to an independent GOD, by whoſe true and real influx they all continue in exiſtence. By creation they became dependent, and by the ſame productive power they continue their dependency. As creation brought them under the dominion of the Creator, their duration rather increaſes than diſſolves their ſubjection.

BY conſidering the contingency of creatures with reſpect to their duration, we ſhall find the ſame concluſion. For what hath only a contingent being, is no more determined to continue in exiſtence than to diſcontinue. What of itſelf is determined, and able to prolong its exiſtence, can have no contingent, but a neceſſary duration. If it is not permanent by the neceſſity of its nature, its duration muſt be owing to the influx of ſome other cauſe. And of what cauſe? Surely to the influence of that cauſe which, from a thing only poſſible, made it actual. All contingent beings, that is, all the creation, owe their exiſtence, and the continuation of it, not to themſelves, but to that ſelf-exiſtent cauſe, that, from a ſtate of poſſibility, raiſed them up to actual and permanent exiſtence.

THE ſame concluſion follows no leſs plainly from

a ſucceſſive duration in created things. The different moments of a contingent and ſucceſſive permanency, have no connection one with another, and far leſs have they any influence and cauſality one upon another. Certainly I am not now, becauſe I was an hour before: nor doth it follow from my preſent being, that I ſhall be an hour after this; otherwiſe my duration would not be contingent, but neceſſary. For if the cauſe of my preſent duration is my preceding duration, then my preſent duration muſt be the cauſe of my duration hereafter; and ſo one moment muſt inſure another, and that to all eternity. Thus it follows, that what of itſelf is inſufficient to continue its exiſtence for one moment, (and whatever laſts by a contingent and ſucceſſive duration, is inſufficient), muſt therefore owe its conſervation, as well as its creation, to an external cauſe; to God the firſt cauſe; who, as he poſſeſſes in himſelf duration in the moſt perfect manner, that is, *eternity*, without contingency or ſucceſſion; ſo is he the fountain and ſource of all other beings, and of their duration, by a true and real influence of his power.

To this it is objected, That every thing of itſelf can eaſily retain what is once given it by creation, without any additional influence, provided what is given is not taken away. And to confirm the objection, it is added, that it is ſuperfluous and vain, and even

abſurd, to ſuppoſe a new, needleſs, and real action, to which no proper and poſitive effect can be aſſigned.

To every creature exiſtence is at once beſtowed by creation; yet its duration, which is ſucceſſive, is not: and as by a ſucceſſive flux it cannot ſubſiſt altogether and at once, ſo no more can this ſucceſſive duration be altogether beſtowed by one momentary act of power. An inſtantaneous and ſucceſſive duration cannot belong to one and the ſame thing: therefore, to eſtabliſh a continued exiſtence, recourſe muſt be had to a continued production. And its proper and ſpecific effect is the exiſtence of the thing preſerved; not as it came firſt from nothing or non-exiſtence, (in that caſe it belongs to creation), but in ſo far as it is extended more and more beyond its firſt appearance in a world of beings. On this account it is commonly, and well ſaid, that preſervation is a continued creation. The ſame act of GOD's almighty will gives being to things which before had none, and prolongs and continues them in exiſtence. It is therefore properly a continued, but not a repeated creation. For it is obvious and known by experience, that what exiſts this moment doth not ceaſe to be the next; which it muſt do, were the act of creation perpetually renewed and repeated.

BOLINGBROKE, and you, DAVID MALLET, Eſq; ſay, "* When we ſpeak of the world as the work of

* Vol. ii. p. 59.

"GOD,

" GOD, we muſt not conceive it to have been made " by a laborious progreſſion, and to have at laſt re- " mained imperfect, as the works of men: we muſt " conceive, on the contrary, as well as we can, that " GOD willed it to exiſt, and it exiſted; that he will- " ed it to continue, and it continues, diſtinct from " the workman, like any human work, and infinitely " better fitted and contrived, by the diſpoſition of it, " to anſwer all the purpoſes of the divine architect." To the ſame act of power and divine will all things created owe their exiſtence, and the continuance of them. They depend as much and as immediately on omnipotent pleaſure that they are now, as they do that they once began to be. This you admit, becauſe " GOD wills things to exiſt, and to continue in ex- " iſtence." And it is only by that cauſe that they began to be, and ſtill are. If creation is immediate, ſo is preſervation; for it is an act of the ſame efficacious power. He therefore who ſuppoſes that things can ſubſiſt without this perpetual and continued influx, or without an interpoſition of it, may as well ſuppoſe that created things made and created themſelves.

HIS Lordſhip was dextrous in turning old objections into a new model, and paſſing them upon the world as his own inventions. He ſays, (and it hath been ſaid long before), " * It is injurious to true " Theiſm, to aſſume the immediate preſence of the

* Vol. ii. p. 58.

" ſupreme Being in all the operations of corporeal " nature, however the aſſumption may be palliated " by metaphyſical diſtinctions, and how innocent ſo- " ever the intentions of thoſe who do may be. They " who do this, do in effect reduce GOD in their ideas, " notwithſtanding all the magnificent expreſſions they " employ, to a ſort of plaſtic intelligent nature, " working conſtantly on matter, if not in it." But, before I return an anſwer to this metaphyſical reproach, I ſhall add his appeal to the philoſophers of the Cape of Good Hope. " To think otherwiſe," (that is, to think that GOD interpoſes immediately and continually in the conſervation and operation of material beings), " is to meaſure divinity by a more ſcanty " meaſure than humanity; and becauſe we cannot " perceive how the operations of this vaſt machine " are performed, to account for them, by ſuppoſing " it, in this inſtance, leſs perfect than a machine of " human execution. Carry a clock to the wild inha- " bitants of the Cape of Good Hope, they will ſoon " be convinced, that intelligence made it: and none " but the moſt ſtupid will imagine, that this intelli- " gence is in the hand that they ſee move, and in the " wheels which they ſee turn. Thoſe among them " who pretend to greater ſagacity than the reſt, may " perhaps ſuſpect, that the workman is concealed in " the clock, and there conducts inviſibly all the mo- " tions of it. The firſt of theſe Hottentot philoſo- " phers are, you ſee, more rational than Atheiſts;

" the

" the ſecond are more ſo than the Heathen natura-
" liſts; and the third is juſt at a pitch with ſome mo-
" dern metaphyſicians."

Besides metaphyſical diſtinctions, there are metaphyſical demonſtrations: and this is one of them, That whatever continues to exiſt of itſelf, is in ſo far independent. But upon ſuppoſition that created things do continue in being of themſelves, then as to this their duration they muſt be independent. Now, God the Creator is the only independent Being, and by his work of creation all things do *eſſentially* depend on him. He muſt therefore change the unchangeable eſſence of things, and diſſolve the relation between the Creator and the creature, before any created being can ſubſiſt independently on him. This I think his Lordſhip cannot decently refuſe, becauſe he ſays, " * That God is the abſolute maſter and free cauſe " of all things, is a propoſition which belongs to the " nature of the Creator; That the creature is eſſen-
" tially dependent on God, is a propoſition which " belongs to the eſſence of the creature.——Theſe " propoſitions are in truth identical; and the one " belongs to the eſſence of God as really as the o-
" ther. And to ſay that the creature depends on the " Creator, or that the Creator is abſolute maſter of " the creature, is the ſame thing." For this reaſon, therefore, whoever imagines, muſt imagine amiſs,

* Vol. iii. p. 344. *ad marg.*

that

that GOD may abandon the works of his hands, and even dignify them with an intrinſic energy to remain ſuch as he hath made them, without any interpoſition of his power. This is his Lordſhip's doctrine. But though maſters may beſtow liberty and independency on their ſlaves, and, as far as is in their power, make them their companions and equals; yet this prerogative of independency GOD cannot beſtow on a creature, becauſe he cannot depart from his ſovereignty and dominion over every thing that he hath made. A power therefore to continue itſelf in being, is what GOD by his eſſence cannot beſtow, nor the creature by its created eſſence receive; and that becauſe of the mutual and immutable relation between them. I do think it is no injury done to true Theiſm to ſay, That GOD, by an act of his omnipotent will, makes the ſun to rule by day, and the moon by night, and continues every planet both in being and in motion; and that this is a part of his unalienable prerogative. Though I cannot hinder men of wit and impiety to leſſen the majeſty of GOD, by uncouth compariſons; I do not ſee, that thoſe who aſſert that the world ſubſiſts by a continued exertion of the divine power, the ſame power that made it, do thereby reduce GOD in their ideas to a ſort of plaſtic intelligent nature. GOD, as the GOD whom Chriſtians adore, is not an indolent and idle Deity, like that of EPICURUS; but a being of ſuch power, that all things are equally eaſy to it, and, as is allowed by BOLINGBROKE, whoſe doings

are

are neither *operoſe* nor *laborious:* and therefore to aſſert, that he works conſtantly on matter, or in it, tends rather to his glory, than to aſſert, that, after creation, he leaves the material world to continue to be and move, without any influx of his omnipotent will. To make God work conſtantly on matter, or in it, is not to leſſen his perfections. It is to ſpeak and to think of the ſupreme Being ſuitably to his immenſity and omnipotence: for matter doth not exclude his omnipreſence, let it be ever ſo large and ſo ſolid; for, ſaith his Lordſhip, "God is an infinite ſpirit."

It being once admitted, (and it is proved), that all that is beſides the ſupreme Being does ſubſiſt by the influence of his almighty will, it is a juſt conſequence, that whatever exiſts without this influence, were it but for a moment, muſt for that moment be independent. This independency it muſt have of itſelf, and in itſelf; for God cannot give it; and he cannot give it, for the reaſon juſt now taken from Bolingbroke, That it is eſſential to the Creator to be maſter of the creature, and eſſential to the creature to depend on the Creator. And indeed whatever exiſts of itſelf, though but for a moment, may ſubſiſt to all eternity, and might have ſubſiſted from eternity. From all which it follows, that all created beings depend on God for the prolongation of their exiſtence; and that every thing which of itſelf ſubſiſts, muſt be neceſſary, eternal, and ſelf-ſufficient; that is, it muſt be God.

I know this can give no great offence to my authors; for they have no quarrel with the eternity and independency of matter. But I ſhall find another place to examine this Atheiſtical conceſſion. To think that all the operations of the material world are performed by the immediate influence of GOD's omnipotent will, is not to meaſure divinity by a more ſcanty meaſure than that with which we meaſure humanity; nor is it to ſuppoſe the work of GOD leſs perfect than the work of human execution. An architect builds a houſe in ſuch a durable manner, that the ſtones and timber remain in the ſame ſituation in which they were placed, when all hands are removed from them. We praiſe the induſtry of artificers who make machines to laſt and to move the beſt and longeſt, without putting a hand to them to continue or renew the motion. From which it hath been argued, before BOLINGBROKE, that unleſs we aſcribe to GOD leſs power and ſkill than we do to ſuch artificers, we muſt acknowledge that he can create, and doth create beings, that may and do ſubſiſt of themſelves, by bare permiſſion or indulgence, without any poſitive influx of power. But the caſes which are ſuppoſed the ſame, differ widely. For, 1*ſt*, All theſe inventions and contrivances ſhew both the wants and the weakneſs of mankind. Could they meaſure time without clocks, or other machines, they would not make any; could they raiſe and remove great weights without counterbalances, or multiplication of ſcrews, they would

would not ſpend their time, nor weary themſelves with ſuch work. Their underſtanding and their power furniſhing ready and eaſy means, they would make uſe of them for every purpoſe. But the doings of God are neither *operoſe* nor *laborious*. He performs all by his will; and all things obey. 2*dly*, The materials which the artificer uſes, are entirely independent on him. He neither made them, nor doth he preſerve them. And, 3*dly*, The artificer himſelf, with all his ſkill, depends upon his maker and creator: therefore, whatever he is, and whatever he does, he does it only as a ſecond and dependent cauſe. It is certainly a mark of ſupereminent perfection, to have all things every way dependent on it, when all this can be had without trouble or pains. The more extenſive dominion and power is, the more perfect and glorious is that being to whom it belongs. And therefore, without denying his own perfection, God cannot diveſt himſelf of his prerogative of having all things, at all times, in the moſt immediate manner dependent on him. And, without doubt, he muſt diveſt himſelf of univerſal ſuperiority and dominion, and diminiſh his own empire and kingdom, did he make beings which could ſubſiſt without the interpoſition and influence of his almighty will. His Lordſhip admits, that it is a contradiction to ſay, that God can make independent creatures. To ſhew that his objection drawn from machines againſt the continued influx of God's

preſerving power is older than he, I here ſubjoin both the objection, and an anſwer to it *.

I am obliged to attend his Lordſhip to the Cape of Good Hope, in order to exhibit his clock to the

* Non difficilis eſt difficultas alia petita ab artificibus, quorum imprimis laudatur induſtria, ſi ſtruant machinas, quibus manum admovere ad earundem conſervationem nihil eſt neceſſe. Inde arguunt, minorem longe agnoſci Dei quam hominum ſapientiam ac potentiam, niſi fateamur eum ſaltem producere poſſe creaturas quæ ipſæ per ſeſe ſubſiſtere queant, ſolo numinis indultu, citra ullum iſtiuſmodi continuatum conſervationis influxum. Sed non attendunt iſti quam quæ duo tanquam paria hic componunt, toto cœlo, revera ſint diſparia. Dedero quod ipſi contendunt, ſi machinæ cujuſpiam a ſuo opifice tantam eſſe dependentiam demonſtraverint, quanta creaturæ cujuſcunque eſt a ſuo creatore. Profecto, uti ſupereminentis perfectionis atque excellentiæ nota eſt, res etiam perfectiſſimas a ſui, tanquam cauſa, influxu habere pendentes omnimodo, (tantum ſi id continget abſque labore et defatigatione illius a quo pendent), ita non abſque ingenti tantæ perfectionis abnegatione, hac ſe prærogativa exueret cauſa perfectiſſima. Exueret revera, ſi quid tale produceret, quod perpetua ſua manutenentia, quamdiu exiſtet, non indigeret. Dixi, ſi ſine labore id fiat et defatigatione: abſque qua quatenus artifex in rem arte factam nec influit nec influere poteſt, induſtriæ alicujus atque peritiæ argumentum opera fabricare, quæ quam diutiſſime per ſe ſubſiſtent et durent, citra architecti ſui manum atque curam. Sed quid hæc omnia ad illum mundi cuſtodem attinent, qui nulla unquam operis magnitudine diſtrahitur nec fatigatur? cujuſque activitas ideo, non abſque contumeliæ nota, cum laborioſo noſtrorum fabrorum conamine confertur. GERARDI DE VRIES *exercitationes rationales de* DEO *divinisque perfectionibus.*

philoſophers

philoſophers there. Upon firſt ſight they are all convinced that intelligence made it. Some of them imagine, that the intelligence is in the hand which moves, and in the wheels which turn. Others pretending to greater ſagacity, ſuſpect ("and perhaps ſuſpect") that the workman is concealed in the work.——Before I meddle with the compariſon between theſe opinions, and thoſe of ancient and modern philoſophers, I deſire it may be remembered, that it is his Lordſhip's opinion, and a firſt principle, That we cannot attain any knowledge of the natural and moral attributes of God, but by ſenſe and experience; which, if true, is to make his Hottentots better philoſophers than he is himſelf. They all of them immediately ſee the clock, and ſee that it is made; and that the materials did not diſpoſe of themſelves in the order that cauſes the motion; and that therefore the hand doth not move, nor the wheels turn, of themſelves. But his Lordſhip, who knows nothing of the matter but by ſenſe and experience, doth not know whether it moves of itſelf, or moves by an impelling cauſe. To put him in the caſe of the Hottentot, whom he perſonates, he never ſaw a clock made; he never ſaw it firſt ſtop, and afterwards winded up; he never ſaw it taken down to pieces, and then joined, and then ſet agoing by a ſpring or by a weight. And therefore, until the machine is demounted and mounted in his view, he is not in a condition to determine whether it moves of itſelf or

not. He makes all the Hottentots reaſon, that nothing makes itſelf; the clock therefore, they conclude, was made by a cauſe diſtinct from it; and that the motion depending upon the conſtruction or the make, the motion muſt be the effect of the cauſe that made the machine. But I cannot allow his Lordſhip to reaſon after this manner, becauſe all his knowledge is founded on ſenſe and experience. The Hottentots are ſure, that the make and motion of the machine are both of them the effect of an intelligent cauſe; ſome placing this intelligence in the hand or wheels, and others *perhaps ſuſpecting*, that the workman is concealed within the machine, and inviſibly and immediately directs the whole work. He who perhaps ſuſpects, that the workman lurks and plays his tricks to amuſe a Hottentot, is juſt at a pitch with modern metaphyſicians; who maintain, that GOD, by the immediate influence of his almighty will, directs all the operations of the vaſt machine of the viſible world, and makes the ſun to riſe and the rain to fall. With leave, it is not true, that modern metaphyſicians do *only ſuſpect*, and *perhaps ſuſpect*, that the ſun rules by day and the moon by night, and that the whole creation depends immediately on GOD, for exiſtence, preſervation, and operation. This they conclude, and this they demonſtrate, from a previous knowledge of many general truths. And did he not deſpiſe that part of philoſophy, for mad, delirious, and unintelligible jargon, (I believe, becauſe

cauſe he did not underſtand it, or becauſe it is ſcarcely ever on his ſide of a queſtion), he might have ſaved himſelf from many blunders, and not a little impiety, to be found in his philoſophical works.

His Hottentot philoſopher, who perhaps ſuſpects that the clock-maker is concealed in his clock, is in a fairer and nearer way, by raiſing his thoughts from the ſmall machine to the grand machine of the univerſe, to find out, that the architect is a being of greater knowledge and power, than his Lordſhip was. Whether the make and motion by which the world ſubſiſts and is ruled, is inherent in itſelf, or dependent on a diſtinct cauſe, he is not clear enough in his judgment to determine. But his Lordſhip determines one ſtep backward (and ſuch a ſtep that he can never recover) from the concluſion. He holds, that it ſubſiſts and operates without the immediate interpoſition of a diſtinct cauſe. He muſt therefore firſt determine, whether this ſelf-ſubſiſtence and operation is eſſential to the grand machine, or accidental only. If it is accidental or contingent, it muſt be made ſuch by a ſuperior power, to which it owes, and on which it depends for its independency. And a dependent independency is ſuch an abſurdity, that no Hottentot can ſwallow and digeſt. If the ſubſiſtence and operation of the mundane machine is not adventitious, but eſſential to it, then from all that his Lordſhip hath learned by his ſenſe and experience, and all that his

his reaſon can ſupply, he cannot demonſtrate the being of GOD, and his infinite wiſdom and power. Perhaps he did not intend it. And this is another reaſon that induces me to think that his philoſophy leads into Atheiſm.

FROM what hath been ſaid, and proved, it follows, that all created things depend on GOD for their being. For as creatures they could not begin to be, nor continue to be of themſelves. All of them, as ſuch, have a dependent, contingent, and ſucceſſive duration. Whatever account we make of things created, whether we eſteem them valuable or contemptible, uſeful or hurtful, excellent or mean, they are creatures, and as ſuch, muſt be under the dominion of divine providence. No creature can be ſo perfect as to tranſcend its dependency on GOD, and none ſo mean and abject as to be below the influence of his preſerving power, or to become unworthy of his regard. GOD doth not make things to be thrown away for their meanneſs, nor to ſurpaſs his preſerving power, for their excellence and perfection. In a word, if there is any thing independent on GOD as preſerver, it muſt be independent on him as creator alſo; and ſo muſt be eternal, ſelf-exiſtent, and ſelf-ſufficient, as is the ſupreme Being; or rather, there can be no being ſupreme, or ſuperior to it. His Lordſhip, who acknowledges and refuſes at his pleaſure, does acknowledge a ſupreme Being, the

the firſt, intelligent cauſe, and the ſource of all other beings; and if he reaſoned conſequentially, he muſt therefore admit, that all things depend on him for their exiſtence, paſt, preſent, and to come. Whether things are preſerved by the mediation of ſecond cauſes or without it, it is always owing to the firſt and creating cauſe, that they ſubſiſt and continue in being, whether in their original, or new ſtate and condition.

All the works and doings of God *ad extra* are voluntary, and purely arbitrary; and all of them therefore liable to change. They depend totally on his good pleaſure. But then whatever alteration they undergo, it is the effect of his omnipotent will. And as preſervation is not a repeated, but a continued creation, all theſe changes and alterations do not imply any change in the divine will. So reaſons the *Pſalmiſt* as a good philoſopher. * *Of old thou haſt laid the foundations of the earth: and the heavens are the work of thy hands. They ſhall periſh, but thou ſhalt endure: yea, all of them ſhall wax old as a garment; as a veſture thou ſhalt change them, and they ſhall be changed. But thou art the ſame.* For † *with him there is no variableneſs, nor ſhadow of turning.* All the changes that have happened or ſhall happen in the creation, are entirely conſiſtent with God's immutability.

* Pſal. cii. 25. † James i. 17.

DESCARTES, and ſome of his followers, have erred groſsly in maintaining, that the divine immutability is a ſtanding reaſon for the preſervation of the ſame quantity of matter and motion, without annihilation of any part or piece of the univerſe. And why? becauſe, ſay they, that would ſpoil the beauty and harmony of the whole mundane fabric. Good; if GOD had promiſed, or could they prove, from the perfection of the Creator, or from the nature of the creature, that the ſtupendous building of the univerſe muſt remain the ſame. But as the world was made, not by any ſuppoſable connection between the divine perfections, and the exiſtence of any other being, and only by arbitrary will and pleaſure; it was made for no longer duration, in the preſent, or any other order, than GOD, at the inſtant of the creation, or rather from eternity, was pleaſed it ſhould continue by the influx of his preſerving power. GOD was in himſelf, independently of all things, before the creation; ſo if all that he hath made were annihilated, his happineſs and ſelf-ſufficiency would ſtill be the ſame. Man, without doubt, is the principal inhabitant of this our planet; and if ſuch creatures as we can neither add to, nor diminiſh the happineſs of the ſupreme Being, what can beings more glorious than we do more? We and they, in that reſpect, are upon the ſame level; for we and they are the work of GOD's hands. The Almighty can eaſily diſpenſe with all revenue of reverence, adoration, obedience,

obedience, and reſignation, of the nobleſt creature that ever he made. We are dependent totally on God, and God is totally independent on us. His ſelf-ſufficiency is the eſſential baſis of his own happineſs; to which we cannot add, and from which we cannot take any thing away. This is a piece of ancient and ſublime philoſophy. For Eliphaz the Temanite hath ſaid, * *Can a man be profitable unto GOD, as he that is wiſe is profitable to himſelf? Is it any* additional *pleaſure to the Almighty, that thou art righteous? or gain to him, that thou makeſt thy ways perfect?*

Creation is an act of power; and for that reaſon annihilation is not a poſitive act of power. And they who imagine that an act of power is requiſite to annihilate any part of the creation, or the whole of it, muſt conceive that there is ſomething inherent in every work of God, and independent on his preſerving power. But, as hath been proved, by virtue of his creating power, all things owe their firſt being, and their continuance, to God; and therefore, to reduce into nothing, there is no more requiſite, than to with-hold the influence or influx of his power. A poſitive act of power annihilation cannot be, becauſe God cannot exert ſuch a power in vain, or make nothing by it. I acknowledge, that it is not eaſy to conceive how a thing can be

* Job xxii. 2. 3.

reduced to nothing. But creation, or bringing things into being which formerly were not, is not more level to our comprehenſion. And ſince we are ſure that GOD only is eternal, we are as ſure that this world, both the materials and the frame of it, were made from nothing, juſt as ſure as we are that the world at preſent exiſts. And though natural reaſon cannot determine that annihilation will certainly happen, yet it is certain that it poſſibly may; becauſe the beginning of beings, and their continuance, do altogether depend on GOD's arbitrary will and mere good pleaſure. So much for GOD's preſerving providence. I ſhall, in the next place, endeavour to vindicate his governing providence, againſt Lord BOLINGBROKE's and Mr MALLET's miſrepreſentations and objections.

SECT.

SECT. X.

Of GOD's *governing providence.*

MODUS *operandi ſequitur modum eſſendi*, is a metaphyſical axiom; and ſignifies, that every thing acts as it is, and not otherwiſe. And ſeeing the whole creation depends totally on GOD, every creature that doth act, muſt act dependently on him. If it acted otherwiſe than it is, I may ſay, (for it hath been ſaid), that in its being and nature it is a creature, but in its way of acting it muſt be a GOD. On the rational part of the creation GOD hath beſtowed powers and faculties of acting; which powers and faculties they uſe; but then they uſe them dependently on him who beſtowed them: and therefore the ſupreme Being, the author of all rational agents and all their faculties, preſides over all their actions, and directs all their doings, for the purpoſe for which he made the world. We obſerve the uſes and ends of innumerable creatures, and the wonderful agreement and mutual ſubſerviency of one part with another. And if the minuteſt parts are ſo well contrived, there is no doubt to be made, that the whole is perfectly fitted for the great end and purpoſe for which the Creator made it. And can this be done, if all his creatures and all their actions were not under the divine ſuperintendency and direction?

I do admit, that rational creatures are miſtreſſes of their own actions in the order of ſecond cauſes; but theſe actions of theirs, and their ſecondary power over them, do not exclude the over-ruling power and influence of the firſt cauſe. They who ſuppoſe, that every degree of liberty beſtowed upon an intelligent creature diminiſhes as much of the dominion and authority of GOD, neither underſtand his power and authority, nor the nature of liberty. For, on the contrary, their liberty and their total dependence make the more glorious diſplay of divine wiſdom and power. A wiſe and a powerful monarch hath many ways, both to induce his ſubjects to act for the purpoſes he hath in view, and to hinder them from acting againſt his deſigns. And the wiſer and more intelligent his ſubjects are, the more eaſily are they governed. And at the ſame time he makes no incroachment on their freedom of acting. For ſince liberty is eſſential to all rational creatures, the more intelligent they are, the more liberty they muſt be poſſeſſed of. And can there any reaſon then be given why GOD cannot govern his rational creatures conſiſtently with their liberty? If ſome things were more eaſy, and others more difficult to the Almighty, (which cannot be), I might affirm, that the more intelligent, and the more rational, and conſequently the more freedom creatures poſſeſs, the more eaſily are they influenced and directed by divine dominion. His Lordſhip ſays, "* That the creation

* Vol. v. p. 295.

"of

" of a man, or an angel, in the works of GOD, is not " more conſiderable than the creation of the meaneſt " inſect, nor requires that the divine energy ſhould " be exerted in a longer or more operoſe proceſs of " nature." And ſure any man, except his Lordſhip, muſt think, that GOD can as eaſily govern, as he could make the world.

THOUGH what I have already proved may furniſh ſufficient anſwers to all the objections which BOLINGBROKE and you have brought againſt divine providence, yet I ſhall conſider them more expreſsly and particularly, that I may not ſeem to neglect what he did, and you do think very material. The reader muſt not expect, that I am to give all that is ſaid on the ſubject in his Lordſhip's own words, (his words are many); however, I ſhall endeavour to make uſe of them rather than my own, as often as occaſion allows. There is no great danger of miſtaking his meaning; for it is too plain to be miſtaken. He ſays, " * We have not in philoſophical ſpeculation, " nor in our own experience, ſufficient grounds to " eſtabliſh the doctrine of particular providences, and " to reconcile it to that of a general providence." And it is his opinion, that what hath been ſaid to reconcile them, not only ſeems to him quite unintelligible; but alſo to conceive ſuch interpoſitions poſſible, either in the material or moral ſyſtem, is to conceive

* Vol. v. p. 28.

a violation of the mechanical conſtitution of the firſt, and the natural order of cauſes and effects in both. What he ſays of the moral world, is ſingularly remarkable. " * It is impoſſible to conceive ſuch occaſional " interpoſitions in the intellectual ſyſtem, as ſhall give " new thoughts and new diſpoſitions to the minds of " men, and, in conſequence, new determinations to " their wills, without altering in every ſuch inſtance " the orderly and natural progreſſion of the human " underſtanding, or without reſuming that freedom " of will which every man is conſcious that he has. " I confeſs, that I comprehend as little the metaphy- " ſical as the phyſical impulſe of ſpirits; and that " the words *ſuggeſtion*, *ſilent communication*, *ſudden* " *influence*, *influx*, or *injection of ideas*, give me no " determinate, clear, and diſtinct ideas, nor even, as I " ſuppoſe, to the perſons who talk of them moſt." And ſo he confeſſes, that he ſuppoſes that theſe words convey no determinate, clear, and diſtinct ideas to him, nor to any one beſides.

IT is well, however, that you admit a divine providence in national affairs, though you exclude all divine regard from individuals. You ſay, " † It is " plain from the whole courſe of GOD's providence, " that he regards his human creatures collectively, " *not individually*, how worthy ſoever every one of " them deems himſelf to be a particular object of the

* Vol. v. p. 29. † Vol. v. p. 110.

" divine

" divine care." Admire his Lordſhip's humility, in deeming himſelf the worſt, and the moſt unworthy of mankind, below the regard of GOD who made him. He is welcome to do himſelf juſtice, by acknowledging his own inſignificancy: but I cannot allow him to impute to GOD a neglect of any thing which he hath made. This modeſt, this humble man, who thinks himſelf unworthy of divine care, acknowledges, notwithſtanding, the obligation he owes to GOD, for placing him in the human rank of beings, when he might have made him an aſs or an oyſter. He accepts of all the good things his Creator beſtows on him as an individual. And how can he, as an individual, refuſe the divine juſtice? Sure he did not like to be an object of it. " * Individuals are the objects of human ju-" ſtice, ſocieties of divine." There needs no more paſſages to ſhew that his meaning is plain beyond miſtake.

THE firſt obſervation that I make on this paradoxical blunder, That divine providence regards human creatures collectively, not individually, is, That conſideration ſhould be had to the number of individuals that compoſe the different nations and ſocieties of men. For if GOD had any regard to nations and ſocieties as ſuch, the greater the number, the greater muſt the divine regard be. According to ſuch principles, the empire of China requires more of a national providence

* Vol. v. p. 111.

than

than the republic of Raguſa. A ſingle family is a ſociety, and therefore an object of the divine care. And if a family in a wilderneſs, as a ſociety, is under the government of GOD, why may not a family in the moſt populous nation on earth be ſubject, as a family, to the protection or puniſhment of divine providence? This philoſopher of a nobleman might have been of this opinion, and even without any detriment to his blunder of a paradox. For he ſays, that "* reaſon, inſtructed by experience, ſhews the law of "human nature, and the ſanctions of it, which are "as invariable and as uniform as the law. For in all "the ages of the world, and among all the ſocieties "of men, the well-being or ill-being of theſe ſocieties, and therefore of all mankind, has borne a "conſtant proportion to the obſervation or neglect "of it." If divine providence, in the government of nations and ſocieties, leaves them in their collective capacity to the natural and unchangeable conſequences of their reaſonable or unreaſonable doings, (and he admits of no additional interpoſitions of providence), then virtue and vice muſt produce their natural effects where-ever and by whomſoever they are practiſed. The ſanction of the law of human nature is as unchangeable as the law itſelf: and therefore individual and perſonal happineſs muſt be the conſequence of individual and perſonal virtue, and perſonal trouble and diſtreſs the inſeparable conſequence of perſonal

* Vol. v. p. 102.

vice.

vice. And can you ſay, or could he have ſaid, that this is actually the caſe of every individual? If the conſequence of virtue is as fixed and uniform as the law of right reaſon, how comes it to paſs, that the beſt of men have often a ſcanty portion of human and temporal happineſs? Muſt all the good conſequences of morality, and all the bad conſequences of immorality, though neceſſarily connected, be ſuſpended, until the one ſort overbalances the other in great collections of good and bad men? If every virtuous and moral man is not happy, and every wicked man is not unhappy, whether in a ſolitary or ſocial ſtate, it muſt be owing to the over-ruling providence of God, and to the ſpecial interpoſitions of it. For his Lordſhip rejects Epicurean chance with diſdain and indignation.

All communities are made up of individuals; and upon the orderly or diſorderly behaviour of theſe individuals, the happineſs or miſery of the whole ſociety depends. And if God takes no care of twenty millions of ſuch individuals aſſembled in one collection, but abandons every one of them to walk in their own ways, and to the conſequences of their good and evil doings, how can he be ſaid to rule and govern the whole nation? A machine depends upon all its parts for performance: and a monarch, whoſe government doth not extend to all his ſubjects, can never take care of all his dominions; for he that neglects the parts, neglects the whole; and if he ſhould indulge but a

few to act independently on him, these few might defeat the best contrived methods of promoting the happiness of all the rest of his subjects. And if divine providence did not extend to individuals, it could never extend to the government of kingdoms and empires. How often are nations raised to honour and happiness, and how often are they reduced to ruin, by one single person? The wisdom and virtue of a good prince, as a second cause, makes his subjects happy; and the pride and ambition of a vitious and foolish prince, brings his innocent and virtuous people into misery, captivity, and slavery. And if divine providence does not extend to these men as individuals, by consequence it cannot extend to mankind either in their collective or personal state. I am of opinion, that though his Lordship might have thought himself above or below the regard of divine providence, that it is owing to this providence, that, as a second cause, he did not betray his country, and that in violation of an oath, into the hands of an arbitrary supreme magistrate.

AGAINST this he objects, *1st*, That "* to suppose a constant series of particular interpositions "from above as necessary to this purpose," (that is, to the government of the world), "seems, to my apprehension, little less absurd, than to suppose the "necessity of a perpetual and universal theocracy;

* Vol. v. p. 40.

"and

" and to complain that such a government of the " world hath not been established, is as silly as to " complain that the golden age of the poets is end- " ed." From this I see no absurdity that follows. For if it is true that the whole creation depends on God for its continuance in being, and that all active creatures act dependently, and as dependently as they exist, (and this I have demonstrated); then it follows, not absurdly nor sillily, that God's government of the creation is *perpetual* and *universal*. Instead of being ashamed of this conclusion, I beg Mr Mallet's leave to triumph in it. And if he means by theocracy any thing else than God's government, whether mediate or immediate, I hope to be excused for not understanding what he hath not said. I know, that the Jewish government, from their exode, until the election of King Saul, is called a *theocracy*, by reason of very remarkable interpositions and directions of divine providence. But unless it can be proved, that the first cause doth not act by second causes, that nation afterwards, and until now, is as really under the divine dominion, as they were in the days of Moses and of Joshuah. And a first and a supreme cause is so far from excluding the agency of second and subordinate causes, that it supposes it. A *first* without a *second*, is neither logic nor arithmetic. If second causes are not admitted, God must be the *only*, and not the first cause in every event. Were there any things or events to which divine providence doth not

extend, (*mediately* or *immediately* makes no difference), or were there any temporary diſcontinuance of it with reſpect to thoſe things and events to which it doth extend, there would remain a poſſibility of wrong events, or events unfit to anſwer the great and ultimate end of the creation. And to ſuppoſe that infinite wiſdom and infinite power can poſſibly miſcarry in any deſign, is an abſurdity which even his Lordſhip doth not admit.

THE *ſecond* objection is fully as trifling as the firſt. " * Particular providences would be miracles, if they " were real; and ſuch they would be ſtrictly, whe- " ther they were contrary to the eſtabliſhed courſe of " nature or not: for the miracle conſiſts in the ex- " traordinary interpoſition, as much as in the nature " of the thing brought to paſs." And *particular providences would be miracles ſtrictly, whether contrary to the eſtabliſhed courſe of nature or not.* This I take for a cloſe and clever contradiction. The thing comes to paſs according to the eſtabliſhed courſe of nature; and if GOD acted in it as the firſt cauſe, then he thinks it would be a miracle ſtrictly. Then all GOD's doings are miraculous; and therefore we can never know what is a miracle, and what is not. He adds, " If they are real." He denies that there ever were any miracles, and ſays, " they are founded on ridi- " culous ſtories, which paſſed in times of ignorance

* Vol. v. p. 83.

" and

" and ſuperſtition." I preſume it lay out of his way to give a definition of a miracle, when in the ſame paragraph he denies them all; and it lay juſt as much out of his way to call particular providences miracles. He is ſo far in the right to ſay, that miracles are extraordinary; and in ſo far he is in the wrong to ſay, that particular providences are miracles, whether they come to paſs in conformity or contrary to the eſtabliſhed courſe of nature or not. And he is again in the wrong for ſaying, that the miracle conſiſts in the extraordinary interpoſition; for, beſides, it muſt be wrought for ſome end and purpoſe made known previouſly to them who obſerve the event. That the ſun roſe to-day, is owing to the providence of God; but not to a miraculous interpoſition of it, becauſe it is ordinary: but if to-morrow, during twenty-four hours, the ſame ſun ſhould be inviſible to all the inhabitants of the earth, it would be extraordinary, but not a miracle; unleſs an appeal was made to ſuch an event, as a confirmation of ſome great and important truth. It is God that makes graſs to grow for cattle, and herbs for the uſe of man; and by this God diſplays his wiſdom and power as much as in the creation and preſervation of man and beaſt. For, as hath been already obſerved, his Lordſhip ſays, " the creation " of man, or angel, in the works of God, is not " more conſiderable than the creation of the meaneſt " inſect." That there is graſs, that there are herbs, that there are cattle, that there are men, is owing to the

the providence of GOD, not in a miraculous, though in an infinitely wife, and in an omnipotent way.

I am unwilling to leave the matter here, (though it might well be done), becauſe he attempts to carry it further. He ſays, " * The circumſtances of in- " dividuals, the public conjunctures wherein numbers " are involved, and the merits and demerits of parti- " cular men, as well as of collective bodies, are ſo " nearly alike, and they return ſo often to be equal- " ly objects of theſe ſuppoſed providences, —— that " no one dares to pronounce where theſe providences " have been employed, and where not." No man indeed who conſiders GOD as a being of infinite wiſdom, will take upon him to determine, that the divine adminiſtration might have been better than it hath been; nor will he ſay, that all private and public connections and relations wherein all mankind is involved, and their frequent alterations, are too heavy a charge for infinite wiſdom and infinite power. This muſt be left to his Lordſhip, and Mr MALLET, who ſpeak and think moſt unworthily of the ſupreme Being. For nothing can perplex infinite wiſdom, and nothing can ſtop or hinder infinite power. " This " ſcheme, if true, would be univerſal in extent, and " continual in time." And ſo it is, and ſo it muſt be, as hath been already demonſtrated. From which he ſays, " theſe great abſurdities would ariſe, that

* Vol. v. p. 86.

" the

" the world would be governed by miracles, until " miracles loſt their name." This is ſo much wit thrown away, or laid out upon his own ignorance of the nature of a miracle. For all events, even the moſt aſtoniſhing and ſurpriſing, and ſuch as nothing but omnipotence can bring to paſs, are not miracles, unleſs appealed to for the confirmation of ſome truth. Let me ſuppoſe, that many more prodigies happened in Egypt than are recorded by Moses, they would not have been miracles, unleſs Moses had appealed to them as a proof of his divine commiſſion.

The other abſurdity is what I underſtand as a *third* objection againſt particular providences. " That " is, the eſtabliſhed order of natural cauſes and ef- " fects would be ſubverted, and the general rule " would be abſorbed in the exceptions to it; or that " God would govern his human creatures by two " rules that do not conſiſt very well together: ſince " by one of them the wants and petitions of theſe " creatures would be ſubmitted to one common pro- " vidence, which carried on the affairs of the world, " according to the firſt conſtitution and original laws " of it; and by the other, this common providence " would break, if I may ſay ſo, into a multitude of " particular providences, for the ſupply of theſe " wants, and the grant of theſe petitions; every one " of which is an appeal to the ſecond rule of govern- " ment, againſt the firſt." He had ſaid before,

" That

" * That we have not in philoſophical ſpeculation, " in any hiſtory except the BIBLE, nor in our own " experience, ſufficient grounds to eſtabliſh the doc- " trine of particular providences, and to reconcile it " to the courſe of things in the material and intellec- " tual ſyſtems, as theſe ſyſtems were originally con- " ſtituted by the author of nature.——It is impoſ- " ſible to conceive, that the courſe of the ſun, or the " double revolution of the earth, ſhould be ſuſ- " pended or altered by a temporary, nay, a mo- " mentary interpoſition of ſome particular providence, " or that any thing worthy of ſuch an interpoſition " ſhould happen in the material world, without vio- " lating the mechanical conſtitution, and the natural " order of cauſes and effects." And what he adds concerning the moral ſyſtem, amounts to this, That GOD cannot meddle with his underſtanding without ſpoiling it.

IT was never thought, that the mechanic, by meddling with the machine of his own conſtruction, muſt neceſſarily ſpoil it. And far leſs muſt GOD, of neceſſity, ſpoil his own works, either by a general or particular providence. Did a being of leſs knowledge, ſkill, and wiſdom, but of power ſufficient to ſtop the motion of the earth, meddle with the make of the material world, he might poſſibly ſpoil it: but GOD, who made the univerſe, cannot, by any interpoſition

* Vol. v. p. 28.

of

of his providence, ſo far diſorder any ſun or planet, as to ſurpaſs his wiſdom and power to repair, and reſtore it to its original conſtitution. To make the eternity of the world paſs for credible, his Lordſhip ſays, " * If a conſtant rotation from exiſtence to " non-exiſtence, or from generation to diſſolution, " maintains our world and the inhabitants of it in be- " ing, why ſhould not ſuch a rotation of worlds " maintain the univerſe in being?" It is ſurpriſing, that he who affirms that our world is continued in being by reſtoring it from corruption by generation, and back from generation to corruption, ſhould deny that God can make the world continue in order, if he interpoſes by particular providences in the adminiſtration of it. And though this nobleman of a philoſopher thinks it impoſſible that any thing ſhould happen in the material world worthy of any alteration, I think, though he does not, that God knows when and where theſe alterations are fit and proper for the government of the world, and for the government of the intellectual part of it in particular. ——Though it doth not belong to the preſent purpoſe, I cannot but obſerve one of the greateſt blunders that ever writer, either peer or commoner, eccleſiaſtic or laic, was guilty of. That is, " A con- " ſtant rotation from exiſtence to non-exiſtence, and " ſo back again, maintains our world in being." From exiſtence to non-exiſtence, is not to maintain

* Vol. v. p. 232.

the ſame thing in being. It is to annihilate one world, to make place for another. And what a rotation forwards and backwards, of cauſes and effects, of annihilation and creation, and of creation and annihilation, would contribute to maintain and continue our world in being and in order, I leave to DAVID MALLET, Eſq; to determine; or if he cannot ſhew what influence a rotation from exiſtence to non-exiſtence hath to maintain the ſame thing in being, he may leave it out of the next edition; for it is enough to diſgrace Lord BOLINGBROKE's works, were they ten times more voluminous.

IT is another bold and falſe aſſertion, That "we "have not in philoſophical ſpeculation, in any hi-"ſtory except the BIBLE, nor in our own expe-"rience, ſufficient grounds to eſtabliſh the doctrine "of particular providences." For it is certain, and clear to demonſtration, that, by philoſophical ſpeculation, we know all things depend on GOD for their being, becauſe he is their creator; and that every thing acts as it is, and not otherwiſe; and therefore they all act dependently on GOD. And this demonſtrated truth is in a great meaſure confirmed by profane hiſtory. As the order, harmony, and mutual ſubſerviency of the parts of the univerſe, prove that all is owing to a deſigning cauſe; ſo the many ſurpriſing and appoſite events proper for the government of mankind, are brought to paſs by a wiſe and powerful

ful governor. That his Lordſhip found nothing of this in his own experience, I can eaſily believe. For he that thinks prayer impertinent, and aſſerts that GOD cannot give audience to all at all times, and he who doth not conſider GOD as the governor of the world, cannot impute events, great or ſmall, general or particular, to his providence. Prayer, he ſays, "is no better than an appeal from the firſt and "original rule of government to the ſecond. * No-"thing can be leſs reconcilable to the notion of an all-"perfect being, than the imagination that he un-"does by his power in particular caſes, what his "wiſdom, to whom nothing is future, once thought "ſufficient to be eſtabliſhed for all caſes."

IF any one caſe is omitted in the general and original plan of providence, it is not ſufficient for all caſes, and infinite wiſdom could not think it ſufficient. He ſays, that "† the whole ſeries of things "is at all times actually preſent to the divine mind." And here he ſays, that nothing is future to infinite knowledge. This is allowed him. But how doth it follow from particular providences, that GOD undoes by his power in particular caſes, what he thought ſufficient for all caſes? All caſes were known to him, and all caſes are provided for. "‖ The world,"

* Vol. v. p. 35.
† Vol. v. p. 82.
‖ Vol. v. p. 30.

ſays his Lordſhip, "is governed by laws, which the "Creator impoſed on the phyſical and moral ſyſtems, "when he willed them into exiſtence.——Theſe "laws are invariable, but they are general; and "from this generality, what we call *contingency* "ariſes." *Neceſſary* and *contingent*, is a diſtinction which is juſtly admitted, but ſuch as can take no place in events. They may be called ordinary or extraordinary, but cannot be ſaid to be neceſſary or contingent. For GOD alone is neceſſary, and all other things depend on him; and becauſe dependent, they are contingent, and may be or may not be. What he means by *contingency* muſt be *chance*; that is, events happening beyond the original and general plan of divine providence. Of theſe chances and extra-providential events, the original and general plan admits of ſuch a latitude, as is enough to *abſorb* the original and general rule of GOD's government of the world. And he likewiſe reaſons, that if GOD made proviſion for ſuch events, it would render the general rule of no uſe; or he governs the world by two inconſiſtent rules, a general, and a multitude of particular providences. There are *generals*, which in their nature, and in our conception of them, take in all particulars. And why GOD's general providence ſhould exclude all particulars, is what I cannot underſtand, nor what you nor any man can prove. The diſtinction of *ordinary* and *extraordinary* is admitted; but a general providence, without particular providences,

dences, is nonſenſe, and a contradiction in terms. *Generals* and *particulars* are *relata* and *correlata*, of which one cannot be without the other.

If theſe extraprovidential events, independent on God as their cauſe, and independent in their effects on his government, are ſo many that they *abſorb* the general rule of divine government, he may ſay, and ſay it in conſequence of his principles, that God doth not, neither can he govern the world. What I have already obſerved on this unphiloſophical word *abſorb*, applied by him to the divine goodneſs being abſorbed in divine wiſdom, is enough to prove, that, among a multitude of chances and independent events, God's general rule of governing muſt be ſwallowed up and ſmothered, and become uſeleſs. He urges and inſiſts, that if God took in all particular caſes into the original and general plan of his providence, he muſt undo by his power in ſome caſes, what in his wiſdom he thought fit to eſtabliſh for all caſes. This is to beg the queſtion, and to beg it abſurdly. For how doth he know, that God in his wiſdom hath eſtabliſhed a general rule of government for all, without providing for particular caſes? This in itſelf is abſurd, as I have proved; but ſtill the more abſurd, by omitting in the general plan as many chances and extraprovidential events as defeat the general rule of government. Known to God are all his creatures, and all their actions. And is it to be ſuppoſed, that it was inconſiſtent

inconſiſtent with his wiſdom, to take his creatures and all their doings under his own government and dominion? Or was it fitter to leave them out of the original plan, and in ſuch numbers and multitudes, as to ſuppreſs the very plan from which they are excluded? GOD muſt govern all things without exception, or he cannot govern the world perfectly. I am ſo far from taking his Lordſhip's word, (and I have no more for it), that if particular caſes were comprehended in divine providence, he would undo by his power what he hath eſtabliſhed in his wiſdom; that, on the contrary, I am obliged to believe, becauſe it is demonſtrable, that divine providence extends to all events, whether they come to paſs in the ordinary courſe of things, commonly called *the courſe of nature*, or in the moſt extraordinary way. And thoſe things which BOLINGBROKE calls *contingent*, are all of them under GOD's government and direction, as really as the riſing of the ſun, which comes to paſs once in the ſpace of twenty-four hours. "The laws of matter and motion are "fixed, no doubt, but within the latitude which "they allow; though nothing happens which is re-"pugnant to them, many things happen which ſeem "ſo to us." So ſays his Lordſhip. But as a reaſoner only *a poſteriori*, he hath no right to ſay ſo. For if any thing appears to him repugnant to the fixed laws of matter and motion, he muſt conclude they are really ſo. And his right is ſtill leſs, as he pretends to know nothing of GOD, nor of nature, but by ſenſe and

and experience. The moſt incompetent judge of mankind muſt he be, to determine what is within and what is without the reach and dominion of divine providence.

As he allows of an imaginary, precarious, and preſumptuous latitude for independent events in the material world, ſo as precariouſly eſtabliſhes he a greater latitude for ſuch events in the moral world. His words are: "* There is no need of any great "ſagacity to perceive, that the caſe is much the ſame "in the moral world; nay that it is more liable to "contingency than the natural. The moral world is "ſubject to the law of right reaſon, fixed, unvariable, "promulgated in the very nature of things, and in-"forced by the ſanctions of rewards and puniſh-"ments," (one would think it is Dr CLARKE who ſpeaks), "which follow often the obſervation or the "breach of it. But then, inſtead of two principles, "whereof the one is active, and the other paſſive on-"ly, as in the other caſe, there are in this two active "principles, the one ſlower than the other, Reaſon, "and Paſſion.——Between both ſtands the freedom "of our will, which can determine either way." On this paſſage I have two occaſional remarks to make. Firſt, he ſays, in the government of the natural or material world, there are two principles concerned, the one active, and the other paſſive: and theſe two

* Vol. v. p. 31.

muſt

muſt be GOD and matter. And if matter is a collateral principle with GOD, it muſt be eternal, and as abſolutely independent as he. That this is falſe and abſurd, I hope to demonſtrate. Until then, let us ſuppoſe that matter is eternal. But it is not ſo ſtubborn as to reſiſt omnipotence. GOD can diſpoſe of matter as he thinks fit: for, being paſſive, it cannot diſpoſe of itſelf; and by fermentation, ſublimation, and by a certain degree of elaſticity, he hath made philoſophers; and, to take their own word, out of ſenſeleſs and inactive matter, he hath made Lord BOLINGBROKE, and DAVID MALLET, Eſq; and can turn their intellectuals into duſt. However, let matter be only matter that is purely paſſive, it can have no part, as ſuch, in the government of the world; no, no more than a ſtone or a brick in your houſe hath in the government of your family.

THE other remark is, that though he had but juſt ſaid, that the ſanction of the law of nature, or the law of right reaſon, is as fixed and invariable as the law itſelf; yet, in this paſſage, he takes this connection between the obſervation and the breach of this law in ſo low a ſenſe, that it deſtroys and diſſolves the indiſſolvable union between the ſanction and the law. For he ſays, this law of right reaſon "is inforced by the "ſanction of rewards and puniſhments, which follow "*often* the obſervation or the breach of it." According

ding to his principles, he ſhould have ſaid, *which follow always.*

To make place for chances in the government of the moral world, he ſays, that this world hath in itſelf two active principles, Paſſion, and Reaſon: and that theſe active principles may have room to exerciſe themſelves, a latitude for extraprovidential events, and a greater latitude muſt be allowed than is juſt neceſſary in the government of the material world. His Lordſhip holds, that matter is eternal, and independent on GOD: but he muſt allow, that whatever he makes of matter, in ſo far as it is made, it muſt depend on him. Now, as our reaſon and paſſion, a deſire of good, and an averſion to evil, are entirely owing to GOD who made us, our animal and rational faculties muſt be entirely under his dominion. And if, inſtead of two, we had twenty active principles in our nature, they could never ſurpaſs the wiſdom and power of their author to rule and govern them. His Lordſhip cannot conceive how this can be done. And no great wonder, for he forgets that he is ſpeaking of the ſupreme Being of infinite wiſdom and power. He ſays, "It is impoſſible to conceive ſuch occaſional in-
" terpoſitions in the intellectual ſyſtem, as ſhall give
" new thoughts and new diſpoſitions to the minds of
" men, and, in conſequence, new determinations of
" their wills, without altering in every ſuch inſtance
" the ordinary and natural progreſſion of the human

 " underſtanding."

" underſtanding." And yet he himſelf hath endeavoured to give new thoughts, and a new turn of mind, not to one individual only, but to the far greater part of mankind, and that without altering the ordinary and natural progreſſion of the human underſtanding. Whether the human ſoul is material or immaterial, he doth allow, that it is the work, and a creature of GOD. And why may not GOD make a ſoul capable to perſuade others into ſuch ſentiments as ſhall induce them to act any part that GOD thinks proper and fit for their own and the government of the world? And if he hath no determinate, clear, and diſtinct ideas of ſuggeſtion, ſilent communication, ſudden influx, and injection of ideas, this his ignorance doth not prove that there is no ſuch thing. For he hath no ſuch determinate, clear, and diſtinct conception of the riſe and occaſion of every particular idea that came into his, nor have you of every one that comes into your mind. For though GOD hath permitted him to write, and you to publiſh many things tending to the diſhonour of your Creator, and to the hurt of mankind, divine providence can eaſily prevent their intended bad conſequence. And I hope and pray, that my endeavours may, as a ſecond cauſe, contribute towards ſo good an end. Without your knowledge of ſudden injection of ideas, GOD can raiſe up, and make human ſouls qualified and fitted to anſwer his deſign in governing the world. This, according to BOLINGBROKE's doctrine, can be done by a ſtronger or weaker

weaker fermentation, or by more or leſs elaſticity. And admitting the human ſoul to be an immaterial ſubſtance, and a ſpirit, God, who is himſelf a ſpirit, may have immediate acceſs to human minds, in a way which we can as little comprehend as we do the manner of his creating them. I believe it will be allowed me, that God acts by his operative will, which all things obey. By this he made, by this he preſerves, and by this he governs the world, and by this too he forms and informs the minds of men; but how this his will is operative, and how it operates, we can as little comprehend, as we can create, preſerve, and govern the world. His Lordſhip's ignorance of the manner wherein God gives new thoughts and new diſpoſitions to the minds of men, is no argument againſt his giving theſe new thoughts and new diſpoſitions, no more than it can be againſt his making man.

It is owing to this affectation of knowing the works and ways of God as he does the works and ways of men, that his Lordſhip makes the government of the world ſurpaſs his infinite wiſdom and power, and that he makes ſo many contingencies, exceptions from the over-ruling providence of God, left entirely to chance and accident, or to the diſcretion or indiſcretion of every individual moral agent. Without determining whether God made the world for the ſake of man, and man that he might communicate happineſs to him, or not; it is certain, and allowed as ſuch by

BOLINGBROKE, that man is the principal inhabitant of our planet; and if he poſſeſſes ſuch a rank in our terreſtrial world, it is aſtoniſhing that ever it ſhould come into the head of any one of the human ſpecies, that he is below the regard, below the care, and ſo turned out of the dominions of his Creator. If GOD takes care of the dwelling-place made for the accommodation of the inhabitant, it is an abſurdity, and reproach to his Lordſhip's underſtanding, to aſſert, that this inhabitant is of no conſideration with the great architect of the world. From his own words I reaſon againſt him. The words are: "Whatever was the "final cauſe of the world; whatever motive, for we "ſpeak after the manner of men," (and he ſhould allow others to do the ſame), "the firſt cauſe had to "create it, which motive could not ariſe from any "thing without himſelf, muſt be therefore reſolved "into his mere will. We conceive eaſily, that infi- "nite wiſdom which determined, and infinite power "which executed the plan of the univerſe, had ſome "ſecondary, ſome inferior regard, in making this, and "every other planet, to all the creatures that were to "inhabit them. Neither any of theſe creatures, nor "all of them, were, in a proper ſenſe, the final "cauſe for which theſe planets were created." True; for GOD made all things for his own glory, or, as Dr CUDWORTH ſays, "the parts were made for the "whole, and the whole for the maker;" and by his providence

providence he hath conducted, and will conduct all things to anſwer that end.

But if all events which his Lordſhip calls *contingencies* in the material and moral world are placed without the reach of God's providence, and if theſe are ſo many that they abſorb the general rule of God's government, even omniſcience and omnipotence cannot inſure the end, the glory and honour of the Creator. All theſe extraprovidential events are either of themſelves beyond the knowledge and power of the ſupreme Being, or he hath freely and abſolutely beſtowed exemption and independency upon them. This cannot be done without diveſting himſelf of his dominion, and without making agents dependent in being, independent in acting, or making them act otherwiſe than they are. And if theſe contingencies are of their own nature beyond the knowledge and power of the ſupreme Being, then he is neither infinitely wiſe nor almighty. And theſe are the only attributes which his Lordſhip aſcribes to the Deity. But, not to truſt any argument to the conceſſion of ſuch an author, it is a contradiction in terms to affirm, that there can be any thing unknown to omniſcience, or any thing that cannot be done by omnipotence.

The *fourth*, and the laſt objection againſt divine providence, the laſt that I ſhall trouble my reader with,

with, is, That there are ſo many mean and trifling things done by mankind, and of ſo little conſequence, that it is below the majeſty of the ſupreme Being to regard them. This is altogether in the Epicurean ſtyle. He that excludes all the individuals of mankind, that is, every ſingle perſon, from the care and regard of GOD, may well exclude their actions. But that every individual and particular perſon and his actions depend on GOD, hath already been demonſtrated. Nor is this below the majeſty of GOD, ſince it was not below his majeſty to create man. I cannot believe, that the author had any but very mean apprehenſions of the dignity of the Deity, by making him, in imitation of his own pride and vanity, ſo ſtately as to neglect the works of his own hands. GOD cannot be weary in caring for his creation, nor can the greateſt variety of events perplex his infinite wiſdom; nor can it ſurpaſs his infinite power, to provide for them all, and direct them finally to his own glory. If the vegetative and animal parts are the works of GOD; if the leaſt and meaneſt inſect is made by him, and are likewiſe preſerved by his providence, ſhall the rational part be entirely neglected?

I am pleaſed that his Lordſhip had ſo much metaphyſics as to ſee, that between the Deity and his creation there is an unmeaſurable diſtance, becauſe between finite and infinite there is no proportion. And if it is unworthy of GOD to regard the meaneſt of

of his creatures, and the loweſt of their actions, upon account of his infinite ſuperiority and majeſty, the whole creation muſt for that reaſon be below his providence. For, ſtrictly ſpeaking, in an infinite diſtance in perfection, to uſe the author's compariſon, man cannot be nearer his Creator than an oyſter; nor all the univerſe nearer than the leaſt part of it. And ſo ſaid the prophet, or, if you pleaſe, ſo ſung the poet. * *Behold, the nations are as a drop of the bucket, and are accounted as the ſmall duſt of the balance: behold, he taketh up the iſles as a very little thing.——All nations are before him as nothing.*

THAT the actions of men are, in appearance, mean and trifling, and often worſe, I do admit; they are to us, as he ſays, no better than farces. But mean as they are, they are not too mean for divine regard, which nothing can exceed, and nothing fall below. They are the actions of his creatures, whom he hath made to exiſt, ſubſiſt, and act. Tho' not always to our obſervation, yet theſe farces, theſe trifling occupations, often give riſe to very great events. In the rational world the philoſopher admits a greater latitude for contingencies, than in the mere material or animal world; and therefore the moral world requires a ſingular adminiſtration, ſuited to the nature of the moral ſubjects. I know no actions of men more childiſh and trifling than gaming; and yet

* Iſaiah xl. 15.

the

the gain or loſs of a game at cheſs gave riſe to a war between England and France; and ſince that time theſe two nations never were good friends, but rather conſtitutional enemies. A debate occaſioned by a cartful of ſkins gave riſe to a war, which coſt a Duke of Burgundy an army, and his own life. But it is not my preſent buſineſs to write hiſtory.

ONE would be apt to think, that his Lordſhip muſt have been very ſure of what he hath taken ſo much pains to prove, and yet he acknowledges he is not. For he ſays, "* Though there is little credit to be "given to all that lying legends, ſuſpicious tradi- "tions, and idle rumours, have reported concern- "ing particular acts of providence, yet I will not "preſume to deny that there have been any ſuch." And if there have been any ſuch, why not many ſuch? All thoſe contingencies, or chances, are not without the reach of divine providence. Any one particular act of providence demoliſhes all his arguments that tend to prove that GOD hath no regard to individuals. For if any one of theſe contingencies are under the dominion and government of GOD, it is impoſſible to prove, and preſumption to aſſert, that any one is exempted. For all events whatever are as eaſily provided for by infinite wiſdom and power, as any one of them. If a divine providence, then, is not perpetual and univerſal, it is not for want of

* Vol. v. p. 35.

knowledge

knowledge and power, but for want of will. And how hath Lord BOLINGBROKE found out, that GOD was unwilling to have any thing to do with him, and that he had, by a ſpecial grant, made him abſolute maſter of himſelf; that is, that GOD hath in many inſtances ſurrendered his right of dominion and ſovereignty, a right founded in his creating and preſerving power, and an eſſential perfection of his being?

To what purpoſe could his Lordſhip have taken ſo much pains to deceive himſelf, and to deceive others, with a conceit of independency on GOD? I know none, after trying the utmoſt of my imagination and invention, except that he had rather things ſhould run at random in the material and moral world, than that they ſhould be under the government and direction of an infinitely-wiſe and almighty being. He might have thought, and ſuch as he may think as they pleaſe, (and it is only becauſe they pleaſe); but with pleaſure, and with gratitude to GOD, I am convinced that I am ſafer in his diſpoſal, than in my own. VELLEIUS the Epicurean could not bear the thoughts of having a GOD wreathed upon his neck, to be dreaded day and night. "* And what man," ſaith he, "would not dread a GOD, whoſe providence is univerſal, who knows and obſerves, and claims a "concern in every thing; a GOD ſo full of buſineſs "and employment?" A ſtrong deſire to be freed

* Cicero de natura deorum, lib. 1.

from thoſe fears and terrors did induce the ancient, and does induce the modern Epicureans, to reject a divine providence. The ancient Epicureans owned the charge, and gloried in the diſcovery; and whether modern Epicureans confeſs it or not, I cannot hinder myſelf to think that the ſame reaſon is the foundation of their doctrine. They may ſay and unſay, (and no man does it more freely than his Lordſhip), I do approve of an ancient ſaying, *The fool*, that is, the wicked man, *hath ſaid in his heart*, *There is no GOD*; to which I add, no providence, no future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments. After all the pains he hath taken to diſprove a providence, and a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, he is not aſhamed to ſay, "* The ancient and modern "Epicureans provoke my indignation, when they "boaſt as a mighty acquiſition, their pretended cer-"tainty that the body and ſoul die together." Is it credible, nay, is it poſſible, that any man of candour and ſincerity can talk after ſuch a rate, or that any man of common ſenſe ſhould flatter himſelf, that he can impoſe on the world ſuch a groſs and induſtrious contradiction, for a truth? Such an ignoble and diſhonourable prevarication is enough to provoke the indignation of a gentleman Atheiſt.

THE amount of all the nobleman author's doctrine of providence comes to this, and no further,

* Vol. v. p. 125.

That

That God hath made the univerſe, and ſet all the ſuns and planets agoing, and furniſhed every habitation with materials for the accommodation and happineſs of ſuch as do, or may inhabit them; with thiſtles for aſſes, and proper food for other beaſts, and for men. To ſome he hath beſtowed inſtinct and appetite, on others ſagacity and reaſon; and hath left to every creature the uſe of its faculties, and the diſpoſal of itſelf; with a large allowance of contingencies and chances in the material world, for which he hath made no proviſion; and with a larger in the moral world, for which every moral agent muſt make proviſion for himſelf, without any aſſiſtance or favourable interpoſition of his providence. He might as well have ſaid in few words, that God doth not govern the world; that earthquakes and inundations, peſtilence and famine, ſtorms and tempeſts, which ſweep off the inhabitants of this earth, without difference of the good from the bad, are all of them contingencies and extraprovidential events, not under the dominion and government of the Creator. For though he did foreſee, or rather ſees them, yet he ſees them as an unconcerned ſpectator. Nor have the moſt innocent and virtuous of the human race reaſon to complain of this adminiſtration, becauſe he hath furniſhed them with materials and faculties ſufficient to provide for their own happineſs. And tho' ſome contingencies ſhould ſurmount their greateſt care and precaution, there remains no ground of com-

plaint, and no ground of gratitude, for whatever happens, becauſe none of theſe things are the doings of their Creator. They have their lot in this world, nor have they reaſon to expect another in a world to come.

IT was a maxim admitted by all except the Epicureans, *Si DEUS eſt, mundus regitur providentia.* And Epicureans were therefore juſtly eſteemed Atheiſts. Between the doctrine of EPICURUS and that of BOLINGBROKE, I ſee no difference in this capital point of providence; and I therefore conclude, that ſo much of his philoſophy is Atheiſm.

SECT.

SECT. XI.

Of the immateriality of the human ſoul.

AS the denying of divine providence, or abſurdly limiting it to nations and ſocieties of men, is Atheiſm to all the purpoſes and conſequences of Atheiſm; ſo doth the denying the immateriality of the human ſoul clear the way, and lead into the ſame impiety. " * For as there were never any yet " known, who aſſerting incorporeal ſubſtance, did " deny a Deity; ſo neither can there be any reaſon, " why he that admits one, ſhould exclude the other." A materialiſt may be, and really is an Atheiſt; but he that admits incorporeal ſubſtances, can have no reaſon to reject the being of a ſpirit infinitely perfect, and the father of ſpirits. Notwithſtanding, his Lordſhip labours hard to prove, that all men are pneumatically mad, who aſſert that there is any created being but mere matter. And at the ſame time he would make the world believe, that he maintains this with ſorrow of heart. For he ſays, " † There is " nothing, philoſophically ſpeaking, at leaſt I could " never find to my ſorrow that there is any thing " which obliges neceſſarily to conclude, that we are " a compound of material and immaterial ſubſtance." As it is pointed, his meaning may be, that he never

* Cudworth, p. 135. † Vol. i. p. 20.

was

was ſorry to find, that we are one ſingle ſyſtem of mere matter.——"For they denote plainly one ſingle "ſyſtem; all the parts of which are ſo intimately "connected and dependent one on another, that the "whole begins, proceeds, and ends together." The ancient and modern Epicureans provoke his indignation, by maintaining that we die whole, and that the ſoul and body periſh together; and therefore, ſince he is ſorry to find their opinion ſo well grounded, he ſhould have been as much diſpleaſed with himſelf, for maintaining his two favourite tenets, the materiality and mortality of the ſoul. To ſhew his ſkill at hedging, or ſpeaking for and againſt the ſame thing, and that too both diffidently and dogmatically, he ſays, "* I do not pretend to deny the poſſible ex-"iſtence of ſpiritual, that is, according to the pre-"ſent notion, of immaterial beings. I have no "more right to deny that there are ſuch, than others "have to affirm it. GOD alone, the author of all "beings, knows how many different kinds of ſub-"ſtances, how many various ſorts of beings, his "omnipotent will hath made to exiſt." It is reaſon that gives right to affirm or to deny. And if he hath no more right to deny the exiſtence of immaterial beings, than his oppoſers have to affirm it, reaſons muſt be balanced on both ſides; and, he himſelf being judge, it muſt be a needleſs debate; becauſe he cannot perſuade his opponent out of his own, into

* Vol. i. p. 207.

the

the author's opinion; and after all he hath ſaid, or can ſay on the ſubject, he obliges himſelf to leave it as he found it, that is, problematical.

ALL that I obſerve more in this place, is, that whatever kinds of ſubſtances, or how many various ſorts of beings GOD hath made, they muſt be either material or immaterial; for there is no *medium* between corporeal and not corporeal. That corporeal is one branch or ſpecies of being, he and thoſe he oppoſes do admit: and if there is any other ſpecies, it muſt be incorporeal. And it is this incorporeal being that muſt have the variety of beings in it. And theſe immaterial and ſpiritual beings are made to act, or be acted upon, or both. If they are made to be only active, or only paſſive, they muſt be of the ſame kind with pure body, or pure ſpirit: and if they are made to be both active and paſſive, they can be neither purely body nor purely ſpirit; but ſomething partaking of material and immaterial, ſomething that is, and is not. However, I do admit, and admit chearfully, that as there are ſeveral degrees in the corporeal world, ſome more and ſome leſs valuable and perfect; ſo in the ſpiritual world there are actually ſome completer and more perfect than others. But all of the firſt ſort are material and corporeal, and all of the ſecond ſort are immaterial and ſpiritual.

BUT to take off the diſtinction of material and immaterial,

material, which notwithſtanding his Lordſhip admits, (for he does not take it on him to deny the poſſibility of immaterial beings), he ſays, " * Though our idea " of thought be not included in the idea of matter or " body, as the idea of figure in that of limited ex- " tenſion; yet the faculty of thinking, in all the " modes of thought, may have been ſuperadded by " omnipotence to certain ſyſtems of matter; which " is no leſs than blaſphemy to deny." This is ſtrongly and terribly ſpoken for one that believes and adores the ſupreme Being. Notwithſtanding the danger of blaſphemy, I am not ſatisfied with his doctrine; which he hath either borrowed from Mr LOCKE, or he makes uſe of his authority to ſupport his own opinion. " † LOCKE," he ſays, " finds no " contradiction in it, that the firſt, eternal, thinking " being, ſhould, if he pleaſed, give to certain ſy- " ſtems of created ſenſeleſs matter, put together as " he thinks fit, ſome degrees of ſenſe, perception, " and thought." This is ſuch a ſort of philoſophy, which his Lordſhip is far from admitting on other occaſions. " ‖ Univerſal poſſibility is the range of di- " vine, particular actuality, paſt or preſent, and that " in a very confined ſyſtem, of human intellect." He acknowledges himſelf an incompetent judge to determine what GOD can or cannot poſſibly do. All his means of knowledge is ſenſe and experience; and all the objects of ſuch knowledge are things actual,

* Vol. i. p. 21. † Vol. i. p. 212. ‖ Vol. i. p. 189.

not

not poſſible. Senſation he hath in common with the meaneſt animal: and experience is the ſchoolmiſtreſs of fools; and of ſome ſort of animals too; ſuch as, his half-reaſoning elephant, dogs, and others. I cannot allow ſo low a genius as his Lordſhip's to judge of poſſibilities and impoſſibilities; of what doth, and what doth not imply a contradiction. I allow him capacity enough to determine, that all things actual are and were poſſible: but I do not allow him to find fault with others for concluding actuality from poſſibility; which never any man did, except thoſe who demonſtrate the being of GOD from the poſſibility of ſuch a being. In every other caſe all poſſibilities are accounted contingencies. "* Whenever we frame "ideas without being authoriſed by exiſtence, theſe "ideas muſt be fantaſtical." And what hath he then to do with poſſibilities?

NEITHER LOCKE nor BOLINGBROKE write like philoſophers, when, to prove that matter thinks and reaſons, they appeal to the divine omnipotence to make it capable of ratiocination. The queſtion is not preciſely, What GOD can do? but, What he hath done, that makes out the concluſion, *Matter actually thinks?* His Lordſhip ſhould give up his appeal to omnipotence, becauſe the ideas he forms of poſſibilities do not conſtitute real, but only fantaſtical knowledge; and therefore he can as little rely on Mr LOCKE's

* Vol. i. p. 184.

ſuppoſition, for the ſupport of the materiality of the human ſoul.

LOCKE, I think, rather limits than extends GOD's infinite power; and that in two inſtances. *1ſt*, He limits the power of ſuperadding the faculty of thinking to certain ſyſtems of created ſenſeleſs matter; and, *2dly*, To ſome degree of ſenſe, perception, and thought. For ſeeing the faculty of thinking is a ſuperaddition to matter, it may be beſtowed on all matter as ſuch, or upon any part or particle of it, as well as upon certain ſyſtems of it firſt put together as GOD thinks fit. Neither LOCKE nor his Lordſhip do nor can make out, that thought and reaſon can be produced by any diſpoſition of matter, without the ſuperaddition of a new power and faculty; and they therefore muſt admit, that omnipotence can beſtow this faculty of thinking on any part of matter, as well as upon the moſt refined and ſubtilized. And thus a pebble may become at once a ſenſitive and percipient ſubſtance. This his Lordſhip cannot well refuſe, who ſays, "* No man living hath higher notions of "divine omnipotence, nor carries them further than "I do. An argument fairly drawn from the power "of GOD will determine me at any time, and on "any occaſion." To this he adds, "I am perſua-"ded," (he ſhould have ſaid fantaſtically), "that "GOD can make material ſyſtems capable of thought,

* Vol. i. p. 135.

"and

" and that he hath done ſo." If there is nothing in matter, abſtracting from this poſſible ſuperaddition of a power of thinking, and if, in oppoſition to LOCKE's ſecond limitation, no reaſon can be aſſigned why *ſome degree* of ſenſe, perception, and thought, may be ſuperadded, and not the higheſt that we know in created beings; then the pebble may be as full of thought and knowledge, and may be internally as great a philoſopher, as either LOCKE or his Lordſhip. If the compariſon degrades the intellectual powers of theſe two authors; upon their own hypotheſis, it exalts the power of the almighty and ſupreme Being beyond any thing that ever entered into their minds.

EVERY ſuperaddition is ſupernatural, that is, above the nature of the thing to which it is ſuperadded. The faculty of thinking ſuperadded to ſenſeleſs matter, is beyond all our ideas of it, as it is matter. If thought could proceed from matter without this ſuperaddition, it muſt flow from motion, or from reſt, to neither of which it can electively determine itſelf. Motion, and far leſs reſt, in my conception, (of which only I can ſpeak with aſſurance), hath no affinity to thought and ratiocination. Nor do theſe two philoſophers admit it to be natural to corporeal beings. It is therefore eaſier to conceive, that thought proceeds from a ſubſtance of quite another nature and conſtitution, diſtinct from that which is merely material, than that a pebble can become an angel, or a being in the higheſt round of

the ſcale of creation. This is no violence offered to his Lordſhip's underſtanding, who admits the poſſibility of immaterial beings. Lord BOLINGBROKE and divines are agreed, that there is in us a thinking ſubſtance. Divines ſay, that this thinker is a ſubſtance of a ſort and nature diſtinct from matter. Lord BOLINGBROKE ſays, that it is of the ſame nature and ſort, not *naturally*, but by a ſuperaddition of an active faculty, whereby it is made capable of thought. Then by the acquiſition of this active faculty it loſes paſſivity, and ceaſes to be mere matter: and if it retains both, it muſt be a free and an active agent, and itſelf a paſſive ſubject for it to act upon. I ſay, matter muſt retain both activity and paſſivity: for a ſuperaddition to the nature of any thing, doth not change or deſtroy the nature of that thing to which the ſuperaddition is made. Addition and alteration are not the ſame in things themſelves, nor in my ideas of them. Matter to which the ſuperaddition of thinking is made, ſtill remains matter without ſpecific change or alteration, and juſt as incapable of thought after the ſuperaddition as it is ſuppoſed to have been before. It is not therefore a new-acquired faculty in matter. If, inſtead of an additional faculty, Mr MALLET will admit a ſuperinduction of an immaterial and thinking ſubſtance to a ſyſtem of matter, divines and he are agreed. But if he will inſiſt, that only an additional faculty, and ſuperior to the nature of mere matter, is made, and this matter remaining the ſame that it was before the

ſuperaddition,

ſuperaddition, I do affirm, that matter can never think and reaſon. And the pains that he takes to prove that it may and doth think by the alledged ſuperaddition, is a fair acknowledgment, that it neither does nor can think while it remains matter.

ONE would be apt to think, that LOCKE and his Lordſhip ſhould have ſaid, that divine omnipotence can alter or change a piece or ſyſtem of matter into a thinking ſubſtance; but then they were aware, or might be aware, that this change muſt be total, that is, from one nature to another, before it could anſwer their purpoſe. For let matter be condenſed into gold, or rarefied into ether; let it ferment, or let it cohere; let it reſt, or let it move; let it move ſlowly or ſwiftly, circularly, angularly, or ſtraightly, upwards or downwards; it is ſtill matter, without a total or a natural change, and as unfit as ever to be capable of thought and ratiocination. If the change is total, and ſuch as reaches the very ſubſtance of matter, it muſt be made immaterial; that is, it muſt be annihilated, and a new immaterial being muſt be made in its place.

How this nobleman writer came to borrow from SPINOZA, and do more than borrow, I cannot, nor am I obliged to underſtand. For he doth not approve, or pretends not to approve of the whole ſyſtem of that Atheiſtical writer; and yet he allows it *ſhould* be ſaid,

"That

" * That the vegetative and ſenſitive, and even the " rational ſoul, can be nothing elſe than matter dif- " ferently fermented and ſubtilized in ſyſtems of it " differently organized." To ſay *it can be nothing elſe*, is to determine dogmatically on a ſubject which he pretends to leave problematical. But he did not conſider, that by this he leaves no place for a ſuppoſed and poſſible ſuperaddition of a power of thinking to be made to matter: ſo that all he hath ſaid of his own head, or from LOCKE, goes for nothing. For matter as it is can do the whole buſineſs, by fermentation, ſublimation, and organization. I cannot ſay that this is an objection againſt what I have ſaid; for it is no more than a ſimple and ſilly aſſertion.

OF the ſame ſort is what may be placed as a *ſecond* objection; that is, That " † it cannot be proved by " metaphyſical jargon, about eſſences, attributes, and " modes, that we are a compound of material and im- " material ſubſtance." Not by jargon of any kind, moſt certainly, even though mathematical. But it may be done by metaphyſics, provided the whole ſcience is not jargon. And that it is not jargon, or words without meaning, is as certain as that the whole is more than any of its parts, and that the cauſe is prior to the effect, and that every thing acts as it is, and no otherwiſe. For theſe are metaphyſical axioms. His Lordſhip, when he finds it to his purpoſe, can

* Vol. i. p. 200. † Vol. i. p. 21.

make

make uſe of metaphyſics. For by theſe he proves, that man comes no nearer to infinite perfection than an oyſter. It is ſomething extraordinary for him or you to imagine, that your readers will accept of ſuch language for argument. That no regard may be had to your contempt of logics and metaphyſics, I have already ſaid enough, and to which I refer my reader *.

A *third* objection, or rather an apology for a material thinker, is taken from an article of the Chriſtian religion. " † The ſoul, the ſpiritual monarch of the " human ſyſtem, doth not remain long in its govern- " ment, becauſe the ſyſtem it governs is ſoon diſſol- " ved by death: but the ſhort time it remains in it, " decides of its ſtate to eternity. It ſeems to be de- " livered from the body, and to be reſtored to the " full force of its nature, and to the free exerciſe of " its powers, in order only to ſuffer, for the moſt " part during an eternity, for what it did in the go- " vernment of the body, when it enjoyed neither du- " ring a moment. As ſoon as philoſophers and divines " are able to reconcile all this to the ideas of the wiſ- " dom, juſtice, and goodneſs of GOD, the hypotheſis " will be no longer neceſſary to the former; ſince " they will not find it at all more difficult to recon- " cile thought to their ideas of the properties of mat- " ter." This paſſage, which I have faithfully tranſcribed, not for the elegancy, but rather to ſhew the

* Sect. ii. † Vol. i. p. 202.

confuſion

confuſion of it, is entirely impertinent. He who reaſons as a philoſopher, ſhould confine himſelf to ſuch arguments as reaſon dictates. For admitting it an abſurdity, that GOD ſhould puniſh human ſouls eternally for their miſgovernment of themſelves, and of the body while they remained in it; it will not juſtify him for making thought and ratiocination, fermentation, ſublimation, elaſticity, and organization of matter; becauſe one abſurdity cannot vindicate another. And I do aſſert, that philoſophers, and divines as philoſophers, can ſooner reconcile the puniſhment of impenitent ſinners with the juſtice and goodneſs of GOD in another life, than he can reconcile his notions of the ſupreme Being with common ſenſe, and clear them of Atheiſm.

HE ſays, "* It is a common-place topic," (*place* or *topic* would have ſerved me), "that infidels are "deſirous to keep GOD at a diſtance from them; "though it is in him they move, and live, and have "their being. This charge cannot be laid juſtly a-"gainſt any man who believes a GOD. For a GOD "without the attributes of an all-perfect being, can-"not be the ſupreme Being.——For my own part, "I am fully perſuaded, that there is a ſupreme Be-"ing, the fountain of all exiſtence, by the efficacy "of whoſe will the whole univerſe was made, and is "governed as well as preſerved; in a word, who is

* Vol. i. p. 256.

"the

" the firſt efficient of all things, and on whom all his " creatures depend." Now, all this orthodoxy is entirely demoliſhed, not by omitting, but by expreſsly denying GOD's moral attributes, as I have already proved *. From which either of theſe two things follows, that *holineſs* is not a perfection; or if it is, GOD is not an all-perfect being. Holineſs is eſſential to the ſupreme Being; otherwiſe this great, this almighty, this fountain of all exiſtence, this governor of the univerſe, may be conſidered as a tremendous, but not as a deſirable and adorable ſovereign. Without holineſs, or moral attributes, thoſe who obey, and thoſe who diſobey the law of right reaſon, and conſequently what we call the law of GOD, (for a GOD without morality cannot be the author of a moral law), are to him equal; neither objects of his pleaſure or diſpleaſure, of reward or puniſhment.

HIS Lordſhip, with more contempt than philoſophers and Chriſtian divines deſerve, or becomes the character of a gentleman to beſtow, accuſes them of abſurdity, and ſometimes of blaſphemy, for aſſerting, that GOD will puniſh ſouls in another life for tranſgreſſing his laws in this life; and that becauſe ſuch a procedure is, as he imagines, inconſiſtent with the wiſdom, juſtice, and goodneſs of GOD. The inconſiſtency of the puniſhment of ſouls in another life with the juſtice and goodneſs of GOD, ſuppoſing it an

* Sect. vii.

abſurdity, returns fully with as great ſtrength on the author, as he lays it to the account of Chriſtian philoſophers and divines. They aſſert, that GOD is good and juſt: he denies that he is either; and yet maintains, that in ſuch a caſe his juſtice and goodneſs may be impeached. As no moral attributes are by him aſcribed to the ſupreme Being, ſo no immorality hath place in his nature. Whether therefore ſouls are happy or miſerable in the body or out of it, either here or hereafter, it is not the doing of GOD; who, according to his Lordſhip's doctrine, does neither good nor evil: and therefore he hath no right to reaſon from his moral attributes for or againſt any procedure of his providence.

WHETHER his Lordſhip intended it as an objection againſt immaterial beings or not, yet what he ſays about the origin of our ideas, were it true, muſt deſtroy all that can be ſaid for the immateriality of the human ſoul. "* We have no ideas until we receive "paſſively the ideas of ſenſible qualities from with-"out. For though, from impreſſions made upon the "mind by objects from without, another ſource is "opened for our ideas; yet all the thoughts proceed-"ing from this new ſpring, *have either immediately "or ultimately corporeal things for their objects.*" (If this is true, we can have no notion of the Deity, but that of a material being). "Senſation would be

* Vol. i. p. 22.

"of

" of little uſe to form the underſtanding, if we had " no other faculty but mere paſſive perceptions. " But without ſenſation theſe other active and ope- " rative faculties would have nothing to operate " upon. Reflection would have nothing to reflect " on. In this manner all our ideas ariſe from our " ſenſes; and there is nothing in the mind which " was not previouſly in the ſenſe. This is evi- " dently ſo true, that even thoſe ideas about which " our reaſon is employed in the moſt abſtract medi- " tation, may be traced back to this original by a " very eaſy analyſis. Since theſe ſimple ideas are " the foundation of human knowledge, this know- " ledge can neither be extended wider, nor elevated " higher, than in a certain proportion to them." Is not this ſomething like metaphyſics, and, I think, the delirious part of it? For if all this is true, and if our moſt abſtract thoughts can be eaſily traced back to ſenſible ſources, then muſt all our ideas have ſome reſemblance to, or rather ſome connection with corporeal objects. But this is ſo far from being true, that it is evidently falſe. " * The idea we have of " thought by reflection, is as clear as that which we " have of extenſion by ſenſation." Now I aſk, as I am allowed, what ſimilitude, what proportion, what connection, is there between the idea of thought, and any corporeal object, or any of its ſenſible qualities, ſecondary and primary? *In our moſt abſtract*

* Vol. i. p. 101.

meditations, we view thought without regard to the object of it, whether intellectual or corporeal; and in such a case there is no analysis that can trace back such ideas to original sensation; no, not *per maximam consequentiam*. If Mr MALLET should turn the idea of thought, abstracted from every object of it, until his head turned round, neither you nor any man shall be able to extract any thing corporeal out of it. For this reason his Lordship gives up the cause, after pleading long and laboriously for it. "* To assert that there is no other source of ideas but sensation, is to assert something most evidently false. For, "to explain what hath been touched already, or hinted at, at least, we have as determinate and as clear "ideas of thought, as of extension or solidity; of "our inward faculties, and their operations, and of "the modes of thinking, as of the powers, the actions, and the modifications of mere body. Were "it otherwise, we should have no intellectual ideas "at all. For ideas, if they cannot be represented "in thought without corporeal images, are not such "most certainly." All that his Lordship hath said (and he hath said much to little purpose) concerning the rise of ideas, and the operative faculty of thinking, instead of supporting the materiality of the human soul, rather makes against it. It is far from being certain, that mere matter hath any operative or active power, either essentially or adventitiously. Essen-

* Vol. i. p. 129.

tially,

tially, no man ſince HOBBES, or at leaſt ſince Lord KAIMS, if he deſerves to be mentioned, and no man before STRATO, ever pretended that matter hath. If mere matter acquires ſuch a power, by addition, by deduction of parts, by conſolidation or diviſion; ſuch a diſpoſition thence ariſing, muſt be ſupernatural, and beyond all the known properties of matter. Even a power of motion, either inherent or adventitious, is an inexplicable and inconceivable property of matter. And if ever matter, or any part of it, great or ſmall, hath a power of determining itſelf to motion or to reſt, it muſt be by a ſuperaddition, ſuch as his Lordſhip and LOCKE makes the power of thinking to be. An operative power beſtowed on mere matter, if it is at all exerted, it muſt be on ſomething diſtinct from itſelf: which is not the caſe of the human ſoul; for it acts on itſelf: it penetrates its own inmoſt receſſes, ſearches out, examines the ideas there laid up in ſtore, and makes an aſſortment of them; it thinks on its faculties, and thinks on its thoughts; it commands the body, it moves it by an act of its will, and even commands or determines itſelf to conſider this or the other ſubject with attention. And is all this no more than mere matter? No, certainly. For nothing can be more unphiloſophical, nothing more unaccountable in his Lordſhip, than to maintain ſuch unintelligible ſtuff, when it might be avoided; becauſe he doth not take on him to deny, that there

are

are immaterial created ſubſtances. He ſays, " * That " we live, and move, and think, according to certain " human modes of thinking; and that there muſt be " ſomething in the conſtitution of our ſyſtem of be- " ing, *beyond* the properties of matter to produce ſuch " phenomena as theſe, are undeniable truths. But here " certainty ends: what that ſomething is, we know " not; and ſurely it is time to be convinced that we " cannot know it." And why then ſhould he dogmatically aſſert, that it is fermentation, ſublimation, and organization, or all of them, that produces the wonderful phenomenon of thinking? It is *beyond* the properties of matter, beyond all of them; and therefore can be none of them. Notwithſtanding his Lordſhip's moderation in inquiring, he thinks nothing of tranſgreſſing himſelf the limits he ſets to human underſtanding, and going beyond certainty with an air of aſſurance; when he ſays, " † If we are to form " a concluſion from concurrent phenomena, without " any further reaſoning about them than ſuch as they " juſtify, what muſt it be? It muſt be plainly this, " that there is in the whole animal kind one intellec- " tual ſpring, common to every ſpecies, but vaſtly " diſtinguiſhed in its effects; that though it appears to " be the ſame ſpring in all, yet it ſeems to be differ- " ently tempered, and to have more elaſticity in " ſome, and leſs in others." This ſpring he is pleaſed to call an intellectual ſpring, though he knows

* Vol. i. p. 206. † Vol. i. p. 229.

nothing

nothing of it, and though it is time to be convinced that it cannot be known. And why not a material ſpring, ſince the whole animal ſyſtem, and the human ſyſtem in particular, is not a compound of material and immaterial parts? He is willing to ſet bounds to the underſtanding of all mankind, eſpecially to the underſtanding of thoſe who cannot underſtand as he does; but for his own part, he pretends to extend it beyond a poſſibility of conceiving. After calling this ſpring intellectual, he at the ſame time makes it material, by giving it more or leſs elaſticity; and ſtill he knows not what it is.

In the character of a plain man, who hath formed this general concluſion, that all animals think by one common ſpring, he ſuppoſes one aſks him this trite queſtion, "Whether he conceives, that matter, how-"ever figured or moved, ſubtilized or fermented, "can be pleaſure or pain, deſire or averſion?" To which I add, can it be demonſtrative knowledge, acquired by a proceſs of reaſoning, as long and as large as to fill volumes with heaps of thoughts, drawn up in order to produce concluſions, to eſtabliſh truth, and to defeat error? "To anſwer truly, I "think he muſt anſwer, that he cannot conceive "matter to be any of theſe, or even how a ſyſtem "of matter can be capable of having any ideas; but "that he cannot draw any other concluſion than this, "that all animal ſyſtems are material." A ſtrange draught

draught this muſt be. Concluſions are often drawn from weak and inſufficient premiſſes; but this plain man's concluſion is drawn directly againſt them. The power of thinking is beyond the properties of matter; and what this thinking principle is, he knows not; neither can he conceive, that a ſyſtem of matter can be capable of having any ideas; and therefore all animal ſyſtems are material. Inſtead of this concluſion, I ſhould chuſe to draw this other, That all animals are not merely material, or I do not know what it is that makes any of them capable of thought. ——"The plain man hath puſhed his inquiry as far "as the true means of inquiry are open, that is, as "far as the phenomena can guide him." What phenomena? Surely the phenomena of matter, and ſuch phenomena as he knows, extenſion, ſolidity, figure, motion, reſt, and all the ſenſible qualities that belong to matter. But thinking is none of theſe, becauſe beyond them all, and becauſe he cannot conceive that matter is capable of it. Whatever I conceive, I judge poſſible; what I cannot conceive, may be poſſible in itſelf, but not in my judgment. In my opinion, this plain man plays tricks with his underſtanding, and endeavours to put his tricks upon mine, when he would teach me to conclude againſt my conception, and againſt poſſibility. With this inconceivable and impoſſible concluſion the plain man muſt be content, " * unleſs ſome other can be

* Vol. i. p. 230.

" drawn

" drawn from the ſame phenomena;" that is, until from the known phenomena of matter we can draw this concluſion, That thinking, which is beyond all the properties of matter, and conſequently none of them, is a phenomenon of matter. Out of which, to make another concluſion different from this contradictory concluſion, That *therefore all animal ſyſtems are material*, it muſt be, All animal ſyſtems are not merely material, or ſyſtems made up of mere matter.

" THE philoſopher is not content with the plain " man's concluſions; and if phyſics will not ſerve " his purpoſe, metaphyſics and theology ſhall. " And becauſe the particular phenomena of the " whole animal ſyſtem lead to a concluſion he does " not like, he reſolves not to be determined by " them. And from his abſtract ideas, he draws a " concluſion as inconceivable as that which he re- " jects." And a more inconceivable, and a worſe connected concluſion, no man can draw. The philoſopher's concluſion is, That thought proceeds from another ſort of being than matter; that it neither is, nor can be any of its known properties; and as no unknown properties can be aſcribed to matter, thinking is none of them. It is not only unknown as a property of matter, but beyond them all. And if the properties of any thing are of the ſame ſort, and certainly they are; then thinking, which ſurpaſſes all

the properties of matter, never can belong to it. The plain man is unable to explain how matter thinks, " though the phenomena are ſo many poſitive proofs, " that oblige him to conclude that a material ſyſtem " hath this power." Abſolutely falſe, as the author ſtates the debate. He will not take on him to deny, that there are immaterial beings or ſubſtances: for this phenomenon of thinking may, for what the plain man knows, belong to this poſſible immaterial ſubſtance. The immaterialiſt maintains, that thinking is no property of matter; the materialiſt acknowledges, that he cannot conceive how it can be capable of thinking; and may not the philoſopher be allowed to conclude, that it is not his material part, but an immaterial ſubſtance, his ſoul, his ſpirit, that thinks and reaſons?

THE plain man however inſiſts, " That the pheno- " mena are ſo many poſitive proofs, that oblige him " to conclude, that material ſyſtems have this power " of thinking." The plain man hath an ill memory, and a worſe judgment. Thinking goes beyond all the properties of matter, and therefore is none of them; and yet he concludes, and that moſt obſtinately and abſurdly, that the phenomena oblige him to conclude, that thinking is one of them. The philoſopher ſays, as the debate is ſtated, the plain man plainly begs the queſtion; becauſe he once admitted, that thought may be a property of an immaterial ſubſtance.

ſtance. The plain man decides poſitively for matter. " The philoſopher decides negatively, on ſuch proofs " as abſtract ideas furniſh him, that no ſyſtem of " matter thinks; that omnipotence cannot any way " communicate to it the faculty of thinking; and " poſitively, that whatever thinks, is a ſimple being, " immaterial, indiſſolvable. The plain man hath " recourſe once more to the phenomena, and objects, " That we muſt be reduced, if we receive this hy- " potheſis, to aſſert, that other animals, beſides man, " have immaterial and immortal ſouls; or that no o- " ther animal beſides man hath the faculty of think- " ing."

THIS, I acknowledge, is a grand objection, and ſuch as well deſerves an anſwer. And I freely join with his Lordſhip in rejecting a modern ſyſtem, that makes all bodily appearances to be deluſions, though I never ſaw what is ſaid in ſupport of it; for I am reſolved to believe no deluſions, knowing them to be ſuch. And I as freely join with him in rejecting the hypotheſis of DESCARTES, which makes all animals, man only excepted, mere machines, or *automata*. It is of the author's own ſhewing, that " * GOD alone, the " author of all beings, knows how many different " kinds of ſubſtances his omnipotent will hath made." As in the material part of the univerſe there are ſeveral ſorts of bodies, ſo in the immaterial creation there

* Vol. i. p. 207.

may be ſeveral ſorts of ſpirits. As the author's intellectual and material ſpring in animals hath in ſome more, and in others leſs elaſticity; ſo in the world of ſpirits, ſome may have more and higher, and others fewer and lower faculties. All animals, all living and ſentient creatures, have a degree or ſort of immaterial ſubſtance in them, ſuch as anſwers the end and uſe for which they were made. That which makes animals move, and live, and act, is not a part of the body, or any thing material; but ſome ſort of ſpirit and immaterial ſubſtance; of which there may be as many ſorts as GOD pleaſes, and many more than his Lordſhip could have imagined. And as they are, ſo they act with a lower and weaker, and with a higher and ſtronger energy and activity. Though the author may make a great difference between a lump of a rock, and a piece of the ſame or other matter fermented into thought and ratiocination; he thinks it no wiſe below his underſtanding to maintain, that "* it implies a contradiction manifeſtly, that a ſub-"ſtance capable of thought by its nature in one de-"gree or inſtance, is by its nature incapable of it in "another." It were to be wiſhed the author had adverted, that the queſtion is not, What may be? but, What is? His own intellectual ſpring in all animals hath not the ſame elaſticity in an oyſter, as it had in his Lordſhip, or hath in DAVID MALLET, Eſq; And why may not theſe immaterial beings or ſubſtances,

* Vol. i. p. 236.

which

which I put in the place of his elaſtic ſprings, differ as much as a philoſopher differs from an aſs? In the material world there is a difference between a moſs and a mineral; the one fit for many uſes, and the other fit only for fewel. All matter is extended and ſolid, but all matter is not fit for every thing. Even thoſe philoſophers who make the univerſe out of a collection of atoms, do not make all theſe atoms of the ſame ſort, but of as many ſorts as there are elements. The atoms of which air is made, differ, as they ſay, from thoſe of which water is made, and terreſtrial atoms from both. I do not ſay, that all the Democritical philoſophers maintained or ſuppoſed a difference in atoms, but ſome of them did. If in the inanimated parts of the creation there is a ſpecific difference, it implies no manifeſt contradiction to aſſert, that there are ſome ſpirits, or immaterial ſubſtances, capable of ſome actions and paſſions, but incapable of others. Lord BOLINGBROKE might have had a head turned for mathematics; but for metaphyſics, he had a head or a heart turned againſt them. All ſpirits, in his Lordſhip's hypothetical ſcale of beings, were not made with equal powers and faculties. And as they were made, ſo they act. And this their *make*, and manner of acting, is called their *nature*. It therefore to me appears a contradiction to ſay, that a ſubſtance capable of thought by its nature in one degree or inſtance, is by its nature capable of any other, even the higheſt: for its capacity is its nature. We ourſelves have a ſentient

ſentient power, we have a percipient power, and we have a power of reflecting on what we feel, and what we perceive; of comparing and compounding our ſimple ideas, and a power of judging of their agreement. But admitting that every animal is informed with an immaterial principle of action, it doth not follow, that every one of them muſt have the ſame, or a principle of action perfectly equal. The ſpirits of all animals have a ſentient power. They feel, they ſee, they hear, they taſte, they ſmell; and many of them poſſeſs theſe ſentient powers in a higher degree than man doth; and all of them have this power ſo far as is neceſſary for their preſervation. They have likewiſe a power of diſtinguiſhing one object from another; and this power may be called *percipient*. And therefore they muſt be allowed to have ideas: for idea and perception is the ſame thing; though his Lordſhip, from his averſion to logics, makes them different, by ſaying we *perceive ideas*; or he muſt mean, that we *perceive perception*. Upon ſome animals I can beſtow memory, judgment, and even ratiocination. Obſervations made on ſeveral ſorts of animals plead ſtrongly, and, I think, unanſwerably for it *.

But the greateſt difficulty conſiſts in a conſequent immortality. To me this is no difficulty at all. Nor ſhould it be any to Mr Mallet, whoſe ſoul is neither the better nor the worſe in this, nor in another

* Rorarius de ratione brutorum.

world,

world, that theſe animal and brutal ſpirits do ſubſiſt after the diſſolution of their material ſyſtem. I am not able to believe, that human ſouls always think, though they always remain capable of thought. And why may not the ſouls of brutes remain the ſame, though they do not exert any of their active powers? Naturally they are as immortal as the ſoul of the greateſt philoſopher. They are both of them immaterial ſubſtances. Diſſolution is the diviſion and ſeparation of parts. Immaterial ſubſtances have no parts, and are naturally not diſſolvable. We do not build the immortality of our ſouls upon their immateriality, as his Lordſhip ignorantly aſſerts. We put the perpetuity of their duration upon the good pleaſure of the creator and father of our ſpirits. If the ſupreme Being pleaſes, he may continue the ſpirit of every animal in being, or he may extinguiſh them totally, or annihilate them. It is not our knowledge in arts and ſciences, nor the ſtrength of our reaſon, nor the immateriality of our ſouls, that intitles us to immortality. It is nobler knowledge. It is the knowledge of our GOD, and of his will, as the rule of our conduct and obedience. And this even Lord BOLINGBROKE is forced to acknowledge, when he diſtinguiſhes between ethics and phyſics. " * The infinite wiſdom " and power of GOD manifeſted in the natural ſyſtem " of the univerſe is the object of one, and the will of " GOD manifeſted in the conſtitution of our moral

* Vol. i. p. 74.

" ſyſtem

"fyſtem is the object of the other." It is this that makes us accountable, and it is this that makes us immortal. But it is not ſimply the knowledge of our duty that determines our happy or unhappy ſtate. It is the choice we make, and the part we act, that renders us objects of commendation or blame, of the approbation or diſapprobation of our maker and maſter. It is this that lays the foundation of a future ſtate in happineſs or in miſery.

We obſerve nothing in other animals that conſtitutes them ſubjects of a moral law. They cannot be ſaid either to obſerve or tranſgreſs it; and have nothing to anſwer for here or hereafter. Many and wonderful marks of ſagacity are to be ſeen in the brutal creation: but it was never obſerved, that any one of them, for the greateſt cruelties exerciſed on one another, gave any ſigns of remorſe, regret, and repentance. If Mr Maillet's coach-horſe, or his cat, knew as much as Bolingbroke hath wrote, and as he himſelf hath wrote or publiſhed: and, at the ſame time, did not know morality from immorality, vice from virtue, and ſin from duty, they could have no right to rewards or puniſhments, or to a future exiſtence. But thy maker and thy maſter, * O man, *hath ſhewed thee what is good, and what doth the* LORD *require of thee, but to do juſtly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy* GOD? For this knowledge, for

* Micah vi. 8.

this

this gift, for this honour and dignity, we are anſwerable here and hereafter. It is not therefore to be thought, that our ſouls, and the ſouls of ſuch animals as cannot diſtinguiſh between vice and virtue, are to be put upon the ſame footing, to periſh alike in death; and if theirs and ours ſurvive the bodies, that both muſt remain in a ſtate of inſenſibility. Though the parts, and pieces, and members of animals are turned into duſt, yet they ſtill remain matter. Nothing of annihilation is obſerved, or pretended. Matter may change its form, and paſs from the groſſeſt to the fineſt, and from earth to ether, and back again, it ſtill remains. And there is no reaſon to ſuſpect or ſuppoſe, that the human ſoul, or even the immaterial principle of action in brutes, periſh quite, and vaniſh into nothing. Diſſolved theſe ſpirits cannot be; for they are indiviſible. If they remain at all, they muſt remain the ſame in ſubſtance. I cannot think, that the infinitely-wiſe Creator of the univerſe makes and unmakes, creates and annihilates, either bodies or ſpirits. The firſt he forms and models anew, to anſwer the purpoſes of his providence; and to the ſecond he may give powers and faculties, higher or lower. The belief of ſuch a futurity naturally leads into a reverential awe of the ALMIGHTY; it inclines us to a chearful obedience to his will; it makes us live and act reaſonably, that is, ſuitably to our higheſt faculties and powers; and tends to the improvement of our natures: whereas they that think their whole being is

made of mere matter, and that after death, and the diſſolution of their bodies, they are to be no more, find little encouragement and inducement to live morally and reaſonably. This life, ſuch as it is, is their all. Their temporal intereſt and advantage is their *prima regula morum*, and the ſupreme rule of their actions. This is the grand principle of materialiſts, and, when reduced to practice, renders them unworthy of human ſociety. I know they all deny the practical part of their philoſophy; but if their principles do not ſupport and inforce every ſocial duty, and eſpecially if they hinder and obſtruct the performance of any, their principles can neither be true nor natural. Strange infatuation, amazing meanneſs of mind, greedily to embrace an opinion that puts them upon a level with the loweſt animals, and that without any poſitive proof, or demonſtrative reaſon for it!

It is true, his Lordſhip, in the character of a plain man, affirms, that "* he ſees no poſitive and deter-" mining proof for the immateriality and immortality " of the human ſoul; and that all the phenomena, " from our birth to our death, ſeem repugnant to " theſe two articles of natural religion and the Chri-" ſtian revelation; and that he is *forced* to conclude " with Lucretius,

" ——*Gigni pariter cum corpore et una*
" *Creſcere ſentimus pariterque ſeneſcere mentem.*

* Vol. i. p. 269.

" That

" That God hath given him reaſon to diſtinguiſh " and to judge, and external and internal ſenſe by " which to perceive and reflect; but that this very " reaſon ſhewed him the abſurdity of embracing an " opinion concerning body and mind, which neither " of theſe ſenſes ſupports; and that how ſhort and " imperfect ſoever the knowledge acquired by the " phenomena might be, he was contented with it, " becauſe it was knowledge acquired in God's way; " that is, the only way that God hath opened to our " inquiries about the nature of things, corporeal and " ſpiritual. Nay, further, if he could ſuſpect him- " ſelf to be deceived in this way, he would be con- " tented ſtill. He would conclude on this and other " occaſions, that whether things appear to him as they " are abſolutely, and ſuch as the ſupreme intelli- " gence knows them to be, or not, they appear to " him ſuch as is fit for his nature they ſhould appear " to him. On this undoubted truth the plain man " would reſt his mind, inſtead of perplexing it about " indeterminable queſtions, and ſtruggling preſump- " tuouſly and vainly to know things otherwiſe than " his nature and theirs admit that he ſhould know " them."

This paſſage, in my opinion, is a ſpecimen, and a very extraordinary ſpecimen, of enthuſiaſtical impiety and blaſphemy. If, by internal ſenſe, he means any thing beſides reaſon, he means what neither he

himſelf, nor any man elſe can underſtand. Of ſenſitive philoſophy, I have already ſaid enough to ſhew that it is nonſenſe *. And becauſe neither his ſenſe nor his reaſon afford him a poſitive proof of the immateriality of the ſoul, it would be abſurd in him to embrace it. Senſe and experience are the only ſources of his knowledge; and from theſe he cannot acquire the knowledge of an immaterial being, I do admit: but it is becauſe he will not hear reaſon, that he refuſes demonſtrative proof that our ſoul is not a material ſubſtance. But if it is an abſurdity to embrace an opinion that cannot be ſupported, it is an equal abſurdity to deny an opinion that cannot be diſproved. And he immediately adds, " † On ſuch principles as " theſe, though he could not affirm, he would not " deny the immateriality of the ſoul."

Observe, the plain man is ſtill uncertain of the ſoul's materiality or immateriality, its mortality or immortality. On this *uncertain* and *undoubted* truth he reſts his mind. And this uncertain and undoubted truth, the ſtay and prop of a ſtupid head and a vitious heart, is, Whether he is deceived, or not, in disbelieving the immateriality of the ſoul, he is reſolved to adhere to the negative, and to hold faſt his opinion; which he cannot embrace without an abſurdity; that is, he chuſes, as ‖ *he is made after the image of other animals*, to live and die as theſe his brethren do.

* Eſtimate, § i. † Vol. i. p. 270. ‖ Vol. i. p. 215. *ad marg.*

Either

Either in vain hath GOD beſtowed more underſtanding on him than upon his brutal brethren, or he abuſes it criminally; becauſe he chuſes one of two uncertain opinions. Were theſe opinions pure ſpeculation, his choice could neither do himſelf or others any hurt; but in this particular caſe of the ſoul's materiality, which prepares a way to the disbelief of its immortality, it is of dangerous conſequence. It is then a principle of conduct in all our doings.

IT is true, he ſays he is *forced* to conclude with LUCRETIUS, that the ſoul is generated, grows, and decays with the body; and that all the phenomena, from our birth to our death, are repugnant to the immateriality and immortality of the ſoul. This is ſtrongly ſaid, but not more ſtrongly than falſely: for, inſtead of all the phenomena of human nature, there is not ſo much as one repugnant to the immateriality of the ſoul. And if there were but one, it would be enough for his Lordſhip's purpoſe. But there are ſeveral phenomena inconſiſtent with the materiality of the ſoul. I think I have already obſerved, that body doth not act on itſelf; for it is purely paſſive and impenetrable: but the mind acts on body, and on itſelf likewiſe. It examines its own powers and faculties; it wills and reſolves, and, I may ſay, it commands itſelf to take this and the other particular ſubject into conſideration; nay more, it judges, acquits, or condemns itſelf. And this matter, while it is matter,

ter, cannot do. And the utmoſt philoſophical efforts to make matter capable of thought, is only a ſuperadditional faculty; which not only differs from all properties of matter, but is inconſiſtent with them. And if there is any one phenomenon which belongs to the mind, and cannot belong to body, it muſt be a ſubſtance diſtinct from all matter.

WONDERFUL is BOLINGBROKE's averſion to ſpirits, when to ſupport his opinion, not of reaſon, but of arbitrary choice, he is forced to conclude a falſity with LUCRETIUS. For if it were true, the biggeſt and the ſtrongeſt man muſt have the moſt enlarged and the ſtrongeſt underſtanding. When he loſt a leg or an arm, he muſt loſe a proportion of his reaſon; and as his bodily ſtrength decayed, ſo muſt his mind. None of which things hold. His Lordſhip's correſpondent Mr POPE was a man of a very ſmall bodily bulk, and yet he admires his parts, both as a poet and a philoſopher. CERVANTES loſt an arm at the battle of Lepanto, and afterwards was ſecretary to the Duke d'ALVA, and wrote the famous romance of DON QUIXOTE. Mr LOCKE, whom he calls his maſter, retained his judgment and underſtanding in a very weak and extenuated body: and when he had ſurvived the time he foretold he was to die, called for water to waſh his hands; and being put in mind of his miſtake, he refuſed the water, and ſaid, his hands would ſerve him as they were, and died

died immediately. With what a wonderful capacity of learning and knowledge doth mankind come into this our world? Left to themſelves to make their obſervations on things that ſurround them, they are able in a little time to diſtinguiſh one thing from another; to know pappa and mamma, tray and puſs; and ſooner ſtill to find out the breaſt, and the way to ſuck it. And mean time their ears are not idle. In two years time, and often leſs, they acquire the names of things, and are able to pronounce them. They make uſe of verbs as well as of nouns, and ſpeak a language better than ſome men at the age of twenty can in ſo ſhort a time, with the uſe of a grammar and an interpreter, learn to ſpeak a language they never heard before. The child's knowledge overgrows his body, which, in bulk and ſtrength, bears no proportion to its mind.

With his knowledge of the materiality and mortality of the ſoul, Lord Bolingbroke is contented; becauſe it is knowledge acquired in God's way. Knowledge it cannot be to him, who knows not whether the ſoul is material or immaterial. Nor can I call it a miſtake, becauſe he doth not take it on him to deny that the ſoul is immaterial. Unleſs he can turn ignorance into knowledge, he can have no knowledge of the ſoul's materiality, either in his own or in God's way. If he could ſuſpect himſelf to be deceived in God's way, he would be contented ſtill.

Such

Such writers as his Lordſhip are ready on all occaſions to accuſe their oppoſers of enthuſiaſm; but I defy them to ſhew, in any ſerious religious author, ſuch rank enthuſiaſm. I believe he is among the firſt that ever was contented to be deceived. He deſires to be deceived, and he endeavours it ſucceſsfully. It is not only in this particular caſe, but on *other occaſions* likewiſe, that he imputes whatever he believes, or would willingly, or pretends to believe, to GOD as his teacher or deceiver. Whether things appear to him as they are abſolutely, and ſuch as the ſupreme intelligence knows them to be, or not, they appear to him ſuch as it is fit for his nature they ſhould appear to him. If plain BOLINGBROKE's nature is any thing diſtinct from human nature, I have nothing to ſay concerning it, becauſe I am unacquainted with it. But if he means human nature, he muſt have been extremely idle in writing volumes for truth, and againſt error. For whether what he, or what you Mr MALLET, believe, or what you teach, be true or falſe, it is the ſame thing; for it is fitteſt for you to believe. And to what purpoſe all this pains to introduce a new ſyſtem of morality and natural religion, when any ſyſtem, true or falſe, anſwers the purpoſe? And why ſhould you labour to undeceive me, when I can anſwer as well as you, that whether I am deceived or not, the thing in debate appears to me ſuch as it is fitteſt it ſhould appear to my nature? Whether things appear to you

ſuch

ſuch as the ſupreme intelligence knows them to be, or not; they appear to you, and conſequently to every man, ſuch as is fit they ſhould appear. And this, you ſay, is an undoubted truth. A truth, however, ſcarce ever known before; and a truth that deſtroys all other truths, and itſelf likewiſe. From this it follows, that it is fit, and fitteſt for you, to believe that the human ſoul is material, though in reality it may be immaterial, and GOD knows it to be ſuch; and the reaſon is, becauſe GOD is the author of your deception. Which two propoſitions are ſo evidently abſurd, that ſcarcely can words make the abſurdity appear plainer. I ſaid, that this doctrine is rank enthuſiaſm; and ſuch it is, if you really believe, that it is GOD who makes you think right or wrong, as is fitteſt for your purpoſe; and if you do not, it is a doctrine founded on this Atheiſtical maxim, *Whatever is, is right.* It is poſſible you may deceive yourſelf; for others do. But I am perſuaded, that GOD neither doth, nor can deceive any man; for he is not a cunning and deceitful being, but a GOD of truth, becauſe he is an all-perfect being. His Lordſhip, however, is not the firſt that hath given GOD the lie publicly. Lord KAIMS, a ſenator of the college of juſtice in Scotland, hath done it before him; and for which he hath received ſuch correction *, as may well ſuit his Lordſhip of BOLINGBROKE. Though it gives me pain to think,

* Eſtimate, p. 111.——137.

that men of rank and liberal education ſhould employ their parts and learning to run down the labours of thoſe who employed themſelves for the glory of GOD and the good of mankind; yet it gives me pleaſure to find, that all that they advance for impiety and irreligion, ends in abſurdity and contradiction.

INSTEAD of helping mankind on in their inquiries after uſeful truths, they would gladly reduce them to a ſuppoſed ancient ſtate of indolence and ignorance. Of which take this for an inſtance. "* Men were "conſcious, ever ſince their race exiſted, that there "is an active thinking principle in their compoſition, "and that there is a mutual influence of body on "mind, which ſhews itſelf firſt, and of mind on "body, which appears a little after. With this know-"ledge men of common ſenſe have contented them-"ſelves, whilſt philoſophers, thoſe men of uncom-"mon ſenſe, have filled their own heads, and the "heads of all thoſe that have hearkened to them, "with fantaſtical ideas and notions." That mankind did conſider the mind and the body, not as the ſame, but as two different things, which mutually influenced one another, he doth admit. And though this is conſcious knowledge, and as ancient as mankind, yet it doth not well agree with his doctrine of the ſoul's materiality. With the knowledge of a mutual influence of mind on body, and body on

* Vol. i. p. 243.

mind,

mind, it is not true, that men of common ſenſe contented themſelves. For time beyond tradition, all the ancient world believed, that the ſoul ſurvived the body, and was immortal, as I have already proved *. And indeed if men of common ſenſe had contented themſelves with the knowledge of two diſtinct parts in their compoſition, their ſenſe muſt have been very ſhallow. For if they did diſtinguiſh between this thinking principle and the body, a further inquiry muſt ſoon have appeared fit and expedient. No ſubject of conſideration concerned them ſo much as themſelves. It was natural to them to aſk themſelves and others, what this thinking principle was, how it came into being, how and wherein it differed from the body which it commanded and moved, and whether it ſurvived the body, or was diſſolved with it? Perhaps theſe queries would not occur to one who conſidered his whole being as one entire ſyſtem of matter, as you and his Lordſhip do. But as ye ſtate the caſe, I cannot ſee how theſe queſtions could be ſuppreſſed. For this active thinking principle, which makes but one part of the human compoſition, muſt differ from all the other ingredients and compounding parts.

With this knowledge of a thinking principle in our compoſition, it is only philoſophers, men of uncommon ſenſe, who are not ſatisfied. You beſtow

* Sect. v.

the dignity of a philoſopher on Lord BOLINGBROKE, (and I am perſuaded that he thought himſelf the greateſt philoſopher of his own, or ſome preceding ages); and why ſhould he find fault with his brethren, men of thought and genius, and take part with the unthinking and unattentive part of mankind? His Lordſhip here commits two miſtakes. 1*ſt*, He preſcribes a rule in reaſoning, which is not in our power to obſerve; and, 2*dly*, A rule which he himſelf does not obſerve. While we have the power of reaſoning, we can no more ſtop the exerciſe of it, than we can hinder ourſelves from ſeeing with open eyes and enlightened objects. This preſcription is philoſophical Popery; and it is a rule which he himſelf does not obſerve. With the knowledge of a thinking principle in our compoſition, and of a mutual influence of mind on body, and body on mind, he is far from being ſatisfied. He inquires further; and finds out, that this thinking principle is matter fermented and ſubtilized, and that he is under a neceſſity of concluding it is no more, even though he ſhould be deceived. And as if he had not ſaid enough to ſupport his diſbelief of the ſoul's immateriality, he adds, "* I am ready to think, that "GOD, who leaves us in many caſes to collect his "will, as he hath made us capable to collect it from "his works, ſhews manifeſtly in this caſe, how re"pugnant it is to the deſign of his all-wiſe provi-

* Vol. i. p. 257.

"dence,

" dence, that we ſhould attempt to acquire know-
" ledge of ſoul and ſpirit." There is nothing nearer to us than ourſelves, and nothing we are ſo much concerned in. This thinking principle, whatever it is, is the nobler part of our compoſition or ſyſtem, and therefore the moſt worthy of our conſideration. It is that by which we are rational, moral, and accountable beings. And doth this philoſopher think that GOD forbids us to beſtow any thoughts on it? If he is of that opinion, no man is guilty more directly of diſobedience in this caſe than he, who hath thought and written ſo much on ſoul and ſpirit, until he hath reduced it into matter, fermented and ſubtilized. And as a concluſion that doth no great honour to his ſpeculations, he thinks it is not our buſineſs to know what we are, while he maintains it is our duty (for it is the deſign of providence) " to employ our in-
" duſtry and penetration to acquire knowledge of
" body terreſtrial and celeſtial, in order to promote
" in general the advantages of human life, and thoſe
" particularly that reſult from the admiration of the
" ſupreme Being." I do think he had much better employed his time in writing almanacks, or in chymical operations, in fermenting and ſubtilizing matter, than in writing on natural religion. This, however, is an acknowledgment of an unſucceſsful attempt on the ſoul's immateriality; and that all he hath ſaid againſt it, doth neither ſatisfy himſelf, nor can it ſatisfy his reader. When men once intangle themſelves in debate,

debate, they are very willing to quit the ſubject, and to introduce another. Whatever he may think, I do believe, that every wiſe and religious man will think it his buſineſs and his duty, rather to acquire knowledge of himſelf, than of things exterior to him. But upon what grounds he finds it repugnant to the deſign of providence, that we ſhould attempt to acquire knowledge of ſoul and ſpirit, is not eaſily imagined. Becauſe he cannot, or will not, believe that the ſoul is an immaterial ſubſtance, muſt he conclude, that it is GOD's deſign, that neither he, nor any one beſides, ſhould ſo much as attempt to know what this active thinking principle in our nature is? As he charges his errors, ſo he charges his ignorance to GOD's account. This is blaſphemy or Atheiſm. Whatever is right, whatever is done, is well done; and whatever is thought, is well thought. And this finiſhes a ſyſtem of fatality and of Atheiſm. But until he attempted in vain to acquire knowledge of ſoul and ſpirit, he did not know that it was unacquirable; and until then he did not know that ſuch an attempt was repugnant to the deſign of divine providence. And, finally, he makes his own underſtanding the ſtandard of all human underſtanding at leaſt, and a criterion of GOD's purpoſes and deſigns. Which is to tell his reader, "You need not trouble yourſelf to "know what your thinking principle is; for I have "tried it without ſucceſs; and I am ſure, that if GOD "had deſigned that any man ſhould know more of "the

" the matter, he would have allowed me to have " made the diſcovery." This is to treat GOD and man with contempt. The amount of all that he hath ſaid on ſoul and ſpirit, and the mutual influence between it and the body, is, That he neither knows, nor ought to know any thing of the whole affair. One would be apt to think, that ignorance is the ultimate end that he and ſuch writers have in all their ſtudies; while at the ſame time they value themſelves on their ſuperior knowledge to that of the moſt learned and knowing part of mankind. In all their debates with philoſophers, whether Chriſtian, Mahometan, Jewiſh, or religious Heathens, they undertake the *negative*. From ſuch teachers one may unlearn, but he can learn nothing that is worth learning, nothing that tends to GOD's glory, or the good of mankind.

BEFORE I finiſh this article of the immateriality of the ſoul, I am willing to take the aſſiſtance of Dr CUDWORTH, to whom Lord BOLINGBROKE ſhews a greater regard than to Dr CLARKE, or to WOLLASTON. And he ſays, " * The atomic or Democriti- " cal, and the hylozoic or Stratonical, are the chief " forms of Atheiſm. The former of which, the De- " mocritic, admitting a true notion of body, does " therefore conclude, that all life and underſtanding " in animals and men are generated out of dead and

* Intellectual ſyſtem, p. 144.

" ſtupid

" ſtupid matter, as reſulting from the contextures of " atoms, or ſome peculiar compoſition of magnitudes, " figures, ſites, and motions; and conſequently that " they are themſelves really nothing elſe than local " motion and mechaniſm.——But the latter, the hy- " lozoic, on the contrary, think, that life, cogita- " tion, and underſtanding, are entities really diſtinct " from local motion and mechaniſm; and therefore " cannot be generated out of dead and ſtupid matter, " but muſt needs be ſomewhere in the world, *origi-* " *nally*, *eſſentially*, and *fundamentally*. Yet becauſe " they take it alſo for granted, that there is another " ſubſtance beſides matter, do thereupon adulterate " the notion of matter, blending and confounding it " with life, as making them two inadequate concep- " tions of ſubſtance; and concluding, that all matter " and ſubſtance, as ſuch, hath life, perception, and " underſtanding, natural and *inconſcious*, eſſentially " belonging to it; and that ſenſe, or conſcious rea- " ſon and underſtanding in animals, ariſes only from " the accidental modification of this fundamental life " of matter, by organization.

" We conclude therefore, that if theſe two A- " theiſtic hypotheſes, which are found to be the moſt " conſiderable, be once confuted, the reality of all " Atheiſm will be *ipſo facto* confuted." If this conſequence holds, I have good reaſon to ſupport the actual immortality of the ſoul, and ſo hath Mr Mal-

LET,

LET, if you are not an Atheiſt, as well as the poſſibility of it, which he and I admit. The author, I mean Dr CUDWORTH, adds, " There is nothing " more requiſite to a thorough confutation of A- " theiſm, than the proving of theſe two things: *1ſt*, " That life and underſtanding are not eſſential to mat- " ter as ſuch; and, *2dly*, That they can never poſ- " ſibly ariſe out of any mixture or modification of " dead and ſtupid matter whatſoever. The reaſon of " which aſſertion is, becauſe all Atheiſts, as before " obſerved, are mere corporealiſts: of which there " can be but theſe two ſorts; either ſuch as make " life to be eſſential to matter, and therefore to be " ingenerable and incorruptible; or elſe ſuch as ſup- " poſe life, and every thing beſides the bare ſub- " ſtance of matter, or extended bulk, to be merely " accidental, generable and corruptible, as riſing out " of ſome mixture and modification of it. And as " the diſproving of theſe two things will overthrow " all Atheiſm, ſo will it likewiſe lay a clear founda- " tion for demonſtrating a Deity diſtinct from the cor- " poreal world.

" Now, that life, perception, and underſtanding, " ſhould be eſſential to matter as ſuch, or that all " ſenſeleſs matter ſhould be perfectly and infallibly " wiſe, (though without conſciouſneſs), as to all its " own congruities and capabilities, which is the doc- " trine of the Hylozoiſts; this, I ſay, is an hypo-

" theſis ſo prodigiouſly paradoxical, and ſo outrage-
" ouſly wild, that very few men ever could have A-
" theiſtical faith enough to ſwallow it down, and di-
" geſt it: wherefore this hylozoic Atheiſm hath been
" very obſcure ever ſince its firſt emerſion, and hath
" found ſo few fautors and abettors, that it hath look-
" ed like a forlorn and deſerted thing. Neither in-
" deed are there any public monuments at all extant,
" in which it is avowedly maintained, ſtated, and re-
" duced into any ſyſtem; inſomuch that we ſhould
" not have taken notice of it at this time as a parti-
" cular form of Atheiſm, nor have conjured it up out
" of its grave, had we not underſtood that STRATO's
" ghoſt had begun to walk of late; and that, among
" ſome wellwiſhers to Atheiſm, deſpairing in a man-
" ner of the atomic form, this hylozoic hypotheſis
" began already to be looked upon as the riſing ſun
" of Atheiſm."

AND it is becauſe I find his Lordſhip inclined to one or other of theſe Atheiſtical ſyſtems, and ſometimes to both of them, that I have made this, though a long, but I hope no uſeleſs quotation. And to do myſelf and his Lordſhip juſtice, I here tranſcribe what he ſays on both theſe ſyſtems. " * The atomi-
" cal ſyſtem, which LEUCIPPUS took perhaps from
" other philoſophers," (perhaps he would give it greater antiquity than it deſerves), " which DEMO-

* Vol. i. p. 226.

" CRITUS

" CRITUS took from LEUCIPPUS to improve it, and " which EPICURUS took from DEMOCRITUS to cor- " rupt it, hath been revived with great reaſon. But " yet we muſt not talk of matter, as if we knew it in " theſe firſt elements or principles, and abſtractly " from all the forms under which we perceive it." And yet talk he will, and talk he muſt of them abſtractly, if he believes that the atomic philoſophy hath been revived with great reaſon. " Theſe origi- " nal particles, in which the nature of it conſiſts, and " on which the conſtitution of it under all its forms " depends, are far beyond the reach of any analyſe " we can make, of any knowledge we can acquire. " Whether theſe particles be uniform and homogene- " ous, or whether they be of different kinds, and dif- " ferent even in ſubſtance, as well as in ſize, figure, " or other circumſtances or accidents, is as much un- " known to the proudeſt dogmatiſt as to you and to " me. Nay, whether many of theſe original particles " may not be endued with active principles, ſuch, " for inſtance, as cauſe fermentation in ſome, and " coheſion in all" (fermentation diſſolves coheſion) " bodies, is a point which none of them can deter- " mine. And yet one need not ſcruple to ſay, that " the affirmative may be aſſumed on better grounds " than their hypotheſes are, notwithſtanding the re- " peated din of inert, ſenſeleſs, ſtupid, and ſimilar " epithets, which they ring in our ears, whenever " they ſpeak of body and matter. The whole diſ-

" courſe, when they go beyond ſome apparent pro-
" perties, whereof we are fitted to have ideas, and
" which have been already diſcovered, is one conti-
" nued petition of principle."

Now, the atomic and hylozoic philoſophy, which Dr CUDWORTH calls *forms of Atheiſm*, are directly oppoſite to one another; and yet, to ſupport the materiality of the human ſoul, his Lordſhip adopts both. He ſays, that the original particles may be endued with active principles, may be aſſumed on better grounds than the atomic; that is, he prefers the hylozoic to the Democritical philoſophy. He muſt therefore give up his fermentation and ſubtilization, as the foundation or formal cauſe of thought and underſtanding, or rather in itſelf *thought* and *ratiocination*. He acknowledges, that ſome matter is *indeed* inert, ſenſeleſs, and ſtupid, in appearance. If it is *indeed* inert, it muſt be really, and not *apparently* only paſſive. And all matter, except what belongs to the animal kind, is equally inert, ſenſeleſs, and ſtupid. And, notwithſtanding, rather than admit ſpiritual and immaterial ſubſtances, he endeavours to perſuade himſelf and his readers, that many original particles of matter are endued with active principles. I leave it to Mr MALLET to decide the debate between Epicurean and Stratonic matter: for I have nothing to do with ſuch hypotheſes, that deſtroy one another. And indeed what his Lordſhip contends for keenly, deſtroys both;

both; that is, a poſſible ſuperadditional and ſupernatural faculty of thinking divinely beſtowed on ſenſeleſs matter. Matter, in its original particles, is beyond his underſtanding; and "therefore the whole "diſcourſe, when it goes beyond ſome apparent pro-"perties, whereof we are fitted to have ideas, and "which have been already diſcovered, is one conti-"nued petition of principle." This he hath certainly ſpoken againſt his own underſtanding, and the whole ſcheme of a material ſoul. If to go beyond ſome apparent properties of matter, is to beg the queſtion; then he that goes fartheſt, is the boldeſt beggar: and he that beſtows the faculty of thinking on certain modifications of matter, and life and underſtanding on all matter, goes far beyond all thoſe who aſcribe nothing to matter that hath any thing of activity in it.

Dr Cudworth hath ſaid, that "* cogitation "may be conceived without extenſion, as extenſion "may be conceived without cogitation;" (that is, the idea of cogitation); "whereas no mode of any thing "can be conceived without that whereof it is a "mode." And indeed thought or cogitation hath no relation, no affinity, no manner of conceivable connection, neither with the primary nor ſecondary properties of matter; neither with extenſion, ſolidity, impenetrability, or diviſibility; nor with figure, or any

* Intellectual ſyſtem, p. 830.

of

of its ſenſible qualities; nor yet with motion, the only thing in it that bears a reſemblance to activity. Thought is neither thick nor thin, broad nor narrow, long nor ſhort, circular nor angular, neither green nor gray, motion nor reſt; and as little is cogitation either fermentation or coheſion. His Lordſhip, in my opinion, hath unluckily pitched on fermentation, from among all the known properties of matter, as the fountain and ſpring of underſtanding and ratiocination. While things are in a ferment, they are always confuſed and drumly. It may ſerve for an emblem of his own underſtanding, but can no wiſe repreſent the ſource of clear and diſtinct thoughts. If his Lordſhip's ſoul was material, and if its activity conſiſted in fermentation, his philoſophical works are its genuine production. They are full of diſorder, confuſion, perplexity, vain ſtruggling, repugnancy, and contradiction. A dread of an omniſcient, almighty, and juſt judge, is the yeaſt that hath ſet his ſoul a-working.

It was objected, as he obſerves, That "* ſince "thought is not the eſſence of matter, nor any attri- "bute of matter neither, in as much as it does not "flow neceſſarily from that eſſence, it cannot have "been communicated or ſuperadded even by omni- "potence to any ſyſtem of matter, becauſe eſſences "are unchangeable, and attributes incommunicable; "ſo that matter cannot be made to think: for the

* Vol. i. p. 212.

"moment

" moment any ſyſtem begins to think, it ceaſes to be " material; and that which was matter becomes a " ſyſtem of another kind." To which I add, that whatever is naturally inert and inactive, can never become naturally active, cogitative, and rational. If it doth, the nature of it muſt be changed, and cannot therefore remain the ſame thing. And therefore whatever is made to think, cannot be matter; becauſe it is impoſſible for it to be active and purely paſſive at once. To which, after his uſual flouriſh of contemptuous language, he ſays, " Theſe reaſonings a- " mount to no more than this: We metaphyſicians " and ontoſophiſts have fixed the eſſence of matter; " it can be no other than it is repreſented in our ab- " ſtract ideas, thoſe eternal natures independent on " GOD himſelf. If you ſuppoſe it modified or mix- " ed, ſo as to be no longer inert and ſenſeleſs, it is " no more conformable to our ideas; it is therefore " no longer matter, as it came out of the region of " poſſibility into that of actuality."

No man who underſtands metaphyſics ever ſaid, that abſtract ideas are eternal natures, or ſpiritual ſubſtances, as he imagines, or rather as he falſely aſſerts, that ontoſophiſts do. Nature is from *natus* or *naſcendo*, and regularly and commonly denotes ſomething real and actual. He who maintains that the eternity of matter is conſiſtent with the exiſtence of one ſupreme being, the firſt cauſe of all things, as his

his Lordſhip does, may well aſſert that there are *eternal natures independent on GOD himſelf*; but not thoſe who maintain that GOD alone is the only eternal being. It is true, that a queſtion hath ariſen about truth and righteouſneſs, whether they are dependent or independent on GOD's arbitrary appointment. But this queſtion I have already ſtated, and decided *, and will ſay no more on that ſubject. In analyſing the properties of matter, there is no occaſion for abſtraction. The knowledge of them is founded on experience. It is by *phyſics*, or natural philoſophy, which hath body or matter for its object, that the properties and attributes of it are fixed and determined. And naturaliſts, as ontoſophiſts, (for there is no inconſiſtency of theſe two ſciences), may reaſon on theſe fixed properties, and likewiſe reaſon abſtractly. The atomic philoſophy, which he ſays is revived with great reaſon, doth make all matter eſſentially inert and inactive. I would learn from him, (for I cannot learn another way), if any of the moſt eminent improvers of the corporeal ſcience have, in their diſcoveries and experiments, found out any thing inconſiſtent with its *vis inertiæ*, or pure paſſivity. And if this hath not been done, metaphyſicians are as free as the moſt eminent modern naturaliſts, to hold, that matter is naturally ſenſeleſs, inactive, and ſtupid. And I have the aſſurance to conclude, that no piece of matter, great or ſmall, round

* Sect. iii.

or

or ſquare, in motion or in reſt, can be inert and alert, purely paſſive and active, at the ſame time. The paper on which I write was once flax, then linen rags, but cannot be all the three at once. Though body could be changed into ſpirit, which I think is impoſſible, yet it cannot poſſibly be both body and ſpirit at the ſame time. To this he anſwers, with the air of a moſt maſterly teacher, " * Learn, that " human knowledge is derived from exiſtence; and " that to be real, it muſt be conformable to things " as they are. Conform your ideas therefore to " them, and pretend no longer to controul or deter- " mine particular exiſtence by abſtract notions." Though the author ſometimes allows me to extend my reaſoning to poſſibilities, yet in this caſe he confines me to actual exiſtence. And I can ſubmit to his orders; becauſe I do not want abſtraction, to know the properties of matter, whether ſimple or compounded; and to know, that, to the conſtant experience of naturaliſts, paſſivity is one of them. " As " long as matter is ſenſeleſs and inert, it is not a " thinking ſubſtance, nor ought it to be called ſo." So far agreed. " But when, in any ſyſtem of it, theſe " eſſential properties, extenſion and ſolidity, *&c.* " are maintained, the ſyſtem is ſtill material, though " it become a ſenſitive plant, a reaſoning elephant, " or a refining metaphyſician." I take the freedom to ſupply his *&c.* with inertneſs and paſſivity, diviſi-

* Vol. i. p. 219.

bility, reſiſtance, and impenetrability, which are all of them as eſſential to matter as ſolidity and extenſion. And then let him put his own fermented underſtanding to the trial, to make any piece of matter, or compoſition of it, to be active and paſſive, inert and alert, diviſible and indiviſible, at the ſame time. It is true, he ſays, "It is nonſenſe, and ſomething "worſe than nonſenſe, to aſſert, that GOD cannot "give the faculty of thinking, a faculty in the prin-"ciple of it entirely unknown to you, to a ſyſtem "of matter whoſe eſſential properties are ſolidity and "extenſion, *&c.* and not incogitativity." I have no reaſon to think that I ſpeak nonſenſe, and worſe than nonſenſe, when I ſay that contradictions are not in the number of poſſibilities. You aſſert that omnipotence can make matter think, by a ſuperaddition of a new power or faculty, the principle of which is *entirely unknown*. The principle therefore to which this new faculty belongs, is not matter, becauſe it is very well known. If, together with the faculty of thinking, a new principle of it is ſuperadded to matter, it muſt be immaterial. And what do you gain for a material ſoul, by your appeal to omnipotence? I have ſaid before, that ſuperaddition to the nature of matter, doth not change the nature of it. For addition and alteration are not the ſame thing. And tho' I do not admit the term *incogitativity*, yet matter, while matter, is as eſſentially inert and paſſive, as it

is

is extended and ſolid; and cannot be active and inactive at the ſame time.

I freely allow, that the negative term *immaterial* doth not denote the ſubſtance and eſſence of the ſoul. But this ſhould give no offence to Mr MALLET, who maintains that all eſſences are unknown to us. We know indeed more properties belonging to matter, and we can analyſe the idea of it into more attributes, than we can that of the ſoul. And the reaſon is plain. Matter is compounded, and conſiſts of various parts, ſo far as we know it. But the ſoul is a ſimple ſubſtance; and one ſingle and ſimple phenomenon diſcovers as much of the principle of thinking, as all the known properties of matter diſcover of its nature and eſſence. His Lordſhip ſays, "* Our ideas of ſoli- "dity and extenſion do not include the idea of "thought, neither do they include that of motion; "but they exclude neither: and the arguments "which you draw from the diviſibility of matter "againſt its cogitability, which you deny, might not "be ill employed againſt its mobility." I cannot admit, that what is not included in an idea, is not therefore excluded. For it is either comprehended in the idea, or not. If it is comprehended, it is included; and if it is not comprehended, it is excluded. The idea of a triangle takes in all ſorts of triangles, whether plain or ſpherical, and every figure bounded

* Vol. i. p. 220.

by three lines. But this idea does not include either a circular or ſquare form; and therefore excludes them entirely from the conception of every triangular figure. If there is any thing like argument in *including* and not *excluding*, it amounts to no more than this, Becauſe I cannot prove from the extenſion and ſolidity of matter that it is moveable, I ought to admit that matter thinks, though it doth not follow from any of its known and eſſential properties, that it doth. Neither motion nor reſt are inconſiſtent with extenſion, ſolidity, paſſivity, and inertneſs. On the contrary, as poſſible modifications, they are included in the idea of matter. As ſolid, it reſiſts; as it reſiſts, it admits of pulſion; and whenever this pulſive force is ſuperior to the reſiſtance, move it muſt. Matter, beſides its ſolidity and extenſion, is inert, ſtupid, and inſenſible, dead and inactive: but the thinker is active and alive. Were cogitability and mobility equally connected with, and included in the idea of matter, I ſhould allow that matter might be forced to think as well as to move. I affirm poſitively, that the idea of matter doth as certainly exclude the idea of thinking, as the idea of a triangle excludes rotundity, becauſe it is inconſiſtent with ſeveral of its known properties. The thinker is alive, and matter is dead.

Though perhaps the reader may be as weary of the debate as I am, yet I beg his patience to hear his Lordſhip's

Lordſhip's ſtrongeſt reaſon againſt the immateriality of the human ſoul. " * He who affirms, that there is " in the compoſition of the human ſyſtem a ſubſtance " to which cogitability belongs, as well as a ſubject " to which mobility belongs, muſt have ideas of the " firſt of theſe ſubſtances prior in the order of nature " to that of its cogitability, as he has the idea of the " ſecond prior in the ſame order to that of its mobi- " lity; or he muſt talk at random, and affirm what " he doth not know. His ſuppoſed diſtinct ſubſtan- " ces muſt ſink into nothing, or be confounded with " one another. It will coſt a reaſonable mind much " leſs to aſſume, that a ſubſtance known by ſome of " its properties, may have others that are unknown, " and may be capable of various ſyſtems of opera- " tions quite inconceivable by us, according to the " deſigns of infinite wiſdom, than to aſſume, that " there is a ſubſtance concerning which men do not " pretend to know what it is, but what it is not." Reaſoners *a poſteriori* (and ſuch is my author under examination) are ſo fully ſatisfied to know in that method that the thing is, that they declare againſt proceeding any further. And I acknowledge, *that it is*, and *what it is*, are very different, and different ſubjects of inquiry. By reaſoning *a poſteriori*, he finds that matter is extended and ſolid; and I find beſides that it is inert; and though he does not, yet I find that mobility hath a connection with the ſolidity of

* Vol. i. p. 210.

matter.

matter. All that he knows is ſome of its properties, which do not lead him up to the knowledge of its eſſence. And if the property of thinking diſcovers to me a ſubſtantial thinker, I know the nature of this thinker as well as he doth the nature and eſſence of matter. When we ſay, that the ſoul is immaterial, it doth not follow that we know no more, or know nothing about it: for we know beſides, that it is a living and active ſubſtance, a ſubſtance that can command and move the whole human body from one place to another; that it can act upon itſelf by reflection; that it can draw concluſions, and form reſolutions; and by an act of its will put them in execution. All this makes it plain and evident, that the human ſoul, or thinking principle, hath an intrinſic energy, and ſelf-determining power. But this, you think, ſhould be aſcribed to matter, according to the *Stratonic* philoſophy; or to a compoſition of ſome ſelect parts of it, according to the atomic or *Democritical* philoſophy; or to a ſuperaddition of a thinking faculty infuſed into matter, a ſubject of itſelf incapable to receive it. I have already obſerved, that all theſe three ſuppoſitions are inconſiſtent with one another; yet his Lordſhip is willing to accept of them all, rather than ſuppoſe another ſubſtance diſtinct from matter, as the principle of ſuch wonderful phenomena. Of the three hypotheſes, he ſeems to make the Stratonic the laſt ſupport of a material thinker. STRATO's living original particles of matter, particles endued not only

with

with life, but with underſtanding, are either complete animals in themſelves, or become ſuch by addition and multiplication. Leave theſe particles in their original ſtate, you and I, and the whole, would have been, and are but the *minimæ naturæ*. If by addition and multiplication of theſe intelligent particles you are become a poet and philoſopher, you are not one ſingle, individual DAVID MALLET, Eſq; but a ſwarm of little thinkers. You may find, that "it will coſt "your mind leſs to aſſume, that a ſubſtance known "by ſome properties may have others unknown, than "to aſſume a new ſubſtance for every unknown pro-"perty." Theſe are your words, and the ſtrength of your aſylum of a material ſoul. I think an unknown property will never require a known ſubject. And if you did not know the property of thinking, it were needleſs, and even impoſſible, to inquire, whether thinking was a property of body or ſpirit, of a material or immaterial ſubſtance. But now that the property of thinking is known, it cannot be aſcribed to matter, becauſe inconſiſtent with ſeveral other well known eſſential properties of it. And when you aſcribe thinking to matter, you do it in an *inconceivable*, and not ſimply in an *unknown* manner. His Lordſhip's, and your words are, "A ſubſtance known by "ſome of its properties, may have others that are "unknown; and may be capable, in various ſyſtems, "of operations quite inconceivable by us." Theſe are your words, ſuch as they are; and if my reader does

does not underſtand them, you are to be blamed for not expreſſing yourſelf more diſtinctly. All I obſerve, or have occaſion in this place to obſerve, is, that it is your opinion, that it is quite inconceivable that matter doth think. And becauſe I cannot conceive that matter in any ſyſtem is capable of thought and reaſoning, I aſcribe the wonderful phenomenon, not to a material, but to a ſpiritual and immaterial principle and ſubſtance: and ſo ſhould you; for to do otherwiſe, is as inconceivable to you as to me. Wonderful is your averſion to ſpiritual things, when you had rather eſtabliſh the doctrine of the ſoul's materiality upon an inconceivable, and quite inconceivable foundation, than admit there is any other created ſubſtance than matter: for, as hath been obſerved before, you have no more right to deny that there are ſuch immaterial beings, than I have to affirm it. "GOD alone, the author of all beings, knows how "many different kinds of ſubſtances his omnipotent "will hath made to exiſt." And why may not one ſort of ſuch ſubſtances be allowed to animate and inform, to direct and to command the human body, and to be the thinker in mankind? This is not inconceivable; whereas the hypotheſis which you adopt is quite inconceivable, and indeed wrought up through many manifeſt contradictions: and therefore it will coſt a reaſonable mind leſs to aſſume, that this faculty of thinking belongs to a ſpiritual and immaterial, than

than to aſſume that it belongs, in an inconceivable manner, to a material ſubſtance.

To conclude this ſection, I add, by way of APPENDIX, that CUDWORTH is of opinion, that diſproving the Democritical and the Stratonic Atheiſtical hypotheſes, does *ipſo facto* demoliſh all Atheiſm; and it likewiſe lays a clear foundation for demonſtrating a Deity, diſtinct from the corporeal world. To which of theſe purpoſes have you an averſion? The pains taken to diſprove the immateriality of the human ſoul ſhew, that you conſider it as an article entirely inconſiſtent with your ſyſtem of irreligion. And if matter can think, know, and reaſon; then may it know in the higheſt as well as in the loweſt degree. It may be omniſcient; it may be GOD. His Lordſhip and you are profeſſedly and learnedly ignorant of GOD's moral attributes; and as little do ye deſire to know his phyſical and natural perfections. Ye confeſs yourſelves guilty of an unpardonable preſumption, for aſſerting, that "* GOD is not a ſyſtem of matter, be- "cauſe there ariſe from the contrary ſuppoſition a "multitude of abſurdities, that cannot deſtroy the "demonſtration of his exiſtence, but that are incon- "ſiſtent with it." This is ſo much well-connected nonſenſe. Theſe abſurdities that follow from the ſuppoſition that GOD is a material being, he ſays, cannot deſtroy the demonſtration of his exiſtence: but

* Vol. iii. p. 138.

theſe abſurdities, and the exiſtence of GOD, cannot ſtand together, becauſe they are inconſiſtent; and therefore the being of GOD, or his materiality, muſt go, unleſs conſiſtency and inconſiſtency are the ſame. I have reaſon to ſuſpect, that he is not unwilling to part with both. To extenuate the guilt of an unpardonable preſumption, he appeals to the ignorance of ſome fathers of the Chriſtian church of the nature of the divine being, who ſpoke in terms which made him material, at leaſt not immaterial. Theſe fathers ſpake often figuratively; which the author is apt to take in a literal ſenſe, as he does Dr CLARKE's ſaying, that GOD hath a hearty concern for the happineſs of mankind. And if it is impoſſible to conceive what theſe fathers thought of GOD, when they made him neither material nor immaterial; it is as impoſſible to know what you and your author mean, when you ſay, "* GOD is not a ſyſtem of matter; but he is "not therefore a ſpirit, ſuch as we conceive ſpirits "to be." What your notion of ſpirits is, ye yourſelves only know. However, ye admit, that the preſent notion of ſpirits is that of immaterial beings. Between material and immaterial, corporeal and not corporeal, there is no medium. And by this, if ye mean any thing, ye mean, that GOD is neither a material nor immaterial, but an inconſiſtent, inconceivable, and impoſſible being. After aſſuming, as a firſt principle, That "† the only criterion we have where-

* Vol. i. p. 266. † Vol. i. p. 101.

"by

" by to judge of ſpirit, or principle of thinking, is our " own ſpirit;" he hath taken care to let the world know what he takes his own ſpirit to be; that is, matter fermented, ſubtilized, or endued with more or leſs elaſticity, according to the organized body it moves and commands: all which, take it as you will, is but a ſyſtem of matter. And therefore, according to his *only* criterion whereby he judges of ſpirit, GOD is a ſyſtem of matter. When he ſays we *conceive*, if he means his conception of ſpirit, he ſpeaks nonſenſe, when he ſays, that GOD is not a ſyſtem of matter, but he is not therefore a ſpirit, ſuch as we conceive ſpirits to be; for he conceives ſpirit to be nothing but a ſyſtem of matter. All that I can make of his words, and of his meaning, if he means any thing, and which I make with grief and horror, is, that GOD is either a material or an impoſſible being. Perhaps he means, that GOD is a material being, but a ſubſtance of matter far ſuperior to our ſpirit, and of another kind than the matter out of which the human ſoul is made; but ſtill he is material. For if we could divide matter into a thouſand claſſes or *ſpecies*, all would ſtill remain matter, and not ſo much as an atom become immaterial. Whatever he means, it is certain, that he runs himſelf into numberleſs abſurdities, by departing from the common way of thinking and ſpeaking of GOD, and of the ſpirits whereof he is the father. " *Spirit*," he ſays, " is not certainly " an univocal term, becauſe the diſtance between

" God and the higheſt created being is infinite. " Thus we ſhould think and ſpeak of God: but the " men we have to do with, have accuſtomed them- " ſelves to think and ſpeak in the ſame manner, and " in the ſame ſtyle, of the divine and human ſpirit, " with no other difference than that of adding *infinite* " to the one, and *finite* to the other. They conceive " them both to be immaterial beings, and ſubſtances " too." And to keep his infinite diſtance from God in ſpeaking, he ſhould have pointed out ſome other terms than *finite* and *infinite*, as more proper for his purpoſe. If one cannot mend a fault, it is with an ill grace that he pretends to find it. Would you have thoſe men with whom you have to do, deny of God whatever they affirm of created beings? If ſo, you muſt deny that God is a being. And then the diſtance in your conception is as far as ſomething is from nothing. Becauſe you are a ſubſtance, does it follow that he is none? For my part, I ſee no offence that it can give to your pious ears to ſay, that the human ſoul is a ſpirit, and that God is a ſpirit; that you are a ſubſtance, and that God is a ſubſtance; and that God is a being, and you another; that the Almighty is the living God, and you a living animal. And the difference of finite and infinite, created and uncreated, is the moſt proper, and therefore the fitteſt to be uſed. It is good he doth not meddle much with the nature and attributes of the ſupreme Being; for he

he ſeldom does without blundering, as will evidently appear by what I have next to ſay.

Our author Bolingbroke, in ſpeaking of ſpirit, which, as he thinks, hath put mankind mad, ſays, " * The ideas we have of ſome few modes of think-" ing, are as clear as thoſe which we have of num-" berleſs modes of extenſion. So far then we have " a criterion by which to judge of the immaterial " ſpirits we are pleaſed to create. I call them crea-" tures of metaphyſics and theology, becauſe in " truth, conſidered as diſtinct ſubſtances, they are " ſuch. All ſpirits are hypothetical, except the in-" finite ſpirit, the father of ſpirits, the ſupreme Be-" ing." He who would not take on him to deny that there are immaterial created beings, has at laſt found aſſurance to affirm, " that all ſpirits are the " creatures of metaphyſics and theology." That the ſoul and body are diſtinct ſubſtances, I have already determined; and the reaſons I have given, I reſt upon. That we have in our make ſomething that thinks, he admits; and I am ſure, that neither metaphyſicians nor divines have created this thinker, though they indeed judge it to be immaterial. But it is aſtoniſhing that a man of common underſtanding, and a man of one half the author's learning, and who is not an arrant and a profeſſed Atheiſt, ſhould ſay, that *all ſpirits are hypothetical, except the infinite ſpirit,*

* Vol. i. p. 102.

the

the father of ſpirits. This is too plain to paſs, or to be excuſed as a blunder. There are no ſpirits but hypothetical ſpirits, and the ſupreme Being is their father. This can bear no meaning, except that GOD is the chief, the father of imaginary ſpirits, and the grand bull-beggar of mankind. " All ſpirits are the " children of metaphyſics and theology, and GOD is " their father: and if children reſemble the father, " GOD and they muſt be of the ſame ſort."

BY the many advices he gives his readers to ſtop all inquiry concerning the nature and attributes of GOD, and by his own bad ſucceſs, ſo far as he hath attempted it, it appears, that the ALMIGHTY, in his opinion, is a being he neither knows, nor deſires to know. And all this affected Atheiſm and impiety, he covers with a veil of the higheſt eſteem and veneration for his unknown GOD. If the ſubject were not too ſerious and important, one might divert himſelf with what he ſays to ſhew the antiquity of the belief of a material ſupreme being. He ſays, " * The abſurdity of ſuppoſing him of matter, *like* " *other material beings*, was diſcovered, and the no- " tion of a ſpiritual ſubſtance was eſtabliſhed. Whe- " ther this notion was entertained firſt of the ſupreme " Being, and was applied afterwards to the human " ſoul; whether it was entertained firſt of the hu- " man ſoul, and was applied afterwards to the ſu-

* Vol. ii. p. 75.

" preme

" preme Being; or whether the idea of ſpirit and " ſpiritual ſubſtance was determined exactly, either " by ancient philoſophers and Chriſtian fathers, as " we have determined ours; if ever it was, or is as " much determined as we ſuppoſe it to be, I ſhall " not inquire at this time." The Noble author, or rather, nobleman author, gives himſelf and his reader needleſs trouble, about the priority of two errors, the immateriality of the human ſoul, and the immateriality of the ſupreme Being. For if all ſpirits are hypothetical, and the ſupreme Being the father of them, the opinion of their reality, if an error now, muſt have been ſuch from the beginning. That the human ſoul is material, he contends obſtinately; and if the ſpirituality and immateriality of it was firſt eſtabliſhed, and if from that eſtabliſhed error, the immateriality of the ſupreme Being followed, theſe two opinions are both of them alike errors. And if from the immateriality of the ſupreme Being, the immateriality of the human ſoul was eſtabliſhed as a conſequence, and if this conſequence is falſe, as he contends, ſo muſt the antecedent be. And, to ſpeak my opinion, unleſs the phenomena of our own minds convince us of its immateriality, we can never arrive at a certainty that GOD is not a material being. And my author having embraced the opinion of the materiality of the human ſoul, he is of conſequence led to make GOD a kind of material being likewiſe. He ſays, " It is abſurd to ſuppoſe

" the

" the ſupreme Being to be matter," but with this limitation, *like other material beings*. Material beings are ſo many and various, that few of them are in every thing alike. His Lordſhip's ſoul and a pebble are both of them material, and both of them very different. So far then, and for all that he hath ſaid, GOD may be a material being, though different from many other material beings, and from all the material beings which we know. And this I conceive to have been his opinion, or what he intended ſhould paſs for his opinion; becauſe, as I have juſt now obſerved, he affirms that it doth not follow, that GOD is a ſpirit, from his not being a ſyſtem of matter. I leave it to the reader's judgment, whether or not he doth not aſcribe the immateriality of human ſouls, and of the ſupreme Being, to the prevalence of imagination over all our rational faculties. His words are, " * One may think that nothing can ſhew " ſo marvellouſly the wanderings of the human mind, " and the prevalence of the imagination over all the " rational faculties, as this inveterate habit of dog- " matizing about ſpirit and ſpiritual things, and even " about GOD, the father of ſpirits." We are conſcious that we have ſome knowledge and ſome power; and, notwithſtanding, he contends obſtinately that we are but a ſyſtem of matter. And why may not he aſcribe all knowledge and all power to a material ſyſtem infinitely tranſcending ours? for it depended

* Vol. ii. p. 79.

on

on his own imagination to make of matter whatever he pleaſed. It is an obſervation made by Dr CUDWORTH, and with which I began this ſection, That no man who acknowledged a GOD, ever denied the immateriality of the ſoul. And I may be allowed to ſay, that no man who makes the human ſoul material, can have ſufficient and demonſtrative reaſon to believe that GOD is an immaterial being.

I did obſerve already, that to make matter co-eternal with GOD, (and poſtponed the conſideration of it), was to weaken the argument for his neceſſary exiſtence. For whatever is eternal cannot depend on any other being for its exiſtence. It never began to be; it always was; and therefore, as to its being and exiſtence, it muſt be as independent on GOD, as GOD is independent on all things. A co-eternity of GOD and matter, were to eſtabliſh the doctrine of two independent beings: than which nothing can be more abſurd. For whatever exiſts independently and eternally, muſt exiſt neceſſarily, or it could not exiſt at all. But two ſuch beings are impoſſible; becauſe, as they are eternally independent on one another, they might ſubſiſt, the one without the other, and ſo neither would exiſt neceſſarily. Not to repeat what I have ſaid to this purpoſe, I refer my reader to the *Eſtimate* *. How his Lordſhip is warranted to ſay, " † Though the univerſe were conceived to be eter-

* P. 201. † Vol. v. p. 73.

" nal, it could not be conceived *ſelf-exiſtent*," is to me inconceivable. For whatever exiſts eternally, muſt exiſt independently and neceſſarily, and muſt be *ſelf exiſtent*, if any being is ſuch.

I learn from Dr CUDWORTH, that " * ſome " Theiſts perſuade themſelves, that the matter " and ſubſtance at leaſt (if not the form alſo) of the " corporeal world did exiſt from eternity; yet, ne- " verthelefs, they both alike proceeded from the " Deity, by way of emanation, and do continually " depend upon it, in the ſame way as light, though " co-eval with the ſun, yet proceeds from the ſun, " and depends upon it." I cannot ſay that this is his Lordſhip's opinion. For I believe he was not ſo ſtupid as not to ſee, that all emanations from the Deity muſt be divine; for they cannot be conſidered as the effects of his arbitrary will and good pleaſure. And this the compariſon with the ſun and the light doth confirm. For the light is not the effect, but a part of the ſun ſcattered in particles, which continually flow from it. It is true, that ſome talk of an eternal effect of an eternal cauſe, (and I think the author ſomewhere does). But this is a contradiction in the plaineſt terms; becauſe every effect hath a beginning. And though GOD is an eternal being, yet he was not actually a cauſe until he created the univerſe. The divine attributes are ſome of them *rela-*

* Intellectual ſyſtem, p. 84.

tive,

tive, and others *abſolute*. The relative are ſuch as, Creator, Governor, Preſerver, and Judge; for they ſuppoſe the Creator's property in them. GOD's abſolute attributes are, ſelf exiſtence and ſufficiency, eternity, power, knowledge, juſtice, goodneſs, and truth, and all other eſſential perfections, without which the Deity cannot be conceived. I do not blame his Lordſhip for aſſerting directly the contrary. For he holds, that all other beings beſides GOD owe their being to his omnipotent will. But whether this is conſiſtent with the eternity and independency of matter, I leave to the reader, and to DAVID MALLET, Eſq; to determine.

BEFORE I conclude this ſection, I cannot omit what Dr CUDWORTH hath ſaid on the ſubject *. "The true and proper idea of GOD, in the moſt "reſtricted form, is this, *A being abſolutely perfect*: "for this is that alone to which neceſſary exiſtence "is eſſential, and of which it is demonſtrable. Now, "as abſolute perfection includes all that belongs to "the Deity, ſo doth it not only comprehend (be-"ſides neceſſary exiſtence) perfect knowledge and "underſtanding, but alſo omni-cauſality, or omni-"potence in the full extent of it. GOD is not only "the beſt living being, or the moſt powerful of all "things, as ſome materiarian Theiſts deſcribed him," (and ſuch as his Lordſhip means by the ſupreme Be-

* Intellectual ſyſtem, p. 200.

ing), "but as abſolutely omnipotent and infinitely "powerful; and therefore neither matter, nor any "thing elſe, can exiſt independently on GOD; but "he is the ſole principle and ſource from which all "things are derived:" not neceſſarily, or by way of emanation. As the *effluvia*, or imperceptible perſpiration in human bodies, doth not depend on the human will, but is a conſequence of our vital conſtitution; no more do GOD's works proceed naturally from his eſſence or being; and therefore muſt be the effect of his will and good pleaſure. In my opinion, ſcarce any hypotheſis can be more abſurd, than that which makes GOD, or the firſt and beſt living being, and the moſt powerful of all things, as materialiſts ſpeak, no more than a neceſſary or material agent: for ſuch a being cannot be ſaid to act at all. The ſun enlightens and warms the habitation of men, but it hath not in itſelf the power of directing or ſuſpending the emanations of light or heat. Were it thus with the ſupreme Being, other beings, which are free and voluntary agents, ſuch as DAVID MALLET, would be the more noble being of the two. And as the effect cannot be more perfect than the cauſe, DAVID cannot owe his reaſon and underſtanding, his freedom and diſpoſal of his inherent powers and faculties, to any being who is not himſelf a free and voluntary agent. From all which I may conclude, that a being from which nothing but involuntary emanations flow, can neither be the creator, preſerver,

nor

nor governor of the world, and conſequently cannot be even Lord BOLINGBROKE's GOD, who is wiſe and powerful; *alias*, the grand bull-beggar of the children of men, or of men who, in underſtanding and fortitude, are no more than children.

SECT.

SECT. XII.

Of the immortality of the human ſoul, and a future ſtate.

AS his Lordſhip left the queſtion about particular providences, and that of the immateriality of the human ſoul, ſeemingly undetermined; ſo he makes the queſtion about a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments problematical. For he ſays, "* Reaſon "will neither deny nor affirm that there is to be a "future ſtate; and the doctrine of rewards and pu- "niſhments in it has ſo great a tendency to inforce "civil laws, and to reſtrain the vices of men, that "reaſon, which cannot decide for it on principles of "natural theology, will not decide againſt it on prin- "ciples of good policy. Let this doctrine reſt on the "authority of revelation. A Theiſt who doth not "believe the revelation, can have no objection to the "doctrine in general: and even a Theiſt who doth "believe the revelation, may refuſe to admit the "doctrine on the principles on which it is uſually "eſtabliſhed by divines." But this profeſſed neutrality, and his ſkill in politics, do not hinder him to direct all his reaſonings againſt a future ſtate. The inequality in the diſtribution of temporal good and evil, hath from time immemorial been made a ſufficient

* Vol. iv. p. 311.

foundation

foundation for a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments.

AGAINST this way of reaſoning his Lordſhip undertakes two things. *1ſt*, "* The diſpenſations of "providence in the diſtribution of good and evil ſtand "in no need of any hypotheſis to juſtify them;" and, *2dly*, "If they did, that of a future ſtate would "be inſufficient." All the arguments uſed for a future ſtate, the author at once dignifies with the epithet of ſophiſms †. But this is owing to the impertinence of his logics: an eminent inſtance of which is juſt at hand. For tho' the reaſonings for a future ſtate are at leaſt regular, yet they may not be juſt. The premiſſes may be ill founded, and therefore may be denied, or diſproved. But upon ſuppoſition of their regularity, they cannot be eſteemed captious and ſophiſtical. And upon this ſuppoſition, that the reaſonings are regular, he enters into an examination of them, and repreſents them in theſe words: "‖ If "there is not a future ſtate, GOD is neither good nor "juſt, according to our ideas of goodneſs and juſtice, "in his diſpenſations; if he is not good and juſt ac"cording to our ideas of theſe moral attributes, nei"ther can the phyſical attributes, ſuch as infinite wiſ"dom and power, belong to him; and a being which "hath none of theſe, is not a GOD. *But there is a "future ſtate.*" Had he underſtood *l'art de penſer*,

* Vol. iv. p. 311. † Vol. iv. p. 207. ‖ Vol. iv. p. 312.

put

put into his hands when he was young, he would not have put a ſubſumption in place of a concluſion: for ſo do his words ſtand. That which religioniſts intend to prove, is a future ſtate; and as a medium, they make uſe of the divine attributes: but as he miſerably and ignorantly repreſents the argument, he makes the divine attributes the point to be proved, and a future ſtate to be the *medium*. If I ſhould ſay, that this is a fraudulent miſrepreſentation, the accuſation would not be more unjuſt than many with which he charges as good men, and better reaſoners than himſelf. They reaſon, that there muſt be a future ſtate, becauſe GOD is holy; and he makes them ſay, that GOD is holy, becauſe there is a future ſtate, that he may with the more aſſurance aſſert, "that divines have dared to "argue, and I am juſtified in ſaying, that they be-"tray the cauſe of GOD to the Atheiſt, when they "join with him in ſo many points, that nothing re-"mains to be oppoſed to him in defence of GOD's ex-"iſtence, but the problematical and futile reaſonings "they employ to prove a future ſtate." Poor reaſoner! I had almoſt ſaid contemptible. If the premiſſes do not bear the concluſion, muſt the diſputant therefore renounce them? And upon ſuppoſition that the religioniſt doth not make out a future ſtate, is he therefore obliged to deny the being of GOD? This may be his Lordſhip's meaning, and very likely it is. May not the religioniſt, with the ſame right which the author pretends to uſe, let the concluſion remain problematical?

blematical? It is generally eſtabliſhed as a maxim, That matter neither doth, nor can be made to think and reaſon; and if from this I ſhould conclude, that DAVID MALLET neither thinks nor reaſons, becauſe he is entirely material, I am ſure he would deny the maxim on which my concluſion is founded. That he thinks and reaſons, ſtands in need of no proof. The point then to be diſcuſſed is, Whether the human ſoul, and DAVID's in particular, is material or immaterial? In favour of the maxim, That matter doth not reaſon, I muſt conclude, and think it a juſt concluſion, that his ſoul is immaterial. Nor hath he ſuch grounds to deny as I have to affirm that it is: for he and his author do not take on them to deny that there are created immaterial beings. And he hath ſaid, in the preſent caſe, that *reaſon will neither deny nor affirm that there is a future ſtate.* And how then can religioniſts, who maintain a future ſtate as agreeable to the divine moral attributes, be ſaid to betray the cauſe of GOD to the Atheiſt? Such are the vain and confounded effects of a fermented underſtanding. Whatever riſk religion may run by maintaining a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, the world can be no greater loſer by it, than gainers by his Lordſhip's philoſophy. He is himſelf a mere material ſyſtem, made for a momentary life: his GOD is neither good nor juſt, according to any idea that we can form of goodneſs and juſtice: his GOD neither regards what he does, nor what he ſuffers, as being perſonally be-

low his providence: that a life to come is but at beſt an uſeful fable: and if it is not a fable, he and every other wicked and impious man are perfectly ſafe; becauſe GOD is an all-perfect being, and will deal with him and them according to the perfections of his own nature, and not according to the imperfections of poor DAVID MALLET, Eſq; in particular. And in all this ſcheme, is there any principle, any reaſon contained, why the ſaid poor DAVID MALLET ſhould be a better man than an Atheiſt?

THE ſame DAVID MALLET makes his Lordſhip ſay, That "* no doctrines were ever inculcated more "ſtrongly in the minds of men, nor inforced by more "authority, than thoſe of a future ſtate. The inſti-"tutors of religion, and the prieſts of theſe religions, "were careful to eſtabliſh and maintain them in be-"lief." The author, I hope inadvertently, makes all religion a human inſtitution; and from this inadvertency he reaſons conſequentially, when he makes a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments a human invention. I ſay, this is to reaſon conſequentially: for if this doctrine of a future ſtate is taken away, there is no ſuch thing as religion left. It is no wonder, then, that much pains are taken to maintain this doctrine, and juſt as much as to maintain religion. I am very well convinced, that, without the belief of a future ſtate of retribution, religion, and the belief of

* Vol. iv. p. 346.

Lord

Lord BOLINGBROKE's GOD, would be of no uſe to mankind, either in a ſingle or ſocial ſtate. He hath ſaid, that " * the belief of future rewards and pu- " niſhments was *very neceſſary*, and could not fail to " have *ſome* effect on the manners of men, to encou- " rage virtue, and to reſtrain vice." Now, if the belief of future rewards and puniſhments is not only neceſſary, but *very neceſſary*, it muſt not only have ſome effect, but a proportionable effect on the manners of men. Take this belief away, and there is nothing left to hinder a man from doing for himſelf, and for his temporal eaſe and advantage, whatever he can do ſafely. It is not at all therefore ſurpriſing, " that ſome at this day ſcruple not to declare, that if " this doctrine is taken away, all difference between " good and bad is taken away, and there is no ſuch " thing as religion left †." Though *juſt* and *unjuſt*, eſſentially, and eternally, and independently of divine appointment, differ, as hath been fully proved; yet this difference brings no man under a formal obligation to ſacrifice himſelf, and all his enjoyments and expectations, for the ſake of this his ſpeculative knowledge. And, according to his Lordſhip's doctrine, he hath nothing to fear from GOD for chuſing his temporal happineſs, (and he expects nothing beyond this life), becauſe he is an individual, and as ſuch below the care and inſpection of divine providence. As ſuch he is an extraprovidential being, whoſe doings and

* Vol. iv. p. 207. † Vol. iv. p. 346.

whoſe ſufferings are entirely indifferent to his Deity. If it is a matter of ſurpriſe, according to his Lordſhip, it muſt be in favour of the ſincerity and integrity of MOSES, " * that a doctrine ſo uſeful in all " religions, and therefore incorporated into all the " ſyſtems of Paganiſm, is left wholly out of that " of the Jews." And I am no leſs ſurpriſed with his ignorance: for that MOSES taught, and the Jews believed, the doctrine of a future ſtate, I have already made appear from the inſtance of ENOCH's tranſlation. And is it not ſtill more ſurpriſing, that one who makes profeſſion of ſome ſort of religion, and ſkill in politics, ſhould labour hard to prove, that this doctrine, ſo uſeful to mankind, and incorporated into all ſyſtems of religion, is only a fable and fiction, of pure human invention. And though " † legiſlators and " magiſtrates have, for political purpoſes, authoriſed " the ſame doctrines, ſolemnized them by religious " inſtitutions, confirmed them by laws, and ſet edu- " cation, the great nurſe of theological opinions, on " their ſide," (to excuſe his contempt of this their wiſdom, or of their real belief, he adds, though theſe were great advantages), " we do not find that this " doctrine ever had an effect ſuitable to it, or to the " importance of it." But this he alleviates, by adding, " that remote conſiderations, though they are " believed, have not the ſame influence which im- " mediate objects have; but they have an influence

* Vol. iv. p. 207. † Vol. iv. p. 347.

" proportionable

" proportionable to the belief of them, eſpecially in " a caſe like this, where the puniſhments held out are " unavoidable; and no man can hope, as every man " does in all other caſes, to eſcape them." It cannot be denied, that men are very ingenious in finding out expedients to reconcile their religious principles with their immoral practice; and ſometimes, with great ſucceſs, they plead in favour of their luſts and paſſions what would always ſtop them in the proſecution of temporal things. To convince a man, that if he proceeds in the execution of ſome ſuch views, he will certainly repent his doings, infallibly hinders him: but with reſpect to another life, his repentance (without which there is no pardon) is often his only encouragement to undertake and to purſue his luſtful purpoſes. This diſorder of mind is not to be accounted for, but by that general diſorder of the human race taught in the ſacred records of the Chriſtian religion.

THAT men are governed by their paſſions and appetites, and not by their principles, hath been maintained by Mr BAYLE; and I have already made my remarks on this his doctrine. But this nobleman of an author, after many declarations made for the utility and neceſſity of religion for the ſupport and government of ſociety, as hath been before obſerved, ſhould not ſay, and cannot ſay, without contradicting himſelf, that it never had an effect ſuitable to the

importance

importance of it. Though many who really believe a life of rewards and punishments when this life is ended, do not act on all occasions suitably to such a persuasion; I am convinced, that numbers are ready to forfeit any temporal advantages, and even their lives, rather than forfeit their glorious hopes, and incur the displeasure of their GOD in a future state. Martyrdom his Lordship may, and does reckon madness: but no man is, or can be admitted a member of society on lower terms than the loss of life when justice due to the society, and his implicit engagement, require it. What an ill man was Lord BOLINGBROKE, and what an ill, or rather what a worse man is DAVID MALLET, Esq; to write and publish, in their mother-tongue, such impious and injurious tenets as tend to their own, and the ruin of mankind, to banish the fear of GOD from the earth, and to dissolve society, only that they may live as they list, and die like the beasts?

AND the more unreasonable both of them are: for they do not say, "* that to believe a future state, "is to believe a vulgar error;" but this they say, that "it cannot be demonstrated by reason. It is not "in the nature of it capable of demonstration. It "was therefore originally an hypothesis, and may "therefore be a vulgar error." Whether it is an error or not, neither the author nor the publisher know.

* Vol. iv. p. 248.

But

But I know, that if it is an error, it is a moſt wonderful error; an error, if not co-eval with mankind, at leaſt of the greateſt antiquity and univerſality. When none returned from the ſtate of death, nor any animal, (if ſome inſects may be excepted), how could it come into the minds of men, that death was but a paſſage from this to another life? All the phenomena of nature were againſt this ancient and univerſal opinion. It is wonderful, I ſay, at any rate; but ſtill more wonderful, had men ſtarted into being, or grown out of the earth like muſhrooms. But this wonder ceaſes, by ſuppoſing man to be made an intelligent creature by an infinitely-wiſe Creator, who is himſelf a ſpirit, and the Father of our ſpirits, who taught man his duty, and the conſequence of performing or neglecting it.

I know for certain, that the belief of a future ſtate is as ancient, as univerſal, and as uſeful, and as neceſſary, as religion. And his Lordſhip admits, that it is not only neceſſary, but *very neceſſary*; and ſo neceſſary, that there can be no ſociety nor government without it. And if ſociety is natural, ſo muſt all the means, without which it cannot ſubſiſt, be natural likewiſe. Was this then an hypotheſis made by ſome Egyptian legiſlator? Not by a prieſt, for prieſthood muſt have been poſterior to religion. I ſhould rather believe, the neceſſity of religion, abſtracting from its being directly taught by GOD, and particularly a future

ture ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, forced itſelf into the minds of men. To ſhew the utility, neceſſity, and truth of religion, I have already publiſhed my thoughts largely *. Of all which I only tranſcribe theſe words †.

" THOUGH I ſhould admit, that the eſſential difference between moral good and moral evil, while " the mind is affected with it, is a principle as ſtrong " as ſelf-preſervation; and that all the motives for " being virtuous and honeſt, and the motives for preſerving one's ſelf, juſt balance one another; the " caſe then would be a continual irreſolution, or a " perpetual contradiction. For this cauſe the debate " about *utile* and *honeſtum* was firſt ſtarted, and continued from beyond the days of SOCRATES until " now, and will continue for ever undecided, according to the Atheiſtical hypotheſis. Between unanſwerable arguments on both ſides of a queſtion, there " always lies ſome unknown truth, in which theſe unanſwerable and contradictory reaſons muſt centre. " And in the preſent caſe, it is the belief of GOD " and his providence; for this concluſion the debate " will bear: for, by our make and conſtitution, virtue and honeſty is to us good and eligible. That " our happineſs is our chief end, and that we are wiſe " enough to conſult it, is certain beyond debate. And " therefore there muſt be ſufficient proviſion in ex-

* Eſtimate, § ix. x. xi. † Sect. x. p. 365.

" pectation

" pectation for the happineſs of thoſe who chuſe to " act the virtuous and reaſonable part. This the " great, the omniſcient, the juſt, and the almighty " GOD, the ſupreme and ſovereign being of the " univerſe, can only do. And this certainly he will " do, if man is not a compoſition of contradictions. " There is no contradiction in nature. We are told " by our reaſon, that we ought to act virtuouſly; and " the ſame reaſon tells us, that we ought to act for " our own happineſs. How eaſy, how natural, and " how comfortable then is it to conclude, that there " is a GOD, whoſe kingdom is univerſal and everlaſt- " ing, who will make all the virtuous actions of a rea- " ſonable man turn out to his happineſs, either here " or hereafter?

" OUR intereſt and our reaſon, our honeſty and " our happineſs, *honeſtum* and *utile*, are two colla- " teral pillars ſupporting human conduct, and reli- " gion is the baſis of both. The natural fitneſs of " things, and the intrinſic rectitude of virtue, is not " the firſt and original obligation of all. For, properly " ſpeaking, it is no obligation; and if it were, and " whatever force it might have, our own happineſs " and preſervation hath at leaſt an equal, and ſome- " times an oppoſite force. Separately, theſe forces " act againſt one another. Intereſt and honeſty in " this life, in many caſes are irreconcilable; and it " is hard for a reaſonable man to part with either.

" Here his reaſon leaves him, by becoming uſeleſs. " And if he retains it, it is to his trouble and diſ- " quiet. The brutal ſpecies of beings, by their " conſtitution, are regularly over-ruled by their in- " ſtinct of ſelf-preſervation, without any obſtruction " from the philoſophy of *right* and *wrong*, or the " diſtinction betwixt *utile* and *honeſtum*. If the A- " theiſt, like the beaſt, is to be eternally diſſolved " into the duſt, he muſt be at a loſs when his reaſon " reſtrains him from the immediate uſe of every " means that tends to the preſervation of his being. " More miſerable than the beaſt muſt that man be, " when his nobleſt faculties become troubleſome and " vexatious! If one eye repreſents a plain, and the " other repreſents it a precipice, both become uſe- " leſs, and not only uſeleſs, but perplexing to the " traveller. This is his caſe, who ſees the ſame " thing to be reaſonable and ruinous, to be good and " eligible in itſelf, but to him dreadful and deſtruc- " tive. But put the force and influence of virtue " and advantage, like two weights in the ſame ſcale, " and they become ſufficient to overbalance the " ſtrongeſt and the moſt unruly paſſions of human " nature.

" This conjunction is only made, and eaſily made, " and always made, in religion. He that ſeparates " *utile* from *honeſtum*, and virtue from happineſs, " has as little knowledge of the make of the human " mind,

" mind, as he hath of the make of the human body,
" who is for cutting off one leg, that the man may
" ſtand the firmer upon the other. We have no rea-
" ſon then to renounce religion and a mercenary mo-
" rality, as libertines call obedience to GOD, and
" the expectation of happineſs, to learn of them ge-
" neroſity, brotherly love, and all ſocial duties and
" virtues. For by how much more religious any
" man is, the better man, and the better member
" of ſociety is he."

I might here put an end to the diſpute concerning a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments; but that Mr MALLET, and ſuch as he, may not triumph in their objections as unanſwerable, I chuſe to follow his Lordſhip and him as far as they go. That all rational beings are eſſentially free agents, I have elſewhere proved*; and this my author, and Mr MALLET for him, do admit. For they expreſsly ſay, that " † GOD, when he gave us reaſon, left us
" to our free will, to make a proper or an improper uſe
" of it. So that we are obliged to our Creator for a
" certain rule, and ſufficient means of arriving at
" happineſs; and have none to blame but ourſelves
" when we fail of it. It is not reaſon, but perverſe
" will, that makes us fall ſhort of *attainable* happi-
" neſs. The rule is certain, and the means ſo ſuf-
" ficient, that they who deviate from them are ſelf-

* Eſſimate, § ii. † Vol. iv. p. 392.

" condemned." But from this rule, and these means, all men do deviate, some more, and some less. This rule, and these means, are bestowed on man by his Creator; and it is therefore his will and pleasure, and consequently his law, that we follow the rule, and use the means. And as there can be no law without a sanction, this sanction may be immediately executed, or it may be delayed. That sentence against every evil work is not speedily executed, no man will deny. It may therefore be delayed; and, for all that can be remarked to the contrary, it is postponed till after death; and if it is not executed then, the sanction is vain, and so is the law: than which there cannot be greater blasphemy.

WELL, saith the author, they are punished here. By their own fault they fall short of happiness, and are self-condemned. That they are self-condemned, I do admit. But this self-condemnation doth not make void the law of GOD, by which they were bound to obedience, nor annul the sanction of it. It is rather an homologation of the law, and of the sanction of it, than the punishment of transgressing it. And it is nothing but the fear of merited punishment, that makes self-condemnation so very severe and smarting. Without such troublesome apprehensions, criminals would be, and generally they are, as happy as other men, or as any Atheist in the world. And as far as the course of nature, and the ordinary state of things,

things, and the common ſtandard of human affairs, permit, he hath his ſhare, and a very large allowance, of all the happineſs that is to be found in this life. It hath been obſerved by an ancient Jewiſh writer, that * *the wicked are not in trouble as other men: neither are they plagued like other men.——Their eyes ſtand out with fatneſs: they have more than heart could wish.——And they ſay, How doth GOD know? and is there knowledge in the Moſt High? Behold, theſe are the ungodly, who proſper in the world.* And if it was not his Lordſhip's, and if it is not Mr MALLET's caſe, it is the caſe of many wicked, and even of the worſt of men. The deſires of mankind are various; and what every man deſires moſt, muſt be his chief happineſs when obtained. And wonderful is their choice. The Arabian in his tent, the Tartar in his car, and the ſavage in his hut, are all of them happy, in ſo far as they enjoy what they deſire. And he who ſets his heart upon worldly pleaſures and enjoyments, is in a fairer way of being happier in this life, than the moſt moral and religious perſon; his glorious hopes, which often fill his ſoul with joy unſpeakable, excepted. Mr MALLET, who hath nothing to fear, and nothing to hope after death, may be as eaſy in the practice of vice as in the practice of virtue, juſt as his doings in either caſe turn out to his temporal advantage. But he may allow others to think that a woful futurity awaits him,

* Pſalm lxxiii.

or

or GOD hath given him no law, or he hath left it to his diſcretion, either to obey or to break it. On ſuch a ſuppoſition, GOD diveſts himſelf of his ſovereignty, in order to confer on his worthleſs creature the ſole diſpoſal of himſelf. How happy muſt that man be in his own conceit, who imagines himſelf in ſuch ſtate? But O how unhappy, if after this life he finds himſelf to have miſtaken the great buſineſs of his being! And he is neither ſure, nor can be ſure; and he ſays he is not ſure *.

" † NOTHING," ſay both the author and the publiſher, " ſeems more natural to man, than to " live without reſtraint or fear;" deſirable to the wicked it may be, but it is not natural; " and yet " how ready were the multitude in the Pagan world to " embrace the hope of immortality, though it was ac- " companied with the fear of damnation?" And he ſays, " ‖ Strange vanity! They aſſume themſelves to " be expoſed to eternal damnation, and the reſt of man- " kind to be almoſt entirely damned, rather than not " aſſume that their ſouls are immortal." And again, " ** They who giving man immortality, expoſed " him to eternal damnation by it, were fondly re- " ceived." This, no doubt, the author thought fine ſaying, ſince he ſays it ſo often. It was highly deſirable to him, to live without reſtraint from the

* Vol. iv. p. 398.
† Vol. iv. p. 20[illegible].
‖ Vol. i. p. 273.
** Vol. iii. p. 135.

law

law of GOD, and fear of the ſanction. How vain muſt he think thoſe who hope for a happy immortality? And how humble is he whoſe deſires have led him to hope and to believe, that as an individual he lives independently on GOD in this world, and hath nothing to fear in another? But how the belief of the immortality of the ſoul can expoſe any one to damnation, is not to be conceived. The doctrine is at leaſt problematical; and if there is any danger in believing it, the danger muſt be vaſtly greater in disbelieving it. And whereas the belief of the ſoul's immortality tends to promote a regular, a reaſonable, and a religious life, and the disbelief of it leaves the man without reſtraint from vice, and inducement to virtue, the danger is wholly on the ſide of disbelief. It is true, that he who believes a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, fears more than he who does not. But what does he fear? He fears to offend GOD, and he fears to tranſgreſs his law, the law and dictate of right reaſon. And *the fear of the Lord is to depart from evil*. It is not then the belief, but the disbelief of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, that expoſes men to damnation.

WITHOUT the apprehenſion of danger there can be no precaution. I acknowledge, that ſometimes the means uſed to prevent danger may be more troubleſome than the dreaded evil would be, did it happen: but this is not the caſe of thoſe who endeavour to prepare

pare themſelves for a trial before the tribunal of the great Sovereign and Judge of mankind. Upon the hypotheſis of natural religion, (for I do not ſpeak of revelation), all that GOD requires of man, is, that he ſhould live and act according to the dictates of right reaſon. And ſuch a life, and ſuch a conduct, is the only means that can procure happineſs in this world, as his Lordſhip often allows and aſſerts. The belief, then, of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, inſtead of occaſioning trouble to the man of ſuch a perſuaſion, and who lives up to this principle and perſuaſion, makes him happy here, and frees him from all fears of unhappineſs hereafter. And who would exchange ſuch thoughts, and ſuch a ſituation of mind, ſuch eaſe and comfort of life, for Lord BOLINGBROKE's uncertainty of a future ſtate; or for a perſuaſion, that both here and hereafter (if there is an hereafter) every individual is below the providence and care of the Deity? His Lordſhip uſes great freedom in beſtowing the character of madneſs on thoſe who differ from him: and I may be allowed to ſay, that he is neither wiſe nor virtuous, who thinks it a hardſhip to live a reaſonable life, and a happineſs to be free from all inducements and reaſons to do ſo.

BUT, ſay they, it is man's own fault if he fails in acquiring happineſs; and is not this ſanction ſufficient, without any future fears or expectations? It is not ſo in the preſent and ſuppoſed caſe: for it is poſſible

ſible that a wicked man may be happy enough in this life, by being ſucceſsful in all the elections he makes, of whatever kind they are. Were it his choice to live without reſtraint put on him by the law and dictates of right reaſon, he is happy if he ſucceeds. He hath his choice, he hath his wiſh, and more he cannot deſire; and he who hath all that he can deſire, muſt be happy. But this happineſs doth not exceed that of a beaſt. A mind capable of nobler and higher enjoyments, muſt be brought very low, in order to be content with ſuch mean attainments. Happy for ſuch they had never heard, never thought of a future ſtate; and happy for them not to know the difference between right and wrong, vice and virtue; and happy to know no more of their maker and maſter than the beaſts of the field. And ſuch a ſtate ſuits as ill the make of the human mind, as a bull's head would become a human body. Without future hopes of happineſs, and without an aſſurance of the goodneſs and mercy of GOD, ſuch muſt be the caſe, and even the happieſt condition of mankind. Better it were for an Atheiſt to be an irrational, than a rational animal; to have no thoughts at all about futurity, and dependence on GOD, and of his being a moral and an accountable ſubject of his government, than to have only ſuch thoughts as are vexatious and troubleſome. It is not in the power of man to ſuppreſs all ſurmiſes of his being accountable to GOD, here or hereafter, for all his tranſgreſſions of the law of right reaſon; no

more than it is in his power to change his nature, and become a beaſt. It is therefore both natural and neceſſary for us to be perſuaded, that GOD, who hath made us reaſonable and accountable creatures, will bring mankind to account either here or hereafter. It is true, if GOD ſhould exert all his right and power to puniſh ſinners, the thoughts of a future judgment muſt be terrible, and even diſtracting to all mankind: but all that believe in GOD, whichever way it came to paſs, believe, that as he is juſt, ſo he is good and merciful. A Jewiſh poet hath ſaid, * *If thou, Lord, ſhouldſt mark iniquities, O Lord, who ſhall ſtand? But there is forgiveneſs with thee, that thou mayſt be feared.* And, † *Bleſſed is he whoſe tranſgreſſion is forgiven, whoſe ſin is covered. Bleſſed is the man unto whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity.*

HIS Lordſhip hath exerted his utmoſt ſtrength and reach of invention, to prove, that the evils which befal mankind in general are but few, and thoſe avoidable or ſupportable; and that if they are neither one nor the other, we and our habitation is ſo ſmall a point in the univerſe, and of ſo little account in the ſight of GOD, that the very beſt of men have no reaſon to complain of their lot in this world, even though there ſhould not be another.

I acknowledge, that I cannot argue ſo ſtrongly for

* Pſal. cxxx. 3. 4. † Pſal. xxxii. 1. 2.

the

the remuneration of the good and virtuous, as for the puniſhment of the wicked and vitious, in another life. For as a Chriſtian I believe, and ſo may he that is but a Deiſt, that all have ſinned, and come ſhort of rendering obedience, adoration, and glory to GOD. And his Lordſhip and Mr MALLET do, and ought to allow it. They ſay, "* I ſhould rouſe in my mind a grate- " ful ſenſe of theſe advantages above all others, that " I am a creature capable of adoring and worſhip- " ping my Creator, capable of diſcovering his will in " the law of my nature, and capable of promoting " my happineſs by obeying it. I ſhould acknowledge " thankfully, that I am able, by the ſuperiority of " my intellectual faculties, much better than my fel- " low-creatures, to avoid ſome evils, and to endure " ſome others which are common to us and to them. " I ſhould confeſs, that as I proved myſelf more ra- " tional than they, by employing my reaſon to this " purpoſe; ſo I ſhould prove myſelf leſs rational, by " repining at my ſtate here, and by complaining that " there are any unavoidable evils. I ſhould confeſs, " that neither perfect virtue, nor perfect happineſs, " is to be found among the ſons of men; and that " we ought to judge of the one, as we may judge of " their perſeverance in the other.——Not by this, " that we never fall from either; ſince in that ſenſe " there would be no one good man, nor no one hap- " py man in the world." Though we ſhould not

* Vol. iv. p. 396.

complain of unavoidable evils in this world, (* *For why ſhould a living man complain, a man for the puniſhment of his ſins?*), yet there are many ſuch evils to which the beſt and the worſt of men are ſubjected. And in many caſes, as is the righteous, ſo is the wicked; and he that ſacrificeth, as he that ſacrificeth not. Though all have tranſgreſſed, yet one may be allowed to believe, that ſome difference is to be made between one who raiſes in his mind a grateful ſenſe of his being a creature capable of knowing, adoring, and worſhipping his Creator, of diſcovering his will, and promoting his own happineſs by obeying it; and an arrant Atheiſt, who admits no diſtinction between right and wrong, but in ſo far as ſuch doings tend to his own temporal advantage; and is as ready to ruin the human race, as to preſerve them, as the caſe may turn out for his own perſonal ſatisfaction: or between a man who believes natural religion, and lives up to the rules and laws of it; and another who only profeſſes to believe it, and lives in a beaſtly ſenſuality in his perſonal ſituation, and like a villain in every public and ſocial ſtation; and then dies mad for fear of death: and, for fear he had not done enough to ſignalize himſelf for vice and wickedneſs during his life, leaves a legacy, contrived to baniſh the fear of God, and the reverence and obedience due to him, from among his rational creatures, and to teach mankind to live immorally with ſafety, and with aſſurance of impunity

* Lam. iii. 39.

both

both here and hereafter. And indeed a very ſtrange difference is ſometimes made in this life; for the beſt men have often the lot that more juſtly belongs to the worſt, and the worſt have that ſhare of happineſs to which the beſt have a claim. I know, that, in particular caſes, it is hard to determine who is the beſt, and who is the worſt: but certain it is, that the virtues of one, and the vices of another, cannot be always miſtaken; for they are often very conſpicuous. The wickedneſs and immorality of ſome is often open and declared. And ſo far we are ſure. But whether the good actions of others are done for a good or for a bad purpoſe, is not ſo certain: only it is preſumable, that the motive is as good as the action. Suppoſe a man who hath lived an inoffenſive and uſeful life, and hath voluntarily undergone hardſhips and dangers for the ſake of others, and at laſt periſhes by the hand of a villain whom he had juſt before delivered from death; and ſuppoſe that this ruffian proſperouſly goes on in crimes, and ends his days in peace; can any one who is perſuaded that both are the ſubjects of GOD's moral government, believe, that the affair is finally ended? For my part, I ſhould embrace any hypotheſis that is not abſurd, which eſtabliſhes the belief of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments: and nothing leſs than a demonſtration of the impoſſibility of it ſhall ever make me reject it. My authors attempt it, and their attempt ſhall be conſidered.

DR CLARKE is uſed very roughly, for preſuming to ſay, "* It is certain and neceſſary, even as certain "as the moral attributes of GOD," (and he had before affirmed, that the moral are as eſſential to the divine nature as the natural), "that there muſt be at "ſome time or other ſuch a revolution and renovation "of things, ſuch a future ſtate of exiſtence of the "ſame perſons, as that, by an exact diſtribution of re-"wards and puniſhments therein, all the preſent diſ-"orders and inequalities may be ſet right, and that "the whole ſcheme of providence may appear at its "conſummation to be a deſign worthy of infinite "wiſdom, juſtice, and goodneſs."

"THE hypothetical certainty and neceſſity," ſays his Lordſhip, "on which the Doctor is willing to riſk "our acknowledgment of a ſupreme Being, is found-"ed on this aſſertion, That rewards and puniſhments "in general are neceſſary to ſupport the honour of "GOD, and of his laws and government; and on "this aſſumed propoſition he concludes, that the con-"dition of mankind in this preſent ſtate is ſuch, that "the natural order of things is perverted, and virtue "and goodneſs prevented from obtaining the proper "and due effects." To this, in his uſual and unmannerly way, he begins his anſwer with an exclamation, "Audacious and vain ſophiſter!" "The "Doctor's terms," he ſays, "have a very ſolemn

* Vol. v. p. 4.

"air,

" air, that may impoſe on the unwary, and confirm " the habitual prejudices of others." It is then his opinion, that it is dangerous to believe a ſtate of rewards and puniſhments hereafter, though this belief tends to the temporal advantage of men in their private and public capacity and ſituation, as he himſelf hath, oftener than once, advanced. However, the danger of ſeducing the inattentive reader into the belief of a future ſtate of retribution, is not great, if it is true, that *more abſurdity cannot be ſtuffed in ſo few words.* Wonderful is his acuteneſs. For all the abſurdities ſtuffed in the Doctor's words amount to this: " His whole chain of reaſoning from the moral attri- " butes of GOD downwards, is nothing more than " one continued application of moral human ideas to " the deſigns and conduct of GOD; and in this caſe " he aſſumes moſt preſumptuouſly, that the ſcheme " and order of things which GOD hath eſtabliſhed in " this ſyſtem of ours, cannot be reconciled even to " the notion of human juſtice." His Lordſhip throws away his wit, in calling the Doctor's doctrine of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, a *hypothetical certainty and neceſſity:* for that is not the Doctor's meaning, but the Doctor's and his joined, but ill joined together. And the only way that his Lordſhip proves a future ſtate to be an hypotheſis, is, by aſſerting, that it was not revealed, but only invented by the Egyptians. The Doctor pretends, and proves, that future rewards and puniſhments, abſtracting from revelation,

revelation, are certain and neceſſary; or that GOD is neither juſt nor good, according to any ideas that we can form of juſtice and goodneſs, *in abſtracto* or *in concreto.* Could Mr MALLET, for his Lordſhip, demonſtrate, that ſuch a future ſtate is impoſſible, what would follow from it? Truly no more than both of them teach, without proof, that moral attributes are not eſſential to the Deity. It is ſaid by them, "* Artificial theology pretends to connect, by very problematical reaſonings *a priori*, the moral attributes, "ſuch as we conceive them to be, with the phyſical "attributes of GOD; though there be no ſufficient "foundation for this proceeding in the phenomena of "nature, nay, though the phenomena are, as hath "been ſaid already, in ſeveral inſtances repugnant." Dr CLARKE makes the moral attributes of GOD as eſſential as his natural attributes; and from theſe attributes reaſons into a concluſion of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments. And he reaſons like a religioniſt; whereas the author and his editor reaſon like Atheiſts, by maintaining, that the preſent ſtate of this world is repugnant to the juſtice and goodneſs of the ſupreme Being, and that afterwards there is no place for reparation. My authors deny the juſtice and goodneſs of GOD; for what reaſon, it is hard to imagine, except it be that they may not be obliged to admit a future ſtate: and this, in effect, is to acknowledge, that if GOD is good and juſt, a lover of righteouſneſs,

* Vol. iv. p. 304.

and

and a hater of wickedneſs, there muſt be a future ſtate. Upon the Doctor's hypotheſis, all the moral attributes of GOD are ſaved; and upon his Lordſhip's they are all rejected, as being inconſiſtent with the preſent moral ſyſtem of things. Only a fermented underſtanding, ſuch as his Lordſhip acknowledges his own to be, can accuſe the Doctor, the GREAT DOCTOR, as an *audacious* and vain ſophiſter, and for cramming as many abſurdities in a few words as words can bear; when he advances nothing but what he himſelf contends for occaſionally, except this concluſion, *There is a future ſtate:* for if there is not, all that follows, is, that GOD neither does, nor ever will adminiſter juſtice in his government; which to his Lordſhip is *quod erat demonſtrandum.* He knew, and Mr MALLET does know, the difference between *right* and *wrong*, *juſt* and *unjuſt*, and they are irreſiſtibly forced to condemn the wrong, and approve the right: but a GOD without moral attributes is not ſo complete, ſo perfect, and ſo deſirable a being, as either of them.

THIS nobleman of a philoſopher, who confeſſes that " * we reaſon on human ideas becauſe we have " no others to reaſon on, will not allow us to reaſon " on GOD's moral attributes, becauſe our ideas are " human, and not divine †." Atheiſts and divines reaſon *a priori*, from the aſſumed attributes of the divinity. " So they call their method of reaſoning

* Vol. iv. p. 318. † Vol. iv. p. 322.

" and ſuch it is in a falſe ſenſe. It cannot be ſuch " in a true ſenſe, ſince their ideas of theſe attributes " are very human ideas, applied arbitrarily to the " divine nature, not founded on any knowledge of " it, that we have really." It is certain we have no other ideas than human ideas; and if we are not to make uſe of them, when we think and ſpeak of GOD, we muſt neither think nor ſpeak of him at all. And if this is not poſitive, it is negative Atheiſm. What he adds in the ſame page is as falſe, as it is injurious to the divine. " The premiſſes wherein A- " theiſts and divines concur ſo amicably, are plainly " contrived to eſtabliſh ſuch notions of the attributes " of GOD, as ſhall appear repugnant to what we ſee, " and feel, and know, when they are applied to the " conſtitution of the world, and the ſtate of man- " kind in it." In this nobleman's opinion, therefore, all the notions of the divine attributes eſtabliſhed by divines, are inconſiſtent with the conſtitution of the world, and the ſtate of mankind in it; and that it is therefore matter of fact, that none of theſe attributes belong to the divine Being. And if this doctrine is a contrivance, ſuppoſe of Dr CLARKE, he muſt have been both ſtupid and wicked to eſtabliſh GOD's moral attributes, only in order to reject them, on account of the conſtitution of the world, and the ſtate of mankind in it. The DOCTOR doth eſtabliſh (and thouſands join with him in eſtabliſhing) the moral attributes of GOD, becauſe a GOD who is nei-

ther

ther good, nor juſt, nor true, is the ſame thing with no GOD; ſeeing he muſt want all moral perfections, and cannot be an all-perfect being. And if his Lordſhip's GOD was ſuch, his Lordſhip was an Atheiſt without Dr CLARKE's leave; and ſo is Mr MALLET without mine. "When Atheiſts and divines," ſay they, "have ſhewn that the preſent ſtate of the world, "and of mankind in it, is inconſiſtent with the good-"neſs and juſtice of GOD; a COLLINS concludes "there is no GOD, and a CLARKE, that there is a "future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments." His Lordſhip will conclude with neither; but concludes by himſelf, that if there is a GOD, he is neither juſt nor good, according to any idea he is able to form of goodneſs and juſtice; that is, that all the moral attributes of GOD are to him inconceivable, impoſſible, and abſurd. I have reaſon to believe, that COLLINS was perſuaded, that if there is a GOD, he muſt be good, juſt, and true. And as he beſt knew his own honeſty and integrity in all his inquiries, ſo he expected to be dealt with after this life (if there was an hereafter) as an honeſt and ſincere man. My reaſon is as good, and better, for ſaying ſo, than his Lordſhip's was for ſaying and believing the contrary. Though all Lord BOLINGBROKE's ideas are human, not divine; and though therefore he hath no right to affirm any thing concerning GOD's moral attributes, yet he retains a right to deny them. They are repugnant to the conſtitution of the world, and the

ſtate of mankind in it. " * And it is from this con-
" ſtitution, and this ſtate alone, that we can acquire
" any ideas of the divine attributes." This conſti-
tution, this ſtate, is repugnant to GOD's moral attri-
butes; and there is no other way to know them,
than that which diſproves them.

To refute abundantly the two allies, and firſt the
Atheiſt, he thinks it ſufficient to ſay, *he cavils*; and
no more he ſays, from the beginning to the end of his
philoſophical works, againſt him. I have better rea-
ſon to think, that he and the Atheiſt are confederates,
than that Atheiſts and divines are allies. But to
confute the divine, the object of his contempt, aver-
ſion, and indignation, he is at ſome more pains. He
pretends to put an end to his preſumption, by ſaying,
" † I aſſume no more than what is proved," (and ad-
mitted, and much better proved by divines than by
him), " when I aſſert, that the ſupreme Being is
" infinitely wiſe, as well as powerful; and if he be
" infinitely wiſe, I need not ſtand to prove that he
" always knows, and always does that which is fit-
" teſt to be done." Agreed; whether what he
doth ultimately, or what he doth as a ſubſervient
means to an ultimate end. The author laughs at
MOSES's account of the creation, for finiſhing it in
ſix days; and rather believes a Tuſcan philoſopher,
who ſaid it took up the ſpace of twelve thouſand

* Vol. iv. p. 322. † Vol. iv. p. 223.

years.

years. Had he been witneſs to this work from the beginning of things until it was finiſhed in the preſent form, at firſt he might have obſerved in the procedure, what to him did not diſplay any thing of wiſdom; and far leſs could he ſay that every thing was done to the beſt purpoſe poſſible, until he ſaw the whole finiſhed. He might believe, that every production, and every advancement made in melioration, was proper and fit for ſome intended ultimate end; but this he muſt have believed upon the credit and character of the artificer, and not on any unfiniſhed piece of the work. One who knew nothing of husbandry, (the compariſon is made by Dr KING, in his book of the origin of evil), admitted at firſt as a witneſs to ſowing, muſt think that the husbandman does but throw away his grain; but after ſeeing it grow, ripen, cut down, and threſhed out into twenty grains for one, which at firſt he thought thrown away, he concludes, that what at firſt he thought fooliſhly, was well and wiſely done; not as an ultimate end, but as a means of increaſing the huſbandman's ſtore. I am not pleaſed with thoſe who limit the wiſdom and power of GOD to the preſent conſtitution of the world. For all that I know of the ſymmetry, order, harmony, and the uſe and ſubſerviency of every part of the univerſe to the whole, I dare not ſay that GOD can make no further improvements. For as the firſt materials being made, were afterwards improved into the preſent form of the world; and

as

as we obſerve ſeveral things in the material part of the creation advancing from one degree to another, into maturity; ſo I can believe, that every diſorder ſhall at laſt be rectified, and every thing, without interruption from another, ſhall be made perfect in its kind. Inundations, earthquakes, the devouring ſword and peſtilence, which I conſider in ſome reſpects as *corrective*, and in others as *vindictive* puniſhments, (and ſo doth my author), and are now the proper means for the reformation of mankind, ſhall all ceaſe when there ſhall be no more occaſion for them. And when the irreclaimably wicked ſhall be ſent to another place, the remainder ſhall improve in holineſs and happineſs, and GOD ſhall wipe away all tears from their eyes.

THOUGH all things that may be, or not be, are contingencies, and though ſuch are all the doings of the LORD GOD *ad extra*; yet ſome think, that every thing that is, could not poſſibly be otherwiſe than it is; and that this world neither could nor can be better or worſe than it is. To hear them, and to believe them, one would think, that this world cannot admit an additional pound weight, or a deduction of ſo much, or of a foot meaſure, without undoing the whole. "Know therefore," ſaith Dr KING *, "it is neceſſa-"ry you ſhould be what you are, or not at all." Sure he could not mean, that you could not have

* Origin of evil, chap. iv. § 5.

been

been taller or lower, ſtronger or weaker; and that you could not know either more or leſs than you actually do, and be neither a better nor a worſe man than you are: and as your caſe is every man's caſe, ſo every man, and every thing, is what it is, and could not poſſibly have been otherwiſe. But as this is *Fatal Atheiſm*, I cannot think it was his GRACE's opinion. And here I may be allowed the uſe of the metaphyſical diſtinction into *ſenſus diviſus*, and *ſenſus compoſitus*. Every thing is what it is, while it is juſt the ſame, I grant; and this is *ſenſus compoſitus*: but that thing might have been, and may be otherwiſe; and this is *ſenſus diviſus*. But ſay the contrary who will, I am very ſure, that any man may be a better man than he is, and notwithſtanding continue to be the ſame perſon.

ONE would think, that Mr MALLET, or his author, ſhould have adduced clear proof of ſome of the abſurdities ſtuffed in Dr CLARKE's aſſertion, That a ſtate of rewards and puniſhments is as certain as are the divine moral attributes; and for which he is called an audacious and vain ſophiſter. But, inſtead of this, I find nothing but a definition of the terms *good* and *bad*, *happy* and *unhappy*. And on this head he talks and trifles, until he comes to deny particular providences; and then promiſes to ſhew, that "* GOD "is wiſe, and man a fool," (and how does a fool

* Vol. v. p. 14.

know

know wiſdom?); "and that of all fools, the moſt "preſumptuous, and at the ſame time the moſt tri- "fling, are metaphyſical philoſophers and divines." Whether he hath made good his promiſe or not, the reader may judge by what I have already ſaid on that ſubject. Does not all the world know, and did they not know ſince the world was inhabited, that men differ much in their morals; and that the beſt have ſometimes the worſt, and the worſt of them the beſt worldly lot? For his ſatisfaction, let Mr MALLET try to find out, among all his acquaintances, dead or alive, a better man than Lord BOLINGBROKE. And ſince the beſt and the worſt of men are unequally dealt with in this world, the juſtice and goodneſs of GOD require, that this inequality be rectified in another life; or this inequality is below the regard of infinite wiſdom, or above the power of the ALMIGHTY to redreſs it.

DR CLARKE is an audacious and vain ſophiſt, and Mr WOLLASTON is a madman. The accuſation of madneſs ought to be well laid; and whether it is well or ill grounded, can only be learned from what his Lordſhip hath quoted * from his *Religion of nature delineated*. "I am ſure, that I am above lifeleſs mat- "ter, above the vegetative tribe, and above the ſen- "ſitive animals that I ſee. I have not only imme- "diate ſenſations, but ideas of a higher order. I can

* Vol. iv. p. 37.

"make

" make excurſions into futurity: I had almoſt ſaid, " that I could, by ſtrict reaſoning, get into another " world before-hand. Can I be made capable of " ſuch great expectations, only to be diſappointed at " laſt? Can I have ſuch overtures of immortality, " if after all there is no ſuch thing? I make great " improvements in knowledge, which I have no op- " portunity of ſhewing here: muſt they not be pre- " parations for another world? Can the author of my " reaſoning faculties be himſelf ſo unreaſonable, as " to give them to no purpoſe? By the exaltation of " my reaſon, and by the practice of virtue, I ap- " proach to a higher manner of being, and taſte al- " ready ſomething ſpiritual, and above this world. " Muſt my private acts of religion be all loſt? Can " GOD have ſo little regard to me, who have ſo much " for GOD?" Thus Mr WOLLASTON is indicted for a madman. And yet all he ſays amounts only to this, That he was made for a more noble purpoſe than to eat and drink, to ſleep and wake, to laugh and weep, to ſpeak and write, to reaſon about his own origin and end, and to chop logics with his Lordſhip and Mr MALLET. However, they acknowledge, that " the " man who wrote all this nonſenſe, was a man of " parts, of learning, a philoſopher, and a geometri- " cian. But he made one miſtake in the delirium of " metaphyſics. Inſtead of reaſoning about a creature " of GOD's, he reaſoned about one of his own crea- " tion." And for this he is one of the *learned* luna-

tics. It is to be obſerved, that the author, as a maſter of hard words, an attainment unbecoming a nobleman, uſes thoſe who have writ with the greateſt reputation on natural religion, with the greateſt contempt. So collie-dogs bark at maſtiffs. But this, inſtead of ſhewing the ſuperiority of his own underſtanding, only ſhews, that he doth not know who writes well, and who writes weakly on the ſubject. That WOLLASTON did improve his natural parts and capacity, and that he with his faculties was a creature of GOD his Creator, (for he did not make himſelf); this, I ſay, is certain: but the improvement which, by his natural power, and the freedom of his will, he made in knowledge, did not make him a creature of his own creation. If blunders, lies, and induſtrious contradictions; if contempt or ignorance of logics and metaphyſics, are ſymptoms of a bad writer, there never was a weaker or a more contemptible author than his Lordſhip. And were it not for the ſake of the important ſubject he writes on, few would read them all, and none would read twice his philoſophical works.

To make good his charge againſt WOLLASTON for a madman, and that the extract of ſo much from the *Religion of nature delineated* as he hath given, is all of it nonſenſe, he ſays, "* After all endeavours to "make a man a being ſuperior to the whole animal

* Vol. iv. p. 377. 380.

"kind,

" kind, rather than a ſuperior ſpecies of the ſame " kind, man will appear what he really is to every " unprejudiced mind." No man, no philoſopher, ever denied that man is an animal, and WOLLASTON never attempted to take him out of that *genus* or kind. And if man is a ſuperior *ſpecies* in the kind of animals, he muſt be ſuperior to all other animals. To all unprejudiced minds, I allow, man will appear what he really is, the ruins of a noble creature; but ſuch ruins as admit of reparation and improvement. No religioniſt ever ſaid directly nor conſequentially, as his Lordſhip's accuſation ſtands, that " the natural ſtate " of mankind is unnatural, a ſtate neither agreeable " to the nature of GOD himſelf, nor to that nature " wherewith he hath digniſied man." Man by nature is a free and a voluntary agent, and as ſuch he may uſe or abuſe his natural powers. He may improve in virtue and morality, or may miſimprove in vice and wickedneſs, conſiſtently with the dignity wherewith his Creator hath honoured and diſtinguiſhed him; and that in a conſiſtency too with all the divine attributes. Man's ſtate is naturally a free ſtate, and this freedom eſſential to rational beings remains the ſame whatever uſe or abuſe he makes of it. And this ſtate and condition of mankind, I acknowledge, is no imperfection in the grand ſyſtem of the creation. The great work of the grand architect of the univerſe is not as yet completed. The author ſays, " The ſen- " ſitive inhabitants of our globe, like the *aramatis*

" *perſonæ*, have different characters, and are applied " to different purpoſes of action in every ſcene." Things therefore are carrying on to a concluſion of the whole plan of GOD's creation. His Lordſhip always miſtakes the means for the end, and concludes, that every thing that is done, is done for no other purpoſe than for the ſake of doing it. " The whole or- " der and ſyſtem of the *drama* would be ſpoiled, if " any alteration was made in it." So far from that, that alterations are made, and muſt be made, in order to finiſh and complete the grand *opera* of GOD's government and creation of the univerſe. His Lordſhip is of another opinion: for he ſays, " If man was a " creature ſuperior or inferior to what he is, he would " be a very prepoſterous creature in this ſyſtem. If " our reaſoning faculties were more perfect than they " are, the order of the intellectual ſyſtem would be " broken unneceſſarily, and man would be raiſed a- " bove his proper form, without any real advantage " to himſelf; ſince the reaſon he hath is ſufficient for " him in the ſtate allotted to him; and ſince higher " faculties and greater degrees of knowledge would, " on one hand, increaſe his preſumption, and yet, on " the other, would rather excite than ſate his curio- " ſity, by ſhewing him more clearly the *extent of his* " *own ignorance*." How can his Lordſhip, or rather Mr MALLET, know the extent of his own ignorance, unleſs his ignorance and his knowledge are the ſame thing?

I

I think it beſt, before I make any more obſervations, to give my reader a view of what more my authors ſay on this head. And they ſay, "* In this "ſcale of being, why ſhould not we be the creatures "we are?" And that they mean we ſhould be juſt ſuch creatures as we are, neither better nor happier, with neither more nor leſs knowledge, appears from another paſſage. "† We may preſume to ſay, that if "it had been in the order of GOD's deſign to make "the ſtate of mankind as happy as the univerſal law, "and the ſteady obſervation of it, would make it, he "would have made the ſanctions of the law as perfect "as the law: but we ſee by what he hath done, "which is the only ſure way of knowing what he "deſigned, that we were made to live in a moderate "and mixed ſtate of happineſs.——Had the ſanctions "of the law of nature been ſtronger, we ſhould have "riſen above this ſtate; had they been weaker, we "ſhould have ſunk below it. Thus they are relatively perfect, relative to the deſign of the lawgiver; "and neither the goodneſs nor the juſtice of GOD "require, that we ſhould be made better or happier "than we are." And again, "‖ If there had been "no conflict between appetite and ſluggard reaſon, "and had all been done in a cloſe conformity to the "law of nature, the moral ſtate of mankind had been "truly paradiſaical; but it had not been human. "We ſhould not have been the creatures we were

* Vol. iv. p. 366. † Vol. v. p. 130. ‖ Vol. iv. p. 98.

"deſigned

" deſigned to be, and a gap would have been left in " the gradation of created intelligences.——The ta- " bles of the law of nature are hung up, and made " obvious to the ſight of man; not becauſe we are " able to obſerve them in their whole extent, and in " every part alike, but that we may keep them con- " ſtantly in view, and depart as little as poſſible, in " the midſt of ſo many infirmities, and ſo many temp- " tations, from them. GOD hath ſhewn us wherein " our wiſdom and happineſs, and the perfection of " our nature, conſiſt; and hath left us to purſue the " end by the uſe of our own reaſon." And, to add no more, he ſays, " * It is true in fact, that neither " reaſon nor revelation, neither Heathen nor Chri- " ſtian philoſophers, neither human nor divine laws, " have been able to reform the manners of men ef- " fectually; may we not, nay *muſt* we not conclude, " that ſuch a reformation is *inconſiſtent* with the origi- " nal conſtitution of the human ſyſtem?——Why " there is ſuch a ſtate as this, and how to reconcile it " to the ideas of holineſs and goodneſs, let thoſe who " preſume to judge of divine goodneſs, judge accor- " dingly: but let you and I pronounce, that ſince " there is ſuch a ſtate as this in the univerſal ſyſtem, " it was fit and right there ſhould be ſuch a ſtate. " On this head we may and ought to be dogmatical." What a field is this of nonſenſe, impiety, and Fata- liſm?

* Vol. iv. p. 243. 244.

THE

THE whole univerſe is filled with beings material, ſenſitive, and rational, connected in one immenſe deſign: from which it follows, that the deſign is not yet attained nor accompliſhed. The theatre ſubſiſts, and the *dramatis perſonæ* continue to act their reſpective parts; and as long as they do act, the *drama* is unfiniſhed. Some great change, ſome amazing alteration to the better, is to be expected, for the greater perfection of the ſyſtem, and for the manifeſtation of the glory and honour of the infinitely-wiſe and almighty architect. To act continually and everlaſtingly in the ſame courſe and method, were to act for the ſake of acting; which is to act rather without deſign, than with a view to an immenſe deſign, a deſign worthy of infinite wiſdom and power. Whatever intelligent beings or actors there may be ſuperior to man, certain it is he is the only actor, or at leaſt the principal actor in this our globe, under the command of his creator and the author of the whole *drama*. The directions given to us how to act our part, are the law of nature, or the dictates of right reaſon. While we obſerve this law and this rule, we act our part well; and when we depart from theſe directions, we act our part ill: and therefore until the whole is finiſhed, we cannot expect to be finally commended or blamed, rewarded or puniſhed. The ſufferings of the beſt, and the enjoyments of the worſt of men during the action, are but the encouragements and corrections adminiſtered in the mean time, and not the total reward or puniſhment:

niſhment: for theſe are to be complete. And it gives me no wonder, that wicked men enjoy more happineſs and proſperity than the good and virtuous. There is no man ſo very wicked who does not ſome good thing; and our GOD is ſo very good and juſt, that no good action paſſes without a reward. Though the Egyptian midwives told a lie, to ſave alive the male children of the Iſraelites, GOD rewarded them for their compaſſion. He built them houſes, or gave them good ſettlements in this world. And as little ſhould the ſufferings of the beſt of men give any ſurpriſe, becauſe they are but corrective. This life is a ſtate of mixed happineſs and mixed miſery, of ſufferings and enjoyments; but that which is future to the concluſion of the whole *drama*, is final, and without mixture, all reward or all puniſhment.

THAT ſome men grow in virtue and morality, and that others degenerate into vice and wickedneſs, and even ſhut their eyes againſt the knowledge of GOD, and the duty which they owe him, is certain: theſe increaſe in number, and thoſe decreaſe in proportion. And when, by prevailing wickedneſs, this part of the creation is overburdened with ſin and iniquity, and the diſorders thereby occaſioned hinder and obſtruct the happineſs of a few worthy inhabitants, it appears congruous to divine wiſdom, to take this ſpot of the univerſe out of the grand ſyſtem of the univerſe, or change it into another form, fitter for the beſt inhabitants.

bitants. It was ſaid by the author of the Chriſtian religion *, *The Son of man when he cometh, ſhall he find faith on the earth?* And Chriſtians therefore believe, that when this world of ours can bear no more wickedneſs, it is to be changed, and a ſeparation made between the good and the bad inhabitants. When mankind can be no longer governed by reaſon nor by faith, it is fit they be governed by ſight, and that a period be put to this our earthly ſyſtem. I beg Mr MALLET's excuſe for troubling him with a quotation from the BIBLE. So far am I from thinking, that the whole ſyſtem of the *drama* would be ſpoiled, if the leaſt alteration were made in the material or moral part of it, that I rather believe that ſome alterations are fit and proper means for carrying on the whole unto a glorious concluſion. By counteracting our part, we ſpoil the harmony of this globe; and to rectify this part of the grand ſyſtem, it is fit it ſhould be changed, fitted up, and filled with better inhabitants. That inundations, earthquakes, famine, peſtilence, and the ſword, are corrective and partial puniſhments, and warnings to thoſe who are witneſſes, and ſtand in need of amendment, is the opinion of his Lordſhip, as hath been already obſerved: and with theſe divine providence hath proceeded, and the order of the *drama* hath been hitherto carried on. And ſure it cannot be ſaid, that a total change of this earth, and of its inhabitants, can

* Luke xviii. 8.

obſtruct the grand and ultimate deſign of the Maker and Governor of the univerſe; and until this great deſign is fully accompliſhed, (and accompliſhed it ſhall be), all changes and alterations are the proper means of advancing God's great and glorious purpoſe.

When he ſays, that the reaſon which man hath, is ſufficient for him in the ſtate allotted to him, he cannot mean, that every individual hath as much knowledge as is proper and fit for him to have. For, in that caſe, he and the Hottentot know enough for their purpoſe, and the buſineſs of their being. The world therefore would have been as well without, as with his philoſophical works, or the works of the beſt mathematician or moraliſt. God hath given reaſon to all mankind, and the means of improving it. Theſe means ſome neglect, and are the cauſe of their own ignorance, errors, and miſcarriages in their conduct. "Had the ſanctions of the law of nature "been ſtronger, we ſhould have riſen above this "ſtate; had they been weaker, we ſhould have "ſunk below it:" ſo ſaith his Lordſhip. That is, it is not the will of God, that man ſhould know more or leſs than he actually does; that he ſhould be better or worſe, more moral or more immoral, more happy or unhappy, than he actually is. But I take on me to affirm, that though human knowledge were more extended than it is, and though the will of man were

were more obedient to his underſtanding, there could not proceed from ſuch knowledge, and ſuch rectitude of conduct, any inconveniency to himſelf, or to the order of the univerſe. From the nature of our reaſon and underſtanding, and from the improvements already made in knowledge, (and they are amazingly great), I can conclude, that the human mind is capable of more and higher degrees of knowledge and wiſdom. And were it not for his own, and the fault of other men, both his knowledge, and the practice of his duty, would be far ſuperior to what it is. What if our reaſoning faculties were raiſed above what they are, muſt not our knowledge and our morality be raiſed in proportion? And though we ſhould become holy, harmleſs and innocent, uſeful and benevolent, and thankful and obedient to GOD our maker and our maſter, we ſhould ſtill be men. For our ignorance of what we ought to know, and the neglect of what we ought to do, are not eſſential to humanity, or to the nature of a reaſonable ſoul. On the contrary, theſe defects and imperfections ſeem to be acquired and adventitious; and that our faculties muſt be ſome way or other ſpoiled and perverted, and not the ſame that they were originally, nor becoming the operation of a moſt holy being. The account we have from MOSES of the creation, and fall of man from his primitive ſtate, with his Lordſhip and you paſſes for romance and forgery. But how ye come to aſſert that it is an Egyptian allegory,

ye are ſtill to account. For ye aſſert it without hiſtorical authority; and, for what ye know, it might have been a tradition handed down to them from ADAM's firſt tranſgreſſion. But revelation and conjectures apart, I ſay, though the reaſonable human ſoul might be proper to make up a ſcale of beings, it doth not follow, that acquired errors, induſtrious ignorance, vice, and immorality, are a neceſſary part of the great *drama*, or a link to connect a chain of beings. On the contrary, they are defects and irregularities, proceeding from man's counteracting his part. All which ſhall be ſupplied and rectified, when this *drama* and GOD's glorious deſign ſhall be finiſhed. Better let this gap in his Lordſhip's imaginary ſcale of beings ſtand open, than to make our good and holy GOD fill it up with the wickedneſs and immorality of men.

THIS, I think, his Lordſhip with preſumptuous impiety does deny. For he preſumes to ſay, that "if it had been in the order of GOD's deſign to make "the ſtate of mankind as the law of nature, and the "ſteady obſervation of it, would make it, he would "have made the ſanctions of the law as perfect as "the law." This I ſhould not have underſtood, had he not ſaid, that "the divine law ſhould inſure "obedience." By this he would teach the world, that GOD inforces his law with different ſanctions, ſome weaker, and ſome ſtronger. He admits, that the law of nature is the law of GOD, which he and

all

all men have tranſgreſſed. He forgets, that every rational creature is eſſentially a free agent. And would he have a law given to man, which would deprive him of his eſſential liberty? With ſuch an irreſiſtible energy the law of GOD would be no moral law, and man muſt be no moral and free agent. The ſanction of the law of GOD and of nature, as it ſtands diſcoverable, and actually diſcovered by reaſon, is the approbation, the protection, and favour of GOD on the one hand, and his diſpleaſure on the other. And what the effects of the pleaſure and diſpleaſure of almighty GOD on the obedient and diſobedient may be, muſt equal, or ſurpaſs our imagination. This ſanction, though ſufficient in itſelf to influence and direct our doings, yet on men ſuch as this world is furniſhed with, they make no ſuitable impreſſion. The reaſon is, they are not firmly believed, and when believed, they are frequently adulterated with reſerves and exceptions. His Lordſhip adds, that "neither the goodneſs nor juſtice of GOD require "that we ſhould be made better or happier than we "are." To make us better and happier than we are, whether we will or not, were to unmake us, and from free and voluntary agents, to convert us into mere paſſive beings. It is enough that GOD hath made us capable to make ourſelves better and happier. And his Lordſhip ſays, "GOD hath ſhewn "us, wherein our wiſdom, our happineſs, and the "perfection of our nature, conſiſt; and hath left us

"to

" to purſue theſe ends by the uſe of our reaſon." And if we do not purſue theſe ends by the uſe of our reaſon, (and certainly we do not), it is our fault, not the doing, though the permiſſion of GOD, that we are not better and happier men than at preſent we are. And though neither the goodneſs nor juſtice of GOD require that he ſhould make us either better or happier than we are, and are willing to be made, (for all GOD's operations *ad extra* are purely voluntary); yet now that we are made rational and free agents, his juſtice requires that we ſhould not make ourſelves worſe than he hath made us, but rather that we ſhould grow and improve in the knowledge of GOD, and in the knowledge and practice of every duty we owe him.

" THE tables of the law of nature are hung up " and made obvious to the ſight of men, not that we " ſhould obſerve them punctually and in every caſe, " but only that we ſhould depart as little as poſſibly " from them." This is his Lordſhip's doctrine. But who gave him authority to reſtrict the law of GOD, and the law of nature, to a partial obligation? And with what power was he inveſted to indulge the ſubjects of GOD's moral government to tranſgreſs his laws at their own diſcretion? Allow him to plead infirmities and temptations, and there will be no end of excuſes. But this is to plead, that a rational creature may reaſonably act irrationally. The law of nature,

nature, as the law of GOD, is fixed and unchangeable, as unchangeable as *right* is into *wrong*; and as ſuch it requires complete and perfect obedience. But becauſe it is not obeyed perfectly, it doth not follow, that it admits either of abrogation or derogation. And if the law ſubſiſts, ſo muſt the ſanction.

BUT becauſe the ſanction is not put in execution in this life, his Lordſhip and Mr MALLET conclude that it never will; for there is not another. Whereas the premiſſes can better bear the contrary concluſion. For our GOD is a GOD of truth; and whatever our reaſon diſcovers to be his law, with the ſanction annexed, we muſt believe, that he who tranſgreſſes incurs the penalty, not to be remitted at the tranſgreſſor's fancy and pleaſure. And becauſe men diſobey the law of GOD in this life with ſafety, to conclude that all the danger is over, is to reaſon on the reverſe. The nobleman of a philoſopher ſeems to divert himſelf, when he ſays, " * Some make good health and the advan- " tages of fortune conſtitute principally happineſs, " becauſe good men ſometimes accuſe GOD for want " of them: they pretend to keep an account between " GOD and man, and to barter ſo much virtue and " ſo many acts of devotion, againſt ſo many degrees " of honour, of power, of riches, and to have their " piety purchaſed by the gratification of their paſſions. " If GOD exacts the duty, he muſt pay the debt. If

* Vol. v. p. 13.

" he

" he does not pay it in this life, he must pay it in an-
" other. Till then they give him credit; and if he
" does not pay it then, he is an unjust and cruel be-
" ing." It doth not belong to the character of a *good* man to accuse GOD of injustice, nor is it just to say so. Neither doth it belong to a man of piety to make GOD debtor to him here, or at least hereafter, for honour, power, and riches, on account of some acts of virtue and devotion. And can his Lordship say in good earnest, that good men barter with their GOD? I rather take it for a burlesque both on virtue and piety. But if he must state an account between GOD and good men, and that in jest; I presume to state another in good earnest. All transgressors of the law of GOD become debtors to divine justice; and if the debt is not cancelled by the mercy of GOD on their repentance in this life, it will certainly be punished in a life to come. This the divine justice and holiness requires.

To prove that it is not our fault that we are not better and happier men than we actually are, he says, that the original constitution of the human system does not admit of an effectual reformation of manners and morals. And his reason is, because neither reason nor revelation, neither Heathen nor Christian philosophers, neither human nor divine laws, have been able to effect such a reformation. From which it follows, that it either is the will of GOD that we should not obey

his

his law, nor conform our conduct to it; or that ſome way or other man hath diſabled and diſqualified himſelf for rendering ſuch obedience. That vice and wickedneſs do abound among men, is a certain, and ſorrowful matter of fact. This I chuſe to impute to man himſelf, rather than charge it to the account of my holy GOD. My author rather blames GOD for not making him a being incapable of abuſing and miſimproving his nature. But, for the honour and dignity of man, GOD hath given him power and dominion over his own actions. Upon man he hath beſtowed man himſelf, with power and ability to uſe or abuſe his faculties, but ſtill accountable to his maker and maſter for all his doings: for GOD cannot diveſt himſelf of his ſovereignty. I appeal to Mr MALLET, and to every man of common underſtanding, if it was not in his, and in their power, to have acted a more reaſonable part than in many caſes they have actually done. It is therefore our own fault that we are not better men than at preſent we are. And as there is no man who does always that which is good and right, the contagion and diſqualification muſt be univerſal. It is their own fault, an univerſal fault in mankind, as much as it is mine and yours perſonally, when we tranſgreſs the law of GOD, or the dictates of right reaſon, by omiſſion or commiſſion. I promiſed not to meddle with revelation, and therefore forbear to mention the riſe and origin of our inability to obey the law of GOD to perfection; but ſince it is univerſal,

and of the greateſt antiquity, I may aſſume, that it proceeds from the firſt of men, or the firſt man. And ſince a good and holy GOD is not to be blamed, it muſt have been his or their fault. Can any imagine, that a holy GOD could have created the firſt man juſt ſuch as we ſee many of his poſterity? I cannot perſuade myſelf, that ſuch as Lord BOLINGBROKE was, might be the immediate workmanſhip of GOD; no more than I can believe, that the righteous and holy LORD approves of all his Lordſhip's doings. However it hath come to paſs, it hath happened to man by his own fault, that he is not ſuch as he was when he came firſt out of the hands of his Creator. He was then perfect, and fitted and finiſhed to obey the will of GOD; and, by ſuch a regular and ſteady conduct, to be a happy creature. GOD made man perfect, but man hath ſought out many ruinous inventions.

LET us ſuppoſe a plain and a ſtraight way, *(and wiſdom's ways are ways of pleaſantneſs, and all her paths are peace)*, it may be thought practicable to walk in this way without ſtraying or ſtumbling: but if he who attempts it ſhould always ſtumble, and frequently fall; if, inſtead of proceeding in a ſtraight courſe, he deviates ſometimes to the one ſide, and ſometimes to the other; muſt we not conclude, that this traveller's feet are lame, that his eyes are dim, or that his head is giddy and vertiginous? Can man be a reaſonable creature, and at the ſame time incapable

pable to act as ſuch? The ſun obſerves a regular courſe; and many animals, by mere inſtinct, keep their ſtation: but theſe are immediately under divine direction; and man, for his honour, is under the direction of his own faculties. He blunders in the buſineſs of his being; and from one unreaſonable action to another, he goes quite aſtray from the law of GOD, and the dictates of right reaſon. The remains of reaſon, and an occaſional approbation of what is good and right, ſhew what man originally was, and to what a low and lamentable condition he hath reduced himſelf. Such thoughts as theſe diſpoſe me to believe the Chriſtian account of the forlorn ſtate of mankind, though it may diſpoſe Mr MALLET to laugh at me for my pains. However, I have proved, that all irregularities, vice, and immorality, are owing to man himſelf, and not to GOD. And I have reconciled the human ſtate to the ideas of the holineſs and goodneſs of the Creator, upon ſuppoſition, and upon his Lordſhip's admiſſion, that the great *drama* is not as yet finiſhed; and that there ſhall be a future ſtate of retribution of rewards and puniſhments.

FROM the incorrigible and incurable indiſpoſition and diſtemper of mankind, which neither reaſon nor revelation, neither Heathen nor Chriſtian philoſophers, neither human nor divine laws, have been able to cure and to reform effectually; from this, I ſay, his Lordſhip concludes, that ſuch a reformation is in-

conſiſtent with the original conſtitution of the human ſyſtem; though at the ſame time he gives it up as inconſiſtent with the holineſs and goodneſs of GOD. His words are: "Why there is ſuch a ſtate as this, and "how to reconcile it to the ideas of holineſs and "goodneſs, let thoſe who preſume to judge of divine "goodneſs, judge accordingly." If it is preſumption to judge of divine goodneſs and holineſs, and if the original conſtitution of the human ſyſtem is inconſiſtent with theſe divine attributes, he judges preſumptuouſly and peremptorily, that there are no ſuch attributes belonging to the Deity. But he adds, "Since "there is ſuch a ſtate as this, let you and I pronounce "that it was fit and right there ſhould be ſuch a "ſtate:" A ſtate, to be ſure, which GOD never ordered, becauſe inconſiſtent with his holineſs and goodneſs. Perhaps every reader doth not know, that the principles of Fataliſm or Fatal Atheiſm are, That every thing is what it is, and how it is, and could not poſſibly have been otherwiſe; and therefore fit, and right, and juſt to be ſuch and ſo. All I obſerve here is, that men, by departing from the religious ſcheme, and a belief of GOD's creation and government of the univerſe, (and this they do, that they may flatter themſelves with impunity), are led from error to error, until they loſe their reaſon, and run into Atheiſm as their only refuge. I have diſtinguiſhed between the end and the means. Whatever GOD does, whatever he permits; if he delays, or executes judgment

ment immediately; it is fit and right for carrying on the great plan of providence, or the univerſal *drama*, as his Lordſhip calls it, to a concluſion. Were this preſent ſtate of things to undergo no alteration, and if it neither wanted nor admitted any; then all that is done here muſt be final, and the preſent muſt be without relation and without connection to futurity. The nobleman of an author, who ſays we are connected with the animal race, and even with plants, and all the parts of the univerſe connected with one another, in one great deſign, ought to admit, that the preſent ſtate of things is ſubſervient, fit, and the right means for carrying on the whole creation into greater perfection, and for finiſhing and completing the grand *drama* that is now in action.

THE Noble author ſays ſtrangely, (and he hath many ſtrange ſayings), that WOLLASTON is brought, or hath brought his reader "* to the very brink of "the precipice. He cannot believe a GOD unjuſt, "cruel, unreaſonable; but he may find it as difficult "to believe a GOD who acts againſt his attributes and "the perfections of his nature in one ſyſtem, only "to have a reaſon the more for acting agreeably to "them in another." That GOD may inflict on the good and the beſt of men corrective puniſhments, and ſuch as tend to their improvement in piety and morality, and to their future happineſs, is no wiſe incon-

* Vol. iv. p. 353.

ſiſtent

ſiſtent with the wiſdom and goodneſs of GOD: but to inflict ſuch puniſhments as tend only to render them unhappy during the whole ſpace of their being, upon ſuppoſition of their perfect innocence, would be cruelty and injuſtice. But this cruelty can by no means be aſcribed to WOLLASTON's ſcheme, though it may be, and muſt be aſcribed to BOLINGBROKE's. It is his doctrine, that man is neither better nor worſe, more moral nor immoral, than GOD deſigned he ſhould, or has commanded him to be. And if he is unhappy in this his only life, it is not his fault. It is his preſent ſtate, and it is fit and right it ſhould be ſuch. It is a part of the univerſal ſyſtem, which admits of no alteration. This philoſopher admits but one grand ſyſtem, one immenſe deſign in the Deity: but here he divides this grand ſyſtem into two, to make place for imputing to WOLLASTON what I am ſure he never ſaid, and what I believe he never thought, that GOD acts againſt his attributes here, only that he may have an occaſion the more for acting agreeably to them hereafter. He may make as many ſyſtems as he pleaſes, one for every individual man, which is finiſhed and completed by death. But it is of his own ſhewing, " * that it is a great truth, that the whole ſeries of " things is at all times actually preſent to the divine " mind." To GOD therefore all is one ſyſtem, who cannot therefore mend in one what he did wrong in another. It is therefore a vain and a dangerous pre-

* Vol. v. p. 82.

ſumption

ſumption, to aſſert, that our ſtate is final when this life is ended: whereas this ſtate of things is a part of the great ſyſtem of GOD's creation and government, which ſtill ſubſiſt. The paſt, the preſent, the future, are all connected in the grand ſeries of things, always preſent to the divine mind.

BECAUSE ſentence againſt an evil work is not ſpeedily executed, my authors conclude, that it never will be executed. But to make out this concluſion, it muſt be immediately executed: for if it is delayed a day, it may be delayed a hundred years, and even poſtponed till after death. But an immediate execution would leave no place, as I obſerved before, for repentance and reformation, admitting the puniſhment to be total and final. With Mr MALLET's leave, I will indulge myſelf in vindication of the wiſdom of GOD in the government of the moral world. If we were witneſſes of the ſentence, and execution of it, which for ever determines the ſtate of good and bad men; did we ſee a judgment-ſeat erected, and an angel of light placed thereon, (and it is ſaid, that there are legions of them attending the throne of the Moſt High, and ready to execute his orders); did we hear ſentence paſſed, and ſee it immediately put in execution; and did this happen periodically in every pariſh, the conſternation would be ſo great, that the buſineſs of this life would be neglected. It would then become the wiſh and prayer of every reaſonable and living

ving man, that their departed friends and acquaintances might not be judged ſo ſoon, and that theſe parochial aſſizes might be adjourned until one great day, until an end was put to the preſent ſyſtem, and until the conſummation of things; when, by the diſſolution of all terreſtrial relations and connections between man and man, they may be enabled to bear an eternal ſeparation from their juſtly-condemned friends and former favourites. That the wicked are not immediately and finally puniſhed, nor the good immediately and totally rewarded, is ſo far from being an objection againſt a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, that it is rather an argument for the certainty of it.

To prove that no man, and in particular Mr WOLLASTON, have any reaſon to complain of the evils of this life, my author affirms for a reaſon, that they are overbalanced by the good things he enjoys; and that it muſt be ſo, ſince if any charitable perſon had offered to cut Mr WOLLASTON's throat, he would have been ill received. By an act of reſignation, his Lordſhip pretends to make life and death equally welcome. But had his Lordſhip been in Mr WOLLASTON's ſuppoſed caſe, he would have received the throat-cutter the ſame way, becauſe "* having taſted exiſtence, he abhorred non-entity." But if the offer had been made to either of them, to

* Vol. iv. p. 393.

live

live the very ſame life over again, without the leaſt variety, I doubt much if it had been thankfully received. A prolongation of life, health, and ſtrength, no man, even in priſon, would refuſe. He would be apt to flatter himſelf, that his paſt errors in life, and the remembrance of them, would make him more careful and cautious than he was before, and wiſe enough to embrace every opportunity of promoting and ſecuring his happineſs.

——————— *Credula vitam*
Spes fovet, et melius cras fore ſemper ait.

But as men are much the ſame, I have reaſon to think, they would deceive themſelves in their expectations. Some have unexpectedly received a new leaſe of life, and even that hath been employed much to the ſame purpoſe with the preceding part. And ſince, on a review of a long and proſperous life, there appears nothing in it, without ſome additional variety, worthy of the pains of living it over again, I conclude, that our deſires are not to be ſatisfied here; and I further conclude, that we are made for more noble buſineſs and enjoyment than this world can afford. Small and trifling ſubjects ingroſs our thoughts when children. Youth is full of ſtrong deſires, often never gratified; and when gratified, are often more hurtful than profitable. After a buſtle in the buſineſs of life, and beſtowing more pains on making ac-

quiſitions than they are worth, we ſit down ſtill unſatisfied. We grieve and mourn, we laugh and ſing, we ſleep, we wake, we eat and drink, and then become hungry and thirſty, and the circle returns, and then we die. And though you ſhould call me mad, as Lord BOLINGBROKE calls Mr WOLLASTON, I cannot but believe that man was made for more noble employment and enjoyment; and if it is not our own fault, we ſhall at laſt have none but regular and reaſonable deſires, which never ſhall be diſappointed; and ſo enjoy all the happineſs that our rational nature is capable of. I add, only as my own opinion, that our preſent faculties ſhall not only be ſtrengthened and improved, but alſo that an addition of new ones ſhall be beſtowed on us, to make us capable of joys unſpeakable and full of glory. As the deaf made to hear, and the blind made to ſee, are ſurpriſingly delighted, the one with a variety of colours and objects, and the other with the harmony of ſounds; ſo ſhall the godly man be when he enters into poſſeſſion of his great reward. Shall ſuch great and glorious views be renounced, for no other reaſon but that we may live and die like the beaſts? With ſuch hopes and expectations, inſtead of dying mad for fear of death, I have ſeen ſome leave this world with as much joy and pleaſure, as ever his Lordſhip of BOLINGBROKE lived in it. Miſerable muſt thoſe principles and opinions be, which fail when

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their ſupport is moſt wanted. " * Hope," ſaith his Lordſhip, " is the cordial drop that ſweetens every " bitter potion, and even the laſt." But thoſe who deny a future ſtate, or look for nothing comfortable in it, cannot partake of it in the laſt, or extremity of this life. I could indulge myſelf in meditating on the glorious ſubject of a bleſſed eternity: but I conſider, that I write not for thoſe that do, but for thoſe that do not believe ſuch a future ſtate; and from them, while they perſiſt in infidelity and Atheiſm, I expect no other return than the character of a delirious enthuſiaſt, or the Italian proverb, *Queſto e bueno por la predica.*

If the happineſs of human life is exalted and magnified on the one hand, the whole race of mankind is made of ſmall account on the other. " The evils " we complain of," (it is his Lordſhip who ſpeaks), " are the conſtant or occaſional effects of the conſti- " tution of a world which was not made for our " ſakes." Natural philoſophers " have done more " ſervice to true Theiſm, than all the metaphyſical " reaſoners *a priori*; or, to ſay ſomething ſtronger, " and equally true, have done it more ſervice than " divines and Atheiſts have done it hurt." Theſe men, he ſays, " have made it evident, that we ought " to conſider the world we inhabit, no otherwiſe " than as a little wheel in our ſolar ſyſtem, nor our

* Vol. iv. p. 382.

" ſolar ſyſtem any otherwiſe than as a little, but a " larger wheel, in the immenſe machine of the uni- " verſe." By others this earth is repreſented as a point, and this point as the dunghill of the creation, and all its inhabitants as muſhrooms growing upon it, when compared with other innumerable ſub-ſyſtems in that of the univerſe.

One would be apt to think, that theſe aſtronomers and natural philoſophers had been tranſported to other planets, and had converſed with their inhabitants, and brought from thence ſyſtems of their religion, ethics, and politics, for our inſtruction, and for our improvement in the knowledge of God, and in the duty which we owe him, before it could be ſaid that they have done more ſervice to religion, than either divines or metaphyſical reaſoners *a priori*. I own the diſcoveries they have made are admirable, and that they ſerve to demonſtrate the wiſdom and power of the grand architect. They ſerve, as far as theſe diſcoveries are new, as new and additional proofs of the exiſtence and being of God. The ancients, from what they knew, (though they knew leſs), could, and did reaſon themſelves into a perſuaſion that God made, and does govern the world. This metaphyſical reaſoners *a priori*, and divines, did not, nor do they deny. They make uſe of theſe diſcoveries, as well, if not better, than thoſe aſtronomers who made them. They are able to correct

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our author for aſſerting, that the world or the univerſe is *immenſe*. For what is immenſe is unbounded; but all corporeal beings, in their nature, and in our conception of them, do imply limitation. Let the author make the univerſe as large as his imagination is able to make it, he can never make it immenſe or infinite. But whatever his Lordſhip can make of the power and knowledge of GOD, he is far from concluding his moral attributes; and without a perſuaſion of theſe, there is no motive, no means left to render mankind better and happier than they are. This I have already made appear. Whatever aſtronomers and divines may learn from the magnificent works of GOD, his Lordſhip hath no occaſion for thoſe diſcoveries they bring from the ſtars. For he forgets that he hath ſaid, "* This world, which is "the ſcene of our actions, is the ſcene of our know-"ledge. We can derive none that is real from any "other, whatever intellectual worlds we may ima-"gine."

BUT however many habitations and inhabitants there are, and how they are ruled and governed, is not our buſineſs to know; and did we know it, it would make little to our purpoſe. I acknowledge that the world was not made for us, though his Lordſhip blames all Heathen and Chriſtian philoſophers for maintaining it was. But he blames them

* Vol. iii. p. 383.

without

without reaſon. Such an article of belief he will not find in any eſtabliſhed ſyſtem of Chriſtianity. He excepts Dr KING; and he might have likewiſe excepted Dr CUDWORTH; who ſays, "The parts "were made for the whole, and the whole for the "Maker." It was a Chriſtian who wrote this doxology; * *Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power: for thou haſt created all things; and for thy pleaſure they are, and were created.* But to paſs this, with which his Lordſhip makes a mighty and impertinent din; *though the world was not made for us*, yet we, and all things beſides, were made for the glory, and honour, and good pleaſure of our GOD and Creator. And though there ſhould be a million of millions of ſyſtems, as large as our ſolar ſyſtem, filled with inhabitants ſuperior to us in knowledge; yet ſuch as our habitation is, and we are, we are not below the care and inſpection of an infinitely-wiſe, powerful, good, and holy GOD. Known to him are all his works, from, and before the beginning of the creation. By his power he upholds them in being; by his providence he rules and governs them; and by his holineſs, or moral attributes, he judges, rewards or puniſhes all rational creatures, who, by being rational, are free and moral agents, and who, by being ſuch, are the ſubjects of his moral government. If this earth was not made for us, as little were we made for the

* Rev. iv. 11.

earth.

earth. Our ſtate, therefore, doth not neceſſarily depend on it, nor on the conſtitution of the ſyſtem, whereof our preſent habitation is a part. And let me aſk Mr MALLET, "Why ſhould the evils we com-"plain of, be the conſtant or occaſional effects of the "conſtitution of a world that was not made for us, "nor we for it?" We are under the dominion, and under GOD's moral government; and we are not therefore neceſſarily ſubjected to the changes and variations to which our habitation is liable. Nor can it be ſaid, conſiſtently with the divine attributes, that our ſtate and condition muſt follow that of our preſent dwelling, whether our conduct be pious or impious, virtuous or vitious, moral or immoral. GOD hath made no more worlds, no more intelligent and rational beings, than he is able to govern. And let this earth, and we that dwell thereon, be ever ſo comparatively mean and contemptible, we are part of GOD's dominions, and he takes care of them all. And this earth being but a ſmall part of the univerſe, were it to be neglected in the grand plan of the Almighty, ſo might the whole. For all nations, all worlds, are before him as a very ſmall thing, as the duſt in the balance, as nothing. From all which I conclude, that all the diſcoveries that mathematicians and aſtronomers have made, and his Lordſhip hath made from them, do not alter the caſe of mankind, nor involve the good and the bad, without diſcrimination, into the ſame ſtate of happineſs or miſery. Whate-

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ver ſervice mathematicians and aſtronomers have done to Theiſm, the uſe which his Lordſhip makes of their lucubrations, is no better than blaſphemy. That is, God hath ſo much to do with other ſyſtems, and their inhabitants, that he cannot attend to what paſſes on our earth; or that we who dwell thereon, are not worthy of his inſpection, and that though we and our habitation are the workmanſhip of his own omnipotent hand.

Whether he intended it as an objection againſt a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, or not, it is a very ſtrong one, if it were true, that God cannot make men happy. After putting his reader in mind that he hath rejected all God's moral attributes, and particularly his goodneſs, he ſays, the argument which divines and Atheiſts draw from it to eſtabliſh a future ſtate of happineſs of thoſe who ſuffer for the ſake of righteouſneſs, proves a great deal too much. His reaſon is, " * If goodneſs ought to be, as they aſ-
" ſume, the directing principle in the caſe; and if
" wiſdom ought to contrive, and power to execute
" under this direction; the happineſs of man ought
" to be proportionable to the goodneſs of God, that
" is, infinite: than which no greater abſurdity can be
" conceived. But if we aſſume, in oppoſition to theſe
" confederates, that divine wiſdom, whereof we have
" ideas much better determined than we have of di-

* Vol. iv. p. 335.

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" vine goodneſs, ought to be deemed in this, as in " every other caſe, the directing principle of divine " conduct; it will follow, without any abſurdity, " nay moſt agreeably to the reaſon of things, that " the effect may be proportionable to the cauſe, that " is, infinite. It implies a contradiction to ſay, that " GOD ſhould have made a creature infinitely happy; " but it implies none to ſay, that he made a ſyſtem " of creation infinitely wiſe, and the beſt of all poſ- " ſible ſyſtems." The amount of this is, If GOD makes good men happy, he muſt make them infinitely happy; but he cannot make them infinitely happy, therefore he cannot make them happy at all. The whole paſſage is a piece of ſublime metaphyſical nonſenſe.

FIRST, He did ſay, that all GOD's moral attributes are abſorbed in his wiſdom; and here he makes the divine wiſdom and goodneſs two different things, and that our idea of the one is not ſo well determined as the idea of the other. Lord BOLINGBROKE might act ſometimes according to reaſon, and then it was the directing principle; and ſometimes according to his luſts and paſſions. But GOD always acts in conſiſtency with all his attributes; nor does any one of them command and direct the reſt. Skill and wiſdom are different things. The one can never be uſed but for a good and important purpoſe, but the other may be exerted either for a trifling or for a bad end. GOD

is not a neceſſary, but a free and voluntary agent with reſpect to all his doings *ad extra*. His Lordſhip is much in love with his imaginary ſcale of beings, and muſt, in conſequence of this his favourite notion, admit, that GOD makes ſome more, and other things leſs perfect. But did he act neceſſarily and adequately to all his attributes and perfections, he muſt make them all equally perfect; that is, he muſt make as many GODS as beings, or make nothing at all. This he may admit, but admit as an Atheiſt.

SECONDLY, He aſſerts, that it is no contradiction to ſay, that GOD made a ſyſtem of creation infinitely wiſe. This might paſs for Spinozian Atheiſm, if he had not ſaid, that GOD *made* this infinitely-wiſe ſyſtem. But it can never paſs for common ſenſe. For we cannot ſay that GOD hath made a world infinitely wiſe, no more than we can ſay, that the houſe is as ſkilful as the architect who built it.

THIRDLY, He aſſerts, in ſupport of all this nonſenſe, that divine wiſdom ought to be deemed in every caſe the directing principle of divine conduct; that is, wiſdom without goodneſs: for he makes them different attributes of the Deity, if not inconſiſtent. But how is it poſſible, how is it conceivable, that GOD hath made the world for a wiſe, but not for a good, and conſequently not for an ill, and, by another conſequence, for no purpoſe at all? But admitting wiſdom

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to be the directing principle, how can it follow, that GOD hath made the world infinitely wiſe, that is, as wiſe as himſelf? He forgets that he had ſaid before, " * To maintain that the material world is a divine " animal, a wiſe being, and a GOD, is blaſphemous " and abſurd." GOD hath made the world freely, not neceſſarily, (this I am obliged to repeat); and, by the freedom of his divine will, he beſtows more or leſs perfection; more upon a man than on an oyſter, the loweſt in his Lordſhip's animal ſcale. He who profeſſes to know nothing but by ſenſe and experience, (and this his Lordſhip does, as before obſerved), cannot want for aſſurance and ignorance to ſpeak as much nonſenſe, in the way of abſtraction, as he pleaſes. Did he ever, by any of his ſenſes, perceive any wiſdom or underſtanding in ſtones and plants? If he hath perceived ſome wiſdom in beaſts, he hath perceived more in himſelf. And he imagined, and ſaid, " † that he had no reaſon to doubt, that there were " created beings above him poſſeſſed of greater wiſ- " dom and knowledge than he was maſter of, but in " perfection infinitely below the ſupreme Being," that is, GOD. The univerſe therefore neither is, nor could be made infinitely wiſe: for infinity admits of no degrees, nor can it be made up of finite and limited perfections.

ANOTHER, and one of his Lordſhip's ſtrongeſt ob-

* Vol. iii. p. 414. † Vol. iv. p. 310.

jections againſt a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, is the evils and calamities which the beſt of men ſuffer in this life, and ſuffer innocently. The injury is done them; and all the reparation that can be made them in another life, doth not acquit the juſtice and goodneſs of GOD. This was not his Lordſhip's caſe, nor is it Mr MALLET's, nor is it mine. His Lordſhip and Mr MALLET confeſs, that " * neither perfect obedience nor perfect happineſs is to " be found among the ſons of men; and that we " ought to judge of the continuance of the one, as " we judge of our perſeverance in the other; not by " this that we never fall from either, ſince in that " caſe there would be no one good, nor no one happy man in the world." And if GOD, to train up ſome of theſe for future happineſs, ſhould chaſtiſe them with ſufferings and afflictions; inſtead of doing them an injury, he does them a favour. " Mortality," his Lordſhip ſays, " is no hardſhip." And if GOD, in his wiſe providence, ſhould make it a good man's duty (I might ſay an innocent man's duty) to lay down his life in the ſervice and in obedience to his maker and maſter, he only exchanges it for a better. And it is only by a firm belief of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, that a man can be enabled to ſuffer every thing rather than offend his GOD.

* Vol. iv. p. 396.

THE

THE concluſion of the fourth volume, and the intended concluſion of all his Lordſhip's philoſophical works, is ſo extraordinary, that, in my opinion, it deſerves to be tranſcribed for the benefit of thoſe who have not the book, and to ſave thoſe who have it the trouble of conſulting it. "He alone is happy, and "he is truly ſo, who can ſay, Welcome life whatever it brings; welcome death whatever it is: *aut* "*tranſfert aut finit.* If the former, we change our "ſtate, but we are ſtill the creatures of the ſame "GOD. He made us to be happy here; he may "make us happier in another ſyſtem of being. At "leaſt this we are ſure of, we ſhall be dealt with according to the perfection of his nature, and not according to the imperfection of our own. Reſignation, in this inſtance, cannot be thought hard to "one who thinks worthily of GOD; nor in the other, "except to one who thinks too highly of man. That "you and I, and even WOLLASTON himſelf, ſhould "return to the earth from whence we came, to the "dirt under our feet, or be mingled with the aſhes "of thoſe herds and plants from which we drew nutrition while we lived, doth not ſeem any indignity "offered to our nature, ſince it is common to all the "animal kind: and he who complains of it as ſuch, "does not ſeem to be ſet by his reaſoning faculties ſo "far above them in life, as to deſerve not to be level-led with them in death. We were like them be-"fore our birth, that is, nothing; ſo ſhall we be,

"on

" on this hypotheſis, like them too after death, that " is, nothing. What hardſhip is done us? None; " unleſs it is a hardſhip that we are not immortal, be- " cauſe we wiſh to be ſo, or flatter ourſelves with " that expectation.——If this hypotheſis were true, " which I am far from aſſuming, I ſhould have no " reaſon to complain; though, having taſted exiſt- " ence, I ſhould abhor non-entity. Since then the " firſt cannot be demonſtrated by reaſon, nor the ſe- " cond be reconciled to my inward ſentiment, let me " take refuge in reſignation at the laſt, as in every " act of my life. Let others be ſolicitous about their " future ſtate, or frighten or flatter themſelves, as " prejudice, imagination, bad health or good health, " nay as a louring day or a clear ſunſhine, ſhall in- " ſpire them to do; let the tranquillity of my mind " reſt on this immovable rock, that my future, as well " as my preſent ſtate, are ordered by an almighty and " all-wiſe Creator; and that they are equally fooliſh " and preſumptuous, who make imaginary excurſions " into futurity, and who complain of the preſent."

Observe the trimmer, or rather the prevaricator. He is far from aſſuming, that death is annihilation, or a converſion of all our animal and rational faculties into duſt and dirt. This however he hath not only aſſumed, but alſo endeavoured to demonſtrate. And trimmer as he is, or affects to be, he cannot forbear degrading thoſe who differ from him, particularly Mr

Wollaston,

WOLLASTON, and to condemn him to be mingled with the aſhes of beaſts and plants, for not making a better uſe of his reaſoning faculties; that is, for not reaſoning himſelf, as his Lordſhip does, into a diſbelief of a future ſtate. It is, ſays he, equally fooliſh and *preſumptuous*, that is, *ſinful*, to make any imaginary excurſions into futurity. To be no better nor worſe after death than the dirt under our feet, and to be put on the level with other animals, even with an oyſter, is no indignity offered to our nature. To die, and to be nothing after death, is no hardſhip. To ſome wicked men it would be rather a favour, and it is generally ſuch to thoſe who delight in the doctrine. The author is far from aſſuming, (and he acted as if he had been certain, and adviſes others to do the ſame), that there is no future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments; yet, contrary to his uncertainty, it was his purpoſe and reſolution not to be ſolicitous about it, nor to frighten or flatter himſelf with the conſequences. Whatever he believed, or whatever he doubted, he thought it beſt to live here as unaccountable to his GOD and Creator hereafter. The tranquillity of his mind reſted on this immovable rock, that both his preſent and future ſtate are ordered by an almighty and all-wiſe Creator; and that this almighty and all-wiſe Creator will deal with us according to the perfections of his own nature, and not according to the imperfections of ours.

HAD we nothing to anſwer for but the eſſential imperfection which belongs to all created beings, the perfections of our Creator would for ever be our ſafeguard and protection. But the caſe is otherwiſe. We are not only imperfect, but we are criminals; and ſuch criminals, with his Lordſhip's and Mr MALLET's leave, as condemn ourſelves, as his Lordſhip did; and if Mr MALLET does not, I do. Surely GOD knows as much as we, or he knows nothing; and therefore knows that we deſerve to be condemned. But, inſtead of begging or accepting pardon, upon the terms of repentance and amendment, his Lordſhip charges GOD with all the faults which he either did or could commit. They are the neceſſary conſequence of the neceſſary and eſſential imperfection of his nature. It is his opinion, that we are neither better nor happier, worſe nor more unhappy, than GOD intended we ſhould be; that though the law of nature is the law of GOD, yet it was not given to us to be obſerved, whenever we can plead, for our tranſgreſſion, infirmities and temptations. It was his opinion, and it is yours, that a more exact and ſtrict obedience is inconſiſtent with the original conſtitution of our nature: but on other occaſions, like one who ſays and unſays at his pleaſure, he charges man with all the faults he does commit, and blames thoſe who go ſo far, as "* to impute to GOD the introduction or per- "miſſion of thoſe very evils, that neither GOD is an-

* Vol. iv. p. 307.

ſwerable

" ſwerable for, (if I may uſe ſuch an expreſſion), nor " nature, nor reaſon, but our own perverſe wills, and " the wrong elections we make." The perfections of GOD, our Governor and Judge, cannot be our refuge againſt the vices and immoralities which we commit, nor againſt the evils and calamities which we bring upon ourſelves in this life, nor againſt the conſequences of them in another life, upon ſuppoſition that there actually is, or may be ſuch another life. So far are the divine perfections from the protection of the irreclaimably wicked, that they inſure their puniſhment. A GOD of infinite perfections always acts ſuitably to them, and proportions all his diſpenſations, as the majeſty of his nature, the univerſal good and happineſs of the rational creation, require. And if, after death, we do ſubſiſt rational beings, and ſubjects of the all-wiſe government of the ALMIGHTY, I do conclude, that if a difference is not made here, it muſt be made hereafter, between the good and the bad. Every thing that GOD does, or permits, is fit, but it is not final. GOD * *hath appointed a day wherein he will judge the world in righteouſneſs.* And though this day is not yet come, yet † GOD *is not ſlack concerning his promiſe; for one day is with the Lord as a thouſand years, and a thouſand years as one day.* The great *drama* is not yet finiſhed; but when men have acted their part in this terreſtrial ſcene, and if they are to be employed hereafter in another, though his Lordſhip may

* Acts xvii. 31. † 2 Pet. iii. 8. 9.

think, yet I cannot believe, that we ſhall be employed again on the ſame footing. " The tranquillity of " his mind reſts on this immovable rock, that his pre- " ſent and future ſtate are ordered by GOD." And becauſe they are ordered by GOD, he thinks it folly and preſumption to be ſolicitous about it, ſeeing he cannot change or alter it to the better or to the worſe. Did not his Lordſhip, and doth not Mr MALLET, provide for a futurity of years, months, and days, notwithſtanding his, and your preſent ſtate, are ordered by GOD? The doctrine of fatality takes no place but only on the moſt important matters, where there ſhould be no place for it. Whether you are to be, or not to be, and how you may be after death, is none of your concern or buſineſs. That is ordered by GOD, you mean by Fate; and you cannot change it. But though what you ſhall eat and drink to-day or to-morrow is unchangeably ordered, yet you are careful to provide for it. Is not this to make yourſelf ridiculous in your own eyes?

I did ſay, " * He that disbelieves a providence " that extends to men after death, can have no prin- " ciple ſuperior to the preſervation of the preſent life; " and therefore cannot blame himſelf for making that " his chief and only end, to which all his philoſophi- " cal notions muſt give way. This is no weakneſs in " him; it is his wiſdom, it is his virtue, it is his for-

* Eſtimate, p. 334.

" titude.

" titude. For to be content to be no more, for ha-
" ving once been a philoſopher, is fooliſh and unna-
" tural. It is not only unnatural, but contrary to na-
" ture, for a man totally to deſtroy himſelf. The
" gentlemen Atheiſts, of whom I ſpeak, do not want
" to be taught by me how to reduce their ſpeculations
" into practice. For the ſake of practice, many, if
" not all of them, have adopted the ſpeculation. And
" that I do not miſrepreſent their opinion, nor do
" them injuſtice, I here appeal to their apologiſt
" M. BAYLE.

" * ONE may reduce Atheiſm to this general te-
" net, That Nature is the cauſe of every thing; that
" it is eternal, ſelf-exiſtent; and that it always acts
" according to the utmoſt extent of its power, and
" according to unchangeable laws, of which it knows
" nothing. From which it follows, that nothing is
" poſſible but what it does; and that it produces eve-
" ry thing that is poſſible: that no human efforts can
" alter the leaſt thing, or break its chain of cauſes
" and effects: that every thing comes to paſs by fa-
" tal and unavoidable neceſſity: that no one thing
" is more natural than another, and neither more nor
" leſs convenient to the perfection of the univerſe:
" that in whatever condition the world is, it is always
" ſuch as it ought to be or can be: that Nature be-
" ing a mother who knows none of her children,

* Vol. iii. p. 400.

" hath no predilection for any of them, and favours " none to the prejudice of others; but beſtows on " every one of them all the attributes and qualities " which it ought and can have according to time and " place: and, finally, that Nature enacts and appoints " no puniſhment for what is called *immoralities*, and " no recompenſe for *morality* and *virtue*; that is, " ſuch as are future.

" It is certain, that a man who carries the con- " ſequences of his Atheiſtical principles ſo far, may " carry them a great deal further. He may per- " ſuade himſelf, that it is to him a matter of indiffer- " ence, (it is M. Balye who ſpeaks), to do this, " or to do that; that having no liberty nor choice " of one thing more than another, and that all things " coming to paſs according to blind and irrevocable " fatality, he ought to maintain himſelf in a ſtate of " tranquillity and inactivity, without either care or " concern about any thing, and abandon all buſineſs " to the activity of nature; and becauſe ignorance " and knowledge, truth and falſity, fidelity and " perfidy, virtue and vice, are equally emanations " from the firſt being, and all of them equally ne- " ceſſary for the perfection of the univerſe, it is ri- " diculous to be at pains for one's own, or for the " reformation of others." Now, all theſe conſe- quences here mentioned, are directly contrary to what we know, and to what we feel in ourſelves.

Does

Does any man, or can any man perſuade himſelf, that it is a matter of indifference whether he does this or that? Can he believe, contrary to his nature and to conſtant experience, that he hath no liberty, nor choice of one thing more than another? Can he perſuade himſelf, that he ought to maintain himſelf in a ſtate of inactivity, and abandon all buſineſs to the activity of nature? or did we reſolve on ſuch idleneſs and indolence, could we poſſibly put ſuch a reſolution in execution? Did we perſuade ourſelves that ignorance and knowledge, truth and falſity, fidelity and perfidy, virtue and vice, are equally emanations from the firſt being, and all of them equally neceſſary for the perfection of the univerſe; we muſt acknowledge, that we are naturally and induſtriouſly idle, to make any diſtinction betwixt good and evil, and what makes for our happineſs or our miſery; and all the pains we take for our own, and the information of others, is officious and impertinent. But before all theſe conſequences can be admitted, we, with all our rational faculties, muſt be unmade, and turned into ſtupid animals, and even into his Lordſhip's oyſters. Strange muſt their averſion be to GOD and to his government, thus to impoſe on themſelves principles inconſiſtent with the make of their own minds, and inconſiſtent with their conſtant experience. And abſtracting from words of courſe, to which his Lordſhip annexes ideas ſuitable to the Atheiſtical hypotheſis, it will be found, that it was his opinion,

opinion, at leaſt his doctrine, that all things go on here, and will go on hereafter, according to unchangeable fatality. Now, whatever ſpeculations and principles are inconſiſtent with a reaſonable practice, muſt, for that very reaſon, be falſe and abſurd; but ſuch is the Atheiſtical doctrine of fatality, and therefore it is abſurd and falſe. What doth knowledge ſignify, if it can have no influence on our conduct and behaviour? But if it hath a tendency to extinguiſh our care about futurity, though this futurity ſhould not extend beyond this life, ſuch philoſophical learning is not only uſeleſs, but even hurtful. And you, and your author, have employed your time not only idly, but to your loſs and hurt, if you reduce your principles into practice. I know you do not, you cannot regulate your conduct according to the doctrine of unchangeable fatality; and therefore you either do not believe ſuch a doctrine, or you believe againſt your own underſtanding, and your natural freedom and liberty of acting for that which you judge your intereſt and your happineſs.

If any man could be allowed to be a proper judge of Atheiſm and religion, M. Bayle muſt be unexceptionable. For if he was not an Atheiſt, he was at leaſt a Sceptic, and as ſuch, moſt impartial. And, according to his judgment, Lord Bolingbroke ſtands convicted of Atheiſm, in quality of author, and you Mr Mallet, as publiſher. Without reſuming what

I have already obſerved, I do aſſert, that you have publiſhed as his Lordſhip's doctrine, what the learned Mr BAYLE declares to be Atheiſm. To avoid repetition, I recommend to you a review. Either you Mr MALLET did not know the difference between Atheiſm and religion; or you did know the difference, and approved his Lordſhip's Atheiſtical doctrine; or you did and do condemn it. If you are in the firſt caſe, it is your duty, as an honeſt and good man, to beg GOD and your country pardon, for publiſhing things that tend to the diſhonour of your Creator, and to rebellion againſt the Sovereign of the univerſe. If you are in the ſecond caſe, and of the ſame opinion with his Lordſhip, all that at preſent I can do for you, is to pity you, and pray for you. If you are in the third caſe, and of a different opinion from your author, you muſt be one of the worſt of men. For your own profit and worldly advantage, you expoſe ſimple ſouls, and ſouls ready to run to their own ruin, to eternal miſery and deſtruction. There is no kind of barbarity ſo great as this of yours. If the murderers of human bodies are in the ſight of GOD and men highly criminal, what muſt be the caſe of ſuch as murder human ſouls, with everlaſting deſtruction from the preſence and favour of their GOD? You may chuſe any of the three characters that ſuits you beſt. For you could not poſſibly perſuade yourſelf, that if Lord BOLINGBROKE's works did not good, they would do no ill to your readers; or that

while

while they ſerved only for their amuſement and diverſion, they turned out to your worldly advantage. This is more than you could be ſure of. And you have therefore riſked human ſouls for the ſake of a frolic, or for a mean and ſordid purpoſe. * *A man who deceiveth his neighbour, and then ſaith, Am not I in ſport? is as a madman, who caſteth firebrands, arrows, and death.* So ſaid SOLOMON. Chriſtians need not be ſurpriſed, being forewarned, that ſuch teachers as Lord BOLINGBROKE, and his publiſher DAVID MALLET, Eſq; ſhould ariſe, *who privily ſhall bring in damnable hereſies, and even* publicly, *denying the Lord that bought them*, and the GOD who made them.—— *And* MANY *ſhall follow their pernicious ways, by reaſon of whom the way of truth ſhall be evil ſpoken of; and through* COVETOUSNESS *ſhall they with feigned words make merchandiſe of you* †. I ſay, ſince this hath actually happened, it is rather a confirmation of the truth of the Chriſtian revelation, than a diſcredit to the GOSPEL.

THOUGH it is a repetition ‖, I preſume to put you in mind, that his Lordſhip of BOLINGBROKE hath ſaid, and you have publiſhed, that, "to make "government effectual to all the good purpoſes of it, "there *muſt* be a religion, this religion *muſt* be na-

* Proverbs xxvi. 18. 19.

† 2 Peter ii. 1. 2. 3.

‖ Introduction, p. 9.

"tional,

" tional, and this national religion *muſt* be maintain-
" ed in reputation and reverence." This you ſay in contradiction to all that you have ſaid againſt GOD and his providence, and againſt the great deſign of his Lordſhip's philoſophical works. You condemn yourſelf; and you muſt allow me to join with you in condemning you, for an unworthy citizen of Great Britain; not only as an unworthy, but as a peſtiferous member of any religious ſociety. Sure, an Atheiſt can have nothing in view, in his perſonal capacity, but his own intereſt; and in a civil or ſocial capacity, nothing but the happineſs and proſperity of the ſociety, as far as his own depends on it. Let every man then be an Atheiſt, and there is an end of all truſt and confidence, and an end of all ſociety and government. What your deſign can be in declaring yourſelf to be an Atheiſt, and in perſuading others to disbelieve a GOD and his providence, which tends to the diſſolution of ſociety, and to the ruin of yourſelf and others, ſurpaſſes my imagination. * *Abraham ſaid, Becauſe I thought, Surely the fear of GOD is not in this place; and they will kill me for my wife's ſake.* And he had reaſon to diſtruſt one who did not fear GOD, and had no occaſion to be afraid of a ſtranger and ſojourner. You Mr MALLET have been recommended to the care of the civil magiſtrate, who hath treated you with diſregard, and the works you

* Gen. xx. 11.

have publiſhed in name of Lord BOLINGBROKE, with contempt. And I recommend you to the GOD whoſe being and dominion you deny, together with my moſt earneſt prayers, that he may grant you repentance and pardon for what you have done.

F I N I S.

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